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
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



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
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HERMATHENA,

A SERIES OF PAPERS ON

LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND
PHILOSOPHY,

BY

Members of Trinity College, Dublin.

VOL. I.



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	Page.
Miscellaneous Notes. By JOHN K. INGRAM, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of Greek.	247
Mr. Hogan's Edition of the Medea. By ROBERT YELVERTON TYRRELL, A.M., Fellow of Trinity College and Professor of Latin	251
On Integration by Rationalization. By BENJAMIN WILLIAM- SON, A.M., Fellow of Trinity College	254
A Simple Method of Determining the Anharmonic Functions of a Cubic. By WILLIAM S. M'CAY, Fellow of Trinity College	261
The Degradation of Odysseus in Greek Literature. By J. P. MAHAFFY, Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Ancient History	265
On the Trisyllabic Endings of the Pentameter in Propertius. By ROBERT ATKINSON, LL.D., Professor of Sanskrit	276
Euripidea. By ROBERT YELVERTON TYRRELL, A.M., Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Latin	286
On the Kantian Theory of External Perception and of the Primary and Secondary Qualities. By FREDERICK PURSER, A.M.	301
On an Attempt to Restore a Lost Uncial MS. of the Gospels. By THOMAS K. ABBOTT, A.M., Fellow of Trinity College	313
Virgil Aeneid VIII. 102—109. By THOMAS J. B. BRADY, A.M., Professor Extraordinary of Classical Literature	332
Professor Campbell's Sophocles, Vol. I. By JOHN FLETCHER DAVIES, A.M.	336
Coniectanea. By ARTHUR PALMER, A.M., Fellow of Trinity College	381
Virg. Aen. II. 1. By JAMES HENRY, M.D.	393
Greek and Latin Etymology in England. By JOHN K. INGRAM, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of Greek	407

CONTENTS.

vii

	Page.
The Philebus of Plato and Recent English Critics. By THOMAS MAGUIRE, LL.D., Professor of Latin, Queen's College, Galway	441
Virg. Aen. I. 246. By JAMES HENRY, M.D.	468
On the Nature of the Bounding Surfaces of Bodies. By JOHN H. JELLETT, Senior Fellow of Trinity College . . .	501
A Sketch in the Theory of Screws. By ROBERT BALL, LL.D., Andrews' Professor of Astronomy, and Astronomer Royal of Ireland	506
On a Geometrical Method of Deducing the Central and Diametral Properties of Conics from those belonging to the Focus and Directrix. By FRANCIS A. TARLETON, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College.	520

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
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CONTENTS.



	Page.
Strictures on Mr. Luard's Edition of a French Poem on the Life of Edward the Confessor. By ROBERT ATKINSON, LL.D., Professor of Sanskrit,	1
Some Notes on the Chronology of Hippolytus. By GEORGE SALMON, D. D., Regius Professor of Divinity,	82
On the Meaning of certain Homeric Words. By JOHN FLETCHER DAVIES, A. M.,	129
Criticism on Mr. Paley's Propertius. By ARTHUR PALMER, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College,	154
Plato's Obligations to the Ionic and Eleatic Schools. By THOMAS MAGUIRE, LL. D.; Professor of Latin, Queen's College, Galway,	187
Notes on the Letters of Cicero to Atticus. By ROBERT VELVERTON TYRRELL, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Latin,	195
On the Foundation of the Science of Number, according to the Philosophy of Kant. By FRANCIS A. TARLETON, LL. D., Fellow of Trinity College,	210
Tacitus and Virgil. By THOMAS J. B. BRADY, A. M.,	233
Notes. By J. P. MAHAFFY, Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Ancient History,	237
Note on a Passage in the Protagoras. By GEORGE LONGFIELD, D. D., Fellow of Trinity College,	243
Note on a Passage in the Phaedo of Plato. By THOMAS K. ABBOTT, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College,	245

	Page.
Miscellaneous Notes. By JOHN K. INGRAM, LL. D., Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Greek,	247
Mr. Hogan's Edition of the Medea. By ROBERT YELVERTON TYRRELL, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Latin,	251
On Integration by Rationalization. By BENJAMIN WILLIAM- SON, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College,	254
A Simple Method of Determining the Anharmonic Functions of a Cubic. By WILLIAM S. M'CAY, Fellow of Trinity College,	261

HERMATHENA.



STRICTURES ON MR. LUARD'S EDITION OF A FRENCH
POEM ON THE LIFE OF EDWARD THE CONFES-
SOR.¹ By ROBERT ATKINSON, LL. D., Professor of Sanskrit
in the University of Dublin.

IT is well enough known that our language has derived a considerable portion of its vocabulary from a Norman source; but as yet, at least, very little use has been made of this fact in any really scientific, or even methodic fashion. In a spasmodic way, indeed, reference is occasionally made by well-meaning lexicographers to a presumed intermediate form of Old French, which they either postulate altogether, or else accept on totally insufficient evidence. There seems, for example, no reason to doubt that many of the ordinary dictionary-makers would receive any Burgundian or Picard form of the *langue d'Oil*, or even Provençal or Catalan forms in case of need (not to go farther a-field) as ample justification for any linguistic freak of etymology. Even when the actual origin of the word is stated, it is put in so clumsy a manner at times, that the student had better be without the information. Ex. gr. I take at random from by no means the worst of the lately

¹ Master of the Rolls Series.

published English Dictionaries, 'Chambers' Etymological' (1867), the following specimens:—

"'Poor' . . . [Old E. *poore*, *povere*; Fr. *pauvre*; L. *pauper*, akin to *paucus*, few]."

Now, one naturally asks, where is the point in inserting F. *pauvre*? why not put in the Ital. *povero*, the Spanish *pobre*, &c., &c.? No doubt the idea that glimmered before the lexicographer was that *poor* came *through* the French somehow, so it might be as well to insert the French form. Yes, certainly, *the* French form, i. e. the Norman-French form, which is *poure*, whence directly our word, the stages being *pauper*, *povere*, *povre*, *poure*, *poor*. It is evident that the introduction of the Mod. Fr. form is altogether an obstacle to a right understanding of the process.

Again. "'Portcullis,' a sliding door, &c., [Fr. *porte*, and *coulisse*, from *couler*, L. *colo*, to filter]."

The inference likely to be drawn from this statement is that portcullis is a *modern* French word,—which it certainly is not. An example will show the use of the word in O. F., cf. Bertrand du Guesclin in l. 21447, speaking of a palace:—

Mais cretel n'i ara ne nul fossez par-	But there shall be no battlement nor
fons	deep moat
Ne <i>porte coulée</i> pour les deffencions.	Nor <i>sliding-door</i> for the defences.

Coulée meant, in O. F., sliding, slipping [Lat. *colaticus* from *cōlo*].

Again. "'Riot,' to brawl, &c. [Fr. *rioter*, Bret. *riota*; Gael. *raoit*, shameless mirth]."

I am inclined to think the lexicographer would be astonished if he looked in a good French dictionary, to see what the meaning of the word *rioter* really is in Mod. Fr.

The O. F. has the word in its present English signification. Might one ask, in passing, what on earth the Keltic forms are inserted for?

Further; there are a great many words for which an

¹ I give only the Etymology, of course.

English derivation is either given, or left to be inferred, which belong altogether to the O. F.

E. gr. "Foreclose,"¹ to *close before* something can get in," &c.

Now, *foreclose* is meant here to be derived from *fore* = before and *close*, with the former of which it has nothing to do. It is the O. F. *for-clos*, *fors-clos* [Lat. *foris clausus*] *shut out*. The following remark of Voltaire, quoted by Burguy, Gram. II., p. 128, will explain the word better:—"On arrive aux portes d'une ville fermée, on est quoi? . . . Nous n'avons plus de mot pour exprimer cette situation. Nos pères disaient *forclos*; ce mot très-expressif n'est demeuré qu'au barreau; c'est dommage."

Sometimes, again, a special form is quoted which is either incorrect, or not to the purpose, or both. Ex. gr. "'Power,' rule, &c. [Norm. *povaire*, *povare*; Lat. *posse*, contr. of *potesse*—*potis*, able (akin to Sanskrit *pati*, ruler)—*pa*, to rule, and *esse*, to be]."

Now the more simple Norman form, and that with which our English word is immediately connected, is the dissyllable *poer*, from the Romance form *potere*.

These few instances will suffice to show the perfunctory manner in which the etymological study of our language has been carried on in this direction. But surely sufficient advance has been made in the comparative study of languages to admit of a removal of similar time-honoured forms, which are now mere absurdities. The interest and utility of a careful investigation of the Norman-French, which was current so long in England, could hardly be over-rated, and there is, perhaps, room for astonishment that no scholar has taken in hands a subject so virgin, and so likely to afford a rich harvest of positive and appreciable gain.

¹ This popular etymology is interesting enough, but very objectionable. The classic languages are still subjected to the process. I doubt whether the old γῆ ἰφ' ἑδωρ would not still pass

current as a sound etymology for γῆφυρα. So Paley, in his notes to the Choëphore 87, on δαυλοῖ, says, "the word is probably from δά, and ἔλη"! It really is = δα(σ)υλός, from δασύς.

As counterplea, the lexicographers may not unnaturally allege that they are pretty much at the mercy of the special students of the French in its old form, and must accept such material as is at hand. And certainly the glossaries extant in English in reference to O. F. are miserably deficient. I am not intending to deny that often enough Frenchmen themselves have failed in their explanation of the old language, but English editions of Old French are generally very far behind the wants of the time. The fact is, it seems hardly to be realized that Old French needs a prolonged and *special* study before it can be understood properly. It may be stated, in the most unqualified terms possible, that Old French, in its various dialects, is not to be read either by the light of nature or by the simple knowledge of Modern French (no matter how perfect the knowledge of the latter be, and it usually is very *imperfect*); but that a complete course of special study will have to be undergone before the requisite mastery is attained, as separately as if the language had been Kamtschatkan or Chinese. And this, in case of an intending Editor of O. F. texts, on peril of no less penalty, in the absence of such special study, than the liability to commit errors of the kind which it is the object of this paper to combat and expose.

But if the glossaries on the subject are so imperfect, the published texts, from which glossarial material might be gathered, are mostly untrustworthy. In one point of view, it is intelligible that it should be so. Many texts have been hastily edited, from a desire to give the historical student access to documents, which would otherwise be unavailable for use. But it may be conjectured what fate was in store for Old French MSS., when even the MSS. of our own mother tongue have been, until very lately, so dreadfully maltreated. The complaints of Germans against certain editors of Anglo-Saxon works are well-known (Grimm, *Deutsche Gram.*, p. 186, edit. 1870). In fact, it is only

since 1870¹ that any grammar has been published in English which showed that the author had a just conception of the structure of the Anglo-Saxon language, and its relation to the remaining Teutonic family. (Of the grammars of the more important Teutonic languages, linguistically speaking, such as Gothic, Icelandic,² &c., the greater portion extant are very unsatisfactory. For instance, Mr. Skeat, in his convenient little Mæso-Gothic glossary, has appended a sketch of Gothic grammar, which is a poor production, *even* as a sketch. The competent reader may judge what a "valde deflendus hiatus" there is *somewhere*, from the following remarks of Mr. Skeat, p. 288, viz. :—"To *au* we may give the sound of *aw* in law [!]; to *ai* that of long *i* in 'pride,' but somewhat broader." Mr. Skeat has evidently therefore (or *had*) not the remotest conception of the absolutely different function of the *two* diphthongs, viz., *ai* and *ai*, *au* and *au*; and, in any case, to give *au* the sound of *aw* in law, was utterly incorrect.)

Old French MSS., therefore, had not much better chance of escape than those of our English mother tongue, in its different periods, and have, in fact, as a body, been inadequately edited. I may have been unfortunate in coming across specimens, but the printed editions which it has been my fate to wade through, in search of linguistic material for a reconstruction of our old Norman tongue, have driven me to the conclusion that many of our existing editions of O. F. *will have to be re-edited*, to be of

¹ I refer to the Comparative Grammar of the Anglo-Saxon language of Professor March, a book in every way excellent, bating certain etymological crudities, such as the statement in p. 75 (b), "Kan in kan-kan [pankan-panchan] is also like the Hebrew kam-es, five"; also some curious notions as to the origin of the case-endings, ex. gr. of the gen. sg. and plur. at § 63, c. b.; and a few inadequately put explana-

tions of certain forms, as in § 158. g. tenima, &c.; see also § 103, a. end.

Helfenstein's Comparative Grammar of the Teutonic languages is a very good compendium, and may be recommended.

² For an instance of the scandalous manner in which the confidence of the public is at times abused, see note at the end of this article.

any real critical value to the linguistic student. It is impossible to work on the data extant without falling into serious error. For instance, misled at least to a certain extent by the printed texts extant, Mr. Payne (in the *Trans. of Phil. Soc.*, 1868-9), p. 381, says:—"Take, first, therefore, *cuer* (Norman F.) Mod. *cœur*), which was, probably, pronounced *kuur* [koor], &c." To this, at p. 385, Mr. A. Ellis, in a note, states his own incompetency to speak on this point. For myself, I can only say that Mr. Payne seems to have adopted the very sound that the Norman had *not*. I may be permitted to quote here the results of my own observations on a poem in Old French, which I am editing. Referring to this identical word: "It is somewhat difficult to decide which is the form of the word (in l. 104) that should be adopted. The MS. has *fully* written out five 'quoer,' eight 'quor.' The contraction *qr*, which occurs 15 times (together with four times in the word *reqt*) should be written 'quor,' of course, though in the only case where any test can be applied, viz., at the end of a line, it is written *qr*, but rhymes with *per*. In pronunciation there is not any reason to suppose that it was at all different from what it is now. (For this rhyme with *per* cf. the German rhyme *entbehren* and *schwören*, to be noted in the spelling *gucur* in 158.) In the compound verb where the forms occur, it is to be noted that in the present tense (where alone it is met) the 1st sing. has *reqt* (all the four times), but the 2nd sing. *reqra* (= *requers*), and the 3rd sing. also *reqrt* (= *requert*), while the 2nd plur. has *requerez*, written fully. [The simple verb 1 sg. has *quoer* (l. 1761) fully]. Besides l. 104, where it is *qr*, though rhyming with *per*, the other four cases where it rhymes with *er* (l. 205, 685, 1348, 1632) are written out *quoer*. It is never rhymed *o*, but there occurs a play on words thrice in the poem, showing that the sound was very close to the open *o*:—

365. Ke hem vus face au *cors* u au *quor* maufé.
 1350. Cist sunt martir de *cors*, cist de *quor* duluser.
 1470. Si *cors* est las, mais sis bons *quors* tut frais est e neuveus.

Vie de St. Auban."

What Mr. Payne means by coupling together such works as "the Life of Edward the Confessor," and "the Conquest of Ireland," in the same breath, as *pure* Norman texts, I am at a loss to conceive. Anything more *impure* than the French in "the Conquest of Ireland," it would be difficult to find, whereas the forms in "Edward the Confessor" (as may be seen *in spite* of Mr. Luard's editorial misdeeds) are remarkably accurate and free from foreign admixture. But, as the works on which he (Mr. Payne) mainly relies are these editions, it may be inferred from the following critique on Mr. Luard, that there is but small chance of any really scientific induction on such data. The editors he has followed are M. Francisque Michel, Mr. Wright, and Mr. Luard. With the former, as being a foreigner, I have nothing especially to do (though his few notes and explanations are given in English); *one* specimen shall suffice to show that he is not, however, an infallible guide.

In 1837, M. Michel published [Pickering, London] a little poem in Anglo-Norman, "On the Conquest of Ireland," with introductory essay by Thomas Wright, &c., &c. Among other curiosities contained in said poem, here is one:

P. 33, l. 670. Maurice Prendergast is signifying to his companions how it would be better for them to fight with the Irish; he says:—

Kar <i>armés</i> <i>eymes</i> le plusurs,	For <i>we are armed</i> the most (of us),
Vassals hardis e combatur;	Vassals hardy and fighters,
E les traïteres sunt tut nues,	And the traitors are all naked
Haubers ne bruïnes n'unt vestues;	With no armour,
Pur ço, si turnum . . .	Therefore, if we, &c.
N'averunt-il de mort garant.	They will have no protection from death.

Here the opposition is plain between the *armed* English knights and the naked Irish caterans, and whatever may

be said of the rest of the text, *armés eymes*, we are armed, is plain enough. But in his notes M. Michel actually translates this—

“For the most part of you, *you like arms*” (!)

So then, *eymes* ought to mean *you like*, which it most assuredly does not.¹

From M. Michel we proceed by easy transition to Mr. Thomas Wright, who, in 1841, published, for the Historical Society of Science, “Popular Treatises on Science in Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-Norman, and English.” Of these we are concerned at present only with the Anglo-Norman. This is a treatise by De Thuan, called “Li livre des Creatures,” and is accompanied by a translation. And this translation is certainly very bad.

Here are a few specimens of the errors in Mr. Wright’s edition and translation, culled from amongst the three or four hundred that are committed within less than 3000 lines!—

L. 65. Coe [sic] dit en repruver li vilain “So the villain said in reproof to the
al buver. drunkard” (!) (v. 276, also.)

Buver has nothing to do with *drinking*, it is simply *bouvier*, “neat-herd.”

L. 108. It may be seen here how poor a basis Mr. Payne has for speculation as to the termination *rie*, supposed equal to *ire* in rhyme. Cf. also l. 264, 693. The line in Mr. Wright’s text is—

Pur cel me plaist à dire, d’iço est ma materie.

Now, as *dire* cannot be otherwise than *dire*, the accompanying rhyme *must* be *mateïre*. To edit *materie* is inadmissible; both *measure* and rhyme are flatly against it.

The poet says he will instruct both clergy and laity,

¹ For another instance in which *eimes* (the same word) has been misunderstood by this savant, the reader may consult Burguy’s Grammar, Vol. I., p. 270, note (1).

- L. 110. Chi grant busuin en unt, "Who have great need of it,
 Pur mei perierunt. And will perish without it."

Let the reader look at that rendering for a moment :

E pur mei perierunt = will perish without it.

Surely, this is disgraceful.

The line is so simple; correct as follows :—

E pur mei preierunt, i. e. and for me they will pray.

L. 115 is all wrong, edited and translated; but I will just quote part to show to what extent mistranslation can be carried.

- | | |
|---------|--|
| L. 118. | (1) Ne hom ne fud mortel,
Chi unc <i>desist el</i> . |
| Wright. | (1) Nor ever was there mortal man
Who was without that. |

If the reader will look in the critique on Luard, l. 429, he will see the same rock of offence. *Desist el* is, of course, *dixisset aliud*, i.e., nor was there a man who ever said aught else.

- | | |
|--|--|
| L. 140. Nuit est dit à nuisir, | Night is named from hurting (<i>nox a nocere</i>), |
| E fait la gent dormir,— | And it makes the people sleep,— |
| Le seir reposer, | Repose in the evening, |
| Ki ne veient à ovrer ; | Lest they keep awake to work ; |
| Pur ço qu'els n'unt lu <i>luur</i> jur | Because they have not day-light |
| Cessent de lur labur. | They cease from their labour. |

L. 143 is quite wrong; it should be, "Who do not see to work." And if Mr. Wright had had any just idea of the exigencies of metre, he would have seen that the *luur*, in l. 144, is a mere *mistake*, and has no business there at all. The poet never wrote it: it is simply a gloss. The line runs metrically thus—

Pur ço | qu'els nunt | lu jur.

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| L. 216. Le premer jurn posad | He assigned the first day |
| 'A sun oes, e ruvat, | To his use, and will have it, |
| Pur sue amur garder | To keep and celebrate much for his |
| E forement celebrer. | love. |

Ruvat = will have it (!) It really means "*he asked*,"
rogavit.

L. 267. Arer e laburer,	To plough and to till,
E en terre semer,	And to sow in the earth,
Martyrie li esteit :	Was punishment to him :
Kar feire ne l' saveit,	For he knew not how to do it,
Cum sereit al <i>buver</i>	As he would be <i>at the drinking</i>
Clerc estre u chevaler.	To be clerk or knight.

These last two lines are plainly nonsense. It should
be :—

Was punishment to him
(For he knew not how to do it),
As it would be to a *neat-herd*
To be a clerk or a knight.

He would be quite *unhandy* at it.

L. 333 sets Mr. Wright's competency in a very strong
light. It is indeed as bad as any Mr. Luard has committed.
I can only regret that Mr. Wright's work had not, long ere
this, received in full its just meed of castigation, for it
might probably have saved Mr. Luard, and some others,
from falling into their almost inconceivable errors.

The poet is telling the origin of the name of the month
January :—

A certain king had fled to Rome, followed by his
enemies. Inside the city he made use of a stratagem,
which was successful in dispersing them. Causing him-
self to be enveloped in lighted tow and pitch, he stood on
the walls, brandishing two gleaming swords; turning
round on all sides, and threatening the enemy, he ordered
the Romans to seize their arms and sally out on the foe.

The poem goes on :—

Cil de fors quant le virent,	Those who were without, when they saw him,
<i>E il le pas fuirent,</i>	And <i>he did not fly from them,</i>
Distrent que dés esteit,	Said that he was a god,
Ocirre les voleit.	And intended to kill them.
E quant li Rumains virent	And when the Romans saw
Que cil de fors fuirent	That those without fled

Pur le rei qui's criout,
 E qui's espoentout,
 Mult forement s'en gabberent,
 E le rei urerent,
 Chi en *fine* les mist
 Que un sul n'en ocist.

On account of the king,
 Who cried at them, and terrified them,
 They made great *rejoicing* for it,
 And worshipped the king,
 Who *at last* managed it
 That he did not kill one of them.

Now, the reader may make sense of that rendering, but he must not flatter himself that he has understood the poet, for the whole translation is a bungle. In the first place :

E il le pas fuirent, And he did not fly from them;
i.e., e and il he pas did not fuirent fly le from them !

The slightest glance will show that this is helplessly wrong. Those four small words, *e il le pas*, are Mr. Wright's way of reading the compound adverb *so common* in O. F., spelt *en es le pas*, *isnel le pas*, *inel le pas*, &c. (vide Burguy, II., p. 298), and meaning *swiftly*; so that the line should be translated, *they swiftly fled*.

Secondly: S'en gabberent does *not* mean "they rejoiced," nor anything like it; but means, *they mocked them greatly*.

Thirdly: Chi en *fine* les mist, &c.

One wonders if Mr. Wright had any inkling that this was incorrect. Whether or no, it certainly is.

Fine is all wrong; it should be *fuie*, flight; *i.e.* who *put them to flight*, and not, "who at last managed it."

And now for the proper text and translation :

Cil de fors quant le virent
 Enis le pas fuirent.¹
 E quant li Rumains virent
 Que cil de fors fuirent
 Pur le rei, qui's criout,
 E qui's espoentout,
 Mult forement s'en gabberent;
 E le rei urerent,
 Chi en fuie les mist
 Que un sul n'en ocist.

Those outside, when they saw him,
 Quickly fled.
 And when the Romans saw
 That those outside fled
 Owing to the king, who shouted at them
 And terrified them,
 Very greatly they (the Romans) mocked
 them,
 And worshipped the king,
 Who had put them to flight
 Without killing one of them.

¹ A reference to the MS. would have to decide how the words should be spelt.

Probably if the letters *are* so written, it will be found *ē 17 le pay, en is le pas*.

But I must conclude. Here is one more specimen:—

864. Et ore mustrum reisun	And now we will show cause
Pur quei bisexte ad nun ;	Why it is named <i>bissexus</i> ;
Pur çeo que el kalender,	Because in the calendar,
Et el meis de Feverer,	And in the month of February,
Par deus faiees est cunted,	It is twice counted,
Û sis [meis] est enbreved,	Where it is <i>shortened six months</i> (?)
E pur cest achaisun	And for this reason
Deus feiez vi. l'apellum.	We call it twice six.

Than which translation anything more preposterous could hardly be imagined. To insert *meis* is to destroy both metre and sense; and Mr. Wright's note of interrogation at the word "months" simply *fixes* his ignorance of the real solution. The passage is—

"It is counted twice
Where *six* is *set-down*" (in the calendar).
û sis est *enbreved*.

Which, surely, Mr. Wright ought to have known, *was* the origin of the term *bis-sexus*; but to talk of its "*being shortened six months*!"

And now we take leave, for the present, of Mr. Wright, and his translation, and come to the similar production of Mr. Luard, which is the special object of animadversion in this paper. This is an edition of the Life of Edward the Confessor, in Old French, forming a goodly volume in the publications commonly called the Master of the Rolls Series, and which, therefore, under such high auspices, may be supposed, and certainly *ought*, to represent the best English knowledge on the subject attainable. It is edited by Henry Richard Luard, M.A., Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Trinity College, Cambridge.

We shall see in the course of a few pages how much knowledge Mr. Luard brought to bear on the MS. entrusted to him to edit. I do not think I should be transgressing fair limits of criticism if I called it an unscholarly and uncandid production. At all events, the reader may easily

be satisfied that too strong language could hardly be used about it, if he will read the following pages, in which some of the more prominent or more easily avoided, and therefore aggravating, mistakes occur.¹

I have taken Mr. Luard's Edition, as I think, on the whole, it is the worst of the class of books to which I refer; but the reader may rest assured that there are others not very *far* inferior in the grossness of the errors they commit, though Mr. Luard undoubtedly bears the palm in the number of the mistakes, and their general silliness. He has Latin originals which he has not properly compared; he has Burguy's grammar, which he has not properly studied; and from common sense he has frequently, in the most unaccountable manner, totally parted company. As I said, the cardinal defect is his not having realized that Old French and modern French are practically two distinct languages, each of which *must be studied per se*.²

It is especially to accentuate this fact that I have written the following strictures. If the public interested in these matters are in any way helped to feel that the separate study *is* a "sine qua non," perhaps Mr. Luard may not have edited in vain his Lives of Edward the Confessor.

THE ILLUSTRATIONS.

In these, the rubrics of the poem, there is hardly a single one which is not susceptible of more or less correc-

¹ As I have never seen the MS. from which the Vie is edited, these criticisms are simply made from his book, wrongly printed as it is. How many hundred (or thousand) more mistakes a competent scholar would discover on an investigation of the MS., I should not like to say.

² Combined with this, his cardinal defect, is his negligence with reference to the form of the letters in the MS. Everybody, of course, is aware that *n*

and *u* are much alike; and that *m*, *ni*, *ui*, *iu*, *in*, are easily confounded. In a language with which he was not familiar, it behoved him to be tenfold more careful to see that at least he set down *exactly* what was in the MS. The reader will see, in the following pages, that a great portion of the errors are connected in some way with this source of confusion, and are therefore, if possible, the more blame-worthy.

P. 19. (liv.) Speaking of the miracles at Edward's tomb, in Westminster, the rubric says:—

N'est nuls ki de maus travaille,	There is no one who suffers from ills,
K'à Westminster pur santé vaille.	But at Westminster he watches for his health.

"Vailler," we are informed in his Glossary, means "watch, guard;" it may be so, but it does not mean that here. It should be *n'aille*.

There is no one, &c., who does not go to Westminster for cure!

Thus much as a foretaste from the rubrics. Once again let me say that I have simply *selected* errors, not *catalogued* them.¹

THE POEM.

The very first word is wrong. The heading runs:—

<i>Ai</i> cumence la estoire.	Here begins the history, &c.
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In 1082 he edits:

<i>Ai</i> reis quant lur voler entent.	The king <i>here</i> , when he understands their wish.
--	--

His Glossary gives "*Ai = here*," referring to these two places. Now, in both it is simply a mis-read (or mis-written) letter; the first should be, *Ci* cumence, here begins; the second should be, *Li* reis, *The* king; and to edit anything else, and put it in the Glossary, is only to introduce so much gibberish.

59. Si dit n'en fuse losengers	But that I should be called a flatterer
Vos bens diroie volenters;	I would willingly speak of your virtues;
Mais brefvement tut vos enclos,	But in a word, <i>everything</i> surrounds you,
Cum il m'apent e dire le os.	Since it befits me, and I venture to say it.

Whatever this may mean! Glossary gives "*Enclos*, 3 pers. sg. pres. indic. of *enclore*." It is not so, nor is it *enclos*

¹ The reader competent in these matters will easily see what a wide field of correction is open in the remaining rubrics; ex. gr. in (vii.) *sesne*, and *surdite*, are wrongly translated; (xxiv.) *airent*; (xxix.) penult. line; (xxx.) third line in third stanza; (xxxi.) first two

lines are nonsense; (v.) tenses are all *past*, not present; (xiv.) is very bad; (xxiv.), second, fourth, and sixth lines wrong; (lxi.) *Buge*, or, *yellow* gold. In Glossary he gives *Buge*, *yellow*. Did he never see the constantly occurring phrase, *ROUGE OR*, the *RED* gold?

at all; but should be *ent los* (inde laudo), (je vous en loue); i.e. "I wholly praise you thereanent, as befits me, and I dare."

67. Cel amur *fait a* preiser.

This love *causes you to* prize, &c.

Surely *this* phrase was common enough in Old French to be understood! But no! "This love *causes you!*" It should be, "This love *ought to be* prized."

I may as well quote here a few more instances of his ignorance of the meaning of this expression.

1347. Cist est Deus
Cist fait à amer.

It is Almighty God
Who *has done* this IN LOVE.

So Mr. Luard, instead of, "He is God, He is worthy of being loved (ought to be loved)."

1590. A seurté de vostre terre
Fait ceu conseil ben acreire.

For the safety of your country
Trust well to this advice (!!).

Read, *à creire*, and translate, "This counsel ought well to be believed."

1918. Par un cunte le voil prover,
Ki ne *fait pas* a ublier.

By a history I will prove it,
Which prevents one from forgetting.

Render: Which *ought not* (is not) to be forgotten.

4261. Mut fait à creire prophecie.

It *makes* the prophecy to be believed.

It should be, "it *is* to be believed."

4269. Mut fait *apriser* (sic!) ta sufrance.

Much it *makes one prize* thy suffering.

Quite wrong. Read, *fait à priser*, "Thy suffering *is to be* prized." This may seem a small mistake, but what it leads to will be seen from the following examples, and the word *apriser* itself, examined in the Glossary, will open out some startling vistas, for even a reader who has no special knowledge of the subject.

287 is edited, "Li quens *feist apriser* plius," which should be *feist à priser*, i.e. "The court *was worthy of being* more prized."

Mr. Luard's Glossary gives us :—

"Apriser; to be skilled. Hence Apris = skilled; learned [here he quotes our passage] :—

Feist apriser plus 283. Displays more skill" (!)

This is curious, very curious; but the Glossary goes yet further into detail; putting under *this same* word—

"Messine li est jà *aprise*. 2742. The remedy is now understood by him."

As if *aprise* [from *aprendre*, of course] were the participle of *apriser*!!

To revert to the order of the lines.

77. Kar il fu reis e seinz, <i>prime</i>	For he was king and saint, <i>before</i>
K'en amur vus ad embrace.	That in love he had embraced you.

But *embrace* should be *embracé*, the participle, so that the rhyme demands *primé*, and the line is, "He was king and *holy primate*, WHO in love has embraced you."

83. Aunez de sa meisun (estes). The *eldest* of his house are you.

In his "Introduction" (p. xxi., note 3) he adds: "unless we take *aunez* in its usual sense of 'patrons,' and suppose *meisun* to refer to Westminster."

Very good; let us see it then in its "usual sense." Glossary gives the same account of the word, and refers to 2944 :—

Requerant Deu	Beseeching God
E les seinz ki aunez	And his saints, <i>who patrons</i>
Sunt des eglises clamez.	Are styled of the churches.

In both places we have *aunez*, and in both it is wrong, as no such word exists at all! It is *avuez*, *avoué*, *advocatus*, a defender, a *patron*. The meaning is right; *this* could not be missed, for the sense of the passage imperatively demanded it; but *aunez*! and that *set down* in the Glossary! As to *aunez* in 83, meaning *eldest* (*vide* also 659) there is only need to add that it does not mean any such thing.

140. Cum de safir e or lusant,
U de lis e rose *Espanie*,
Teu fu le cuple e cumpainnie.

Rose Espanie the Editor would actually render in his Glossary a *Spanish rose!* and accordingly has printed it with a *capital E* in the text (itself in any case a blunder), though in his translation he has given it rightly, in accordance with an afterthought in his Glossary, where, after the entry, "*Espanie, Spanish,*" he adds:—"It seems, however, preferable to take this as the participle of *espanir*, a fullblown rose." Decidedly *preferable*, if that be the word to use, seeing that the one translation (full-blown) is right, and the other totally wrong, and indeed inconceivable, save to rare wits.

199. L'avoir tut retent e keut	All the property he keeps and amasses ;
E pis guerroe k'il ne seut	And makes war the worse <i>because he</i>
	<i>knew</i>
Ke n'ad contre li foisun	That against him could make <i>no resist-</i>
	<i>ance</i>
La gent de la region.	The people of the country.

Seut rhyming with *keut* (colligit), cannot possibly be from *saver*, to know; it is from *soloir*, to be accustomed, "worse than he is wont."

But the word "*foisun*" is a great stumbling-block to Mr. Luard, if we may judge from the variety of renderings given to it and its derivatives.

For convenience sake, I will quote them together:—

(NOUN.)

1205. Mais la pucele est tant amée . . .	The maiden is so beloved,
Ke ne put aver <i>fuisun</i>	That she <i>can have no opposition,</i>
Ki deist de li ren si ben nun.	Since nothing ought to be said of her
	but good.
2126. . . s'en prist peisun	. . . he caught fish
Demanois a grant <i>foisun</i> .	At once in great <i>plenty</i> .
4507. Ke ne pout prendre <i>foisun</i>	That he cannot <i>prevent himself</i>
K'il n'alast à perdicun.	From going to perdition.

(VERB.)

3249. Ne put <i>fusuner</i> malice	Nor was it possible <i>to destroy</i> the malice
Ne de parjure k'a vice.	And the vice of perjury which he had.
4310. Co fist pecché e encumbrier,	This caused sin and trouble,
Ne puit parjure <i>fusuner</i> .	Nor can a perjured <i>man resist</i> .

As, according to the Introduction (p. xiii.) the Glossary was made "to enable the poem to be read with as little trouble as possible," we naturally expect help from it in difficulties. Let us consult it here. It gives—

"*Foisun* (1) Resistance; force. (2). Plenty.

Fusuner, i. e. Foisouner.

To confound, destroy. To resist."

Surely, one thinks, this is a word needing some little explanation, if it is not to be troublesome! But nothing in the way of explanation is vouchsafed. The fact is, that the word simply means "prosperity," "plenty," and the verb "*to prosper*;" and has nothing to do with any of the other meanings in the passages quoted. Ex. gr.

1205. How Mr. Luard's third line is to be got out of the text, or rather *got into it*, I am unable to imagine. It is simply,—“the maiden is so loved, &c., that he *who should say of her* aught but good, cannot prosper.”

In the other case, the meaning is equally clear, viz. :—

199. “The people cannot prosper against him.”

3249. “Malice cannot prosper.”

4310. “Perjury cannot prosper.”

Thus his translation of 2126 is the only one which is correct, and *there* he *could* not go wrong.

296. Fert e refert, ke du *mivel*

He strikes and strikes again, so that
from the *middle*

Escu Aedmund fait un *chancel*.

Of Edmund's shield he breaks off a
piece.

Glossary, “*Mivel*. 296. Middle.”

There is no such word as *mivel*; *mivel*, forsooth! It should be “*nevel*.”

“So that from the *new* shield, &c.”

Besides, *chancel* is wrong, though he puts it so also in Glossary. It should be *chantel*, a CANTLE.

429. Grant tens n'ai desiré *el*.

As the Editor in his Glossary sub voce *el* risks a few explanations which are little short of astounding, I will

give them all, and, gathering a few flowers of translation in which this unfortunate monosyllable *el* is concerned, will present the reader with a bouquet of them.

The entries in the Glossary stand thus:—

“ *El*, He. Fem. *Ele*, 3665.”

“ *El*, i. e. *En le*.”

“ *El*, indef. pronoun. 429 = of it.”

“ *El*, 1785, i. e. *Eu*, water.”

Let the reader dwell for a moment on the last two entries: *el* means “of it;” *el*, i. e. *eu* = water. *El*, i. e. *Eu* (!)

Now for the passages where said meanings are to be introduced.

429. *Grant tens n'ai désiré el.* Have I not long time desired *him*?

So Mr. L., who had apparently changed his mind as to the propriety of the rendering “of it” given in Glossary for this line.

1785. *Ne lur purra vent ne el nuire.* Nor can hurt them wind nor *water*.

Here, at least, he is consistent with his statement in Glossary, which is in one way advantageous, as it removes all doubt as to his view of the word.

2927. *Nel surent de ben faire el.* They know not how to do *him* good.

Which, I suppose, we might regard as an advisable addition to the four meanings quoted in his Glossary.

All this is supremely ridiculous. Every example is wrong, this abused word being simply the Old French form of the Latin *aliud*, and meaning “*anything else*.” Thus—

429. *Grant tens n'ai désiré el,* i. e. I have desired nothing else.

1785. *Ne lur purra vent ne el nuire,* i. e. Neither wind nor anything else can hurt them.

2927. *Nel surent de ben faire el,* i. e. They knew not how to benefit him in anything else.

One doubts whether it would be possible to find a parallel to this *even* in Mr. Luard's further renderings. But

the reader is not to despair; Mr. Luard can beat *even this!*

Edward's brothers had been killed, and the poem goes on:—

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 444. Ne remist ja nuls enuie | L. There remained now <i>no cause of anxiety</i> |
| Fors sul Aedward en Normendie . . . | Excepting only Edward . . . |
| Puisnez de ses freres tuz. | Youngest of all his brothers. |

Glossary says:—"Enuie *v.* Esnuie," which, we are told, means "harm." It is hard to speak seriously of a blunder so gratuitous. The line is simply—

Ne remist ja nuls *en vie* (i. e.) There remained now none *in life!*

there were none living of the brothers save the youngest, Edward.

451. The reader was asked not to despair of Mr. Luard's blunder-capacity; hopefulness on that score is justified by the following specimens of editing:—

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 451. Harauld ki fiz Cnud fu | Harold [i. e. <i>Harefoot</i> , son of Cnut] |
| Ses natureus <i>ad nieus</i> tenu, | Held <i>at nought</i> his countrymen, |
| Ke Daneis fu; pur co Daneis | Because he was a Dane; wherefore the Danes |
| Atrait, e avila Engleis. | He drew to himself, and abased the English. |

Nieus does not mean *nought*, or *at nought*; it is not *nieus*, but *meus*, i. e. "(the Dane) Harold has BETTER (treated) his countrymen (the Danes)." Glossary inserts the item—

"Nieus, 451. Nothing."

Here is another addled egg, with "nothing" in it, viz., the next entry in Glossary, which is—

"Niz, 2983 = Nothing."

Let us look at this.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 2983. E ne devet, beus reis gentilz, | And you ought not, good gentle king, |
| Vos vertuz <i>partir en niz</i> . | To let your wishes SINK to NOTHING. |

It should be *enviz* (invitus), i. e. "you ought not to dispense *unwillingly* your acts of kindness."

This "nothing" also proves to be a no-thing, a nonentity;

which makes two nothings. Once more on the same tack. Glossary gives: "Niot, 1339 = Nothing." We shall see.

The king had fallen into the sea, and was drowned; so that—

1339. De li après *voirent* NIOT. Of him afterwards *they saw* NOTHING.

Decidedly this is a fatal word! It should be—

De li apres *n'oient* MOT, i. e. Of him afterwards they never *heard* a WORD.

And now for *another* addled egg to put into our basket.

4167. NIL ad dit a nul del mund. NOTHING has he said to anyone in the world.

Which, however, he has not put into his Glossary, because it is so plain; for, of course, *nil* means *nothing*! why shouldn't it? Ah, why indeed! only it does not! It should be *ni l'ad* dit, i. e. nor has he said IT.

And so I beg to hand over to Mr. Luard HIS four "*nothings*," they are all *his*:—

- | | | |
|---|----------|---|
| { | I. | <i>nieus</i> , "nothing," should be <i>meus</i> , "better." |
| | II. (en) | <i>niez</i> , "nothing," should be <i>enviez</i> , "unwilling." |
| | III. | <i>niot</i> , "nothing," should be <i>mot</i> , "a word." |
| | IV. | <i>nil</i> , "nothing," should be <i>ni l'</i> , "nor it." |

And all this gravely inserted in a Glossary!

426. Mut *se duit* de teu ruine. Much *he thinks* of such a loss.

This he explains in the Glossary:—

"*Duire* to direct, instruct; *se duit*, 462, to think of."

Deriving the verb, no doubt, from *ducere*; still the form "*se duit*" might have "given him pause." It has nothing to do at all with *duire*, but is from *doloir* (*dolere*) to *grieve*. In the *very same* page, l. 469, occurs this same spelling, where it is said:—

Sa mère *kī à duit* vesqui. Who lived in *sorrow*.

which might have put Mr. Luard on the right track; the meaning being, of course, "much *he* grieves at," &c.

-
477. Chacer la fist hors de tere, Causes her to be hunted from the country,
 E mut en tut le regne guerre. And wars against the whole kingdom.

I think it may be taken for granted that Mr. Luard has no idea that *mut* is here the verb, for he has not translated it, he has not put it into his Glossary, and he translates by the present tense (i. e. guerre, *he wars*); but *mut* is the preterite tense of "mouvoir," and means "he moved," "intulit bellum."

-
482. Mais il ne regna pas grant tens
 Teus fu ke le plut abatre. Such was he, that one rejoices at his downfall.

Impossible to extract this from the original! But the reader will have ere this perceived that tenses, conjunctions, pronouns, &c., flit before Mr. Luard's mental vision in a very hazy way.

It should be :—

Such an one was (He) whom it pleased to strike him down.

Cf. a somewhat similar periphrasis for the name of God, in Dante, Inf. xxvi., 141 :—

Tre volte il fe girar con tutte le acque,
 Alla quarta levar la poppa in suso,
 E la prora ire in giù com' altrui piacque,
 Infin che'l mar fu sopra noi richiuso.

where "altrui piacque" means "a Dio piacque."

496. What shall we say to the following incomprehensible "divellication"? "When Hardicanute became king, he recalled the exiles," &c.; and (continues Mr. Luard's text, as he has edited it) "fist DE S'EN FUIR le cors (Harold)," (absolutely so separated!) translating: "And he caused to be hurled out the body of Harold"! Now, for anybody to miss *this*, with the ordinary French word almost "leaping into his eyes," is argument of great ignorance of modern French

And a "shame" it is that it should so stand. Mr. Luard has fallen here into precisely the same snare as in 3412, q. v. *Da* does not mean "from," nor *untire* "shame," but the words are to be edited thus :

D'avutire, from adultery.

635. Vis li est k'il veit un ber	It seems to him that he sees a personage
Du cel venant lusan e cler,	From Heaven coming shining and
	bright,
Un veillard a cler semblant	An old man like to a clerk,
Ki resplent cum solail raant.	Who shines like the beaming sun.

This is St. Peter. It is a pity that we are not further informed as to the *circumstances* of the likeness! But not only St. Peter; St. John is also similarly likened to a clerk by—Mr. Luard, not, certainly, the author of the poem!

3525. E li veillard là respundu,	And the old man answered <i>these</i>
Haitement, a cler semblant,	Joyously, like to a clerk,
"Venez apres."	"Come," &c.

It is quite wrong. The phrase is Old French, and very good Old French, where *à cler vis*, *à cler semblant*, &c., mean "with a *bright face*;" and l. 635 is simply—

"An old man *with a bright face, which shines like the sun.*"

Besides, how Mr. Luard could edit "*là respundu*," and translate "answered *these*," I cannot understand. It should be "*l'a respundu*," "has answered *him*," viz., the "*un de eus*" mentioned in l. 3510.

659. Peis e plenté li nuncie	Peace and plenty he promises him
Cunseil, sucour, auverie.	Counsel, succour, <i>wealth</i> .

The word occurs also elsewhere in the poem, viz. :—

805. Sire Seint Père, en ki aie	Peter, under whose aid
Me met e auverie.	I put myself and <i>protection</i> .

Glossary gives—

"*Auverie*, Possessions, *wealth*."

It is evident, therefore, that Mr. Luard connects *auverie* in some way or other with *avoir* ! But here, even the metre might have helped him, if he were capable of seeing metre in the poem, which I doubt. Just as in 83, his *aunez* should be *avuez*, so his *auverie* should be *avuerie*, i. e. advocacy, which is the meaning it bears in every place it occurs either here or elsewhere.

The following is not perhaps so unpardonable an error, but still is altogether to be stigmatized in an Editor.

683. Deu omnipotent

Ki translate et mue e change, (God) who transfers and alters and changes,

Regnes privez a humme estrange. Alienates kingdoms taken from one.

i. e. according to our Editor :—" *estrange*, he alienates, *regnes*, kingdoms, *privez*, taken, *a humme*, from one." It does not perhaps *look* so bad as it really *is*. It should be: "(he transfers) *regnes privez*, private (own) kingdoms, *a humme estrange* to another (a strange) man;" i. e. "he gives away to another man the kingdoms which belong to somebody."

This antithesis between *privez* and *estrange* is quite common in O. F. Cf. ex. gr. Vie de St. Auban, 1541.

N' i peust hem cunestre *privé* ne *estrangi*.

None could there recognise *their own* (friends) or *strangers*.

Mr. Luard has given the sense, but the form in which he has given it shows that he is utterly at sea as to the construction.

687. Deus ad eschoisi un humme,

God has chosen a man,

Ni ad meillur de ci ca Rumme . . .

He has not a better from here to Rome :

Ki vie ert nette e sanz vice.

Who in life will be pure, &c.

This is not correctly translated ; it should be, "*there is not a better*," &c.; *n'i ad* being the equivalent of the modern *il n'y a pas* ; and the last line should be : "*ki vie*

ert nette, *cujus vita erit pura*." Again a perfectly familiar O. F. construction, *ki* in the oblique case, with its governing noun following. Cf. Vie de St. Auban, 736, "Celui sive *ki doctrine tant prise e maistrice*," i. e. "Let him follow him, whose doctrine and mastership he so much prizes."

Edward's sad condition before he came to the throne is described by the poet, who tells how his life was sought after by the Danes.

722. Mut en averoit or e argent
Ki as Danois en feist present ;

i. e. as plainly as words can say it :—

(That man) would have for it much gold and silver
Who would make of him (Edward) a present to the Danes.

i. e. "anybody who should deliver him up to the Danes would be rewarded." Mr. Luard, however, presents us with the following *mis*-interpretation :—

"Had he much gold or silver
To make presents to the Danes,

[joining it on to the next line]—

No one would lie in wait to take him away." (!)

Which last is Mr. Luard's Englishing of line 724, "Aucun le augueite *d'entucher*."

Pure guess-work this ! If it was not for a certain feeling of indignation at the idea of any one, with such slender capacity for the undertaking, venturing to edit a poem written in a foreign language, one could find room for interest and amusement in the spectacle of the sort of ingenuity exercised by our Editor in "beating up" for possible constructions ; but there is a limit to all patience, and Mr. L. has outstript that limit. "*Quidquid horum attigeris, ulcus est.*"

Let us inquire further.

Glossary gives : "Entucher. To take away."

This entry (which is quite wrong) is the more remark-

able, because the very next entry is *Entuchement*, which he gives as the *probable* reading in a line, 1521, presently to be quoted, to which he attributes the (right) meaning, "poison," and in accordance with which he should have given—

"Entucher. To poison."

Now let us see his text at 1521.

Esguez as punz e as passages	Ambuscades at the bridges and the crossings
De venim e de <i>encuchement</i> ,	Venomous and <i>poisonous</i> ,
E agueitz de aliene gent.	And spyings of foreign people.

It is a peculiar rendering, but as he has judged it worthy of a note, his note shall be given here:—

"I have translated this as if it were *entuchement*. See the Glossary. The word in the text, *encuchement*, *lying in wait*, may, however, be correct." I dare say the reader may have heard of *accouchement*, as "lying-in," but it is probable that *encuchement* as "lying-in-wait," will be quite new to him. But, in *that* case, how would he translate the line? Thus we have:—

"Entucher. To take away."

"Encuchement. Lying-in-wait."

And both words are utterly wrong.

912. Cruel a ses enemis,	Fierce was he to his enemies,
Debonaire ert a ses amis ;	Debonaire to his friends ;
<i>Les uns fu as barbarins,</i>	<i>To the one he was as to barbarians</i>
Aignel as suens e as veisins.	A lamb to his own people and to his neighbours.

It is manifest that the third line was a complete mystery to our Editor. Of course, a MS. is to be read with an adequate knowledge of the language in which it was written, and from an Editor one naturally expects a little more familiarity with the language than would enable him to read a printed text; he should be able, on occasion, to correct in a MS. what is obviously wrong. But the faculty of

seeing a real error seems to have been denied to Mr. Luard. It does seem extraordinary that he should not have seen there was an error here, which needed correction, and one would have thought that the antithesis in the two preceding lines might have given him a hint as to the right word. Without any possibility of doubt, the poet never wrote *Les uns*, but *Léuns*. Read therefore:—

Léuns fu as barbarins,
Aignel as suens, &c.

A lion he was to the barbarians,
A lamb to his own people, &c.

He must have known that his own translation was quite unwarranted by the words of the text; he ought therefore to have left a blank in confession of ignorance, and this was the only candid and justifiable course. Filled as the book is with such absurdities, it is comparatively useless in a linguistic point of view, as it cannot be trusted for ten lines together. Scholars who use it for historical¹ purposes will need to beware of the translation. Were there even unity in his mistakes, were there a sufficient number of cross references to parallel passages in his text, to show that at least he had compared the passages in order to elucidate the meaning! Of comparison, however, but little is to be seen. This, our great modern lever, is a tool unknown to Mr. Luard. A few places show that towards the end of the poem, he had an inkling of the meaning of some things that in the beginning were as intelligible to him as a Babylonian brick; but there is no evidence to show that, as a rule, he went back on his work to correct previous mistakes. What is to be said of the following triad?

(1) 997. The thief seizes the money:

Muscer les va, e puis repaire,

He goes to conceal them, and then
returns,

E autant prent e musce a veire.

And takes as much and conceals them
at once.

(2) 1011. Li chamberleins après repaire,
E veit le larcin a veire.

The chamberlain afterwards returns,
And sees the theft at a glance.

¹ Historically, it does not seem to be of the slightest value; linguistically, it

should have been of great value.

His notes on these passages, and the alternative in the Glossary, suggest "*aveire* = money;" but the entry in the Glossary is: "*Veire*, i. e. *Voir*. *A veire*, *At a glance*; *at once*." How, in the name of common sense, does *veire*, which means *voir*, come to mean *at a glance*, or *at once*?

But now, (3), exactly the same rhyme occurs in p. 10, Rubric xxxi.

Quant Seint Pere ad fait <i>avoire</i> ,	When St. Peter had caused him <i>to see it</i> ,
Au bat sun pescur repoire.	He returns to the boat of his fisherman.

giving in a note, "I have translated this as if a *voire*, but with hesitation." The note at 1011 suggests:

Veit le larcin <i>aveire</i> .	Sees the theft of the money!
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Another grammatical note hazarded, with the usual result:—

987. Atant est venuz . . .	Now arrived
Li chamberleins ki deners prent,	The chamberlain, who takes some money,
Tant cum li vint <i>duc</i> a talent.	<i>Carries off</i> as much as he wished.

How *duc*, which is supposed here to mean "carries off," could get into *this position*, is not said; it is quite impossible to Old French construction. But let us refer to the Glossary:—

"Duc, 987. 3 pers. sing. pres. indic. of *Ducer*, to carry away."

To which statement the principal objections are:—
1. That there is no verb *duer* meaning either "carry away," or anything else. 2. That *duc* is not the 3rd pers. ind., nor any other number, person, tense, or mood of a verb at all, but is simply *dunc*, with the not-infrequent omission (by scribes) of the transverse stroke over the u, which represents the *n* (*dūc*).

Therefore, as to the translation, it is to be corrected:

Meanwhile came
The Chamberlain, who takes money
As much as was pleasing to him <i>then</i> (= at that time).

The sting in the matter is, that Mr. Luard *has* on one occasion made this very conjecture on this identical word, *where it was quite unnecessary*: "366. Un dunc l'ocist per traisun," which means, "somebody *afterwards* slew him by treachery," plainly enough to ordinary people, but not to Mr. L., who alters it to "un DUC, a *duke* slew him, &c."!

In 1347 he has made a trying experiment on the temper of his readers, by perverting everything he could possibly get at in the line. Absolutely *every* word in the line (except *e* = *and*) involves a gross error!

1346. Cist est Deus omnipotent
Cist fait a amer e aducer.

L. It is almighty God
Has done this in love and gentleness.

The calmness with which *aducer* is explained in Glossary has its effect, no doubt; one thinks "surely it *must* be so, or an Editor would never . . . !" Thus reads this wonder-working Glossary:—

"Aducer, 1347, i. e. Adoucir."

To which it may be replied, that *aducer* does *not* mean *adoucir*, and, further, that it is not *aducer* at all. The line is to be corrected thus:—

"Cist fait à amer e à duter, i. e. *He is to be loved and to be feared.*"

A thief had come in and carried off a portion of the treasure in the absence of the chamberlain, who, on his return, asks the king—

1021. Veistes vus estranges, puis
Ke m'en parti entrer al vis,
Ki ad emporté cest aver?

Did you see a stranger, since
I went away entering in your sight
Who has carried off the property?

I have no doubt that this may *seem* not so far wrong. (Let me say, once for all, that there is not one of the passages quoted and corrected, for which almost any amount of justifying quotations could not be furnished. The reason why I have *not* given them is just that I have not *space* at my disposal; but, indeed, the greater part of the errors will

demonstrate themselves to be such, even to the uninitiated, on a comparison of the correction and the mistake in any given case.) This, I say, may *seem* to be right, but it is distinctly and absolutely *wrong*. *Al vis* never *could* mean, and certainly never *did* mean, "in your sight," in spite of Mr. L.'s translation, and his Glossary to boot, where the same statement is made: "Al vis, 1021. In your sight."

It should be "al *uis*, at the DOOR, *by the door-way*." What should possess the poet to say—"Did you *see* him enter in *your sight*?" Cf. Vie de St. Auban, 18.

E le scingnur séant AL UIS de sun ostal.

And the lord sitting at the door of his dwelling.

1029. After the thief had stolen the money from the treasury, Edward thus excuses him: "He was a poor needy man, and I have enough;

Asez tresor ad rois Aedward

Drois est ke *si promes eit part*."

The last line Mr. Luard renders as follows:—

"It is right that the *promise made to him* SHOULD BE PERFORMED"!

Cf. Glossary sub voce "promes," where he explains:—"That so the promise *have its place*, i. e. be accomplished."

A *promise may have its place*! i. e. be accomplished!!

Another piece of singular blundering in the translation, caused by the total incapacity of the Editor to perceive a mistake of the scribe. The *r* in *promes* is either not in the MS., or is wrong, and the text should run:

"Drois est ke *si poures eit part*."

"It is right that *so poor a person* should have a share."

1119. (Jesus) Ki puceus e fiz de pucele, Thou who a Virgin and Son of a Virgin,
 Nasquis de mère pure e Wert born from a Mother pure and
 bele, beautiful,
 Ke autrement apent de Who otherwise belongs by birth
 nestre
 A Deu, k'à un peccheur To God, who (now) to an earthly sin-
 terrestre. ner.

And the sentence so concludes with a full stop; Mr. L. leaving it to the unfortunate reader to pick out what crumbs of sense he may. The last two lines of the translation are certainly anything but felicitous! Yet it is so extremely simple that the wonder is *how* he perverts it. Translate: "Thou who wast born a virgin, &c., for differently it belongs to God to be born than to an earthly man (to be born)," i. e. God must be born differently from a sinner, therefore, Jesus was born a virgin from a virgin.

King Edward had been at mass, and after prayers had smiled; his attendants wondered, as they said:—

1303. Qu'en baidur out dunc e deduit, That he *thence* had joy and amusement,
 Ke de mut simple porteur Who *like a simple infant*
 Solcit estre a cel ure. Was wont to be at that hour.

It will, I think, be apparent to all, that his translation of the first of these lines is quite unwarranted by the text. As "dunc" means only "then," the word "thence" must be intended to refer to "en." But this position of *en* (= thence) would be as impossible in O. F. as it is in Mod. F. And if "thence" is to stand for "dunc," there would be nothing in his translation to correspond to "en," for "out" can only mean "he had." In reality, it is a difficulty entirely created by his text, for the proper way is as follows:

"*Queu* baidur out dunc e deduit, *What* joy and amusement he *then* had."

The remaining lines are also to be altered, and may be rendered:—

"Who was wont at that hour to be of *very simple behaviour*."

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1445. S'en voil . . . | So I wish |
| Cest véage par vus furnir, | By your aid to perform this journey, |
| K'a Deus e vus venge a plaisir | That it may accord with God's pleasure
and yours |
| Ne ma moster del cuntredire, | Not to oppose my purpose, |
| Ke Deus vers moi e vus s'en ire. | That God may be wrath with me and
you. |

We look with amazement for further information in that "repertory of rarities," Mr. Luard's Glossary, and find—

"Moster, 1445, Intention."

Nothing more.

But in twisting this into the printed translation, we have got a knotty point indeed! It ought to be "*Ne m'a mester del cuntredire*," &c., i. e. "I do not want God to be angry with you and me for our opposition."

On this word *mester* the light plays very brokenly, refracted as it is through Mr. Luard's prism. That Mr. Luard has no abiding idea of the meaning of *aver mester*, viz., *to be needful*, is clear. Cf. ex. gr.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 2190. Merchée est la eglise tute, | Marked is the whole church, |
| N'a mester ke nuls en dute. | That no one may doubt of the service [!] |

It should be: "*There is no need*, use, possibility, that any body should doubt of it." The Glossary is, if possible, worse than usual. This is the entry:—

"Mester, Mestre.¹ Office; duty; *service*. 2190, 3742."

We have just seen 2190; let us see the other instance, viz.:—

3742. The bishops are behaving badly; they will not feed their sheep:—

Ovailles ne querent pestre;
Mais du vendre est checuns *mestre*.

i. e. They do not try to feed their *sheep*,
But of selling each one is *master* (skilful).

¹ In 4590 he had transliterated inaccurately MESTS instead of mester; and to make matters worse, in his own list of Errata, he has corrected it into *mestre* (!)

But Mr. Luard's translation stands printed :—

They seek not to *feed the sheep-folds*,
But to sell them is each ONE'S business (!)

[What a curious process it must be to *feed sheep-folds*!

Where did Mr. L. learn that *ovailles* means sheep-FOLDS, as he has it also in Glossary? Had he consulted even Roquefort, he would have found two examples quoted that ought to have saved him from this error. Roquefort gives :

- (1). "A guise d'aigniaus ou d' *ovailles*."
(2). "Les faudes de nos *ovailles*, 'caulas *ovium*.'"

Besides, the word is quite modern enough, though confined to the Biblical style, to be understood even now, when spelt with the *u* (*ouailles*).

So much for the examples quoted in the Glossary; here is another example in which this phrase is equally misunderstood :—

- | | |
|---|---|
| 4469. Conseil <i>ne dit</i> de prudumme,
Ne prise vaillant une pumme ;
<i>N'aueroit mester</i> ke Den sufrist,

Ke teu tirant regne tenist. | He <i>speaks</i> no wise man's counsel,
Nor values it an apple ;
<i>He could not hold his office</i> did not God
suffer,
That such a tyrant should have the
kingdom. |
|---|---|

It should be :—

The counsel or *the saying* of a wise man
He does not prize (the worth) of an apple ;
It would not be good that God should suffer
That such a tyrant should hold the kingdom.

To return to the order of the lines.

The king is counselling the people to keep together, by the parable of the bundle of sticks :

' We have a phrase singularly corresponding to this in the North of England, where one might say, "He *hadn't* need suffer such a tyrant to hold the kingdom."

1464. Si un bastun teng e feble e grelle	If I hold a stick weak and slender
En ma mein petit e felle	In my small and slight hand
Sanz gref le puis froisir des	Without any difficulty I can break it
poinz ;	with my fist ;
Si sis u set leez e viouz	If six or seven long and old
Bastunceus liez ensemble,	Sticks together you tie,
Nes despecasse.	I could not break them in pieces.

Now for the Glossary :—

“Leez, 1464. Long.”

“Viouz. Old.”

These are the entries ; they repeat the translation, and they are both totally wrong. *Leez* is, of course, *broad*, and has nothing to do with *length*, and this no-word *viouz* should be *LOINZ*, as the rhyme *poinz* might have told him ; and then we have what the poet wrote, as can hardly be doubted :

(Froisir des *poinz* ;

Si) sis u seet leez e loinz. . . .

i. e. Six or seven *broad* and *long* sticks, &c.

Even the *sense*, one thinks, might have suggested that long and old sticks were not likely to prove strong, under any circumstances. But this word *leez* has been elsewhere to Mr. L. a stumbling-block ; witness the following !

2292. Atant ad fundé sa iglise	(He founded the church)
De grantz quareus de pere bise ;	With large square blocks of grey stone ;
A fundement le e parfund.	Its foundations are deep.

Can anybody see how this last line is to be equated with Mr. L.'s translation ? It is manifest that *le* is intended to mean *its* ; but where is the *ARE* which he extracts from the French, and what has become of the *à* and the *e* ? The translation is incorrect, and admits of no defence or excuse ; for the sentence is so easy—“*with foundation broad and deep.*” How *did* he miss it ?

A cynic once defined philology to be a science “in which the consonants are worth nothing, and the vowels

not much." Mr. Luard's translations go upon the principle that the large words are not worth a great deal, and the little words nothing at all. At any rate, he frequently renders the text as if he thought so.

Thus, ex. gr. he edits 1583, "*sanz lassen de la commune*;" giving as the English, "without *permission* of the commons." Is it conceivable that he should have erred here? One thinks not: yet he has. In his Glossary we have:

"Lassen, 1583. Permission."

Litera scripta manet. Mr. Luard actually gives *lassen* as one word in his Glossary!

It *should* be *l'assen*, *the assent*, as it occurs in 2060, where, however, it was not open to him to make a mistake, as it does not happen to be preceded by the article.

2060. *Par assen* sun uncle, By consent of his uncle.

Probably the explanation of this is to be found in the fact that there *is* a word *lassen*, meaning "to let," "to permit," and so, capable of being rendered *permission*. The further fact that this is a word of another language will perhaps, however, arouse misgivings in the minds of ordinary readers as to the propriety of this mode of viewing the matter. There are such curious insertions in the Glossary that it is very hard to say *what* is not possible to Mr. Luard, but he will hardly contend, one would think, that a *Modern* German word has a legitimate "*droit de cité*" in a Norman-French poem of the 13th century.

1620. Joie unt grant e espérance	Have great joy and hope
Ke efforcée eirt lur purvéance.	That confirmed <i>would be</i> their provision.

Glossary on this line hazards another attempt at grammatical explanation:—

"Eirt, 3rd pers. sing. subj. pres. of *Estre*."

The whole procedure of Mr. Luard is here laid bare;

it might be called a "constructio κατὰ σύνεσιν,"—or thus :
1, what does the Editor think the sense requires? 2, how
can this meaning be got *into* the words?

"Eirt" is no subjunctive, it is the indicative future
3 sing.

1674. *Fai* k'a Deu plest. *I do* what pleases God.

In the Glossary he makes honourable mention of the right parsing (2 sing. imperative), but grammatical analysis, simple as it is, and essential though it be (for an Editor), Mr. Luard has not assayed. He continues in Glossary, sub voce *Fai*: "In 1674, it seems to be the 1st pers. indic. pres., but [let the reader note the 'but;'] 'fie upon that 'but,' it doth lay the good precedency"! the passage is obscure" (!) Yes, it certainly *is* obscure, because—it is not the 1st pers. indic. pres., but what he had already said, the 2nd pers. sing. imper., and means "*Do thou do* what is pleasing to God"; and then there is not the slightest obscurity in the passage. The Pope bids the king not go on the pilgrimage himself, as he wished and had vowed; but "*Do* what pleases God," viz., rule thy land. That land, he says, was in peril from war and treason, and danger might arise from the king's departure; "to thee it belongs to guide the rein" (1677). There is no obscurity when read in the light of the preceding lines, 1662-4:

Au roi de tuz rois mercis rent,
Pur [sic, but read *par*] ki *regnent* communement
Reis renumez en terre,
E princes *pur dreiture fere*.

i. e. Thanks to God, by whom kings *reign in order to execute justice*.

1697.	Par prière	By the prayer
Tut cest sené, ke i assent		Of all this assembly, which agrees to it,
Ki est en Deu le <i>vout</i> present		Since it is the present <i>will</i> of God.

Glossary, "*Vout*, 1696, the will." Now, suppose a school-

boy had had presented to him for translation this piece of printed Latin :—

“Qui est in Deo, hoc vult præsens.”

(This assembly, which is in God, wishes this, being present.)

And suppose said school-boy were to render “*since it is the present WILL of God,*” what considerations would prevent his master from flagellating him? At least, I know, that if any one of us school-boys had ventured on *such* a piece of “construe,” the punishment would have been very swift, very painful, and, I may add, very richly deserved.

Mr. Luard's edition of the twelve lines (from 2063 to 2075) will probably startle the reader, as, I confess, it startled me. By way of introduction, we shall take—

1706. Un muster en l'onur Seint Pere	A monastery in honour of St. Peter
Real frez, de chans e p[ri]ère.	A royal one you make, for chant and prayer.

The reader will observe that Mr. L. has had occasion to resort to the (perfectly allowable) expedient of conjectural emendation. Perhaps, however, it should not be resorted to too often, *especially the same* emendation!

Keeping in view this introduction, let the reader examine the following passage, and the Editor's accompanying note at 2066 :—

2063. Un muster fist de Seint Pere	A monastery he erected to St. Peter
Vers occident <i>de chans e p[ri]ère:</i>	Towards the west, <i>for chant and prayer:</i>
Quant fu parfaite la iglise,	{ He directs and has arranged everything,
Tute apoint e a devise,	
E preste au dediement,	{ When the church was completed, (1)
E croizée cum il apent,	And ready for the dedication,
	And furnished with the crosses, as is befitting,
E Seint Mellit en lendemain	And St. Mellitus on the morrow
Del dedier fu tut certain.	Was quite prepared to dedicate it.
La nuit avant pur la merveille	The previous night for the wonder
Grant gent i atent e veille,	Many people wait there and watch,
Ki mirent veu tel sacrement,	Who admire the sight of such a consecration,

Converse a Deu novelement,	As being persons newly converted to
	God,
Ki mirent un veu ceste aprise.	Who ever admire the sight of such an
	event.

At (1) is the following note of the Editor:—"The order of this and the previous line has been changed in the translation:" which note in any case is quite superfluous, as the change is obvious. Also, the reason for the change is equally obvious, viz., the Editor's ignorance of Old French.

In this passage there are three things especially needing remark, though even then the passage will not be wholly purged of error.

And first, was it not very improbable that in *two* places, so widely apart, the same faulty omission in the transcript should be repeated? One fancies the Editor might have suspected so. But no! *Chant and prayer* were so very natural for a monastery! Yes, certainly, *after* it was built; but *in order to* build it, *lime and stone* were very much more necessary, and that is what the original text says.

"De chaux e père, "(de calce et petrâ) of lime and stone"!!

Cf. Li Romans d'Alixandre, 404-11:

Signor, dist Tholomes, je voi une maison,
Close est toute *de marbre, de cauc, et de sablon.*

i. e., with *marble and lime and sand.*

Secondly, his note is not only useless, but the alteration to which it refers is uncalled for, and quite wrong. As to the translation!

Quant fu parfekte la iglise,	He directs and has arranged everything,
Tute a point e a devise.	When the church was completed.

But it should stand as in the text, and his translation be altered into:

"When the church was quite finished
(Tute a point e a devise) all *point-device* [as we say even now],
And ready for the dedication," &c.

Text, translation, and note are astounding.

Thirdly, the word *mirent* in its double occurrence at the end of the passage quoted, is quite out of the question; it should be:

"Ki n'urent veu tel sacrement,"

"Ki n'urent unc veu ceste aprise."

i. e. "Who *had* not *seen*," "Who *had* never *seen*," &c.

As I have already said, it is not simply ignorance of Old French, and want of comparative study of the poem itself, with which Mr. Luard may fairly be taxed. He is further guilty of neglecting the aids that lie within the covers of his own book, in the shape of two Latin compositions treating on the same subject, and edited by himself. I have not gone through these, because generally they only express the *idea*, without much similarity in the choice of words; and besides, are very far from narrating the same set of incidents, or in the same order, so that it would need a much longer time than is at my disposal to go through the whole in detail. But an Editor should have been thoroughly awake to the importance of comparing the accounts. The following instances, which come in the order of the French lines, will be amply sufficient to bear out my statement that the Editor has been culpably remiss, feeling, as he must have done, how much he needed all the helps he could get.

1771. Thorneie, u est une eglise
Aunciene e bas assise,
Ke poverté nuls ne *prise*.

Thorney, where there is a church
Ancient and situated low,
So that no poverty may overtake it.

What this may mean, I do not profess to explain (a church situated low, so that no poverty *may overtake it*!), but it most assuredly is not what the poet said. To find out how Mr. L. reaches this explanation, we must examine his Glossary.

"*Prise*, 1771, 3 pers. sing. subj. of *Prendre*" [sic!]

Prise a subjunctive of *prendre*!

The line is so plain that he who runs may read—

Ke poverté nuls ne prise, i. e., Whose poverty no man prizes.

Now, had Mr. L. compared his own edition of the Latin poem in this identical volume, he would have found the description as follows:—

P. 369, l. 276. Est mihi Thorneia locus ingens, nobilis olim,
Nunc vilis.

which I leave Mr. Luard to reconcile with his

“*So that no poverty may overtake it.*”

Again, 1773, even in so simple a matter as the following he has gone wrong:—

Jo mêmes le liu *sacrai*
De mes meins.

I myself WILL consecrate the spot.

But *sacrai* is past, not future; and the Latin has (*ibid.*, l. 277)

“*Nunc vilis; mea quem quondam sacra dextra SACRAVIT.*”

1884. *Quitte vus dem iceu paage.*

I acquit you OF this tax.

Glossary has “Dem. 1884, i. e. De.”

This monstrosity is only another instance of a misread *paage*. It should be:—

“*Quitte vus claim iceu pange. I cry you quits (of) this payment (= I free you from it).*”

We shall see that elsewhere also he has confounded this initial *d* with other letters, and so (v. 2093) obscured *paage* otherwise perfectly plain.

1914. *N'out en sa terre malaun*
D'ordre e de religion,
Real dun de li ki ne ust,
PAN que benistre nel dust.

He had not in his country a house
Of order and religion,
Which had not from him a royal gift,
Which owed him not a blessing.

So, in Glossary, “Benistre = Blessing.”

One is petrified! for benistre is an infinitive, and there is a *par* before the *que*! Translate:—

There was not in his land a house, &c.,
Which had not from him a royal gift,
Wherefore it owed not to bless him.

i. e., *for which* it had not to bless him.

Here is another passage worthy of being quoted "in extenso" as a specimen of the mistakes into which an incompetent Editor will almost inevitably fall, no matter what his effort or diligence *at the time* of editing. To borrow an expression of John Bunyan: "There is knowledge and knowledge;" there is the knowledge of the school-boy, the knowledge of the student, the knowledge of the master. The last, I apprehend, should be the implement wielded by an intending Editor, but to the last, Mr. Luard cannot be said to have the slightest claim.

I have marked in italics the salient points, as usual, and shall take them afterwards in detail; but I give the whole seventeen lines, in order that the reader may get a physical conception of Mr. Luard's Edition at (about) its worst.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1937. Les pez out tortz, nerfs engur- | He had his feet twisted, his nerves |
| diz, | torpid, |
| <i>Gambes sanz brahun, engreslüz</i> | <i>His legs without coverings curved</i> |
| <i>Si de genoilz la junture</i> | <i>So that the joints of his knees</i> |
| 1940. Au dos se cuert cuntre nature, | <i>Turned towards his back against nature.</i> |
| Li pe besturne flestriz | His feet bent the wrong way, withered, |
| As nages se aerdent revertiz. | Were turned round and attached themselves behind him. |
| A uns eschameus feitiz | By a convenient stool |
| K'il teneit cuntre sun piz, | Which he held against his breast |
| 1945. Se trait li povre frarin | The poor unfortunate dragged himself |
| <i>Par cel en bone chemin.</i> | <i>By this on a good way.</i> |
| Veit Hugelin, en haut s'escric, | He sees Hugelin, cries out loudly, |
| "Mercis, Hugun, ne me out tu | "Mercy, Hugo, have you none on me? |
| <i>mie,</i> | |
| Jas es tu gentilz de sanc, | Of old wert thou gentle in blood, |

1950. E de quor pitus e franc." And pitiful and frank of heart."
 "Revolez," dist Huges, "ke "Explain," said Hugo, "what I can
 te fasse." do for you."
 Cist li respundi mut basse, He answered him very humbly,
 "A Rumme sui aler sis feiz." "To Rome have I gone six times."

Here it is said of the poor cripple, that

1938. Les peiz out tortz, nerfs engurdiz, He had his feet twisted, his nerves
 torpid,
 Gambes sanz brahun engresliz. His legs without coverings curved.

Glossary, "*Brahun*, 1938. Breeches [!]; coverings."

So stands Mr. Luard's Glossary. He has, indeed, put a note of interrogation at the end, but it does not much matter; that he should even have *imagined* this possible, is enough.

As for engresliz, he merely gives: "Engresliz, 1938, Twisted (?)."

Now, engresliz is simply a compound of *gresle* (= *gracilis*) = thin, attenuated: and the word "*brahun*" is, of course, *our* word *brawn*!

The O. F. *brahun*, *braion*, *brahon* (in Old Spanish, &c.) means *the fleshy part*; as Mr. Luard will see if he consults *Diez*, sub voce "*Brandone*."

The line is, therefore: "He had legs without *brawn*, *attenuated*;" and not, as Mr. L. would give: "legs without *breeches*, *twisted*!"

1940. Si de genoilz la junture
 Au dos se cuert cuntre nature.

(Now here the MS. has *de de*, which ought to be *ke de*, not simply *de*, as Mr. L. has edited. But this by the way.)
 He translates:

- [The deformed man's legs were curved]
 So that the joints of his knees
 Turned towards his back against nature.

Glossary entry is again grammatical.

"*Cuert*, 1940, 3 pers. sing. pres. ind. of *curre*, to run."

This is, in itself, a strictly correct statement, but it has nothing to do here; it is only a mistake, rectified thus:

An dos *se tuert* cuntre nature, i.e., *is twisted*;—*tuert* from *tordre* (torquere).

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1946. A uns eschameus feitiz | By a convenient stool |
| K'il teneit cuntre sun piz, | Which he held against his breast, |
| Se trait li povre frarin | The poor unfortunate dragged himself |
| Par cel <i>en bone</i> chemin. | By this <i>on a good</i> way. |

But this last line is much more likely to mean on a *bad* road than a good road, for it should run—

Par cel <i>enboué</i> chemin.	By that miry road.
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- | | |
|--|--|
| 1951. " <i>Revoles</i> ," dist Hugues, "ke
te fasse." | " <i>Explain</i> ," said Hugo, "what I can
do for you." |
|--|--|

In Glossary we have:—

"*Revolez*, 1951, i.e., *Revelez*. 2nd. pers. plur. imperat. of *Reveler*. *Reveal*, *tell*."

Quite wide of the mark; for neither the word "*revolez*," nor the construction with the subjunctive *fasse*, is admissible; nor does "*reveler*" mean "*explain*," &c. The Editor has misread his MS. again. It should be corrected thus:—

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| " <i>Ke voles</i> ke te fasse?" | " <i>What do you wish</i> that I should do
for you?" |
|---------------------------------|---|

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1948. Mercis, Hugun, ne me <i>out tu</i> mie? | Mercy, Hugo, <i>have you none</i> on me?" |
|---|---|

This line, which he has translated as above, cannot possibly be right. To render *out tu* by *hast thou* is simply a confession of ignorance. His suggestion in Glossary that the *out* should be *ous*, does not in the least smooth the difficulty. There are so many ways in which the phrase might be completed, that speculation as to what the words are in the MS. is almost precluded. I can only suggest that possibly they might be, not "*out tu*," but "*orras tu*," i. e., "*wilt thou hear*," and the line would read:

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| "Ne me orras tu mie?" | Wilt thou not hear me at all?" |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|

In any case, "*out tu, hast thou,*" is quite out of the question.

To edit *aler* as the word stands in 1953, is simply to deny to the O. F. all grammatical concord. It should be *alez*, of course.

And now I would ask the reader to go over the whole passage quoted above, text and translation, and compare it with these corrections.

1986. Atant, esvus ke la cher morte	Now lo! OF THE dead flesh
S'estent e laschent les junctures.	The joints <i>are</i> <i>straightened</i> and loosened!

This is the miracle which was worked on a deformed body, and which, according to our Editor, consisted in the *straightening* (&c.) of the joints of the dead flesh. One naturally asks what this means. Glossary shall help us.

"S'ester, i.e., *Se tenir debout, se comporter.*"

I should be glad to know—1. Where Mr. Luard got these renderings of *s'ester*, viz., "*se tenir debout,*" "*se comporter.*" 2. What meaning *he* attributes to them, as the one means "*to stand upright,*" and the other, "*to behave one's self;*" and 3. How these meanings, together, or separately, or thaumatropically, are to be made to mean, *to straighten*. In reality, the passage should be read:—

"Behold! the dead flesh
Stretches itself, and the joints become loosened."

A great number of angels had come to dedicate the church, so that:—

2093. Tant ja partut odur,	So much odour is there <i>now</i> throughout,
Ke vis est a cel pescur,	That it seems to this fisherman
Ke li solailz a la lune	That the sun <i>and</i> the moon
Sa clarté tute preste u dunc.	Lend or give all their brightness.

It is worth while to pause a few moments on this translation per se: "*there is so much odour that the sun*

and the moon seem to be lending all their *brightness*! the *brightness* of an *odour*! That fisherman *saw with his nose*, then?

Misreading of MS. again; it should be *colour*, not *odur*, and *i a*, not *ja*, which gives us—

Tant i a partut colour.

“So much *colour* there is everywhere.”

But we are not done with the passage yet. According to Mr. L., the sun *and* moon *are* lending all *their* brightness. Nay, not so, it was *night-time*, and the object of curiosity to the fisherman was, that the moon shone as brightly, and brought out as much colour, as if she had had the sun's brightness! The poet says in unmistakeable language: “so much colour there was that it seemed to him,

That the sun TO the moon
All *his* brightness is lending or giving.”

2003. A pas seur serrément
L'enmeine par ceu pavement,
Ke ne besille ne tremble.

With sure step carefully
(He) conducts him along the pavement,
Which *hurts* him not *nor* makes him
tremble.

Quite wrong. The last line should be—

“That he may not stumble nor tremble.”

I do not know that there is a more characteristic and significant mistake than the following. Small as it is, to any one who is competent to judge, it speaks volumes.

2042. Eu tens le rei Aethelbert, i. e. In the time of King Ethelbert.

Here *le rei* is, of course, in the (oblique) genitive case. But Mr. Luard gives, “*Of old*, King Ethelbert, &c.” (as if it were the nominative). Now this is bad enough in the translator, but he makes matters worse by putting *eu* into the Glossary, where it stands thus:—

“*Eu*, i. e. *au*, *Eu tens*, 2042, *Of old*” (!)

moment, till we examine the Glossary. As there is no hyphen (in his translation) between the words "celestial" and "visitants," we are led perhaps hastily to infer that *solaz* is to mean "*visitants*." That would, however, be a hasty judgment. "*Solaz*," we are informed in Glossary, means (in 2117) *Only*.

This entry, however, by no means allays the thirst for inquiry about the word. Other questions start up and demand to be answered. One naturally wishes to know how *solaz* can mean "*only*," what the singular is, whether "*-az*" is regarded as a plural affix, &c. Had Mr. Luard had any sufficient training in the matter, such questions could never have been possible, for the alternative which is possible by no means includes the meaning here attributed to the word. That alternative is:—

1. *Solaz*, pleasures [*solatia*].
2. *Solaz* (for *solailz*, M. F. *soleils*, suns).

Both words are found in the following lines (*Vie de St. Auban*, 1170):—

Co fu la vertu du <i>solail</i> raant	That was the power of the bright <i>sun</i>
Ke teu <i>solaz</i> nus feseit.	Which gave us such <i>comfort</i> .

and what the fisherman said is :

I could not pay attention save to the celestial *joys* [or *suns*],
With which this place was entirely full.

2275. The chronicler tells of King Edward's restoration of the church :

(Ceste iglise) mettre en estat
A cuvent veut suz prelat,
E enricher de riche duns.

Which passage is quite explained by lines 2320, seqq.

E met l'ordre en bon estat
Suz seint e ordené prelat ;
E nombre de cuvent receit
Sulum l'ordre de Seint Beneit.

Evidently he is speaking of the foundation of a convent, according to the order of St. Benedict.

Now let us turn back to 2275, and see Mr. Luard's helpless translation :—

mettre en estat	to put into a proper condition
<i>A cuvent veut suz prelat.</i>	Under a prelate <i>he had often wished.</i>

Glossary says :—

“Cuvent, i. e. souvent. Often.”

After the fashion of Giles' Key to the Classics, it would therefore run :—

a he had, *cuvent* often, *veut* wished.

There are some delicious renderings of this kind in that admirable series of “keys” just mentioned (notably the Italian one), but I do not think that even *in them* anything more inexcusable could be found or imagined, than this ; “*a* he had, *cuvent* often, *veut* wished” ! It is only wasting paper to translate it correctly, but for uniformity's sake it shall be given :—

This church to put into proper condition
<i>As a convent</i> under a prelate <i>he wishes.</i>

2282. U est du mund *li maire sege.*

i. e., the *master*-seat, chief seat, a very common mode of expression. But Mr. L. has no experience in the matter to guide him, so he translates :—

“Which is the *mother* throne,” &c.

Glossary, “*Maire*, Mother. *Li maire sege*, 2282, the mother seat.”

King Edward is restoring the monastery ; he makes a cloister, chapter-house,—

2313. Refaitur e le dortur	Refectory and dormitory,
E les officines <i>en tur.</i>	And the offices IN THE TOWER. (! !)

“Officines” means “workshops,” “rooms for work,” as

his Glossary has it. But they were not *in the tower*. At least, there is no such thing stated here. The last line is wrongfully divided :

Correct : "les officines *entur*, and workshops *around*."

2369. Ai un muster restoré :	(I have restored a monastery) :
Vai un cuvent posé.	A convent <i>exists</i> placed.

So, then, *vai* means "exists." Voyons. Glossary says : "Vai, vait, 3 pers. sing. pres. ind. of *aler*." Now, as *aler* means *to go*, this does not give us "*exists*," at best, and therefore the passage should not have been left in this state.

Simply correct in opposite direction from last quotation, by separation.

Ai un muster restoré,	I have restored a monastery,
U ai un cuvent pose.	Where I have placed a convent.

2440. Ordres eveske ne i face	Let not the bishop send there his commands,
For par prière e par grace	Excepting with entreaty and by permission
D'abbé, <i>k'au ceus</i> i serra.	Of the abbot <i>whom THEY shall have</i> .

"K'au ceus i serra"—"whom they shall have;" which is to be got thus; *k'*, who, AU CEUS, TO THEM (!!), *i serra*, there shall be. Mr. Luard has misread his MS. again.

Instead of *ceus*, read *tens*, i. e., "*au tens*, at that time."

2475. Quant est oi e cunfermé	When it is heard and confirmed,
Mais enregistre e enbullé	And registered and ratified
Au cuncil, &c.	At the council, &c.

But this translation takes no heed of the *mais* (which certainly cannot be rendered as if it were *e*, and, as Mr. L. has done). There is no doubt that this *mais* should be MIS, reading

"MIS EN REGISTRE e enbullé,"	"Put into the register," &c.
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Cf. l. 2288, where we have

E recunferme e resaele
E face *en* registre mettre.

(where also probably the *en* should be *eu*, but of this further.)

King Edward appoints judges, &c.,

2493. Ke pleintes ne plaitz de <i>curt</i>	That the complaints and lawsuits of the court
De Deu amer ne le <i>destrut</i> .	May not <i>draw him off</i> from loving God.

Glossary has: "Destruter, to destroy. In 2493, it seems to be used in the sense of "*to draw away from*."

So then, neither (1) rhyme, nor (2) accident, nor (3) meaning, could help Mr. Luard to the right word for his text!

1. *Destrut* does not rhyme with *curt*.
2. *Destrut* does not come from *destruer*, which is not = *destruir*.
3. *Destrut* could not (if it were from *destruer*) mean "*they may draw off*."

The real word is plain from the rhyme, viz., "*desturt*," i. e. "*turns him away*," from *des-tordre* (dis-torquere).

The king has told his vision to Leofric, and charges him not to reveal it, adding:—

2568. <i>Ben puis</i> cest ensample traire,	<i>Since it is better</i> to follow the <i>example</i>
Ke nostre Sire ruva taire	<i>Of our Lord who commanded silence</i>
As tres ke vindrent en munt	To the three who came to mount
Tabor of li, e <i>la veu unt</i>	Tabor with him, and <i>had the sight</i> . . .
<i>La Transfiguraciun</i> .	<i>Of the Transfiguration</i> .

The translation of the first two lines is startling.

A la Giles, we might have: *puis*, since, *ben*, it is better, &c.

How any man not devoid of the average amount of knowledge of Mod. Fr. should have been able to fancy this a *possible* construction, seems inexplicable. The penultimate line is also very bad.

One of Mr. Luard's marvels !

2709. Humme ki ne veit cist, tant *marvit*.

It is difficult to realize what must have been the state of bewilderment in which our Editor had involved himself at the time when he was engaged on this task. The natural, and indeed only, possible inference is, that he had read exceedingly little of Old French when he undertook the responsibility of editing this poem.

Mr. Luard has translated the above line as follows :—

“Who sees not *this man*, much *marvels* ;”

the glossarial instruction being—

“*Marvit*, 2709, 3 pers. sing. pres. ind. From *Marvoyer*, to wonder.”

The whole line of translation is, indeed, marvellous !

Humme ki ne veit cist, tant marvit. Who sees not *this man*, much *marvels* ! !

Correct as under :—

“A man who *does not see this*, LIVES *in vain*,” reading, of course, “*tant mar vit*,” without the slightest doubt.

The phrase *tant mar* = “to his own cost,” “in vain,” “without profit,” &c., is of perpetual occurrence in O. F.

King Edward is unwilling to trust a dream which has appeared to him, deeming it a phantom and a lie. His councillors advise him.

2764. Sire,” dient cist “merci—
Par sunge fu Joseph garni,
K’il en Egipte s’en alast,
E quant tens fu k’il repeifast,

N'est pas fentosme ne gile,
Co testmoine la ewangile
En la veu lei l'avisium
Du rei de Egipte Pharaun.

“Sire,” said they, “pardon—
By a dream was Joseph warned,
That he should go into Egypt,
And when the time was come that he
should return,
It was no phantasm or guile,
So testifies the Gospel,
In his sight of the vision
Of Pharaoh, king of Egypt.

I confess to being totally unable to understand what Mr. Luard meant here, so far as the *sense* of the passage is

concerned. As to the construction, probably he intends *lei* to be taken as a genitive dependent on *la veu*, viz., the sight of him. But what governs *l'avisiun*, we are left to our unaided efforts to discover. Further, are we to suppose that Mr. Luard had been led by his studies to infer that *Pharaoh* was the name of the king of whom Joseph was afraid? Or shall we infer that Mr. Luard supposes that the Joseph here spoken of was Joseph the son of Jacob? Either way, it is curious to consider how ingeniously Mr. Luard has distorted the passage.

The fact is, two instances are here given of true dreams; the one of Joseph, which the New Testament, the *Gospel*, testifies; the other of Pharaoh, which the *Old Testament* speaks of! The line is simply:

En la veu lei, In the old law.

A blind man who has been healed is rejoicing:

2791. Mut m'esjois, mut m'esmerveil
Ne pèce a rai du solail,
Ore vei ja tuz de ceste curt.

Which means:

"Much I rejoice and marvel,
A short while ago, not even a ray of the sun (could I have seen),
Now I see all of this court."

The phrase *pèce a*, means simply "a short while ago." It is a mode of expression that occurs scores of times, even in a writer so late as Montaigne [written *pièce*]; yet will it be believed that Mr. Luard has actually rendered this, "A ray of the sun has not PIERCED me" (!) His Glossary says;—

"Pèce, 2791, seems to be for *Percè* [sic!], pierced."

The people are addressing the blind man:—

2797. Es tu certain, Art thou sure,
Est co celui ke vè ni mein? Is it he who saw NOT his hand?

Construction and accidance alike disregarded! It should be :—

"Celui ke vi *ui mein*, Whom I *saw* TO-DAY (= this) morning." The words "*ui mein*," for "this morning," are too common to need explanation; but if Mr. L. have any doubts about it, he has *mein* in his own edition (3356, "cum flur ki s'espanist *au mein*, e au vespre flestrit), and *ui* he will find in Burguy, I., p. 315.

(This *ui* is, of course, the *hui* in aujourd' hui.)

2877. Li reis respunt, "Si Deus le voille,	The king answers: "If God wills it,
N'est droitz k'en curuce u doille,	It is not right to be angry or sorrowful at it;
Par un pecchur autre garir	By one sinner another to cure
Si l'en plest, n'est droitz ke <i>menir.</i> "	If it please Him, it is only right to <i>bring him.</i> "

The last line is quite wrong. It should be "*m'EN ir*," i. e. If it please God so, it is not right that I *should be angry at it*; and the second of the lines quoted has the same construction.

After dinner

2911. Vait chescuns <i>en arbri</i> cucher.	Each goes to lie down <i>under a tree</i> .
En arbri, <i>under a tree</i> !	
<i>En</i> does not mean "under," and <i>arbri</i> is not "a tree."	
It should be <i>en abri</i> , in shelter, in the shade.	

Here is a line mangled almost beyond the power of recognition. Let us re-assort these "disjecta membra poetæ."

2942. Faire t'apent un pelerinage	It behoves thee to make a pilgrimage
A seisante e vint eglises,	To eighty churches,
<i>Agenue</i> , <i>lange</i> uraisun	<i>On thy knees</i> , utter a prayer
Requerant Deu ta gareisun.	Beseeching God for thy cure.

Then, for Glossary, the two entries are :—

1. "*Agenue*, 2942, *On thy knees*."

For our edification he adds : *Perhaps, A genuë.*

2. "Langer, 2942, To speak."

And neither is correct, nor anything like it. The line should be :—

"*A geun e lunge uraisun*," i. e., With fasting and long prayer.

That Mr. Luard has no real hold of the fact that *G*¹ is very often used where the modern form has *j* (*à jeun*) is plain, but will be further established by a few more instances.

Here are, ex. gr., two, with curious results; and as both occur *close together*, the reader may fill his eye with them both at one glance.

(A young lady has scrofula. Her state is described.)
She had swellings

2617. Ki a dular e meschéance	Which with pain and suffering
De la GOUE avoit nissance;	From the <i>throat</i> took their rise;
Le face en out mut enlaidie,	Her face by it was much injured,
Depecée e <i>engannie</i> .	Mutilated and <i>disfigured</i> .

Glossary has both the words :—

1. "Goue, 2618, i. e., *Goule*, Throat."

But, of course, it is the modern *joue*, "cheek." !

2. Gives us a brief disquisition on the use of the word "*Engannie*, 2619. Enganni, Plur. 4430. Part. of Enganner, to deceive, abuse. (Ital. Ingannare.) In both the above places it is used of a disease."

Let us see, then, the second place of its occurrence, which is in a list of diseased persons, among whom are

4430. Li langerus, e li flestri,	The weak and the withered,
Li emflé e <i>enganni</i> ,	The swollen and <i>disfigured</i> ,
Li cuntrait e li leprus, &c.	The deformed and leprous.

Here, at least, he has made no attempt to solve the problem which arises, viz., how *to deceive, to abuse*, Ital. *ingannare*, can possibly come to mean *disfigured*.

¹ Yet he has such forms as *gambes, gardins, garetz* (= jarrets, &c.).

It should be *engauni* (*engaunie*, 2618), from the verb "engaunir, to grow YELLOW," Modern French, *jaunir* (cf. our *jaundice*).

Engannir, to deceive, to abuse, forsooth!

He is deceived and *we* are abused.

(Cf. Auban, 705. Fevres ki funt la gent *engaunir* e trembler, i. e., Fevers which made the people grow yellow and shiver.)

A young man, who had fallen asleep under a tree, suddenly loses his sight. He rubs his eyes, &c., but he has become quite blind :—

2920. Tert les oilz *de la chacie*,

Mais l'avoglesse n'en tert mie.

He wipes his eyes *hastily*,

But the blindness he wipes not away.

In the Glossary he has no further light to shed over the passage than what may be struck out of the following entry :—

"Chacie, De la chacie. Hastily, 2920 (?)"

I do not remember to have seen a "?" more justifiably added to any suggestion in the entire Glossary, nor indeed, in any other book extant. There is absolutely no ground for assuming "hastily" to be the meaning. Why not "slowly," or "angrily," or "sadly," or, in fact, *any* adverb capable of qualifying a verb which means "to rub"? On the *κατὰ σύνεσιν* method, I would suggest "carefully" as the more likely adverb!

His translation only shows "the poverty of the land." A *thorough* acquaintance (I mean such an acquaintance as ought to be, and *is*, attainable by a scholar,) with Modern French could not have failed to call up to him the word "CHASSIE," i. e. "*rheum*, moisture affecting the eyes," and that too with such force and obviousness as to preclude all chance of entrance to any mere speculative adverb picked out at hap-hazard to fill up the phrase.

"He cleanses his eyes of *the rheum*,

But the blindness he wipes not away."

Mr. Luard's notes are not very frequent, but they are exceedingly pregnant—of mistakes ! ex. gr.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 2952. E cum dit fu ke ne sujurt | And as he <i>was told to stay</i> |
| U li rois fu, s'en va a curt, | Where the king was, he went to court, |
| E se met enmi la rute | And put himself in the midst of the company, |
| Ki siveit le rei Aedward tute. | All of which followed King Edward. |

His note on the first line is as follows :—

"The negative in the text '*ke ne sujurt*' cannot be correct."

But it *can* be correct, and *is* correct ; and it is only the three sides of Mr. Luard's operation in the matter—text, translation, and note—that are in the wrong.

Remove the comma from the middle of the second line to the end of the first :

E cum dit fu ke ne sujurt,
 Û li rois fu s'en va à curt, &c.

That is :

As it was said that *he should not delay*,
 He sets off to court, where the king was,
 And gets into the middle of the crowd
 Which was following the king.

Here and there the Glossary is enlivened by a little etymology also, the derivations being, some of them, as curious as the accidence, or the syntax, or the orthography.

[Listen to his cry,]

- | | |
|--|--|
| 2975. <i>Ke</i> vostre franchise e grace | For your liberality and favour |
| <i>Suatun</i> pur Deu li face. | Through God <i>will give</i> him relief. |

It should be :

(Listen) THAT God MAY give.

But how do we get *relief*?

Glossary gives: "*suatun*, relief;" actually deriving the word from *suavitus*!

I think there can be little doubt that *sauvacium*, salvation, should be read.

(In order to cure the poor man)

2999. Li reis le fait droit *sus* ester
E li dist, "Vees tu, amis?"
"Sire, *oil vostre cler vis*."

Where Mr. Luard's curious misinterpretation is as follows :

The king makes him stand straight *below* HIM,
And says to him, "seest thou, friend?"
"Sire, *your bright eye I see*."

But (1,) in reality, the king only makes him stand UP, which is the meaning of *sus* (not *below*), and there is no *him*. And (2), what shall we say to the last line ?

Oil vostre cler vis.

I see your bright eye.

À la Giles: *vis*, I see; *vostre cler*, your clear; *oil*, eye! Now, it is as plain as Old French can make it. The line contains a direct answer to the king's question, and then a specification.

"Do you see, friend?"

"Sire, *yes*, your bright *face* (which is so fair and honourable.)"

"*Oil, vostre cler vis, (oui, votre cler visage)*."

To translate as Mr. L. has done is to ignore all grammatical concord. "Throw *grammar* to the winds, I'll none of it." Clearly there had not been much special study of the Langue d'OIL before undertaking this edition! The word *vis* could not possibly be 1st sg. pres. indic., any more than the *vi* in 2797 (*vide supra*) could be "he saw."

The servant says he could cure the blind men if he could get the miraculous water in which the king washed his hands, and which—

3049. Tant est a *seinté* truvée

So good has it been *for the restoration*
found

E en avogles espruvée;

And proved in the case of the blind;

Cist quatre povre dolent

These four poor miserables

Mut en averunt riche present

Would have by it a very rich present

De *santé* trestut ensemble.

Of *restoration* all together.

It is evident that Mr. L. thinks *seinté* and *santé* are the

same. But it is not so; *seinté* is *holiness*, and the meaning of 3049 is:—"the water is of tried *holiness*, sanctity, &c." (see 3986).

3100. Mut cremut Deus e ot pour	Much he feared God and had dread
De la force sun Créatur.	Of the might of his Creator.
Ne fust a ses povres venu	Nor would he have gone to his poor
<i>S'il nel eust amé e cremu.</i>	Had he <i>not been loved and feared.</i>

Here the meaning is completely lost. But what shall we say of the grammar? Surely, one fancies *eust amé* was not so far apart from *eût aimé* of the modern language as to make of it a hidden mystery!

Render:

He feared God, &c.,
Nor would he have gone to the poor
If he *had* not loved *Him* (i. e. God).

3107. De haut cunseil fu *tute* NEIS. Of high counsel was he *entirely*.

As to *neis*, all the information furnished us in the Glossary is contained in the following entry:

"Neis, even. Joined with *tute* in 3107."

But it is not *neis* at all that should be read, and "*tute*" does not mean "*entirely*." It should be *tute veis*, i. e. "*toutefois*," which is quite common, and which he may find in Burguy, Vol. II., p. 293.

Here is one of those incomprehensible pieces of silliness which are scattered broad-cast throughout the whole edition, for the reader will be pleased to recollect that these specimens are only *selections*.

Two children are playing, and

3148. L'un al autre teu coup dune	One to the other gives such a blow
K' <i>abatu</i> là e tut l'estune.	That it <i>strikes</i> him down <i>there</i> , and quite stuns him.

"*Abatu*, it strikes down ; *là*, there" ! which translation is, without dispute, utterly beyond the sphere of ordinary criticism. It should be :

"*K' abatu l'a*, that it *has struck him* down (and stuns him)."

After watching the struggle of the children, the king says to the father :—

3165. Dist li reis : "Ne veis tu mie De tes fiz, quens, la crapoudie ?"	Said the king : "Seest thou not Of thy sons, earl, the struggle ?"
"Oil, sire, co est lur deduitz ; Einz est estrifs, feluns e fruitz, Sire." "Ni a mal ne peril N'entenz tu el ?" "Sire, nenil."	"Yes, sire, this is their amusement ; But it is a quarrel, cruel and violent, Sire." "Nor ill, nor danger Expect you <i>from</i> it ?" "Sire, nothing."

(A few lines below, 3178, the king says :—

Mi quers en est tut *el* pensanz, My heart is all pensive *concerning it*.

Here we have our old friend *el*, already so often mangled. But besides, the whole passage is wretchedly done, and the proper translation of the last line (3178) will make it plain that the Editor has totally misunderstood the preceding colloquy. Translate :

"My heart is thinking altogether *DIFFERENTLY* about it ;"

and then re-arrange the other lines as follows :—

King. Dist le reis "Ne veis tu mie De tes fiz, quens, la crapou- die ?"	King. "Dost thou not see The ill-behaviour of thy sons, Count ?"
Count. "Oil, sire, co est lur deduitz."	Count. "Yes, sire, it is their sport."
King. "Einz est estrifs, feluns e fruitz."	King. " <i>Nay, rather</i> , it is a quarrel," &c.
Count. "Sire, <i>n'i a</i> mal ne peril."	Count. "Sire, there is neither ill nor harm in it."
King. "N'entenz-tu el ?" "Sire, nenil—"	King. "Do you not see <i>anything else</i> ?" "No, sire—"

3236. Speaking of the bad character of Harold :—

Nel creust humme plus ke le vent.

which Mr. Luard thinks means—

“*Man he believed* no more than the wind.”

But it really is:—

“*People would* not believe *him*,” &c.

-
- | | | |
|-------|------------------------------------|---|
| 3266. | Les chers amis . . . | The dear friends |
| | Out cist losengers mauveis | Had this wicked flatterer |
| | Destruit e ocis <i>de maneis</i> . | Destroyed and slain <i>with his HANDS</i> (!) |

It is absolutely so put in his translation: *with his hands!* and to make matters certain, and ease the mind of the critic of any misgivings as to whether it might not be an accidental slip, it is stated in the Glossary:—

“*Maneis, Hands.*”

But *demaneis* is merely a compound adverb, meaning “*immediately.*” (*v. Burguy Gram. II., p. 304.*)

-
- | | | |
|-------|------------------------------------|--|
| 3286. | Servi un sergantz des vins, | A servant served out the wine, |
| | La cupe lu roi gentement | The cup of the king gently |
| | Portant <i>sur co pavement</i> ; | Carrying <i>over the pavement</i> ; |
| | As desgrez du dois quant munte, | When he mounts the steps of the dais, |
| | <i>Ceste</i> du pè, dunt a hunte ; | <i>His foot slips</i> , which makes him
ashamed ; |
| | A pou k'a terre n'est chaet. | He has all but fallen on the ground. |

In Glossary we are informed:—

“*Ceste*, 3286, for *Cheste*, 3rd pers. sing. ind. of *Chaoir*, with the intercalary *s.*” (!!)

Mr. Luard's explanation is a complete mistake. The word is perhaps “*cesce*,” i. e. *cesse*, and *cesse du pé* (or probably *d'un pé*) means “blunders with his (one) foot.”

3326. When the Count was choked by the morsel that stuck in his throat, his death-agony is thus described:—

Andui li *oïl en* [sic ; but read *eu*] *chef li virent*,
Char li nercist e devient pale.

This is plain enough: "His two eyes *roll* in his head," &c. But Mr. L. is above ordinary sense. He puts it thus:—

"Both his eyes in his head *seemed to be*" !!

I should think so indeed! Where *else* should they SEEM to be?

- | | |
|--|---|
| 3334. Mut out force la benaicun,
Ke duna a mors vertu,
<i>Par unc</i> la mort provée fu. | Much power had the blessing
Which gave power to the morsel;
<i>For aye</i> was the murder proved. |
|--|---|

Wrong, text and translation. Correct:—

<i>Par unt</i> la mort provée fu.	<i>By which</i> the death was proved.
-----------------------------------	---------------------------------------

As to *Par unt*, a common phrase, cf. Burguy, Gram. II., 285:—"Unt, dérivé de *unde*, s'unissait à la préposition *par*: *par unt* = *par où*, *par quel moyen*."

- | | |
|--|--|
| 3384. Mut fait bon de Deu penser,
E despire la vanité
Du mund. | <i>Thoughts from God</i> bring great good,
And MAKE ONE despise the vanity
Of the world. |
|--|--|

But it really means something quite different.

It is of very great service to *think of God*,
And to *despise* the vanity of the world.

As it happens, the Latin might have kept him from the error. P. 373, line 394: "*Sum memor Domini*."

- | | |
|--|---|
| 3386. . . . despire la vanité
Du mund, ki n'est fors <i>fause</i> . | despise the vanity
Of the world, which is nought but
<i>falsity</i> . |
|--|---|

As Glossary only gives "*fause*, false," one would rather meet the adjective in the translation also. But here we are in a difficulty; for if it be *fause*, the feminine adjective, it will by no means rhyme with *vanité*.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the word is not *fause*, but *fauseté*, which satisfies both rhyme and rhythm, and has the merit, besides, of allowing the translation to stand.

The king is telling his dream, how he saw the seven sleepers:—

3396. Ben le vi apertement,	Well I saw it distinctly,
<i>Vi is robes, cuntenement.</i>	I saw <i>their</i> dress, their appearance.

From which one is compelled to infer that Mr. Luard believes *is* can mean "*their*" in Old French! Utter amazement sends us to his Glossary, where we meet the entry:

"*Is*, 3396. *Their*, Plural."

Plainly, the process is as follows: "*Vi is robes*" was assumed to mean something that the king might have been expected to say, such as, e. g. "*I saw their dress.*" Then as *vi* meant *I saw*, and *robes* meant *dress*, there was only left *is* to mean *their*; this being thus mathematically determined, it was inserted in the Glossary.

Only the first mistake vitiated the whole process: he *did not* say, "I saw their robes."

Correct Mr. Luard's *vi is* into *viis*, a form of *vis*, "visage" [cf. *riis*, in 3436], and then translate:

"*Viis*, robes, cuntenement."
i. e. "*Face*, dress, deportment."

Once more the Latin might have saved him from a ridiculous blunder, for in the corresponding passage, it gives the identical *three* matters of detail!

P. 373, l. 398, "*Vultus quoque vestes, membrorum cætera signa*,"
i. e. *viis*, robes, cuntenement.

And yet in the face of that, he could edit as he has done, and put *is* = *their*!

3412. Li ducs envieit un chivaler,	The duke sent a knight,
Li eveske, un clerc; l'abé, un	The bishop, a cleric; the abbé, a monk.
moine;	
Cist troi sanz deslai <i>da</i> soinne,	These three, without delaying <i>their care</i>
Vunt en la terre, &c.	Go into the land.

Glossary:—

"*Soinne*, 3412, *Care*."

"*Da*, 3412, i. e. *De*."

Both which entries are, as too frequently, wrong.

It should be, "sanz delai d'asoinne, without delay of excuse," i. e. on any plea of excuse.

The word asoinne (essoinne, essone, esoine) means "an excuse of difficulty, danger, &c., for not performing a service; for not answering a summons of the court," &c.

It occurs in Bartsch Chrest., p. 227, l. 29, with the very same word in the rhyme as here:—

Que menguent donc vostre moine ?
Jel vos dirai sanz nule essoine.

What then do your monks eat ?

I will tell it you without any objection, plea of excuse to be silent about the matter.

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 3441. N'est terre ke peccché ne soille, | There is no land which sin soils not, |
| France, Lunbardie, Poille, | France, Lombardy, Poland, |
| Nis Engleterre ki fors lingne | Even England, which degenerates, |
| E de heritage per[ç] la lingne. | And loses the line of its heirs. |
| N'out unc pus roi sint apert, | Nor has there since a king appeared, |
| Dunt li monde en fust ben cert, | Whom the world has well known, |
| Ki vie laboriuse | Who a life of labour |
| E mort ne estoit perilluse. | And a death of danger has not had. |

Glossary gives:—

(1). "Poille, Poland." But Poille does *not* mean Poland; it is *Apulia*, i. e. *South Italy*, in contradistinction to "Lunbardie," which of course means *North Italy*.

[Mr. Luard's mistake in the meaning of the word *Poille*, however, is far and away outdone in the following passage, which contains a precisely similar blunder, but of the most preposterous character.

In dedicating his book to Queen Eleanor, wife of Henry III., our poet speaks in terms of praise of the harmonious life of the noble pair:—

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 70. Dunc est bone la cumpainie, | Then the company is good, |
| Ke veut amie, e amis voile; | What the lady love wills, that her lover |
| | should will; |
| Tesmoine nus enporte toile. | The nuptial-couch gives us the proof. |

Now, the *κατὰ σύνεσιν* principle here fails to satisfy

the demand of the reader for an acceptable translation, which shall be grammatical, &c. Plainly, the words I have italicized are intended to be equivalent. When one comes to examine into the possibility of such equivalence, however, it certainly seems more than doubtful, for "nuptial" has to do with *marriage*, and "couch" means *bed*, but neither of these words has anything like the meaning of "toile." By the figure of speech called "synecdoche," the word, which means "sheet," may be construed to mean *bed*, as a part of the whole, but how the *other* idea, viz., that of "nuptial," is to be justifiably connected therewith, one does not readily see. Evidently Mr. Luard's exposition will not do.

If the possibilities had been exhausted, one must perforce have remained content; the wrong in the matter is, that the possibilities were *not* exhausted, and therefore such a piece of perverted ingenuity should never have been printed. Here is the passage as it should stand:—

"Temoine nus en porte *Toile*, *Toile* bears witness of it to us."

And "*Toile*" is *Tullius*,¹ and Tullius is Cicero, and probably most readers of *Tully* will be able to recall the passage in which this harmony (*amicitia—rerum omnium consensio*) is spoken of.]

(2). "Fors-lingne *seems better* than fors lingne" (!)

Surely, *if* it is to mean "degenerates." But this translation is only suggested to him by his needless conjecture in the following line, viz., *pert* for *per* (which the MS. gives). The lines as they stand without the conjecture simply mean "outside of the line, or by the line, of heritage." The next verse, however, is a total failure with Mr. Luard. He has not ventured to translate "sint" at all, and the Glossary shows his state of mind in relation to this small word. Oh, these small words!

¹ Cf. the quotation in Roquefort sub voce *Tuilles*: "devez garder ke votre don ne nuise à celui qui vous le donez: kar *Tuilles* dist: ki done à home chose que lui nuise, est . . . felonie."

The reader may compare *Toile* = *Tuille* with *voile* (71) = *vuille* (at p. 385, quoted infra, p. 79), and *Poille* = *Puille*, in Roquefort, sub voce.

"Sint, 3445 (?). This word may possibly be *sint*, and might be a form of the participle of *surire*, but even then it would be difficult to understand. There is probably some corruption."

That, reader, is the extent to which Mr. Luard is prepared to go. "May be," "might be," "a form," "probably."

Probably, indeed! But surely an Editor is expected to make some rational attempt to *remove* a corruption if he finds any in his text. It is, of course, not always safe conjecturing when one has not the MS. near to consult; but I think that it should be "*seint*, holy," and then the passage would run:—"Even England (is stained by sin), for whether by direct line of descent or not, it has never more had a *holy* king (roi *seint*) whose life and death were not, &c." The clause "apert, dunt li monde en fust ben cert" is a further qualification of this holy king: "openly (holy), and about whom (dunt) the world was certain as to his character (en)."

But I protest against any such note as Mr. Luard has put in his Glossary.

3656. . . . Tant est febles e malade,	So weak and ill is he,
Tant <i>dout</i> si chefs e quor ad	So much <i>doubt</i> has his head, and feeble-
fade.	ness has his heart.

If he had consulted Burguy (II., 170, line 17), he would have seen that *fade* is an adjective, not a noun. The lines there quoted have the same rhyme:—

Sire Artus, rois, je sui *malades*,
Bociez, meseaus, desfait et *faides*.

And *dout* is a verb, *dolet*: "his head is pained."

When the king is dead,

3694. La reine a poi ne muert,	The queen all but dies,
Ses cheveus trait, ses meins <i>de-</i>	Tears her hair, wrings her hands.
<i>curi</i> .	

Let us see how Mr. L. gets at this (correct) translation.

Glossary, "*Decurt*, 3694, 3 pers. sing. pres. indic. of *decurre*."

What *decurre* here means we are left to conjecture; I do not know, and probably the reader is in the same predicament. Fortunately, it is not necessary that we should know; the word *decurt* is a *figment*. The very rhyme might have shown him what it was, viz., *detuert*, twists, wrings, from *detordre* (vid. supra, on l. 2493, p. 52).

In describing the future punishment of England, the poet sets forth the rapacity of its rulers:—

3747. Prince e cunte, e li barun	Princes and counts and barons
Ne vunt querant si gloire nun,	Go seeking only <i>vain</i> -glory, (sic !)
Ne sunt saul k'aver n'engulent.	Nor do they live but to swallow <i>money</i> .

I have not the remotest conception how he contrives to educe this meaning from the last line. At first one fancies he takes *aver* to be "money," but no, the fatal entry in Glossary debars this:—

"Saul. Money."

But if so, then how is the rest of the sentence to be got at? On arithmetico-logical principles, as "engulent" must mean "swallow," and "saul" is to mean "money," we should have:—

"Ne sunt aver = nor do they live"!!

Query, is it "*ne aver*, nor have they, *sunt*, existence"?

He might just as well have translated the line:—

"Some have *souls* in their *gullets*,"

which, at all events, is something like the *sound* of the French words, and is really *done* on the principle which seems to have guided our Editor in his search for a meaning!

The word *saul* simply means "full, satiated," [M. F. *saoûl*, *soûl*] and the line is:—

They are never so *full*, that they (could) not swallow *property*, &c.

They are never content with what they have, but are always hungry for more.

Two saints had appeared to the king, and predicted evils to come upon England, owing to the wickedness of the clergy and the rulers. It is asked by the king :—

- | | |
|--|---|
| 3756. Dis lur jo; . . . "Ne put penance
Desturber ceste grant ven-
gance?" | I say to them, "Cannot penance
Prevent this mighty vengeance?" |
| "Nun," dient cist, "purqui lur
quers
Plus sunt endurcis l'acres." | "No," say they, "because their hearts
Advance to a greater hardening." |

This rendering not being literal, we turn to the Glossary to see what scraps of information we can pick up. And this time there is no stint of explanation. Here is the entry :—

"Acres. Increase. *Used adverbially in 3756.*"

So then, "acres," a noun, is used adverbially. But what about the article? May we conjecture that *its* function also has gone over into that of another part of speech? that it is used, in fact, *prepositionally*? Thus we should have :—

l' = in, *acres* = increase, i. e. increasingly.

It is clear that this process opens endless vistas of possible translation. One fears it is too easy to be a legitimate process. Yet the line could scarcely fail to right itself, if the reader will merely read aloud the translation up to the last two words, and let *them* supply themselves. "For their hearts are harder" The MS. had surely, *k'acres*, "than steel," which satisfies both sense, rhyme, and grammar.

Harold swears he will not take the crown :—

- | | |
|---|--|
| 3899. Juré l'ai co est verité;
N'ert humme par mei deserte
Le droite du regne ki apent
A vos, sire, naturaument. | I have sworn <i>that which</i> is true;
No man through me <i>shall attack</i>
The right of the throne which belongs
To you, sire, . . . |
|---|--|

This is all wrong; wrongly punctuated, and worse translated. Correct:—

Juré l'ai—co est verité,—
N'ert humme par mei *deserité*.

i. e. I have sworn (—this is truth),
(That) No man *shall be disinherited* (= ousted) by me.

Plainly enough, in all conscience! Besides, he puts into his Glossary:—

“*Deserte*, 3898, = to *destroy, ravage* ;”

neither of which meanings is even *applicable* to his text.

The rhyme demanded so imperatively *deserité* [*verité* was, of course, unmistakeable] that the mistake is really incomprehensible.

3954. . . . Aedward li rois King Edward
Murut, quart jur de Jenevers,	Died, the fourth day of January,
Pucens [read puceus] du cors,	Virgin of body, <i>pure throughout</i> .
<i>pur se enters.</i>	

Now, what is to be made of that, by a reader who is not master of O. F.? “*Pur se enters*, i. e. *pure throughout* :” which is which? Two explanations seem possible :

1. *Pur*, pure, *se enters* (himself entire =) throughout.
2. *Enters*, pure, *pur se* (for himself =) throughout.

But as neither of these explanations is for a moment tenable, such a reader would be totally at fault.

Mr. Luard has in his Preface a sentence which I would recommend to his own serious consideration, viz.—“I believe, that to a person *not familiar with this language*, his chief difficulties will arise from ignorance of the tense and person of the verbs.”

So do I: but not his *sole* difficulties. I rather think that a great portion of them will arise from the manner in which the book has been edited. No unskilled reader could make anything of the line in the state in which Mr. Luard has left it, and yet it could have been put so that it should have been impossible for any one to miss it.

As thus :—

“Puceus du cors, *purs* e enters. Virgin of body, pure and whole.”

A very simple sentence, wrongly rendered, from sheer neglect of an ordinary grammatical concord.

The author of the poem says, that for those who cannot *read*, he has *drawn* the leading scenes, adding—

3966. Pur co ke desir e voil Because I desire and wish
Ke oraille *ot, voient* li oil. That ear *should* hear, eyes should see.

This is wrong : it should be :—

Because I desire that *what* the ear *hears*, the eyes should see.

i. e. that the picture should tell what the words tell.

3984 (vide also 3049). Many miracles are performed at the king's tomb ; as the poem says :—

Peccheur, salu
Malade i trove
Sancté, de seinteté k'est prove.

Which means clearly :—

“The sinner (finds) salvation, the sick man finds health,
Which is a proof of the *holiness*, saintship (of the dead king).”

Now Mr. Luard gives this as follows :—

“The sick man finds health,
The sinner there holiness,
Which is a proof of his [whose ?] sanctity.”

From which it might, perhaps, be inferred that he really understood the passage. Alas, no !

He will not leave us in this favourable judgment ; he adds a note, saying :—“I have altered the order of the original ;” and to make sure as to *what* he means, he puts the figures which refer to this note at the end of both the lines in question. In other words, he takes *salu* to mean *health*, and *sancté* to mean *holiness* ; clinching the matter by his insertion in the Glossary of “*Salu. Health.*”

2638, 2639, in that passage. *The same blunder, 'par' for 'pas,' occurs in 3880.*"

The reader has seen 2638-9; here is 3880:

Speaking of his queen, whom he is eulogizing, the king says of her:

3880. Ki bens ne pus *pas* cunter [MS. *par*]. Whose virtues I cannot number.

But it really is what the MS. had, viz., *parcunter*, i. e. "to enumerate thoroughly." (For *ki* = *cujus*, vide l. 687, p. 26.)

4199. E ke ne seit si os k'il *sente mette* And let him not be so daring *as to attempt*

De enfreindre chose k'il pro- To infringe a promise that he has
mette. made.

Glossary only introduces us to the following explanation:—

"*Sente. Way*, k'il *sente mette*. 4199 = That he direct his way, i. e. undertake, venture."

The text should be corrected into:

Ne seit si os k'il *s'entremette* (de enfreindre),

to which his translation will fairly correspond. Cf. de Valenciennes (Ed. de Wailly) § 501: "Puis ke li hom *s'entremet* de biel dire et de traitier, il se doit bien traveller," &c.

As I said, I have never seen the MS. from which Mr. Luard has edited this poem, but there cannot be the slightest doubt of the reading.

To a person with the MS. before him, hundreds of places may (nay *must*, under such editing) turn up where the MS. has been misread, &c. The confusion introduced by the Editor into the *n*, *u*, *m*, *ni*, *ui*, *in*, &c., is fearful. Ex. gr. here is a monosyllable that it is quite impossible to follow in this edition, viz., *em*, which is mixed up with other words in the most bewildering fashion. Of course, in MSS. the sign *ē* will stand for either *em* or *en*; but it

would much conduce to the intelligibility of the text if, in transliterating, he had kept *em* [homo] and *en* [in] distinct, as I have no doubt they are kept distinct in the MS. Let the reader compare his treatment of lines 4157, 4207, 4164, which lie pretty closely together.

But further, he has not learned when to look for *eu*, which being very like *en*, is easily mistaken for it, unless one is careful. That the original poet employed the words indiscriminately the one for the other, I deny utterly. Thus, an examination of the MS. in the following lines will certainly furnish a number of cases where *eu* should be edited, and not *en*, as he has given:—

119, 209, 322, 457, 740, 931, 982, 1430, 1648, 1690, 1738, 1806, 1925, 2043, 2055, 2089, 2191, 2201, 2225, 2243, 2288, 2516, 2570, 2612, 2906, 3272, 3648, 3725, 3942, 3973, 4001, 4003, 4045, 4268, 4385, 4440, 4670.

And to show the necessity of care in discriminating these two completely different forms, here is one instance of what such confusion leads to:—

4268. “Estoilles crias *en quart jur*,”

which he has so edited, giving as the translation:—

“The stars thou hast created, *in four days*”!

The line is, of course: “The stars thou createdst (on the) *in the (eu) fourth day*”! Concerning which he may consult Genesis, chap. i.

4450. Co di pur le rei Haraud
A ki ne cheut cum li mundz aud.

This I say on account of King Harold,
To whom it falls not out, as the world
hears.

On this last word *aud*, Glossary gives:—

“*Aud*, 4450, 3 pers. sing. indic. of *ouir*. To hear.”

This is bad enough, for *aud* is no such thing; he adds: “More usually *od*.”

Assuming that it *did* come from *ouir*, I would beg to

ask, *where* it is "more *usually* od?" I am not familiar with its greater usualness, and neither Burguy nor Bartsch gives this form at all. But it has nothing to do with *ouir*; it comes from *aler*, to go. Mr. Luard will find the usual form *aut* (for *alt*, M. F. *aille*), subj. 3rd sg. pres., and as he is *not* familiar with his Burguy, the page is (Vol. I.) 284. Cf. also, Bartsch, 133, 12, "et il n'i avra ja si haut qui s'ost vanter que il i *aut*."

But we are not yet done with the line "a ki *ne cheut*," &c. As the same word occurs a few lines below, 4456, I will quote the line. (The chronicler is describing the ill-behaviour of King Harold, how he is plundering poor people); he adds:

"Ne cheut s'aucun ses pleint."

Now, in both examples the phrase is simply *he does not care*, if or how, &c.

4450. "Harold, who cares not how the world goes."

4456. "Does not care if any one pities . . ."

Ne cheut (ne chalt, ne chelt, &c.) (Ital. *non cale*) is a phrase hackneyed enough in O. F., but Mr. Luard must again exhibit his transcendent ignorance on the matter, and renders:

4456. *Ne cheut s'aucun les pleint*, NO ONE LETS FALL HIS COMPLAINTS(!)

As a corollary, here is his Glossarial entry:

"Cheiir. To fall, used actively in 4456."

Even supposing this to be possible (which it is not), the line is still a puzzle. Whence comes the *his*? Doubtless from a mixture of *s'* and *les*, but it is curious. Besides, the Editor has not seen that, in any case, the line is faulty, as it wants a "beat." Something has been omitted by the scribe, probably "sugetz":—

"Ne cheut s'aucun ses [sugetz] pleint, He cares not if any one commiserates
his [subjects]."

In describing Harold, he was a good knight, powerful, and skilled :

4506. Mais pecché e malicun	But sin and wickedness
Si grant fesa, si grant lascun,	So great <i>has he done</i> , so much <i>wrong</i> ,
Ke ne pout prendre foisum	That he cannot <i>prevent</i>
K'il n'alast a perdicun.	Himself from going to perdition.

Of the last two lines I have spoken elsewhere. The translation of the rest is pure guess-work, and has not even the exceedingly small merit of ingenuity.

Glossary, instructive as usual, under its entries :

"Fesa, 4506, seems to be [*seems to be!*] a form of the imperfect 3 pers. sing. of Faire."

Yet he *had* stumbled on the right :

Video melior, proboque
Deteriora sequor.

He continues : "Unless we read *fes a*, and the meaning of the line will then be : 'sin and wickedness have so much *weight*.' "

"Fes = Fais, Burden ; weight."

Granted ; this is what that part of the line *does* mean. But what about the *other part* of the line ? what about *lascun* ? Here was the difficulty for our Editor and Translator ; for *if* the line meant "sin has so much *weight*," how could the parallel clause be translated at all ? "Sin has so much *wrong*" would hardly do. We turn to the Glossary, which, I regret to say, here throws us over, leaves us in the lurch ! Not, however, without pity for a struggling reader, Mr. Luard hazards a suggestion, thus :—

"Lascun, 4506 (?) *Possibly* Lechery."

But now we are plunged into Cimmerian darkness, for applying Mr. Luard's *possibility* to his *alternative*, we have

A. Sin has so much weight, and so much lechery.

B. He did so much sin, so much lechery (*fesa lascun* !)

In a note the Editor explains (!) *eals*:—

“*Eals*, i. e. *eux*.”

Let us then attempt to translate the passage.

“The lay people cries him mercy,
Prays him much that he remain with them,
And if he now will not give it up (i. e. the journey)
. . . ? that he may be willing to defer it.”

As the Latin has it, p. 382, l. 43 :

“Ut vel omittat iter, *vel* differat.”

Still there is a gap to be filled up. A competent scholar will at once see that Mr. Luard's edition is rectified, and his note superseded by the following alteration (which the unlearned reader may note does not do the slightest violence to the MS.) :—

“*Seveals* le vaille purluigner. At least that he may defer it.”

Cf. Burguy, II., 331 :—“*Veals*, *veaus*, etc., sont des dérivés du latin *vel* dans sa signification de *même*, *aussi*, et le *s* final est paragogique. *Veals* ne répond pas à l'*igitur* latin, mais à *saltem*; il signifiait, *au moins*, *du moins*. On préposait souvent *si* [se] a ces formes, de là *siveals*,” &c.

And now I have finished my task. Perhaps I have been biassed in my criticism by the utter disappointment which the whole edition caused me, on coming to examine it for linguistic purposes. I could not possibly have believed, without seeing the matter before me, that a work could be issued under such high auspices with so little real claim to public attention. I have done what I could in the way of correction of the mistakes quoted, but I fear that it is a thankless office. If on any particular occasion I have used language severer than that occasion warrants, I can only regret that the number and general avoidableness of the mistakes have given the key-note to the whole criticism. Mr. Luard has expended on this edition, as I have not the slightest doubt, an amount of labour and

thought that might have sufficed for ten such poems, *if he had only* possessed the requisite previous knowledge. With even a little more knowledge, the importance of the poem linguistically would have been felt so deeply by him, that it perhaps might have made him hesitate before undertaking such a task. One always is more or less sorrowful at the sight of labour expended in vain.

[NOTE ON P. 5⁽¹⁾.]

The book to which I refer is a grammar of Icelandic, published by Franz Thimm. Its title-page declares it to be : —“A short practical and easy method of learning the Old Norsk tongue or Icelandic language, after the Danish of Rask, with reader &c., by H. Lund.” It is, in fact, a translation of Rask’s little grammar “Kortfattet Vejledning til det oldnordiske eller gamle islandske Sprog.” But it is shamefully translated. Here are a few examples.

§ 52. In speaking of the declension of masculine nouns, which add *r* for nom. sg., Rask says :

“Hvor det sidste Rodbogstav er *r*, *s*, *dér* vakler Brugen imellem *rr*, *ss*, eller enkelt *r*, *s*, med bortkastet Kønsmærke ; dog findes vel oftest : þórr, *herr*, *hauss*, *íss*, *óss*, men *hamar*, *kurteis*, fordi den sidste har mindre Vægt.” i. e. “Where the final consonant of the root is *r*, *s*, there the usage fluctuates between *rr*, *ss*, or merely *r*, *s*, with omission of the mark of gender ; still we find oftenest þórr, *herr*, *hauss*, *íss*, *óss*, [with two *rr*, *ss*] but *hamar*, *kurteis* [with only one], because the last has less weight.” Here is Mr. Lund’s curious rendering : “In the last radical letters *r* and *s* the use fluctuates between *r* and *rr*, *s* and *ss* þórr, *herr*, *hauss*, *íss*, *óss*, is often found because of little consequence.”

A student could of course make no sense out of that. Another example will suffice : Ex pede Herculem.

At § 57, Rusk has :

“Det indskudte *v* beskytter et foregående *ö* (eller *au*) for at forandres til *a* (eller *å*), foran Endelsen *-a*, og erholder derved samme Virkning som *u*.”

i. e. “The inserted *v* hinders a foregoing *ö* from changing to *a*, before the ending *-a*, and therefore [the *v*] has the same effect as *u*.” For the better understanding of this, the reader should know that the vowel *u* changes into *ö* an *a* of preceding syllable, thus “aska,” but “ösku,” and vice versa, we have “ögn(u),” but “agnar.” Rask means, therefore, that *ör*, which takes an intercalary *v*, before the ending of the gen. sg. *-ar*, is not changed to *ar* in the root syllable, by the influence of the case ending with initial *a*, but keeps its *ö* ; i. e. *ör* has gen. *ör-v-ar* (instead of *ar-v-ar* as might have been expected, on analogy of

ögn, gen. *agn-ar*).

But now let the reader compare the above with the unmitigated nonsense, given as a translation, in Lund’s grammar. He has :—

57. “The inserted letter *v* requires a preceding *ö* (or *au*) before they change into a or *å* if it terminates in *a* and has

therefore the same effect as *u*." (No stop of any kind).

Similar specimens of this sort of *translation* occur everywhere in the book.

Yet bad as that is, it is nothing compared to what I am about to show.

Throughout the greater part of the book, the Editor has absolutely *inverted Genitive and Accusative*, in the declension of nouns, adjectives, and pronouns! Thus, from p. 8 to p. 34, *every page* is full of mistakes. One wonders with a great and increasing wonder as one reads on. Here, for example, is his paradigm at p. 9:—

<i>Sing. Nom.</i>	land
<i>GEN.</i>	land
<i>Dat.</i>	landi
<i>ACC.</i>	lands (!)

And so on, in every case.

To make the matter clear to the reader, it may be as well to give a few specimens of each class.

Mr. Lund gives:—

PRONOUN.

§ 105. <i>Nom.</i>	ek	§ 107. <i>Nom.</i>	þat
<i>Gen.</i>	mik	<i>Gen.</i>	þat
<i>Dat.</i>	mer	<i>Dat.</i>	þvi
<i>Acc.</i>	mín	<i>Acc.</i>	þess

ADJECTIVE.

§ 86. Mas. }	} spakr	Ntr. Nom. spakt
Nom. }		
Gen. spakan		Gen. spakt
Dat. spökum		Dat. spöku
Acc. spaks		Acc. spaks

What is to be thought of a Translator, or Editor, or Compiler, or whatever designation is most fitting (and the Italian proverb says very appropriately: — “traduttore, traditore,”) who should print as above,

{ *mik*, þat, as the GENITIVE,
mín, þess, as the ACCUSATIVE, }

of a pronoun in *any* Teutonic tongue?

NOUN.

If the reader can get a look at the book, pp. 18, 19 will furnish him with *forty-eight* mistakes of the same kind.

It is plain that nothing but the crassest ignorance of the Danish language (and indeed of *any* Teutonic language whatever) could have perpetrated such a hideous blunder.

Would the reader know *how* the mistake was made, he has only to look at Rask's paradigm:—

“Ent. N.	land
G.	land
H.	landi
E.	lands”

But our Editor had not the slightest idea that the *G.* in the second line has nothing to do with *Genitive*, but is the initial of the Danish term for “Accusativus,” and that the *E.* in the fourth line is the initial of the Danish word “Ejeform” = “Possessive case.”

As a delectus of specimens in the translation, I may refer in particular to § 51, 52, 56, 64, 68, 69, to be found on pp. 8–17 in the declension of nouns.

SOME NOTES ON THE CHRONOLOGY OF HIPPOLYTUS. By GEORGE SALMON, D. D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Dublin.

SOME twenty years ago, the attention of all students of Ecclesiastical History was directed to Hippolytus, in consequence of the then recent discovery of a lost portion of his Refutation of all Heresies. I believe, however, that that work does not fill so influential a place in the history of religious opinion as the unpretending tract on Chronology on which I purpose in this paper to make some comments. In his notice of the writings of Hippolytus, Eusebius mentions a chronological work of his, containing a sixteen years' cycle for the computation of Easter, and bringing down its chronology to the first year of the Emperor Alexander. This account was repeated by other writers; but nothing more was known of this work until the year 1551, when a marble statue was dug up at Rome, containing on the sides and back inscriptions in Greek uncial letters. The inscription on the back contains a list of works composed, doubtless, by the person represented by the statue; and several of these we can identify with works known to have been composed by Hippolytus. On one side of the chair is a calendar, showing the Paschal full moons for seven cycles of sixteen years each, beginning with A. D. 222, the first year of the Emperor Alexander. On the opposite side is a table, showing the corresponding Easter Days. Some controversy has been raised as to the date to be assigned to this statue,¹ but the reasons stated by Döllinger (Hippolytus und Kallistus, p. 27) are absolutely conclusive in proving this statue to be one of the earliest remaining

¹ See, in particular, Gieseler, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1853, p. 783.

works of Christian art, and that it must have been erected shortly after the death or banishment of Hippolytus: that is to say, that the date of the statue cannot be much later than A. D. 235. From the list of works inscribed on the statue, it appears that Hippolytus was the author of another work on Chronology beside that containing the explanation of his Easter cycle. Of this second work I shall speak presently. The work on Easter is completely lost, but the cycle itself engraved on the chair enables us to make a tolerable guess as to what the contents of the work must have been. In order to make what follows more intelligible, I give a translation of the cycle of full moons. It has been stated that the original is in Greek; but the Roman calculation by Kalends, Nones, and Ides is employed.

"In the first year of the reign of the Emperor Alexander, the fourteenth day of the Paschal moon occurred on Saturday, April 13, after the Intercalary month. It will take place in following years as exhibited in the table, and it has taken place in past years as shown. The fast must always be broken off on the Sunday:—

Int.	April 13.	G.	F. ⁽⁵⁾	E.	D.	C.	B.	A.
	April 2.	D. ⁽¹⁾	C.	B.	A.	G.	F.	E.
B.	March 21, 22,	A. ⁽⁴⁾	G.	F. ⁽⁸⁾	E.	D.	C.	B.
Int.	April 9.	G. ⁽³⁾	F.	E.	D.	C.	B.	A.
	March 29.	D.	C.	B.	A.	G.	F.	E. ⁽¹³⁾
	March 18.	A.	G. ⁽⁶⁾	F.	E.	D.	C.	B.
B. Int.	April 5.	G.	F.	E.	D. ⁽⁹⁾	C.	B.	A.
	March 25.	D.	C.	B.	A.	G.	F.	E.
Int.	April 13.	C.	B.	A.	G.	F.	E.	D.
	April 2.	G.	F.	E.	D.	C.	B.	A. ⁽¹⁰⁾
B.	March 21, 22,	D.	C.	B.	A.	G.	F.	E.
Int.	April 9.	C.	B.	A.	G.	F.	E.	D. ⁽¹¹⁾
	March 29.	G.	F.	E.	D.	C.	B.	A.
	March 18.	D.	C.	B.	A.	G.	F.	E.
B. Int.	April 5.	C. ⁽⁴⁾	B.	A.	G.	F.	E.	D. ⁽¹²⁾
	March 25.	G.	F. ⁽⁷⁾	E.	D.	C.	B.	A.

For the convenience of printing, the following notes, written in words in the table, have been indicated by references:—⁽¹⁾ Incarnation of Christ. ⁽⁴⁾ Hezekiah. ⁽³⁾ Josiah. ⁽⁴⁾ Exodus, according to Daniel. ⁽⁵⁾ Esdras, according to Daniel, and Wilderness. ⁽⁶⁾ Hezekiah, according to Daniel, and Josiah. ⁽⁷⁾ Passion of Christ. ⁽⁸⁾ Joshua. ⁽⁹⁾ Joshua, according to Daniel. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Exodus. ⁽¹¹⁾ Wilderness. ⁽¹²⁾ Esdras. ⁽¹³⁾ Does not correspond to any note on the table, but marks the year of the cycle answering to Hippolytus's date of the Creation. B. marks the Bissex-tile years; Int. those in which an Intercalary month is inserted.

On inspection of this table it will appear that though in form a 16-years cycle, as Eusebius has described it, it may more properly be called a cycle of 8 years, or one of 112. It proceeds on the assumption that the full moons return to the same day of the month after an interval of eight years. But the table is intended also to show the days of the week on which the full moons fall. The full moon in the first year of the cycle falling on Saturday, the table expresses that in the 17th year it falls on Friday; after 16 years more, on Thursday; and so on until, at the end of 112 years, it returns to the same day of the week as well as of the month. Actually a cycle of 56 years would have sufficed to express these changes, but it will presently appear that we get more information as to the chronological system of Hippolytus through his having fortunately preferred a cycle of 112 years.

The assumption of the table that the full moons, after eight years, return to the same day of the month, is extremely erroneous. Actually in eight years the full moons fall about a day and a half later; so that in about eighty years' use, the table would come to show full moon at the time of new moon; but long before that time its error would have become evident to the most careless observer. The table is so far behind the astronomical knowledge, not only of our day, but of that of Hippolytus himself, that some commentators have thought it incredible that so learned a man should have given birth to so monstrous a production, and gained honour and glory by it. Accordingly, Bianchini¹ invented an ingenious and highly artificial mode of using the table,

¹ His dissertation may be most conveniently consulted in Fabricius's edition of the works of Hippolytus, where also may be found what had been written on this Easter cycle by Scaliger, Bucherius, and others. Of more recent commentaries on the cycle, the most valuable are

the accounts of it given by Ideler, *Chronologie*, II., 213; and by De Rossi, in the Prolegomena to his *Inscriptiones Urbis Romae*. De Rossi there promises a fuller discussion of this subject, but this I have not seen, nor do I know if it has been published.

whereby, making corrections according to certain rules, it can be made to exhibit true full moons with reasonable accuracy. But the imagination is utterly groundless, that the table is anything different from what appears on the face of it. Not to say that if Hippolytus had had astronomical knowledge enough to make Bianchini's corrections, he would have had skill enough to make a table not requiring such correction, though we have not Hippolytus' own explanation of his table, its place is well supplied by another tract of the same nature. There is printed in the appendix to Fell's Cyprian a tract, *De Pascha Computus*, written in Africa in the year 243.¹ It is an explanation of a sixteen years' cycle, though not exactly that of Hippolytus, the error of whose cycle had become by that time too great to be overlooked. But the African writer does not dream that the error had arisen from the radical fault of the cycle itself; he supposes that the error had resulted from the framer of the cycle having been led, by a misunderstanding of the first chapter of Genesis, to place the full moons originally on wrong days.² Accordingly, he pushes on each of Hippolytus' full moons three days, and having thus made the table fairly represent the phenomena of his own time, he imagines that the sixteen years' cycle so corrected will show all full moons, past and future. From the explanation which he gives, it is manifest that the basis of the scheme is the eight years' cycle which had been used long before by Greek astronomers. The months

* The use of this tract in illustrating the cycle of Hippolytus is pointed out by De Rossi, and had also been remarked by Dodwell (*Diss. Singularis de Rom. Pont.*, p. 97). It is not actually impossible that Cyprian may have been the author; but as, for reasons which I need not here detail, I do not believe that he was, I abstain from citing the tract under his name.

* Both Dodwell and De Rossi ex-

plain his theory to be that his predecessors had committed the mistake of counting the first full moon on the first day of the Creation, whereas it ought to have been on the fourth day, on which the moon was created; and that in this way he gets his correction of three days. This fits so well, that it is with some diffidence I say that I have not been able to get this meaning from his words.

in use among the Greeks consisted of 30 and 29 days alternately. Twelve such months, averaging $29\frac{1}{2}$ days, made a lunar year of 354 days; this came short of the solar year of $365\frac{1}{4}$ days, by $11\frac{1}{4}$ days. In eight years this deficit would amount to 90 days, which was made up by intercalating three months of 30 days each. The African computist illustrates somewhat as follows the manner in which the intercalation was made. The table of Hippolytus states the 13th of April to be the fourteenth day of the moon in the first year of the cycle; consequently in that year the last day of March was the first day of the moon. On account of the excess of eleven days in a solar over a lunar year, the last day of March in the second year of the cycle is the 12th day of the moon. In the third year it is the 24th; for that year being Bissextile, there is an advance of 12 days. In the fourth year it is the 35th day; that is to say, a month of 30 days is intercalated, the last of March being the fifth of the next moon. Accordingly, it will be seen that the fourth year of the cycle is marked in the table as an intercalary year. In the fifth year, the last of March is the 16th day; in the sixth, the 27th; in the seventh, which is Bissextile, the 39th, or, in other words, that year is intercalary, and the last of March is the 9th of the moon. In the eighth year it is the 20th; in the ninth, the 31st; that is to say, we intercalate a month, and then the last of March is the first day of the moon again, as it was in the first year of the cycle. Thus it will be understood why the first, fourth, and seventh years of the cycle are marked as intercalary, and why the April moon is said to come after the intercalary month. In other words, according to this scheme, when a month is intercalated, it is at the end of a year of which the last day of March had been the beginning.

It has been stated that the notion of an eight years' cycle is much older than Hippolytus. All that appears to have been original in his scheme is the putting the cycles together in the manner exhibited in the table, so as to show the day of the week of the full moon, as well as the

day of the month. The scheme shows Hippolytus to have been a mere calendar-maker, and not an astronomer. He could not have obtained his system from observation; for observation, even carelessly conducted, would have shown him that the full moons do not return in eight years to the same day. But he seems to have thought the whole problem solved when he saw the possibility of making a calendar in which eight years contained an exact number of months without any days over. He overlooked that his months were not all of the same length, the three intercalated months being thirty days each, while the scheme assumes $29\frac{1}{2}$ days to be the true length of a month; so that if this assumption were correct, the table would go wrong a day and a-half every eight years. And there is not the slightest reason for supposing that Hippolytus was acquainted with the difference between $29\frac{1}{2}$ days and the accurate value of the length of a month. If then it be asked how could Hippolytus have obtained honour and celebrity for so defective a performance, all that can be said is, that his admirers were more ignorant than himself. He was a one-eyed man in the country of the blind. In all probability, before his time the Christians of Rome and Africa had been unable to predict the Easter of a future year, but were obliged either each year to watch for the appearing of the moon, or else to rely on Jewish calculations; a deep disgrace, in the opinion of the African computist, for Christians, "*tanquam ignorantes quæ sit dies Paschæ post Iudæos caecos et hebetes ambulare.*" They would naturally then welcome thankfully a work which undertook to show them how to find the true Easter-day for a hundred years to come.

It would appear that Hippolytus having learned the principle of the eight years' cycle, had recourse to observation to find the days to be placed on his table; for it

* The immediate reference of these words was probably to Quartodeciman celebration.

can hardly be accident that the table gives accurately the astronomical full moons for the years 217-223, inclusive.¹ For the eight years beginning with 225, the true full moons are a day or two later than those given in the table; for the eight years ending with 215, a day or two earlier. The table speaks of the year 222 as past, and of subsequent years as future; but I am inclined to believe that the table only begins with 222, because that was the first year of an Emperor's reign, and that the true date of publication was 224. Thus the full moon for 223 was April 2, as given in the table; that for 215 was April 1. It seems likely, therefore, that the former year—not the latter—was that which furnished the observation on which the table was founded. The full moon in 216 occurred on the forenoon of March 21, that in 224 on the afternoon of March 22; the table gives
 * the double date March 21, 22, but whenever it makes a difference with respect to the finding of Easter, the earlier date is followed. No one has been able to explain why the table should give a double date for the full moon of this year of the cycle; my conjecture is, that Hippolytus became acquainted with the notion of an eight years' cycle in 216, and noted the full moon of that year as March 21, and that in 224, the year of publication of his cycle, the full moon seeming to be on March 22, he arrived at the

¹ I calculated these full moons by the rules given in De Morgan's "Book of Almanacs;" but owing to my want of experience in astronomical calculations, I thought it desirable that my work should be verified, and accordingly asked my friend Professor Adams to enable me to test my results by giving me the true date of one or two of these full moons. He very kindly sent me the following list, which agreed so well with what I had already obtained, as to give me confidence in working with De Morgan's rules in other cases. The full moons given are according to Green-

wich time:—

A. D.

215,	April 1,	. . . 4,	P. M.
216,	March 21,	. . . 8,	A. M.
217,	April 9,	. . . 8,	A. M.
218,	March 29,	. . . 6,	P. M.
219,	March 18,	. . . 8,	P. M.
220,	April 5,	. . . 1,	P. M.
221,	March 25,	. . . 3,	P. M.
222,	April 13,	. . . 11,	A. M.
223,	April 2,	. . . 11,	P. M.
224,	March 22,	. . . 4,	P. M.
A. D. 29,	March 18,	. . . 7,	P. M.
30,	April 6,	. . . 8,	P. M.

conclusion that the true date of the full moon was the midnight separating these two days. I should have more confidence in asserting this theory as to the date of publication of the cycle, if I could give Hippolytus or his advisers credit for any great accuracy in the determination of the true full moons. But no doubt his methods were rough; in all probability he followed the ancient method of observing the first evening of the moon's visibility, which was reckoned the first day of the moon, and then counting on to the fourteenth day, which was the day given in the table.¹ Hippolytus, probably, did not continue his verifications after the publication of his cycle; he remained fully persuaded of its accuracy up to 235, the year of his banishment. But he would not have been compelled to distrust his method had he noticed a difference of one day or even of two days between the actual full moons and those shown in his tables. For, in any attempt to represent full moons by a cycle, a certain moderate divergence from time to time between the true moon and the calendar moon is inevitable; and it is notorious that the cycle in use among ourselves occasionally leads to an Easter different from what would result if the calculation were made according to the astronomical full moon. As far as the year 235, the full moons of the Alexandrian cycle do not differ by more than one day from those of Hippolytus.² After 235, the full moons of Hippolytus begin to diverge two days from the Alexandrian full moons, and still more from the true. Thus, in 236 the full moon, according to Hippolytus, is the

¹ The day, thus determined, would, on the average, agree with the day of astronomical full moon,*and accordingly I have all through used the word full moon as equivalent to Hippolytus' fourteenth day.

² There are, however, other differences between Hippolytus' and the Alexandrian system. For instance, the Easter limits are different; the earliest

full moon admissible by the Alexandrian rules being March 21, whereas Hippolytus goes back to March 18. Again, there is a peculiarity in the Roman rule, viz., that Easter cannot be earlier than the 16th day of the moon, so that, if the full moon should be on Saturday, Easter Sunday is not the next day, but the Sunday after.

5th April—according to the Alexandrian cycle the 7th; the true full moon taking place very early in the morning of the 9th. It is intelligible, then, that Easter may have been calculated at Rome, according to the cycle of Hippolytus, up to the year 235, but unlikely that this cycle could have continued to be used very much longer; and we have already seen that, by A. D. 243, its erroneous character had become notorious.¹ This consideration at once puts a limit to the time at which the statue of Hippolytus could have been erected. No one could have imagined it to be an honour to him to engrave for perpetual record a cycle known to be erroneous, and a list of Easter days for 100 years totally different from those celebrated in the Church. We may conclude, then, as has been already stated, that the statue was erected very shortly after the banishment of Hippolytus in 235.²

I next proceed to comment on the notes appended to certain years in the cycle—Exodus, Joshua, Hezekiah, &c. Scaliger imagined that these notes referred to some system of Church lessons, and they puzzled some succeeding commentators. The true explanation was given by Bianchini. Hippolytus had such implicit faith in his cycle, that he believed, as is stated in the heading of the table, that it was perpetually applicable, whether to the future or to the past. He not only calculated by its means the Easter days for the next 112 years, but he applied it to all the Passovers mentioned in the Old Testament, and had no doubt of thus being able to tell the day of the week and month on which the Israelites came out of Egypt; on which Hezekiah celebrated his Passover, &c. This expla-

¹ De Rossi finds two inscriptions which throw light on the date at which the cycle of Hippolytus ceased to be used at Rome. One, A. D. 269, shows that the Easter kept that year corresponded neither to the cycle of Hippolytus nor to that of its African corrector. The other, if rightly dated A. D. 249,

would correspond to the cycle of Hippolytus; but the date is doubtful, and De Rossi is inclined to refer the inscription to the next century.

² It could not have been erected earlier, for we shall presently see that one of the works mentioned on the statue was written in 235.

nation of Bianchini's is verified by the fact, that the African computist makes precisely this use of his cycle ; though, as both his system of chronology and his cycle are different from those of Hippolytus, the days he assigns to the different Passovers are, of course, different. Nay, this tract gives us reason to conjecture that Hippolytus carried his calculations back to the creation of the world.

I have mentioned that the African computist alters the cycle of Hippolytus by pushing on each of the full moons three days ; and, no doubt, the motive that influenced him was, that the altered days better represented the full moons of his own time ; but this is not the reason he alleges : his arguments are founded on a discussion of the first chapter of Genesis, and on the inference he thence draws as to the date on which the moon commenced her course. The principles he employs are, that, since we are told God divided the light from the darkness, and since we must believe that in His justice He made an equal division, the world was created at the Equinox. The moon was created on the fourth day, and must have been then at the full ; for, if not visible all the night, she could not have fulfilled the duty enjoined on her of ruling the night and giving light upon the earth. He adds, that some of his predecessors had counted the day of the Creation as the 25th March ; consequently, the 28th March as the date of the creation of the moon, and as the date of the first full moon. This African writer never names Hippolytus ; but he is evidently indebted to him for the whole notion of his cycle, and for the application of it to determine the dates of the Old Testament Passovers. But there is so complete a difference between the chronological system of the African writer and that of Hippolytus, that I am led to conclude that, though the former must have known the cycle itself, such as it is engraved on the statue, he had not read the tract in which the cycle is explained. In fact, on one or two points, he clearly misunderstood Hippolytus.

On examining whether Hippolytus be the person whose

theory concerning the Creation is referred to by the African writer, I find a coincidence which can hardly be accidental. It is plain that, if Hippolytus were the person referred to, the year he assigned to the Creation must be one in which the 25th March fell on the first day of the week. Now, from the chronological work which we shall presently consider, it appears that Hippolytus counted the Incarnation to have taken place in the year of the world 5502. Counting back, then, from the first year of the Emperor Alexander, I find that the Creation answers to the 101st year of the cycle, which I have marked ⁽¹³⁾ on the table, and in this year the 25th of March is a Sunday. It is in itself probable that Hippolytus believed the Creation to have taken place on the day of the Equinox, and, also, that he would use his table to test whether, on his system, this were so. But from his Paschal limits I infer that he counted the Equinox not with the African writer, the 25th March, but the 18th, both days however giving the same results, as far as the determination of the day of the week is concerned. Perhaps the reason why Hippolytus dates the Creation not like Africanus,¹ A. M. 5500, but 5502, may be that Hippolytus took the nearest date to 5500 on which he found the Equinox to fall on a Sunday. The African theory as to the date of the first full moon does not seem to have been derived from Hippolytus. The first full moon of Hippolytus is March 29, not March 28, which is not a full moon in any year of his cycle.

Bianchini made the valuable remark, that the Passovers noted on the cycle enable us to recover all the principal points of the chronological system of Hippolytus; but in working out this idea he made an unlucky slip, which has

¹ I shall show, presently, that Momm-
sen is mistaken in supposing that Hip-
polytus was indebted to Africanus for
his chronological system. Except the
single coincidence in the date of the
Incarnation, their systems completely
differ. Hippolytus acknowledges the

second Cainan, whom Africanus does
not recognise. The dates given by Hip-
polytus for the calling of Abraham, the
Exodus, and the Babylonian captivity,
are 3387, 3817, 4842; and by Africanus
are 3277, 3705, 4750.

caused his theory to be overlooked or rejected. On referring to the table, it will be seen that Hippolytus notes the Passover of Hezekiah as occurring in the third year of his cycle, and the Passover of Josiah in the fourth. Consequently, as it is out of the question that he only counted one year between these two Passovers, it is evident he must have reckoned the interval to be one year together with some complete number of cycles; that is to say (the cycle being one of 112 years), 113, or 225, &c., years. And, as we know roughly, that the interval was somewhat over 100 years, we conclude that Hippolytus counted it exactly 113 years. In this way we can determine the intervals between every two of the Passovers named in the cycle, and knowing that the first year of the cycle corresponds to A. D. 222, we can, if we please, express in years B. C. the dates assigned by Hippolytus to the Exodus and other leading events in Jewish history.

The knowledge thus gained of the chronological system of Hippolytus enables us with absolute certainty to identify as his the work of which I have next to speak. This is a *Chronicle*, first published by Canisius in 1602 (*Antiq. Lect.*, II. 580), and included by Du Cange among the illustrative documents appended to his edition of the *Paschal Chronicle*. An account of the manuscripts from which the printed text is derived is given in Mommsen's valuable essay on the *Chronographer* of the year 354, (*"Ueber den Chronographen vom Jahre 354"* *Abhandl. der philolog-histor. Classe der Königl. Sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, I. 585). The *Chronicle* is anonymous and in Latin, but unmistakeable internal evidence shows it to have been originally written in Greek, there being even extant two versions agreeing perfectly in sense but differing in words. It begins with Adam, and closes with the termination of the reign of the Emperor Alexander Severus, A. D. 235. It can scarcely be called a *Chronicle* in the modern sense of the word, for it does not contain any continuous history, its

object being chronological rather than historical; it merely gives, from the Old Testament, a series of names and lengths of lives or reigns sufficient for the purposes of chronological computation. From these are inferred the dates Anno Mundi of the principal epochs of the history ending with the Babylonian captivity, which is dated from the commencement of the world 4842 years 9 months. It passes then at once to the Incarnation, which it dates A. M. 5502, and gives only two subsequent dates—the Passion, 5532, and the 13th year of Alexander, 5738. The calculation also proceeds in another way; it counts the interval between the Exodus and the Passion by Passovers: from the Exodus to the Passover celebrated by Joshua, 41 years; thence to that celebrated by Hezekiah, 464 years, according to the reading of the MSS.: but the years as given by the other calculation show that we are to correct this reading into 864; thence to Josiah's Passover, 114; thence to Esdras' Passover, 108; thence to the generation of Christ, 563; thence to the Passion, 30. By the generation (γενεσις) of Christ we are, doubtless, to understand our Lord's Conception, and may infer that the Annunciation was then, as now, celebrated at the Passover season. If these figures be added up they make the date Anno Mundi of the Incarnation 5507 instead of 5502, according to the previous calculation. The difference may be accounted for by supposing the intervals to be in each case reckoned, including the extreme terms; but, in truth, the work of the chronicler will not bear too minute an examination. On comparing several of his items with the sums total which he gives, although we can set many matters to rights by correcting from the Septuagint the numbers given in the MSS. of the Chronicle, yet there remain discrepancies for which the author, not the transcriber, seems to be responsible.

Du Cange suspected that this Chronicle was the work of Hippolytus, and supported his conjecture by very strong arguments. Hippolytus wrote in Greek, and lived in the

reign of Alexander Severus. His connexion with the Roman Church would account for the presence in the Chronicle of a list of Roman bishops, of which I shall speak presently; and the inscription on his statue informs us that Hippolytus wrote a second work on Chronology besides that exposition of the cycle of which Eusebius makes mention. Further, we learn from Syncellus that Hippolytus attributed to Joachim (Jehoiachin), king of Judah, a reign of three years instead of three months—a peculiarity to be found in this Chronicle; and lastly, it is inferred indirectly from Cyrillus Scythopolitanus, and directly asserted by Photius, that Hippolytus counted 5500 years to the Incarnation.¹ On the other hand, Bianchini undertook to show that Hippolytus was not the author, by exhibiting the differences between the Passover intervals given in the Chronicle and those deduced from the cycle in the manner already explained. Mommsen, holding the Hippolytine authorship to be sufficiently established by Du Cange's reasons, summarily sets aside Bianchini's argument, the principle of which he does not seem to have taken the trouble to understand, supposing it to have been part of that fanciful theory as to the use of the cycle of which I have made mention already. But, in truth, Bianchini's method is quite sound; it is in the application of it that he had the misfortune to go wrong; for the method, rightly conducted, establishes most decisively the authorship of Hippolytus. I have mentioned that four Passover intervals, as given in the Chronicle, are 864, 114, 108, 563. The same intervals, as deduced from the table on the chair, are 864, 113, 107, 563. Thus, in two cases there is absolute agreement, in the other two the difference of only a unit. I have already said the writer is not so

¹ Photius tells that Hippolytus fixed the coming of Antichrist for A.M. 6000, and therefore, according to his scheme, 500 years from the Incarnation. Few writers who have undertaken to deter-

mine from prophecy the date of the end of the world have been content to place it so far in advance of their own time.

minutely accurate that the difference of a unit need weigh with us; and we shall be less disposed to make difficulties about it, if we look at the same intervals as given by other chronologers. The Cyprianic computist, whose chronological calculations are completely independent of Hippolytus, brings out the intervals, 826, 103, 144, 465. Eusebius makes them 730, 114, 111, 514; Syncellus 909, 105, 128, 502; modern chronologers also widely different. It is, therefore, sufficiently evident that the coincidence between the dates indicated on the statue and in the Chronicle can only be accounted for by identity of authorship.

A further coincidence is, that, both from cycle and Chronicle, the date of our Lord's Passion is inferred to be A. D. 29. The Chronicler adopts what we otherwise know to be the view of Hippolytus, that our Lord suffered on the 14th—Himself being the true Passover—differing in this from the Cyprian computist, who makes our Lord eat the Last Supper on the 14th, and suffer on the 15th. As Hippolytus in this follows St. John's account, it is the more surprising that he has not made the usual inference from St. John's account as to the duration of our Lord's ministry; but, both in cycle and in Chronicle, the interval between the Incarnation and the Passion is given as only 30 years. Hippolytus might have dated the Passion A. D. 32 or 35, without violating the condition, that the full moon, according to his cycle, should occur on a Friday; nor do we know of anything in his system which limits the Incarnation to the year he has assigned to it. Indeed, as I do not know of any legend that our Lord's Conception took place on the Passover day, I am not able to explain why Hippolytus should have noticed it on his table of full moons. If the day to which the note belonged had been the 25th March, we should have inferred that the commemoration of the Annunciation on that day had already commenced; but the full moon for the year in question is given as April 2. The Cyprianic writer, whose knowledge, as I have already said, seems not to extend beyond what he

might have learned from the cycle itself, understands *γένεσις Χριστοῦ* not of the conception, but of the birth of Christ, which he places on the 28th March—a date we may well believe not in conformity to even then received opinion.

The next question I have to notice is that which I found the most difficult of the arithmetical problems suggested by the table, and the solution of which surprised me most. The cycle contains a double calculation of each of the Old Testament full moons; Exodus, for instance, is cited opposite one year—Exodus according to Daniel, opposite another. Similarly, we have Hezekiah, and Hezekiah according to Daniel; and so on. It is obvious that Hippolytus made his chronological calculations in both directions, forwards and backwards; forwards, beginning with the Creation, and so counting on the years recorded in the Scripture history down to Ezra, and from him to Christ; and backwards, beginning with the Passion of Christ, and counting backwards the number of years answering to his interpretation of Daniel's prophecy of the weeks, to the time which he reckoned the commencement of that period. It is plain, also, that the dates did not quite agree, which these two methods led him to assign to Ezra's Passover. A similar difficulty presented itself to Africanus. He counted the seventy weeks to begin with the twentieth year of Artaxerxes; but the interval which he found by chronological computation between this and the Passion being less than 490 years—he got over the difficulty by supposing the prophecy to speak of weeks of lunar years. In the case of Hippolytus the difficulty is of an opposite kind; the interval, according to his direct computation, between Ezra's Passover and the Passion is considerably longer than 490 years. It would appear that Hippolytus, either not attempting or not succeeding in the attempt to force the two calculations into agreement, contented himself with giving in his cycle alternative dates for the year of Ezra's Passover. It ought to be a problem possible of

solution, putting together the notices we find elsewhere of the manner in which Hippolytus interpreted the prophecy of the seventy weeks, to recover his scheme, and make it fit into the dates indicated by the table.

It is evident that the computation "according to Daniel" can only affect the interval between Ezra's Passover and Christ; the other parts of the chronology ought to remain the same in both systems. Notwithstanding, there are small differences in the intervals given according to the two methods, between each of the earlier Passovers. Thus, the three intervals which I have already stated to be according to the direct calculation, 864, 1114, 108 years, are, as deduced from the calculation "according to Daniel," 863, 1112, 107. These discrepancies must be attributed to carelessness, whether of Hippolytus himself, or more probably of the engraver of the stone, who has been guilty of other inaccuracies, and might easily err a line in placing these notes. These discrepancies are only important as a measure of the accuracy of the work, and as showing that in checking the calculations of Hippolytus, as I have already said, we must not be particular about a unit. But the interval important to ascertain is that between Ezra and Christ. On the cycle "Ezra according to Daniel" precedes the Incarnation by an interval of 97 years. Hippolytus, therefore, must have computed the interval between the two as deduced from prophecy to be 97 years, together with some entire number of cycles; that is to say, 209, 321, 433, or 545 years. The interval as given by the direct calculation is 563 years. Expecting, in common with all who have written on the subject, to find but a small difference between the two calculations of Hippolytus, I concluded 545 to be his prophetic interval, and vainly sought what considerations could have led him to make this difference of 18 years. I ought to have seen from the first that the solution 545 is excluded by the fact of its being in excess of seventy weeks, and that the true prophetic interval of Hippolytus is 433 years. And this is made

certain by the testimony of St. Jerome, who, in his Commentary on Daniel, tells us that Hippolytus counted the 70 weeks to begin with the first year of Cyrus, and that he divided them—7 weeks from Cyrus to the return of the people under Ezra; 62 from Ezra to Christ, and one week at the end of the world. But the 62 weeks are, within a unit, the 433 years deduced from the table. Thus it appears that the difference between Hippolytus' two modes of computation is not less than 130 years. St. Jerome had remarked that Hippolytus had interpreted the prophecy so as not to agree with history: "*quarum tempora omnino non congruunt;*" the historical interval between Cyrus and Christ being, as he states, 560 years, instead of 490. But it appears now that Hippolytus himself confessed total inability to harmonize the prophecy with history, making a still larger difference between the two computations than that counted by Jerome. Yet he does not count the prophecy to have failed; nor does he seem to doubt of the correctness of his interpretation of it. He sets down the two calculations side by side, possibly with a preference in his own mind for that which rested on inspired authority.

Mommsen has supposed that Hippolytus borrowed his chronological system from Africanus. In support of this idea is the solitary fact of the near coincidence of the two in the date of the Incarnation. But I have already noted differences in detail which had led me to conclude that Hippolytus was not acquainted with the work of Africanus, and that the coincidence in question, if not altogether accidental, was due to indirect obligation. But the present example proves decisively how little Hippolytus knew of what Africanus had done, if indeed the labours of Hippolytus on the 70 weeks are not earlier than those of Africanus. For the idea of counting the 70 weeks from the 20th of Artaxerxes instead of the 1st of Cyrus, in which Africanus has been followed by a great body of succeeding interpreters, and which would have gone far to remove the difficulties felt by Hippolytus, seems never once to have

presented itself to him, at least not up to the date of the formation of his cycle.¹

The speculations which I have thus far discussed will be thought to fulfil very badly the expectations suggested in my opening sentences, in which I spoke of the chronology of Hippolytus as having left permanent traces in the history of religious opinion. In what I said I meant to refer to the last section of the work, which contained a list of the bishops of Rome. The manuscripts of the chronicle commence with a table of contents, the title of the last section being "*Nomina Episcoporum Romae, et quis quot annis praefuit.*" Owing partly to accidental mutilation of the MSS. and partly to designed displacement of the contents, this section is not now to be found. But the work of the chronographer of the year 354 (the subject of Mommsen's essay already referred to), and which has for part of its contents a chronicle identical with that of Hippolytus, contains also a list of Roman bishops, ending with Liberius, whence this is commonly known as the Liberian catalogue. Now, Mommsen has pointed out that internal evidence shows that the earlier part of this

¹ Africanus' chronology is brought down to A. D. 221. Though the chronicle of Hippolytus is dated 235, we have seen that his chronological system was completely formed at the time of the publication of the explanation of the cycle which I have dated 224. But both writers published separately on the 70 weeks tracts the dates of which we cannot assign. If either saw the work of the other, Africanus saw that of Hippolytus, for he expressly considers and refutes the theory which counts the 70 weeks from the 1st Cyrus, showing that this introduces an error of 100 years. And as this refutation is repeated in his chronography, I conclude that Hippolytus in 224 could not have seen that work, and that his

chronological system was, therefore, formed in complete independence of Africanus.

In arithmetical skill Africanus was much superior to Hippolytus. Hippolytus seems not to be trustworthy in simple addition and subtraction. Africanus is skilful in the management of fractions. He computes (*Routh's Reliquiae*, II., 303) the difference between the two values of the length of a month $29\frac{1}{2}$ and $29\frac{13}{32}$ days (for the corrupt figures of the MSS. must be corrected so as to make the latter agree with what he is speaking of, the length of the month as given by the system of Euctemon and Meton), and he correctly finds the difference to be $\frac{3}{8}$ of a day.

catalogue, ending with Urban, A.D. 230, comes from a different source from the part which follows. The earlier part gives the names of the bishops, the time of their government, reckoned in years, months, and days, the contemporaneous emperors, and the consuls of the first and last year of each bishop. These consuls are given in such a way that the consuls of the first year of any bishop are never the same as those of the last year of the preceding bishop, but are those of the following year. With one remarkable exception there are no historical notices in this part of the chronicle. With the part of the chronicle immediately succeeding the death of Urban, a different mode of treatment begins. Frequently the days of the ordination and of the death of the bishops are noted; the years of the death of one bishop, and of the accession of the next are no longer referred to two successive consulates, but ordinarily to the same; and historical notices appear bearing all the marks of contemporaneousness, and making the list into a short chronicle. Hence Mommsen deduced the theory¹ that the basis of the Liberian catalogue is the list of Hippolytus, that the latter was detached by the chronographer of the year 354 from its place at the end of the chronicle, because it was to be completed in another part of his work; that the original list of Hippolytus contained no names of consuls (and, indeed, the title of his section contains no intimation that there were any such notes of time); that the compiler finding the names of consuls to be given in the second part of the lists which he put together, completed the earlier part by adding in names of consuls, using for that purpose a table of consuls still to be found in another part of his work, but in the process committing several palpable mistakes. Döllinger argues against the theory of Mommsen (*Hipp. und Kall.* p. 67). If, however, Mommsen's arguments needed confirmation, it is to be

¹ Dodwell had previously expressed the opinion (*l. c.*, p. 94) that the list of the chronicle under consideration was the original source of all the later catalogues.

found in the opening sentence of the Liberian catalogue, which, to my mind, contains demonstrative evidence of Hippolytine authorship. It runs—"Imperante Tiberio Caesare, passus est Dominus noster Iesus Christus, duobus Geminis consulibus [A. D. 29] VIII. Kal. April., et post ascensum eius beatissimus Petrus episcopatum suscepit. Ex quo tempore per successionem dispositum, quis episcopus quot annis praefuit vel quo imperante." Now, in reference to this statement that our Lord suffered on the 25th March, let us ask, on what grounds the writer could have made it? A real or trustworthy tradition is out of the question. The complicated rules for finding Easter, which we follow to this day, attest that the early Church did not connect the memory of our Lord's Resurrection with any day of the solar year; but that the first commemorations of that event took place as the recurrence of the Passover season naturally brought to the disciples' minds the things which had happened at that Passover when their Master was betrayed into the hands of sinful men; and thus that the commemorations of necessity at first followed the rules of the Jewish Passover, as they have always been connected with the lunar, not the solar, year. It was not till far on in the second century, when the Christian body included some men of science, that it was attempted to recover, and doubtless by astronomical calculation, the day of the solar year on which the full moon of the Crucifixion occurred. I do not know that any one in the East imagined the day to have been the 25th March. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* I., xxi.) gives the dates assigned by various persons who aimed at minute accuracy, as the 25th Phamenoth, 25th Pharmuthi, and 19th Pharmuthi (March 21, April 20, April 14). That the date March 25, A. D. 29, was not obtained by tradition, is further evident from the fact that it cannot be the true date, being a full week away from the full moon, which in that year fell on the 18th March. If we ask then, how this date came to be fixed on, the answer is, that the full moon did fall in the year 221 on

the 25th March, whence any one who lived then and who believed in a 16 years' cycle, would conclude that it fell on the same day in the year 29, which is distant 12 times 16 years from the year 221. Accordingly, we find in the cycle engraved on the statue of Hippolytus, on the line answering to the year 29, and opposite the date of the 25th March, *πάθος Χριστοῦ*. We know, too, from the chronicle that Hippolytus held that our Lord suffered on this the fourteenth day of the moon, and not on the following day. I draw the conclusion, that it was Hippolytus who made the calculation, that the 25th March was the day of the Crucifixion, and that any one who asserts the same thing does so on his authority.¹

One of the most interesting applications of this principle is in the case of Tertullian, the earliest Latin writer who gives this date of the Crucifixion. In his treatise *Adv. Judaeos*, cap. 8 he states that the Passion took place "sub Tiberio Cesare, coss. Rubellio Gemino et Rufio Gemino, mense Martio, temporibus Paschae, die VIII. Kalendarum Aprilium, die prima azymorum." According to my view, that this statement was made on the authority of a work of Hippolytus, published, probably, A. D. 224, we should not be more than four or five years wrong in dating this treatise of Tertullian, A. D. 230. Let us inquire whether there is any difficulty in admitting this date. Allix, indeed, assigns the year 220 as the date of the death of Tertullian, and gives 208 as the date of this particular tract; but he makes the first statement on pure conjecture, and the second on grounds extremely weak. So early a date for the death of Tertullian is inconsistent with the statement of St. Jerome, that Tertullian lived to extreme old age—"usque ad decrepitam aetatem vixisse fertur." Neander has a dissertation,

¹ I cannot delay to discuss the statement, that our Lord suffered in the consulship of the two Gemini. Several modern chronologers adopt this conclusion, nor do I quarrel with them for doing so, except so far as they rely on

traditional authority; but I believe that the ancient writers who make this assertion were mainly influenced by arguments which would not now be regarded as having weight.

in which he undertakes to show that the concluding chapters of the tract against the Jews (commencing with the chapter next after that which contains the date of the Passion) are spurious, and Bp. Kaye admits that there is force in his arguments. It appears to me, however, that what Neander really succeeds in showing is only, that the tract against the Jews is a later work than the third book against Marcion, because that where the two works have matter in common the connexion proves that the work against Marcion was its original place. But the suspicion seems groundless that we have here the case of an interpolator attempting to complete a work which Tertullian had for some unknown reason left unfinished. Rather, examination will show that this is an example of a thing of no uncommon occurrence where an author saves himself trouble by using what he had written on a former occasion, making, however, such alterations as are necessary to adapt it to his new purpose. The fact that the work against the Jews is later than the work against Marcion quite harmonizes with the late date I have assigned to the former work. We are told by the writer known as Praedestinus, that Tertullian, in a letter to Bishop Soter, claimed for the Montanists perfect agreement with the Church of Rome in respect to the celebration of Easter. It is quite intelligible therefore that Tertullian received with complete assent the work of Hippolytus, which, no doubt, for the time regulated the observance of the Roman Church. And the Cyprianic tract, to which I have so often referred, shows the acceptance of the 16 years' cycle by the Church in Africa. I have thought it worth while to delay on this tract of Tertullian, the cases being so few where we can, with tolerable approximation, date any of Tertullian's writings.

To return now to the Liberian Catalogue, I hold that the date given for the Passion at the commencement removes any possible doubt that the foundation of it was that list of Roman bishops which is absent from its place in

the Chronicle of Hippolytus. If we found a mutilated statue wanting an arm, and if near the same spot we found a separate arm, it would be natural to guess that the one belonged to the other. And all doubt would be removed if we found the two precisely to fit together, both showing the signs of the same workmanship. I may seem to have expended needless labour in establishing the connexion of Hippolytus with the earlier part of the Liberian Catalogue—a point now accepted by nearly all the best authorities, by Mommsen as cited above, by De Rossi, *Roma Sotterranea*, vol. I., p. 117; vol. II., p. iii.; and by Lipsius, whose valuable work on the chronology of the Roman bishops down to the middle of the fourth century, contains a complete digest of all the information accessible on this subject. But, as Döllinger dissents, I have tried to remove all possibility of doubt on this point, because I believe that the key to all the difficulties of the problem of settling the succession of the early Roman bishops is the thorough understanding of the place which Hippolytus holds among our authorities.

Pearson has illustrated, by the example of the succession of the bishops of Jerusalem, how dependent Eusebius and the chronologers of the fourth century were on the records preserved in the different Churches, and how unable they were to supply the defect when those records failed them. For the chronology then of the early Roman bishops the traditions of the Roman Church itself must have been their primary source of information. And we may count it now as an ascertained fact that, not later than the year 235, the most learned man then to be found in the Roman Church had investigated the chronology of its former bishops, and published a list containing his results. There is every reason to think that Hippolytus had no predecessor in this work. Before his time, pains had been taken to ascertain the *succession* of the Roman bishops. Hegesippus, we are told, made such a *διαδοχή*, and though his list is lost, it is probably represented in the catalogue given by Irenaeus, which ends with the episcopate of Eleutherus. But this

list gives only names of bishops, and not their duration of office; nor is it reasonable to expect a chronological work from an earlier age. Hippolytus' own age witnessed the rise of Christian scientific chronology, and of this science he seems to have been in the West the only representative. Indeed, the obscurity in which the whole life of Hippolytus is shrouded arises from the fact that he was, unless we except the still more shadowy Caius,¹ the only learned man of the Church of Rome in his time, so that we have scarcely any information as to his history, but what we can glean from his own writings. There is then every reason to think that in this part of his work he was not copying the labours of any other, and that no other chronological list competed with his. From the use made of his list in the Liberian Catalogue, and subsequently in the Liber Pontificalis, we may gather that his list was accepted in the Church of Rome itself, and that it is it that would be produced in reply to inquiries from other Churches, as containing the authentic traditions of the Church of Rome. In this way it would become known to many who never would see the Chronicle of Hippolytus, and who would have no reason for connecting the list with his name. And we might expect that this investigation, made by so high an authority, would as completely supersede every other catalogue, as the Masoretic revision of the Hebrew text has suppressed every other recension. And so, no doubt, it would, if it had not been for variations between the list of Hippolytus and that previously accepted—variations the origin of which it will presently be attempted to explain, but which chronologers of other countries would not be likely to accept; for they would naturally prefer the authority of Irenaeus, and probably of Hegesippus, to that of a list which came to them anonymously. The actual study of

¹ One difficulty I feel in accepting Prof. Lightfoot's seductive theory which identifies Caius and Hippolytus, is the absence of the dialogue against Proclus from the list of works on the statue.

the lists¹ given by later writers leads me to the conclusion that, as we might have expected, all are derived from the list of Hippolytus; that where they differ from it, the difference is due either to transcriptional errors, or to critical correction,² but not to the later writers being in possession of any independent source of information. If this be so, in any inquiry concerning the early Roman bishops, our course must be to investigate what is the testimony of Hippolytus, and to what credit it is entitled. Writers who lived a century or more after Hippolytus, if they copy what he said, add nothing to his authority; if they reject his statements, are only entitled to attention so far as the reasons that weighed with them may weigh with us also.

The present Liberian Catalogue is, no doubt, very different from the list which came from the hands of Hippolytus. It is, of course, lengthened by the addition of the names of the bishops who lived after his time; and it has been stated that the earlier entries have been enlarged by the addition of the names of consuls answering to the accession and to the death of each bishop. This addition may be regarded as the commentary of the chronographer of 354 on the original bare list of Hippolytus, and is valuable as showing the readings which he followed, and the interpretations he put on them. Hippolytus, no doubt, must have formed a chronology for himself, but his list does not contain it. It assigned, for instance, 25 years to Peter's episcopate, but it did not state where the 25 years were to begin; and accordingly, the chronographer of 354, Eusebius, and Jerome, differing on this point, found on the same datum different chronological systems. In order to get the list of Hippolytus we must also strike out of the Liberian Catalogue the record of contemporaneous

¹ For a convenient conspectus of such lists, see Lipsius, *Chronologie der römischen Bischöfe*, p. 143.

² For example, I believe that Pearson is quite right in thinking that the version which makes Peter's episcopate

22 years is a critical correction of Hippolytus' 25 years, corresponding to the computation of the length of our Lord's life as 33 years, instead of the 30 assigned by Hippolytus.

emperors, and, in fact, with the exception probably of one note, of which I will speak afterwards, strike out everything but the bare list of names and lengths of episcopates. I agree with those who hold that we must also strike out the months and days, as no part of the original list. The second part of the *Liberian Catalogue*, being contemporary history, gave the duration of episcopates in years, months, and days; and it was natural that, for the sake of symmetry, months and days should have been added in the case of the earlier names. Taking the days on which the deaths of the different bishops appear to have been commemorated, and calculating, as respects months and days, the interval between the deaths of each two consecutive bishops, I find no correspondence whatever between the interval so determined, and that given in the *Catalogue*. The months and days there seem to have been set down quite at random, unless, indeed, they be really of greater antiquity than the selection of days of commemoration of the early bishops. Regarding the months and days as of no historic authority, I prefer to believe them not to have been given by Hippolytus; and they seem to have been dropped out of the lists supplied by the Church of Rome to Eastern inquirers. But I will not venture to speak positively. The *Chronicle of Hippolytus* gives the lengths of emperors' reigns in years, months, and days. And I cannot lay stress on Lipsius' argument (p. 58), that it is only by leaving out months and days that we can make the sum of the items tolerably agree with the space they are intended to cover. Not to say that, owing to accidental mutilation of the list, we are obliged to supply some of the items conjecturally on later authority, a failure of correspondence such as that of which Lipsius speaks is a common thing in the *Chronology of Hippolytus*. And the facts which he states, p. 59, rather lead to the conclusion, that the chronographer of 354 found months and days already in the list; and that some of the blunders of which he has been accused in his assignment of consuls were but the result

of arithmetical inaccuracies in the original list of Hippolytus.

We have little means of judging of the authority on which Hippolytus made his statements. It is reasonable to believe that the archives of the Roman Church, to which he had access, contained notes of the lengths of different episcopates, and that those notes were, in the case at least of the later bishops, historically trustworthy. The fact that Irenaeus, whose object was completely satisfied by tracing the *succession* of the bishops, does not give these notes of time, is no proof that they did not exist in the sources which he consulted. We may set down as a later growth anything that Hippolytus states *contradictory* to the account of Irenaeus, but we can find no argument on what may have been simple omission by Irenaeus of things unsuitable to his purpose. Assuming that Hippolytus had for his materials notes of the lengths of different episcopates, his work as a chronologer ought to have been to arrange them in order, to deduce thence the date of the commencement of each episcopate, or, at least, to compare the sum total of the episcopates with the period which they covered, and to correct any errors that might be detected by such comparison. We have little means of testing the manner in which Hippolytus performed this task, but I have no very high opinion of his qualifications for it. It is not merely that he does not seem a computer of much arithmetical accuracy, but that he seems little capable of weighing evidence. Men, incapable of asserting anything they do not believe to be true, still differ widely from each other as to the amount of evidence which will induce them to make an assertion, and themselves believe it firmly. Hippolytus strikes me as one of those arbitrary and self-confident men who have unbounded faith in their own theories, and the confidence of whose assertions is quite disproportionate to the evidence they can produce for them. It is thus that when he became acquainted with the eight years' cycle, he has no doubt but that he can

assign the date of every full moon from the beginning to the end of the world. And in like manner I receive with a grain, or rather with a bushel, of salt the defamatory history which, in the "*Refutation of all Heresies*," he tells of Callistus, and which certainly does not appear to have found acceptance among the Christians of his own day. But whatever distrust we may feel, we must perforce take him as our guide to the chronology of the early Roman bishops, since we have scarce any information that may not be ultimately traced to him.

On comparing now the succession of Roman bishops, as given by Hippolytus, with the earlier account of Irenaeus, we find at the beginning of the list some important discrepancies. The account of Irenaeus is, that the Roman Church was founded by the two apostles, Peter and Paul; that the apostles, when they had founded and built up the Church, committed the episcopate of it to Linus, who is mentioned in Paul's Epistles to Timothy; that Linus was succeeded by Anencletus, and that after him, in the third place from the apostles, succeeded Clement, the author of the Epistle to the Church of Corinth, who himself also had been a personal hearer of the apostles. Hippolytus' account, on the other hand, is, that after the Ascension, Peter received the episcopate, and held it 25 years [1 month and 9 days]. Next, Linus, 12 years [4 months 12 days]; then Clement, 9 years [11 months 12 days]; then Cletus, 6 years [2 months, 10 days]; then Anacletus, 12 years [10 months, 3 days]. After this the two lists unite. It will be observed that we have here three discrepancies—(1). In the one list Linus is the first bishop, owing his appointment to Paul as well as to Peter; in the other list Peter himself is the first bishop; (2), while in both lists Linus is the first bishop after the apostles, the order of the next two, Cletus and Clement, is different in the two lists; (3), in the second list two bishops of similar name, Cletus and Anacletus, correspond to the single Anencletus of the first list. I believe that these three discrepancies ought

not to be considered apart from each other, and that one explanation will account for all three.

These three innovations of Hippolytus met with very different reception. The duplication of Cletus and Anacletus, which on the face of it suggests that an error has occurred, found so little favour even among Western writers, that it has been questioned whether it did not merely creep into the list through transcribers' error. The transposition of Cletus and Clement was accepted by no Eastern authority, and not universally in the West. But the placing Peter at the head as first bishop was generally adopted, and no less generally the attributing to his episcopate a duration of 25 years, the variations from this number found in a very few lists seeming to be later and arbitrary corrections, on the grounds of chronological theories. But this different reception is exactly what might have been expected. The statements which contradicted the previous account of Irenaeus were not accepted; those which seemed merely to supplement it were received without question.

It is so hard to harmonize the 25 years' episcopate with what we can learn from the New Testament, either as to the movements of St. Peter, or as to the condition of the early Roman Church, that several have contented themselves with maintaining that St. Peter was bishop of Rome, without insisting on the 25 years. But the 25 years' episcopate is an essential part of the story told by all the witnesses to whom they appeal. Considering the important doctrinal consequences which have been developed from the alleged fact of the 25 years' episcopate, the work on whose authority that statement rests must be admitted to hold an important place in the history of religious thought. I myself feel no doubt that that work is the *Chronicle of Hippolytus* on which I have been commenting. That *Chronicle* certainly contained the statement of the 25 years' episcopate; the publication of such a statement by a man of Hippolytus' consideration, and the acceptance of it by the Roman Church, is a full and adequate explanation of the

agreement in that statement by a number of writers, the earliest of whom wrote almost a century after. There is no evidence whatever that this statement was made in any work earlier than that of Hippolytus; and the Catalogue of Irenaeus enables us to define a date (not so very much earlier than the time when Hippolytus wrote), at which the episcopate of Peter was not part of the traditions of the Roman Church.

But how came Hippolytus himself to set down Peter's episcopate at 25 years? It may be answered, because even then such was the tradition of the Roman Church. But this only shifts the difficulty a step further, if no explanation is given how the tradition arose. If we can admit that a fact really occurred, no further explanation is required of a traditional belief in it. If it did not occur, the first person who asserted it had probably some reason for doing so, if we could only tell what it was. Thus, in the case already considered, Tertullian's statement that our Lord was crucified on the 25th March, is not sufficiently explained by saying that such was the traditional belief, unless we hold that our Lord really did suffer on that day, and that the remembrance of it was always preserved in the Church. If not, the question remains which I have already attempted to answer, how came that day to be fixed on? So here, if we can believe that St. Peter really did for 25 years reside at Rome as its bishop, there is no more to be said; if not, how came that number of years to be fixed on? One single assumption will explain not only this, but all three variations between the Catalogues of Hippolytus and Irenaeus; it is that Hippolytus received the Pseudo-Clementines as historically trustworthy; in particular, that he received it as a fact that Clement was ordained bishop by Peter. I have called this an assumption, yet it is very nearly capable of proof. We have every reason to believe that Irenaeus accepted the main points of the Clementine legend. His statement that Clement was a companion of the apostles, can hardly

have rested on any other authority, since there is every reason to hold that the real Clement lived at the end of the century, separated by two episcopates from the apostles. Between the times when Irenaeus and when Hippolytus wrote, belief in the Clementine story had had some years to grow and strengthen. And we have the direct evidence of Tertullian (*De Praescrip.* c. 32), "*Romanorum (ecclesia) Clementem a Petro ordinatum (refert).*"¹ These words describe the then prevalent belief in the Roman Church which it is almost inevitable that Hippolytus shared. Assuming then that Hippolytus held this belief, put yourself in his place. Suppose the task committed to you, not merely to give a list of Roman bishops, in which case you would have no difficulty in following the traditional account preserved by Irenaeus, but to make a chronology of them, assigning at least in your own mind the date of the accession of each. Your data are notes of the duration of episcopates, in the main agreeing with those in the Liberian Catalogue; but with these you have to combine the fact that Clement was ordained by Peter, and therefore that his episcopate cannot begin later than about A. D. 67. When you push back Clement's episcopate so early, you will find after his death a large gap in your chronology, which you will not know how to fill up without completely altering the times assigned for the episcopates of subsequent bishops. Grapple with this problem, and I will not say that the solution

¹ In the passage cited, Tertullian represents it as the boast of each of the most ancient Churches that its first bishop had an apostle or apostolic man as his "*auctor et antecessor.*" Thus Smyrna related that Polycarp had been appointed by John; Rome, that Clement had been ordained by Peter. It would appear, hence, that Tertullian counted Clement, not Linus, as the first bishop

of Rome. It is more doubtful whether he recognised the episcopate of Peter. The word "*antecessor*" is in favour of it; yet, as John was never accounted the first bishop of Smyrna, we are not forced to suppose Tertullian guilty of the bull of asserting the "*first bishop*" to have had a predecessor in that office.

of Hippolytus will be forced on you; but I will say, you will not have devised one more simple and ingenious, and which with less violence fulfils the conditions of the question.

The dates of the terminations of the different episcopates, as the *Liberian Catalogue* stands at present, are given as follows:—Peter, A. D. 55; Linus, 67; Clement, 76; Cletus, 83; Anacletus, 95; the date to which we are thus led for the accession of the next bishop not differing very seriously from those arrived at by Eusebius and by Jerome, who adhered to the earlier account of the order of the bishops. These dates may be regarded as the commentary of the chronographer of 354, on the mere list of lengths of episcopates given by Hippolytus, but they cannot differ very much from what Hippolytus intended. In one point, however, I am convinced that Lipsius mistakes what Hippolytus intended—a mistake apparently shared by the chronographer of 354. He supposes that this Hippolytine list places the death of Peter so early as A. D. 55—the first year of Nero. I have no doubt that Hippolytus means to place it where others do—at the great persecution under Nero, which he dates 67. In dealing with the problem which I stated, Hippolytus found the place of Linus at the head of the list too well established by tradition for him to think of shaking it. Accordingly, his theory is, that the traditional 12 years of Linus' episcopate are to be placed in the lifetime of Peter, who, on the death of Linus, ordained Clement. This is the theory adopted in the *Apostolical Constitutions*, whether there derived from Hippolytus, or obtained by independent conjecture, we cannot tell. Although Hippolytus did not venture to displace Linus, whose connexion with the apostles was established through the mention of his name by St. Paul, he had not the same scruple about Cletus, who was, doubtless, to him a mere name. Apparently he found his name given by one of his authorities as Cletus with an episcopate of 6 years, by another as Anacletus with 12; and finding, in

consequence of the gap caused by the early dating of Clement, a space in his chronology large enough to admit of both bishops, he convinced himself that the two were distinct. Since both Cletus and Anacletus are required in order to fill out the time in the Hippolytine chronology, I think it to be without reason that Lipsius has suggested that this duplication may have arisen through transcribers' error.

It is needless to notice arguments which only go to show, what I readily concede, that Cletus and Anacletus were really not distinct, but do not show that Hippolytus did not count them so. The most formidable argument (see Pearson, *Diss.* II., cap. 1.) is, that a writer quoted by Eusebius (*H. E.* v. 28), whom there is reason for identifying with Hippolytus, speaks of Victor as the thirteenth bishop from Peter; whereas he would be the fourteenth if we count Cletus and Anacletus as distinct. Assuming that the quotation is from the "Little Labyrinth," and that Hippolytus was the author of that work; assuming also that he did not write it before he had formed his chronology of the Roman bishops, we can still reconcile his language with that chronology. The mode of counting Sixtus 6th, Eleutherus 12th from the apostles, &c., must have been too well established in the time of Hippolytus for him to think of changing it; but as he believed the second bishop, Clement, in his series to have been in immediate contact with the apostles, Hippolytus could, without inconsistency, express the distance of each bishop from the apostles according to the received numbering. We can see now how Hippolytus arrived at the 25 years for Peter's episcopate. If I am right in supposing him to have been induced by the Pseudo-Clementines to believe that Clement was ordained by Peter, the same authority would induce him to count Peter in the list of Roman bishops. The whole interval between the Ascension and the death of Peter being, according to his calculation, about 37 years, and the

traditional¹ 12 being taken out for Linus, there remain 25 for Peter.

It will be observed, then, that Hippolytus' 25 years are not, as Eusebius and Jerome counted them, the 25 immediately preceding the death of St. Peter, but that they begin to count either from the Ascension, or from the year after; for in following Hippolytus we cannot pretend to be exact to a year.² And any one who thinks it worth while to discuss whether the 25 years' episcopate is credible, ought not to deal with the story in its altered form, 25 years beginning with the 2nd of Claudius, but in its original form, 25 years beginning with the Ascension. Thus we see that the scheme of Hippolytus is nothing more than some such modification of the previously received account as was rendered necessary by the acceptance of the Clementine story.

It is scarcely necessary that I should spend argument to show that we ought to return to the original account, setting aside the Clementines as quite unhistorical, and not even Roman in their origin. There is an entire absence of true tradition about Clement, of whom we know nothing, save that he lived at the end of the first century, occupied a leading position in the Roman Church, and was the writer of the Epistle to the Church at Corinth. It is remarkable how insignificant a part oral tradition bears in Church history. Where we meet such formulae as "fertur," "*λόγος κατέχει*," &c., we are not to suppose that the writer is repeating what he learned by hearsay, but that he is

¹ It is not impossible that this may have been a true tradition. Another solution is (see Lactant. *De Mort. Pers.* cap. 2) that Hippolytus divided his 37 years by assigning to Peter the 25 between the Ascension and the accession of Nero, and the rest to Linus.

² Unfortunately our data are not sufficiently precise to enable us to say with certainty whether Hippolytus counted his 25 years to begin (as his

words might imply) from the Ascension, or from the year after, as the chronographer of 354 reckons. The latter computation implies a belief in a real visit to Rome shortly after the Ascension. The former computation does not necessarily imply this, any more than the way in which the years of the reign of Charles II. are reckoned implies a belief in his presence in England from the year 1649.

quoting some work whose author's name he either does not know, or does not care to repeat. Where there was no literary activity we find no traditions. We are strongly tempted to guess that if genuine records of the Roman Church of the first century had been preserved, we should have found something to connect the bishop Clement with the consul Flavius Clemens, a member of the imperial house, who, if not himself a martyr for the faith, seems undoubtedly to have had Christians in his family. But the Consul is absent from the earliest Clementine legends, which were made by persons distant enough from him, in time and space, to give us reason to suspect that they knew less of the Consul than we do now. I feel no doubt that the true account of the Clementine legends is, that they sprang out of the celebrity attached to Clement as the author of the Epistle to the Church of Corinth, which, though written only in the name of the Church of Rome, was everywhere known as his, and was honoured by being read in the public assemblies for worship. It is not wonderful that one whose work was thus placed in company with the writings of the apostles should in popular feeling come to be regarded as their contemporary, since Hippolytus himself had the fortune to pass with certain,¹ from whom he was sufficiently removed in time, as personally acquainted with the apostles. Thus Clement presented himself as the natural hero of a legend connecting the apostles with the Church of Rome. If, then, it be the case that the Clementine story took its origin at a distance from Rome, and if it did not appear in its earliest form until so long after the publication of the Epistle of Clement, that its author had had time to become a mythical personage, then, notwithstanding that this early Christian novel² afterwards found popularity and acceptance in Rome itself, its statements cannot for a

¹ Viz., Palladius and Cyrillus Scythopolitanus. See Lumper, viii. 3.

² Perhaps I ought to say "Jewish novel." I have chanced to meet an article by Dr. Perles, "Rabbinische Agada's, in 1001 Nacht;" Monats-

schrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums, Jan. 1873, p. 28, which suggests that the Talmud would supply interesting illustrations of the sources whence the Clementine writer drew the materials for his story.

moment be allowed to weigh against the clear tradition of the Roman Church that two bishops, Linus and Cletus, interposed between Clement and the apostles. If it be asked, in what way was the tradition of the Church as to the order of its bishops preserved, one way ought not to be forgotten—the liturgical mention of their names. It is notorious that the early Christians did not think that the death of a bishop made it necessary that the mention of his name in their public prayers should be discontinued. Consequently, the early liturgies of a Church might be expected to preserve the names of its first bishops, and, naturally, in the order in which they⁹ ruled. Now, it is a fact almost decisive in this inquiry, that the Roman Canon of the Mass to this day recites the names in the order Linus, Cletus, Clemens. At what time can we conceive these names to have been inserted? It is to be remembered that the Hippolytine catalogue was for a time the official catalogue of the Roman Church, and that Augustine and Optatus adopt its order. If the Liturgy had ever recited the names in the order Linus, Clemens, the name of the unknown Cletus would never have been interposed in priority to the celebrated Clement. We must believe, then, that the order Linus, Cletus, Clement, was the established liturgical order before the time of Hippolytus, and that his innovation never affected the public prayers. The Roman catalogues, a couple of centuries after Hippolytus, contain a curious compromise. They were evidently founded on the list of Hippolytus, for they contain the duplication Cletus and Anacletus; but Clement is interposed between the two, so as to restore the liturgical order, Linus, Cletus, Clement.

The antiquity and trustworthiness of the order Linus, Cletus, Clement, is proved as well by internal evidence as by external. The name of him who at the end of the second century was most celebrated, and was then believed to be apostolic, is placed only third; the second name is that of an unknown person; the first, that of one whom we know from the New Testament to have been one of Paul's

circle, but who is mentioned there with so little prominence that he offers no attraction to a forger.¹

The conclusion I come to is, that we are to reject every attempt which has been made to reconcile the different accounts given of the order of the first Roman bishops, and which proceeds on the assumption that these different accounts are equally worthy of credit. I hold that the order Linus, Cletus, Clement is unquestionably the original order, and the only one entitled to respect; the inversion of Cletus and Clement being an arbitrary correction, made by a chronologer of the third century, in deference to an authority which we now know to be of no weight.

I have not meddled with the question whether St. Peter ever visited Rome, but I hold that the assertion that he was its bishop rests ultimately on the authority of the Pseudo-Clementines, and that the assigning of 25 years for the length of his episcopate was first made by Hippolytus.

Holding, as I do, that the true order of the first Roman bishops cannot be considered doubtful, I reject certain consequences which have been drawn from the supposed uncertainty and confusion as to this order. Lipsius arrives at the conclusion that Linus, Cletus, Clement, are to be considered but as the names of leading presbyters of the Church of Rome towards the close of the first century. Those whose names are given as bishops during the early part of the second century he counts as presbyter-bishops, and reckons Pius (about the middle of the century) as the first bishop in the strict sense of the word. That the power exercised by Pius differed in any important degree from that exercised by his predecessor, is more than I think we have any historical grounds for asserting;

¹ I do not think that in the 2nd Epistle to Timothy, Eubulus and Pudens would have been placed before Linus, if at the time the Epistle was written Linus had been recognised as the foremost man in the Roman Church.

One, therefore, who does not believe the Epistle to Timothy to have been written in the lifetime of St. Paul, is strongly tempted to deny the episcopate of Linus.

but for reasons such as those stated so ably by Professor Lightfoot, in his well-known dissertation, I readily concede that the interval which separated a bishop from his presbyters was less in early times than in later; and so I am not disposed to quarrel with the title presbyter-bishops used by Lipsius; but I differ with Lipsius on the question whether, in the Roman Church of the first century, as far as we can trace its constitution, one presbyter did not stand out clearly to be distinguished as holding recognised superiority over the others. The first fact relied on by Lipsius is one that I am surprised he should have thought it worth while to mention, viz., that Irenaeus (Eus. H. E. v. 24) speaks of Soter's predecessors as the *presbyters* "who, before Soter, presided over the Roman Church." Irenaeus unquestionably held as high a theory of primitive episcopacy as any I contend for: among those presbyters before Soter are included Anicetus and Pius, whom Lipsius allows to have been bishops in the strict sense: Irenaeus' use of the word *πρεσβύτερος*, in speaking of bishops, is notorious (see Döllinger's remarks on it, Hipp. und Kall., p. 338): and Hippolytus gives this same title, *πρεσβύτερος*, to Irenaeus himself. In the second place, Lipsius urges the passages in the "Shepherd" of Hermas, where the writer condemns dissensions, and contests for precedence, and notes it as a mark distinguishing the false prophet from the true, that the former exalts himself, and wishes to have the chief seat. Ritschl had already thence inferred that this was written at a time when the presbyterian form of government was passing into the episcopal, and that Hermas was one of the minority which protested against the change. It is on this ground that Lipsius names the episcopate of Pius as that when Rome began to have a bishop, in the narrower sense of the word. Yet it seems to me that Lipsius precludes himself from drawing this inference by his acknowledgment of the existence of presbyter-bishops at Rome since the beginning of the second century. We may blame a man for aspiring to the

chief seat if none ought to be above another, or if the rightful owner of the chief place were some other than he. But we should use different language if we desired to condemn the attempt of one who already confessedly held the chief place, unduly to enlarge his powers. If a dispute were to arise in France, in consequence of an attempt by M. Thiers to arrogate to himself powers belonging to the Assembly, no one would describe the matter as a contest for precedence. I am, therefore, of opinion that the language of Hermas is better satisfied by explaining it as condemning rather ambitious disputes about chief places, under the existing constitution of the Church, than attempts to alter that constitution. But undoubtedly the strongest argument in favour of the position that the original constitution of the Roman Church was simple presbyterianism, is drawn from the confusion as to the order of the first bishops. If history had handed down to us the names of leading presbyters at Rome during the first century, but had left their order in utter uncertainty, it would be a most natural and legitimate inference that there never had been any order, that all had been originally equal, and that it was only in order to make the history correspond to later notions of Church government that the names were arranged in order, which order different writers settled for themselves in different ways. If the view taken in this paper be correct, precisely the opposite conclusion follows. Then it appears that the three names were handed down to the beginning of the third century in the definite order, Linus, Cletus, Clemens; that afterwards the most learned man in the Roman Church, though believing that he had historical evidence connecting Clement directly with the apostles, yet found the position of Linus too firmly fixed for him to dream of disturbing it; that though he ventured to transpose the other two, the alteration was not accepted by foreign Churches, and could not maintain itself in his own. We have thus the names of three presbyters singled out from others whom we know

to have been members of the Roman Church in the first century; these names handed down in a perfectly definite order, the first name on the list being one which we have otherwise reason to connect with St. Paul, the last being one which we have otherwise reason to connect with the persecution of Domitian at the end of the century. Can we explain this more simply than by the received account that these were the names of successive governors of the Roman Church? To my mind the conclusion irresistibly suggests itself, that in the first century, beginning with the time immediately following the death of St. Paul, the constitution of the Roman Church was one in which a single presbyter (whatever may have been his powers and functions) was singled out from the rest, was supposed to be specially charged with the government of the Church, and was specially commemorated in the Church's prayers.

I do not mean in this paper to discuss the chronology of the other Roman bishops in the list of Hippolytus, but refer my readers to Lipsius's work. There is one other entry in the Catalogue on which I wish to make some remarks. The principal other points which I have tried to establish in this paper I have maintained by arguments which were at least convincing to myself. In the present case I have only a doubtful conjecture to put forward, and this I should not venture to do were it not that the subject is one on which nothing better than conjecture is to be had. The only historical note in the portion of the Liberian Catalogue which relates to the times earlier than Hippolytus is on the episcopate of Pius, and runs as follows:—"Sub huius episcopatu frater eius Hermes librum scripsit in quo mandatur contineturque quod ei precepit angelus cum venit ad illum in habitu pastoris." I assume this note to have been part of the original Catalogue of Hippolytus. Although the lists of kings contained in his chronicle give for the most part mere names and lengths of reigns, there are a few historical notes such as to prevent us from being surprised at finding a historical note in a Hippo-

lytine list of Roman bishops. If one such note occurred in the original list, it would form a precedent for the notes added by the next continuator of the list. I am not singular in supposing this particular note to belong to Hippolytus, although I freely own that the point admits of doubt, and that this doubtfulness attaches to any inferences I draw from it. The statement here made that Hermas, the author of the "Shepherd," was a brother of Pius, and wrote under his episcopate, is to be found also in a well-known passage in the Muratorian fragment on the Canon, if indeed the latter were not the authority on which the annotation in the catalogue was made. "*Pastorem vero nuperrime temporibus nostris in urbe Roma Hermas conscripsit sedente Cathedra urbis Romae ecclesiae Pio episcopo fratre eius.*" It has been inferred, with very general consent, from these words "*nuperrime temporibus nostris,*" that the work to which this fragment belongs could not have been written long after the episcopate of Pius. Tregelles argues that we should now scarcely apply the word "*nuperrime*" to the Crimean War, still less to the battle of Waterloo, and therefore that an interval of ten years between the episcopate of Pius and the date of the writing is more likely than one of twenty, and that an interval of fifty years is out of the question. Yet if we diminish the interval too much, we scarcely leave room for the growth of the state of things implied in the fragment, when the existence of a Hermas, brother to Pius, would seem to have been forgotten, and the "Shepherd" to have been publicly read in Churches in the same manner as the apostolic writings. And before we can confidently build an argument on a writer's use of a particular word, there are questions which we ought to be able to answer, and to which in this case we have no means of replying: What is the character of the writer? Is he cautious and accurate, or is he lax and rhetorical? Is he writing historically, or controversially? Thus, for instance, though no one in sober narrative would call the battle of Waterloo very recent, yet if we can con-

ceive such an assertion made as that the "Lay of the last Minstrel" was written by Shakespeare, there are many persons who, though themselves born within the last fifty years, would be quite capable of saying that it was ridiculous to ascribe to Shakespeare a work written quite recently and in our own time.

There is, I think, reason to believe that the work to which the Muratorian fragment belongs, though now lost, had when it was published considerable influence and authority. I would ascribe to the influence of this work the change of opinion that took place, and especially in the West, as to the right of the "Shepherd" to a place in the Canon. It was quoted as of the highest authority by Clement of Alexandria and Irenaeus, and pronounced by Origen to be in his opinion divinely inspired. Yet Jerome describes it as in his time almost unknown in the West, though still read in the public worship of some Eastern Churches. This change is satisfactorily accounted for by what the Muratorian fragment reveals—that a work was published, apparently by a learned member of the Roman Church, in which the writer declares that he had ascertained that the author of the "Shepherd" was not a hearer of the Apostles, but one who lived a century after their time. Where this statement was known and received, the public reading of the "Shepherd" would naturally be discontinued.

We can define within tolerably narrow limits when this change occurred. It must have been later than the time of Irenaeus, who quotes the "Shepherd" as Scripture. And it would seem to have been in the lifetime of Tertullian. In an earlier writing, "De Oratione," when a practice which he disapproves is defended on the authority of the "Shepherd," he uses towards the book no word of scorn or disparagement, but merely argues that the inference is not legitimate which had been drawn from it. In a later book, "De Pudicitia," under similar circumstances he scornfully rejects the authority of the "Shepherd" as apocryphal. And he there makes a statement worthy of particular attention,

viz.: that the "Shepherd" had been classed "by every council of your Churches among false and apocryphal books." We gather from the list of books in the Codex Claromontanus that there was a time when the "Shepherd" was publicly read in the African Churches. What I infer from the passage just cited from Tertullian is, that after the Muratorian work appeared, in which it is laid down that the "Shepherd" being a modern work, may be read privately, but ought by no means to be read publicly in the Church, at different councils of bishops in Africa it was resolved to discontinue the public reading of *Hermas*. Certainly we know that the public reading of *Hermas* was discontinued, and Tertullian seems to tell us the kind of authority on which the change took place. This supposition completely accounts for the language used in the "*De Pudicitia*." But the phrase "your Churches" shows that this expulsion of the "Shepherd" from the public reading must have taken place later than Tertullian's secession from the Church. Such then is the date which the external history of the "Shepherd" would lead us to assign to the Muratorian work.

Since all parties are agreed in assigning to the Muratorian fragment a date earlier than 235, and that it was probably published at Rome, it is evident that the statement about the "Shepherd" must have been known to Hippolytus, and therefore that I make no improbable supposition in ascribing the note in the Liberian Catalogue to him.

The question which I wish now to raise is whether, in affixing this note, Hippolytus was repeating the statement of an earlier writer, or whether he was putting on record a fact elicited by his own research? If it were possible to ascribe to Hippolytus the authorship of the Muratorian fragment, the history of the general change of feeling with respect to the "Shepherd" would be completely accounted for. Hippolytus lived at the time when, as I have already tried to show, the change took place. If about that time one of his reputation for learning, and with his means of ascertaining the true traditions of the Roman

Church, had published that he had ascertained Hermas' book to be modern, and improperly honoured by public reading, the very effects might be expected to follow which actually did occur, viz.: that in the West the discontinuance of the reading of the "Shepherd" would be immediate and universal; while this change would more slowly happen in the East, where the writings of Hippolytus seem to have had but small circulation. Africa in particular would be one of the places earliest affected by an authoritative statement made at Rome, and by Hippolytus, whose work on the Easter Cycle we otherwise know to have met with acceptance in Africa. And we could then more easily understand why Hippolytus affixed to his Catalogue this solitary note about the authorship of the "Shepherd," if what he believed to be the true account of the matter had been obtained by his own research, and was, in fact, a favourite discovery of his own. Other things in the fragment would harmonize well enough with the hypothesis that Hippolytus was the author. The passage which speaks of St. John's "fellow apostles and bishops" harmonizes well enough with the ideas of primitive Church government which made Peter bishop of Rome, as he is given in the list of Hippolytus. The language in which the double advent of our Lord is described, though not so peculiar as to afford ground for any identification, yet agrees well enough with language used by Hippolytus (*De Christo et Antichristo*, c. 44). The one bar to the ascribing the fragment to Hippolytus is this "*nuperrime temporibus nostris*." Yet when I ask myself is it quite impossible that Hippolytus could have used these expressions, I fail to recognize in him a writer so careful to measure his language, so studious to avoid exaggeration, as to enable me to answer with the same confidence with which critics of different schools, with general consent, have done.

I have already given my reasons for thinking of Hippolytus as one of those men of vehement temper who are apt to hold and express opinions with confidence much in ex-

cess of what is warranted by the evidence. The words of such a man must not be interpreted with as much strictness as if they were formulae in a mathematical treatise. Hippolytus must have known members of the Roman Church who could remember the episcopate of Pius, and it therefore does not seem to me impossible that, in contrast with the times of the Apostles, he might speak of the episcopate of Pius as his own time.

A little exaggeration in his language would be still more natural if he had any polemical motive for resisting the claim for the "Shepherd" of apostolic authority. We know that the "Shepherd" was quoted on the laxer side in the controversy whether the sin of adultery admitted of forgiveness and restoration. And on this subject we know, from the charges which Hippolytus brought against Callistus, that he himself strongly condemned the laxer view on behalf of which the authority of the "Shepherd" was urged. But I do not lay any stress on this, since the Muratorian work may probably have been published before Hippolytus took any part in the controversy concerning discipline. It does not deny that the "Shepherd" is edifying for private reading, and the Liberian entry would even seem to admit the reality of the angelic appearance to Hermas. On the whole, I am of opinion that the possibility of Hippolytine authorship is not excluded by the words "*nuperrime temporibus nostris*;" and I even hold that the supposition that he was the author, if not positively probable, is at least more probable than any other. If we have to choose between the suppositions, that the author was a person so obscure that his very name has perished, or some one whose name has come down to us, the latter seems plainly to be preferred; and of all the persons whose names have come down to us, I do not know one against whose claims stronger objections cannot be urged than against those of Hippolytus.

In the few words I have to add as to the credibility of the account given in the fragment of the authorship of the

"Shepherd," it will make no difference if I assume the author to be Hippolytus, for the story is at least as credible, if resting on his authority, as if resting on the authority of some unknown person. We may safely conclude that Hippolytus had ascertained the existence of a Hermas, brother of bishop Pius;¹ and more than this, I think, we cannot assert positively. We ourselves, when once we have ascertained the existence of a Hermas, a distinguished man in the Roman Church, in the first half of the second century, are strongly tempted to believe that he must have been the author of the "Shepherd," and, as well as I can judge of the amount of evidence which would induce Hippolytus to entertain and express a confident opinion, this would suffice for him. And therefore, though I believe that the fact which he has preserved, that Pius had a brother named Hermas, gives the right clue to the authorship of the "Shepherd," I hesitate to admit that we have any certainty that Hippolytus had any such grounds for asserting that Hermas wrote the book *during his brother's episcopate*, as need force us to adopt this conclusion, should internal evidence lead us to an earlier date.

¹ I have not thought it worth while to discuss in the text instances where the assertion that Hermas was a brother of Pius is clearly copied from the Liberian Catalogue. The notices in the *Liber Pontificalis*, and in the letter of Pius, are only interesting as illustrating how a story improves in the telling. At the time when these notices were written, the book of Hermas was, probably, unknown, and the entry in the Liberian Catalogue not understood; and so an explanation was invented that the angel had come in the habit of a shepherd, in order to direct that Easter should always be observed on a Sunday. It is to this

that reference is, probably, made in the "tradita verba" of the poem against Marcion. Oehler ascribes this poem, with much probability, to Victorinus, of Marseilles, who was two centuries later than Hippolytus. The author clearly copied from the Liberian list, for he counts both Cletus and Anacletus. As he puts Clement in the fourth place, he must have lived at a time when the Clementine legend had so far died out that no incongruity was felt in placing Clement at a distance from the apostles. His indifference to the liturgical order, Linus, Cletus, Clement, indicates that he did not write at Rome.

ON THE MEANING OF CERTAIN HOMERIC WORDS.

By JOHN FLETCHER DAVIES, M. A., Trinity College, Dublin.

THAT praiseworthy investigator and discoverer who first determined the rate at which sound travels was at the same time the first to determine the meaning of a common Homeric phrase. I venture to propose for consideration whether this latter was not a very important part of the discovery. It has scarcely ever been of even the least importance to me to know that sound travels eleven hundred feet, more or less, in a second (the odd units and fraction are really not material), but to be able to fasten on the fact that Homer means words which fly at about that rate of speed from the tongue of a speaker to the understanding of a listener has been an actual pleasure to me many times in many bygone years. To explain Homer and give a thoroughly definite and well proved meaning to Homeric words, whose meaning was unknown before, is to perform a great service to the more cultivated part of society by increasing the delight of reading Homer. We do not, many of us, wish to stand Government examinations in Natural and Experimental Science, and become manipulators of those wonderful modern contrivances for making words vastly more winged than Homer's. Natural philosophers shall discover, if they please, the way to make words fly at any multiple of one hundred and ninety thousand miles per second. The discovery will not much increase the happiness of any portion of mankind, however much it may make some people stare and gape. But it is a matter of sublime interest to all readers of Homer, such, for instance, as was Peter de' Medicis, to whom the first printed Homer was dedicated, or the English statesman Fox, or the now living William Gladstone, that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* should be well understood. For they have power to de-

light the mind impatient of silliness when Robinson Crusoe, Gulliver's Travels, the Pilgrim's Progress, Ivanhoe, and even Lady Audley's Secret, can please no more. Of those two poems no man ever tires; and we can hardly call him a man who has not read them at least once in his life. But you would be very willing to tolerate a man's ignorance of any number of natural sciences.

There are many men, however, to whom Homer is much more than the progenitor of a large portion of their intellectual life. There are many who have been moved to say over and over again: "that mortal man who put those words together was the greatest of the sons of men, and there is no name fit to be mentioned by the side of his, no, not one." Think: there was a great Transpadane Roman, and we were very near having a great Englishman in the reign of one of the Tudors, but he was too rude; and there has been no good second to Homer. Like that Yorkshire Phrenicus of a hundred years ago, Homer is first, and the rest, good runners some of them, are nowhere.

And so Aeschylus called himself a *rechauffeur* of Homer's scraps, and Virgil preferred Lucretius before himself, and so would William Shakspeare, if he had been able to read the *De Rerum Natura* and the Odyssey. In Homer's poems we have the true paragon of poetry, and their maker sways the principedom over all the givers of delight. How judicious, too, was that arrangement of mundane occurrences by which the poet who possessed this supreme power to please was made to live so early in the life of the world, even in the very rosy fingered dawn of man's mental birth, and be the delight of the greatest possible number of generations! For the literary works of the Easterns, which are either wholly religious or amatory, and deal so largely in the grotesque and supernatural, are not remarkably interesting and pleasing. The best are the fables of Lokman, the ancient Persian, and the only barbarian to whom the Greeks were indebted for any portion of their poetic literature.

Because of this incomparable and inexhaustible beauty of Homer's poems, I do not think that it is too much to say that the discovery of the meaning of Homeric words is a contribution to the pleasure of cultivated men with which not many other discoveries can compete. Suppose the question were put to you: "would you rather that Homer's poems were utterly lost out of the memory of men, and that all the influence they have had on men's minds should be wiped out, and this one cause of human culture and life's embellishment should never have existed, and that you should have no Homer near your hand on your study table, and no Odyssey in your pocket when you take your summer trip to Theaki, or: that the printing press and the London Times, electrical machines and very quick telegrams, the steam engine and frightfully perilous locomotion, the mariner's compass, telescopes, microscopes, logarithms, gunpowder, photography, and all the new planets, comets, and lucifer matches had never been thought of, and did not exist?" It is, I know, a heart-searching alternative. But, as I have no power of divine language to do what Henry Stephens shrank from attempting in the Preface to his *Poetae Graeci Principes*, "*Homerum ita laudare ut volebam non poteram*," for only a Cicero could worthily pronounce the praises of Cicero, and as I would, nevertheless, testify my solemn homage to the great king and father of inspired men, I will throw this little handful of barley meal and honey sweet words of loving adoration of Homer over my own private holocaust of all those tricks and toys of late born men. O ye lucifer matches, ye sulphurless, nophosphorus, only-igniting-on-the-box and nonpareil Tandstickors, useful but not beauteous beings, shall I keep you, or Homer? I shall miss you, to be sure, but how much more miss Homer! Ye must go; and the great two-headed continent that Columbus discovered shall go along with you to swell the precious pile.

Among the successors of Professor Buttman Mr. F. A.

Paley holds, I think, a high rank. To him we owe the interpretations ἀμφιγυῖεις "ambidexter," βoήν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος 'Menelaus good at need,' and γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη 'lion eyed Athené.' In all of these the advantage is immense over the old renderings, while their Homeric propriety and etymological probability are unimpeachable. They seem to me to require no proof; they commend themselves at once to the experienced reader of Homer. Menelaus, for instance, the most courtly and best mannered of the Homeric heroes, is no longer represented to us as constantly vociferating and using his voice in an undignified style. The etymological probability that κλυτὸς ἀμφιγυῖεις means "the famous artificer with two right hands" may be shown in the following way; for this is rather a wonderfully acute guess of Mr. Paley's than a discovery with proof. Γύης originally meant the spike or pointed end of a wooden ploughshare, which was afterwards shod with an iron ὕνυς. The word γύης occurs (nine times in the Il. and Od.) in the epithet of ἔγχος, ἀμφίγυον, which means a spear "having a spike at both ends;" one was the αἶχμη or λόγχη, the spear head, and the other the σαρωτήρ used by Homer's heroes for sticking the spear in the ground, Il. 10. 153. Ἀμφιγυῖεις, then, as an epithet of a skilled workman, will mean "one who is sharp on both sides, or with both hands, who has not a left hand blunt as compared with his right hand." The metaphor of dulling or blunting hand or heart was familiar enough to the Greeks, as all know. Shakspeare, too, has "do not dull thy palm" and "blunts the edge of husbandry." I suppose that every one can see that "the famous cripple with two lame legs" is a very limping expression for Homer to use. And so with many more of Mr. Paley's contributions: they almost dispense with proof because of a certain patency of fitness and rightness which they bear in their front. But my object is to introduce, in these papers, some new interpretations of my own. I am not altogether a novice in Homeric interpretation. Mr. Paley has tacitly adopted in

several passages the translation of ἀμύμων "faultless in beauty" which was suggested, and nearly proved on p. xi of my Choephorae, 1862. I am still of opinion that that is the primary meaning, and that the old translation, "blameless, in a moral sense," is quite wrong. My suggestion that in μάντις ἀμύμων the allusion may be to some superior elegance of costume and other professional adornments, such as the crown and golden wand (poor Cassandra's χρῆστηρία ἱσθῆς, and κόσμοι, Aesch. Ag. 1270, 1; Arion's σκευὴ which he puts on to sing his last melody in), has been confirmed by such passages as Ovid Amor. 8. 59, *ipse deus vatū palla spectabilis aurea*; and it seems to me to be only by a wrong prejudice that one is prevented from saying "the handsome seer." We are so full of the notion that a prophet must be a grey bearded old man with a sour face, who delights in jeremiads and is always saying unpleasant things. As if θεοειδὴς Theoclymenus (Od. 17. 151) was not a handsome man, and the μάντις Agasias not in the flower of grace-beautified manhood when he won a chariot race at Olympia, Pind. Ol. 6. Καλογηρός, Modern Greek for 'a priest,' looks very like 'handsome old man.' Ἀγασσάμεθ' is another word the meaning of which I have tried to define more clearly (Agam. p. 191). If you take ἄγαν to be the root, an old accusative of ἄγη 'surprise,' the verb will mean 'to regard as in excess' and will bear the two meanings 'to admire' and 'to disparage.' Then we can interpret the line about Ulysses, Il. 3. 224, always rejected as spurious: "after hearing him speak, we did not think so meanly of the person of Ulysses when we looked upon it;" and that about Eurylochus, Odyss. 10. 249, "when, asking him questions and getting no answers, we began to think he was carrying the thing too far," that is, "was in too great a fright for a brave man." In Odyss. 16. 203, οὔτε τι θαυμάζειν περιώσιον, οὔτ' ἀγασσασθαι "you ought neither to admire your father too much, nor to disparage him," two verbs, one half neutral and the other quite, have their sense defined in opposite directions. Nor have I changed

my opinion that ἀμητὸς should be read Il. 19. 222. In advancing these new interpretations, I willingly put myself under the law that 'he only discovers who proves,' and, although I cannot help thinking that when I say—ἀλφηστῆς means 'barley meal eating,' formed nearly like ὠμηστής, and equivalent to σῖτον ἔδοντες and σιτοφάγοι—there will be some who will embrace the meaning at once, without a word of proof, I now proceed to give what I believe to be a nearly complete demonstration.

To begin with a very damaging admission: only two Greek authors whose works are extant seem to me to have known the meaning of Homer's ἀλφηστῆς. I think that Hesiod, and am certain that Aeschylus, was ignorant of it. Sophocles and Epicharmus knew it: all other writers and critics, ancient and modern, have given unhomeric mean-

¹ I could never understand, it is even now a matter of amazement to me, how Daniel Heinsius in his notes on Hesiod (A. D. 1603, p. 108 of the notes) could be disposed to laugh, "cum praesertim libenter rideamus," at those who think it a far less thing to take a city, "multo minus arbitrentur urbem expugnare," than to restore a corrupt passage in a classical author, "locum aliquem probabiliter emendare." A sentiment so base deserves to be reprobated and chastised; and I have, in imagination, held the rod of correction over Daniel Heinsius's head for now above twelve years. I take this opportunity of carrying out my intention; and at the same time I bid 'Αγγελία announce to the learned manes of Heinsius that I should have considered it a far greater glory to be the discoverer of the meaning of Homer's ἀλφηστῆς than to be the man who took Paris two years ago, or even the man who took Berlin, Vienna, and most other German cities some sixty years before that. All of this paper, except this note, was written under the impres-

sion that the true meaning of ἀλφηστῆς had not yet been given. I thought that I should surely get the latest intelligence about the word from Mr. Hayman's "Odyssey," 1866, and from Mr. Paley's "Aeschylus," 1870. The discovery is due, however, to Professor F. G. Schneidewin. Doctor Ingram, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Dublin, has very kindly called my attention to a note in Mr. Blaydes' "Philoctetes," Mr. Blaydes having very judiciously adopted the note from Professor Schneidewin. Schneidewin, alas! has gone to join the greater number, but he has left behind him a brighter and more beautiful memory, in my judgment, than that of any πολιορκητῆς whatsoever.

Schneidewin's note as given by Mr. Blaydes, and communicated to me by Professor Ingram, is as follows:—

"ἀλφησται, eaters of bread, from ἀλφι and ἔδω, a term derived from the principal article of human food, the μνηλός ἀνθρώπων, by the use of which they are distinguished from the gods, who lived

ings of the word. By unhomeric I mean such as are not in the style of Homer's epithets, and which a critical sense much imbued with Homer's way of looking at things and describing them cannot help rejecting as false and factitious. For an epithet to be Homer's it must fasten upon some most salient peculiarity of a thing; it must dash off some characteristic which is most palpable at first sight to the discriminating observation of a man of genius. Homer had, in a supreme degree, that highest faculty of the understanding, *to perceive the distinction between things that differ*, and so he described more truly than any other poet. I remember to have read somewhere in Aristotle, for I cannot find the passage, that Homer is the most graphic of poets, and that in reading his story one is made to realise it, hear, see, and feel it, more thoroughly than in reading any other story. Every word is a fit part of a most vivid picture. Because the usual and traditional interpretations of ἀλφησστής do not tally with this oft-told description I have long rejected them as mere make-shifts and not true. Let us see what they are.

Eustathius and the Scholiasts on Homer give the meanings εὐρετικός, ἐφευρετής, φρόνιμος, "inventive, inventor, rational." Mr. Hayman, whose promised volumes I have been looking for this long time, interprets "merchant adventurers." The Scholiasts on Hesiod give τοῖς ἐφευροῦσιν. τοῖς διανοητικοῖς καὶ εὐρετικοῖς: oldest Latin Translation, "hominibus curiosis." Daniel Heinsius explains: "qui semper excogitandae aut inveniendae rei alicui intenti sunt," and in another place, "qui circa investigationem rerum necessariarum versantur." At Hes. Sc. 21, there is

on nectar and ambrosia, as well as from the ὠμησταὶ θῆρες. Compare the Homeric οἱ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδουσιν—οἵτινες ἄνθρωποι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σίτον ἔδοντες, the ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός of Simonides, and the "quicumque terrae munere vescimur" of Horace."

The reader will observe that Schneide-
win says "eaters of bread," which should be, I think, "eaters of barley meal;" and that he regards the epithet as relative to the food of the gods; while I take it to be such a Homeric epithet of man as is able to stand on its own legs.

the Scholium ὁ ἐφευρετὴς κατὰ Τζέτζην ὁτουδήποτε πράγματος. τάχα δὲ ἀλφηστὴς ἐνταῦθα λέγεται ὁ διανοητικός, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλφῶ, τὸ ἐφευρίσκω καὶ διανοοῦμαι: Latin Trans. here gives 'hominibus indagatoribus.' The Scholiast at Aesch. Sept. 770 explains, ὑβριστῶν, φρονίμων, ("ruffians, rational," a strange combination!) Lat. Tr. "hominum industriorum." Here Mr. Paley agrees with Mr. Hayman in the interpretation 'traders or merchants.' Herman, than whom few have ever been more familiar with Homer, *seems* to adopt the Scholiast's ὑβριστῶν. If he does not, he is silent. Bloomfield gives: "Inventor. Qui sibi quid lucratur;" and he is followed by W. Dindorf. The Scholia Minora have: ἐφευρετῶν, πλουσίων, φρονίμων. ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀλφηστῶν (well, well!) καὶ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ τῶν ἐφευρετικῶν τῶν ἀναγκαίων πραγμάτων. ταῦτο δὲ λέγεται διὰ τὸν Οἰδίπουν. Very ingenious and very untrue, both for Aeschylus and Homer. To come to the Schol. on Soph. Phil. 709, where Wunder has only references to some of the above, although Sophocles had let the cat out of the bag, the Scholium is provokingly vague: ἤγουν οὐ τροφὴν ἔχων ἐκ τῶν σπερμάτων τῆς γῆς (quite right) οὐκ ἄλλο ὃ νεμόμεσθα ἄνδρες ἀλφησταί, τουτέστιν (now then!) οὐ δημητριακὸν καρπὸν, οὐδὲ τι τῆς συνήθους ἀνθρώπων διαίτης, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν πτηνῶν οἰστῶν τὴν διὰ τῶν ὀρνέων τροφὴν προσφερόμενος. Really I can hardly pronounce whether this Scholiast knew that ἀλφηστὴς means 'barley meal eating' or not; but I suspect that he is only interpreting, which he does right well, the passage in the Philoctetes; and is so much cleverer than Joseph that he could have interpreted Pharaoh's dream, without knowing it either by narration or inspiration. An old Latin Translation gives here "homines qui ratione valent." Benloew's Lat. Tr., a most able one, gives wrongly "homines industrii." The Lexicon edited by Messrs. Liddell and Scott adopts the interpretation of Eustathius, given above. Hesychius has ἀμειπταί (barterers) εὐρετικοί. The Etymologicum Magnum, ἀλφηστής ὁ εὐρετικός. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθετὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἱ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. παρὰ τὸ ἀλφεῖν, τὸ εὐρίσκειν.

μόνος γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εὐρετικός. This explanation is not unimportant, and I will presently remark on that derivation; but ἄλφειν, so I would write it, certainly did not mean 'invent' in any sense of the word. Suidas has only εὐρετής, Lat. Trans. 'inventor.' Julius Pollux does not mention the word; but he quotes the phrase ἄλφιστα δεύσασθαι 'to wet the barley meal,' which is quite correct; and 'wet' does not mean 'to make dough,' which is done by kneading, but simply to rub water, wine, or oil, into the meal, for the purpose of at once eating the cold paste.

This I believe to be a virtually exhaustive statement of all the meanings given hitherto, and will now bring forward the passages in which ἀλφηστῆς occurs.

It does not occur in the Iliad; but three times in the Odyssey: 1,349 Ζεὺς δίδωσιν ἀνδράσιν ἀλφηστῆσιν ὕπνῳ ἐθέλῃσιν ἐκάστω—13,261 ἀνέρας ἀλφηστὰς νύκτα ταχέεσσι πόδεσσιν—6. 8 ἐκὰς ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων, where Plutarch, De Exilio C. 10, gives ἄλλων for ἀνδρῶν. Mr. Hayman is afraid to take ἄλλων into the text, although the presumptions are in favour of it. The Phaeacians do not remove from barley meal eating men because they are not barley meal eaters themselves, for σῖτος, which there means 'meal' or 'flour,' is ready to hand on the supper table of Alcinous, Odys. 7. 175. But Etym. Magn., l. c., informed us that some of the ancients took ἀλφησταὶ to be a name for man, and not merely an epithet. This is the only passage in which it occurs without ἀνδρες, and therefore we may conclude that ἄλλων was read here.

I have said that σῖτος means 'meal' in that passage. It always means 'meal' in Homer when used in connexion with words that mean flesh meat; but it means 'food' when joined with words that mean 'drink.' 'Food' is its original meaning; and the word seems, as well as ἀλφησταὶ (for Homer's men were decidedly 'flesh-eaters') to date from a time when man's food was principally or wholly 'meal.' The Greek Grammarians derived σῖτος from σείω (they add σίω) equal to σήθω. Σήθω is not in Homer, nor σείω in that signification of sifting. They

said that *σίτος* is formed from *σειώ* like *οἶτος* from *οἶω*. But 'shaken' is far too general a notion from which to take the name for flour. Does the word 'shaken' suggest flour? *Σίτος* is from *ἐσθίω*, through its verbal *εἰστός*, and means 'that which may be eaten,' with a very strong preference for the meaning "flour." But there is no doubt that it can mean "food," for Circe's potion of cheese (so the Italians put cheese in their soup) barley meal, honey, Pramnian wine, (whatever that was) and deleterious drugs, is *σίτος* *Odyss.* 10. 234, and this word even takes the place usually occupied by *νέκταρι* in *Hom. Ven.* 233 *σίτω τ' ἀμβροσίη τε*.

From those passages of the *Odyssey* nothing could be inferred as to the meaning of the epithet or name *ἀλφησταί*. *Hom. Hymn. Ap.* 458 is a little more suggestive :

αὕτη μὲν γε δίκη πέλει ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων,
ὅππότε' ἂν ἐκ πόντοιο ποτὶ χθονὶ νηὶ μελαίνῃ
ἔλθωσιν, καμάτῳ ἀδδηκότες, αὐτίκα δὲ σφεας
σίτοιο γλυκεροῖο περὶ φρένας ἥμερος αἰρεῖ,

"for this is the way with barley meal eating men; whenever they come from sea to land with black ship, and have had their full of toil, forthwith a craving for sweet flour takes hold of them about their stomachs." The *σίτος* of which *Apollo* is speaking is fairly inferred to be white barley meal from the mention of *ἄλφιτα λευκά* *v.* 490, *σίτοιο* *v.* 499, and *ἄλφιτα λευκά* again *v.* 509.

Those are all the passages in *Homer*. *Hesiod* took up the word and used it in three passages which throw no light on the meaning. In *Th.* 512 *Epimetheus* is a bad thing for barley meal eating men; in *Op.* 82 *Pandora* is a cause of suffering to them; and in *Sc.* 29 *Zeus* is minded to beget for them a defender from harm.

Next we have a fragment of *Epicharmus*, *Athenaeus* 7. 15, *μῦες τ' ἀλφησταί τε κορακῖνοι κοριο εἰδέες* (sic) which, allowing the penult of *μῦες* to remain long, one may hastily correct to *μῦες τ' ἀλφησταί, κορακῖνοί θ' ὥρι' ἔδοντες* "the barley meal eating mice, and the crop devouring crows." The

poet seems to be describing the farmer's enemies, like Virgil G. 1. 181 "*saepe exiguus mus*," and ib. 120 "*improbus anser Strymoniaeque grues . . . nocet*." Epicharmus, then, understood the meaning of ἀλφηστής; and observe how true and Homeric the epithet is: Epicharmus could find only the little mouse to whom the epithet would apply, and even so the mouse cannot eat the ἄλφιστα unless man has first made it for himself. For the mouse is not truly ἀλφηστής or flour eating, but 'grain eating' σπερμοφάγος, as distinguished from σπερμολόγος, the epithet of crows.

As to the fish mentioned in that passage of Athenaeus, whose specific name was ἀλφησταί, I think they must have been some species which was found to be fond of a bait of barley meal paste, as, when a boy, I caught minnows with a pellet of bread on a small hook; or which could be made to rise at a certain spot by throwing barley meal into the water. Compare Odyss. 12. 252, ἰχθύσι τοῖς ὀλίγοισι δόλον κατὰ εἶδατα βάλλων "throwing down food as a trap for the little fishes." The man has a hook and line, it is true, but the description reads as if he threw the food in besides the bait on the hook. This I have also seen done.

Aeschylus ventured to use ἀλφηστής in one place extant, Sept. 770, where ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστῶν occurs in connexion with nautical allusions; and he seems to use it in the sense of men who ἄλφουσι 'increase' their wealth by maritime adventure, buccaneering, kidnapping, filibustering and other more or less respectable forms of trade. Now ἄλφω is quite wrongly explained by the ancient commentators as equivalent to εὐρίσκειν (hence their words εὐρετικός, ἐφευρετής κ. τ. λ.). It never meant "invent." But it approached very nearly to *one* of the meanings of εὐρίσκειν "to find, or fetch, a price," and this led them all astray. For instance: "the shrewd little fellow, fond of toddling after you when you go out of doors (ἁματροχόωντα is desiderative) μυρίον ὄνον ἄλφοι, would run up, or 'fetch,' a tremendous price, Odyss. 15. 451. For ἄλφειν is without doubt the same word as Latin 'alere.' Nor does it seem fanciful to give a common root to 'alere' and

'albus.' Homer is quite unable to disconnect the ideas of 'whiteness' and 'barley meal.' Nearly always he says ἄλφιτα λευκά and κρεῖ λευκόν, and barley meal was the most remarkable white thing that he knew. Perhaps here is the reason why 'alb' means 'dead white,' the unluminous white of white meal.

So Aeschylus was deceived, in common with the rest, by this wrong derivation from ἄλφειν, which does not mean to "invent," but "to nourish and make to grow." It was this wonderful fact, that, of all the things in the world, it should be white barley meal that best nourishes man and makes him grow, that made Homer call it *ἱερόν*, 'mysterious,' ἄλφειτον ἱεροῦ ἀκτὴν, "the crushed particles of the mysterious barley meal." So Circe's halls are *ἱερά* because she is *πολυφάρμακος* 'the great sorceress,' Translate 'mystic halls.' And *ἱερά* is an epithet of γῆ both elsewhere, and in the passage which I shall next quote, because of its mysterious faculty of producing the peculiar food required by man—because it is *ζείδωρος*, "corn giving."

After Aeschylus I come to Soph. Phil. 709, the passage which about four years ago revealed to me the meaning of ἀλφηστής :

οὐ φορβὰν ἱεῶς γὰρ σπόρον οὐκ ἄλλων
αἶρων, τῶν νεμόμεσθ' ἀνέρες ἀλφησταί·
πλὴν ἐξ ὠκυβόλων εἴ ποτε τόξων
πτανόις ἰοῖς ἀνύσειε γαστρί φορβάν :

"not taking up for food the seed (of the corn plant, "fruges," Lat. Tr. all,) grown from the mysterious earth, nor of other things (fruit of trees, and flower or heart of vegetables) such as we (mainly) barley meal eating men feed upon, but (eating) whatever food (flesh meat of birds, so Sch.) he could get for his stomach by the winged arrows from his swift-hitting bow." There is a point in αἶρων; 'taking up' food from the earth, as opposed to hitting it down thither. "Ἀλφιτα is expressly called "the most important food," ἡ ἀξιολογωτάτη τροφή, in Suidas s. v.

For my own part I require no further guide to the meaning of ἀλφηστής than is afforded by those three passages

(Homer Hymn Ap., Epicharmus, Sophocles, ll. c.) and the strikingly Homeric character of the epithet. It fixes on that strange peculiarity of mankind, accounted for by the Greeks as a revelation from the gods, that he did not eat the grains of plants like birds and some cattle, nor the leaves of plants like other cattle, and so on, but he eats the flour of various species of corn after the grains have been ground. The account of the revelation as given in the fragmentary Homeric Hymn to Ceres is very ingenious and pretty, but it is also very inconsistent. It is ingenious because the writer has carefully excluded every reference to the eating of flesh, in order that he may be able to say that, when Demeter would not let the corn grow, the race of men was in danger of perishing utterly: *φθίσαι φῦλ' ἀμειννὰ χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων, σπέρμ' ὑπὸ γῆν κρύπτουσιν*, Hom. Cer. 353. This exclusion was necessary because the Greeks of Homer's time were such thorough-going flesh eaters. If the poet had expressly stated that he is speaking of an age when men lived on barley meal, the story might have been made to appear much more likely to a Greek. Putting the books of Moses out of the question, it really does appear from the existence of words like *ἀλφειστῆς* and *σιτοφάγοι* that such an epoch has been. There is also the tradition that for a long time man did not eat flesh; not until (Porphyrius de Abstinencia Carnis, 4, 15) a burnt offering chanced to fall off the altar, and the priest in picking it up scalded his fingers with the gravy. In a hurry he clapped them smarting to his mouth, and was so charmed with the dainty juice that it is said he afterwards ate roast meat whenever he could get it. The meanings of *σίτος* 'food=flour' also point to a time when man fed on flour only. There is something peculiar about the passage in Deuteronomy 8. 3, "Man doth not live by bread only but by every word of God," as if in the time when Moses spoke 'bread' was really man's only food. I should like to know what the Hebrew word means which is used there for 'bread': it is translated *ἄπρος* in St. Matthew's Gospel;

but as there are plenty of cakes and bread in the book of Genesis, I do not think that the point can be material.

Those three passages, then, and the Homeric character of the epithet would suffice me; but there are other arguments which appear to have weight. "Ἄλφι, an apocopated form of ἄλφιτα, cited by Suidas s. v., occurs in Hom. Cer. 208, which passage may be literally rendered: "Metaneira filled and offered to her (Ceres) a cup of honey sweet wine; but she shook her head (nodded back); for she said that it was not lawful for her to drink the red wine. And she bade her mix barley meal (ἄλφι) and water with the soft leaves of penny royal, and give it her to drink. And she made the mixture, and gave it to the goddess, as she bade." Here I may record, in passing, my correction of v. 229 in that Hymn: ὕλοτόμοιο should be οὐλοτόμοιο "gum-cutting," from οὔλα 'gums.' Demeter says that she has a fine remedy for a baby's pains in 'teething'; ὑποσταμνὸν in v. 228 means the same, "the tooth's cutting upwards through the gum." So ἀλφηστῆς is fairly formed from ἄλφι and ἐσθίω and man is a "barley meal eater" in the same way that ὠμηστῆς is formed from ὠμά and ἐσθίω and the lion is a raw-flesh-eater. There was no need that the τ should be kept in the compound, because when the word was first made there was no chance of the ἀλφ being taken for anything but 'white meal,' as has been shown above: whereas, supposing a word μελφηστῆς, there might have been the doubt whether it meant black-eating, or song-eating, or limb-eating. Or the word may have been originally ἀλφιτηστῆς, and clipped down to ἀλφηστῆς when it was found that the clipping left the meaning of the word entire.

After what has been written above, I think that very few kind readers will be disposed to say, "Oh, but man does *not* eat barley meal, and flour; he eats bread." Rather say that the men from whom Homer inherited the word ἀλφηστῆς did not eat bread; they ate barley meal and flour. There is no bread spoken of in the Iliad.

Even little children are brought up on meat, ὄψον, and wine, like Achilles in the lap of Phoenix—what a fractious little beauty that baby Achilles must have been!—; or on the marrow and rich fat of sheep, like Hector's beautiful-star baby Astyanax; or on roast flesh and red wine, like Eurymachus, the sneak! sitting on the lap of Ulysses, *Odyss.* 16, 444. There is no process of making dough hinted at either in the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, no, nor in the *Hymn to Ceres*; nor of fermentation, a metaphor so dear to poets; nor of baking; nor of any apparatus for baking, such as κοίβανον. Buttman would be the first to concede to me that his taking for granted the existence both of fermentation and baking in Homeric times is wrong. It could not be shown that there is any trace of them in Homer. All the allusions and descriptions point the other way, even the ἄστρος which occurs twice in the *Odyssey*. When a Greek feast is described, what have the Greeks to feast upon? Answer, δαῖτ' ἀγαθὴν κρεῖων τε καὶ οἶνου ἡδυνότοιο, *Od.* 15. 507; roast flesh, barley meal, and wine; occasionally an onion, and a haggis. You have got your notion of 'bread' from the books of Moses, as when some Hebrew patriarch is visited by three angels, and he bids Sarah "make ready quickly three measures of fine meal, knead it and make cakes upon the hearth." He himself goes and kills a calf tender and good, which a young man hastily dresses. Then he serves up butter, milk, the roast calf, and the three measures of cakes, and stands by while the three angels eat them. This is very much the same sort of entertainment that an ordinary Jew would have given to three other ordinary Jews some thousand years later. The Homeric meal, on the other hand, is remarkable for the absence of bread and the presence of wine. The description is stereotyped, and I need only remind the reader of a few cases, and first that which is most parallel to Abraham's entertainment of the angels. The "divine swineherd" upon the arrival of his "beggarly" visitor, tucks up his tunic, goes to the sty, and kills two

young porkers. Observe the same profusion; it is one pig a piece, and a little later in the day they eat the biggest pig they can find. He roasts the flesh, and serves it up smoking hot on the spits, having first sprinkled it over with barley meal. Ajax, victorious in his duel with Hector, is feasted by Agamemnon with slices cut all down the chine of beef. Here observe that the feast was not 'equally divided;' Ajax got the best cuts; and yet it is called *δαῖς ἴση*, Il. 7. 320. For that and other reasons I reject the meaning 'equally divided.' *Δαῖς ἴση* means the feast that is equal, or corresponds in quantity, to the desire for eating; and *ἴση* means the same, in the end, as the other Homeric epithet of a feast *μενοεικής*, like, or answering to, the appetite: just as Homer has *σιτοφάγοι* and *σίτον ἔδοντες*, equivalent, in the end, to *ἀλφειστής*. *Δαῖς ἴση* is 'the appetite-sufficing banquet.' In Il. 18. 560, the women prepare a dinner for reapers by pouring or shaking out for them barley meal. This barley meal is one of the ingredients in Nestor's cup, Il. 11. 640. Ulysses mixes honey, wine, water, and barley meal, to pour around the little pit from which "the phantoms of paralysed humanity," "the disembodied dead" are to drink. Poor things! their spectral bones were much in need of the *ἄλφιστα καὶ ἀλείατα, μυελὸς ἀνδρῶν*, and Circe very properly directed Ulysses to give them all these most nourishing things, to revive their vitality. Barley meal is also the regular and, apparently, sole food-provision for a ship. The much honoured lady storekeeper pours out for Telemachus and his crew twenty measures of mill-ground barley flour into well stitched skin bags, Od. 2. 380, 354.

Another argument is found in the fact that the words of action used in connexion with *ἄλφιστα* and *σίτος* are such as apply to meal and flour, and not to bread. They are *πάσσω*, *παλύνω* and *χέω* in the Iliad and Odyssey, and, besides, *θύω* and *παλάσσω* in the minor poems. The Thriae, those winged, prophetic, honey-comb eating virgins, dwelling in a glade of Parnassus, seem to have anticipated

a modern custom and worn flour powdered over their hair, κατὰ δὲ κρᾶτας πεπαλαγμέναι ἄλφιστα λευκά, Hymn. Merc. 554. In Hymn Apoll. 509 ἐπὶ τ' ἄλφιστα λευκὰ θύοντες is "sprinkling the barley meal like incense, θύος 'thus,' on a burning sacrifice. The mates of Ulysses scatter leaves over it when they have no κρεῖ λευκόν, Od. 12, 257, no οὐλοχύται. With regard to Buttmann's interpretation of the last word I must beg his readers not to puzzle over the word 'coarsely' in the definition 'coarsely ground barley meal.' The grinding of the grains in the οὐλοχύται was precisely the same as for the Greeks' own food. The word means 'scattered barley meal.' You should also mix a few grains of salt with the fine flour of Buttmann's criticism when he talks of 'cakes' being laid on a victim's head, Lexil. p. 455, 3rd Ed., and when he speaks of "the well known usual means by which a cake was brought to rise and ferment," p. 91, of which there is no trace in Homer.

The verbs πάλλω, παλύνω, παλάσσω seem to mean much the same thing, 'shake' and 'shake out;' and to be formed like mollio, i. e. mollo, μολύνω, μαλάσσω; for the primary meaning of μολύνω was not 'soil' but 'soften,' and strangely enough the word is said to mean 'sprinkle flour' in a passage of Sotades which I cannot verify. There are plenty of parallels to the formation of παλύνω from πάλλω such as ἐλάω, (pello) ἐλαύνω. I think there is one in 'meio' μιαίνω, ὁμίχω being only the Greek form of 'meio.'

I am doubtful about 'sieves' and 'sifting' in Homer, and am afraid to give that meaning to the Homeric παλύνω and παλάσσω. There is no hint of sifting, whereas grinding is stated expressly; and I think it is safer to translate "strew," "sprinkle" or "shake out." πάσσω and χέω, of course, only apply to such things as take the form of drops or small atoms, like liquids, salt, and meal. Πάλλω and πάσσω are so closely allied in meaning that Aristophanes has two words of the same signification, παιπάλη and πασ-πάλη, formed by combining πάλη 'flour' with παλλω and πάσσω respectively.

I know that I shall find it very hard to shake any one's opinion that ἄρτος, which occurs in Od. 17. 373 ; 18. 120 ; Batrach. 35 ; and in the mouse hero's name Ἄρτοφάγος, does not mean loaf. And with respect to the two passages in Batrach., I willingly grant that that poem was written at a time when the art of baking was practised. The first of them ἄρτος τρισκοπάνιστος ἀπ' εὐκύκλου κανέοιο v. 35 seems certainly to mean "the cut-and-come-again loaf from the dumb waiter," and I believe that μεγαλήτωρ Τρωξάρτης, and the gallant hero Ἄρτοφάγος nibbled at loaves, and were not only ἀλφισοιτοῦντες and ἀλφησταί as Epicharmus calls them, but also ἄρτοσιτοῦντες.

But in the two passages from the Odyssey, ἄρτον τ' οὔλον ἐλὼν περικαλλέος ἐκ κανέοιο and ἄρτους ἐκ κανέοιο δῶν παρέθηκεν αἰέρας, I declare that the burden of proof rests with those who say that ἄρτος there means 'loaf.' Of course it meant loaf at a later period ; but how can any one be confident that it means loaf here, when he calls to mind what I have said above, that no kneading, no baking, no fermentation, no baking-utensil is mentioned in Homer ; when nothing is said of any of these having to do with a servant's duties in the passages where those duties are enumerated Od. 15. 320 ; 22. 420 ; Hymn Cer. 140 ; when the only vessels, ἄγγεα (Od. 16. 13), with which Eumaeus prepares breakfast are vessels for mixing wine ; when all the words used about σῖτος and its equivalents represent it as soft with the softness of powdered meal, and not close or crusty ; when little children are fed on roast meat, and meal mixed with water in Demeter's way, described above ? That word οὔλον, in ἄρτον οὔλον, surely means 'barley meal,' exactly as in οὔλοχύται ; and I shall presently show that the word δῶν does not help the notion of 'loaf.' In Odys. 17. 12, πύρνον, the beggar's pittance, is more probably derived from πῦρ than from πυρός 'wheat,' and seems to be the burnt and less palatable portions of the roast meat. Κάμινος and 'caminus' did not mean a kitchen-oven any more than 'kiln' and 'furnace' do. When Herodotus speaks of a kiln he calls it κάμινος, 1. 179, but the oven

into which Periander put his loaves is ἵπνος, Hdt. 5. 92. Κάμινος is unmistakably a potter's furnace in the only place where the word occurs in the Homeric poems, Hom. Epigr. 14. It does not occur in all those many octavo pages, 6. § 32-83 and 10. § 97-115, in which Julius Pollux enumerates every kind of bread, cooking-utensils, and kitchen-apparatus. We may suppose, therefore, that the γρηῦς καμινῶ of Odys. 18. 27 frequented a potter's furnace either to tend the fire, or else to warm herself. So that fair cheeked hussy Melantho reproaches her disguised master for not going to sleep in the blacksmith's forge along with the other beggars, Odys. 18. 328. Even if the γρηῦς occasionally brought a φρύγετρον or a κοδομείον and parched some grains of barley, that will no more turn the κάμινος into an ἵπνος than my roasting potatoes in a bonfire, long ago in the jolly times of Guy Fawkes burning and bonfire nights, turned the bonfire into an oven. The word μᾶζα does not occur in the Iliad and Odyssey, and in the only place where it occurs in the Homeric poems, Epigr. 15. 6, it is said to mean 'a kind of paste or porridge,' Liddell and Scott's Lexicon.

By derivation, too, ἄρτος does not mean loaf any more than μᾶζα does. Μᾶζα is from μάσσω 'I mash' or 'rub together,' 'knead' is a secondary and later meaning. In Modern Greek μᾶζα means 'a mass.' Ἄρτος is from ἄρω, and means meal compacted into a lump by mixing some liquid with it. It is far more reasonable to suppose that Homer's ἄρτοι are balls of meal with water rubbed into it, and put into the tray in a solid form, like cakes of curd soap or snowballs. It is worth observing that the tray, κάνεον, was used to hold other things besides ἄρτοι. It was from the κάνεον that Ctesippus took the cow's foot to fling at Ulysses' head, 20. 300. So I would translate Homer's ἄρτον οὔλον 'barley meal cake' in the sense in which we say a 'cake' of soap and a 'cake' of blacking. Even if φοξὸς is from a verb φώγω, which I cannot believe to be like Homer, the baking is the baking of pottery and not of loaves. I here remark, however, not at all as part of my

argument, that the whole of that passage about Thersites appears to me to be the work of some very degenerate Homerid. There are many other passages of the same type, especially in the *Odyssey*, which want the true old Homer's grace, evenness, delicacy, dignity, and tranquillity, passages that are ragged, jerky, blotched with uncouth words, strokes of unsustained sensationalism, and patches of sporadic and spasmodic tinsel. There is one immense patch from *Odyss.* 11. 335 all the way on to *Odyss.* 13. 3, where old Homer at length begins again. This I know from the tone, style, and words.

As I have been so persistently talking about 'Homer,' and called 'Homer' 'the great king and father of inspired men,' perhaps one or two of my readers would like to know what views I hold about the author of these poems. Mr. F. A. Paley has a very strong opinion on this subject, and the promulgation of one more opinion, which is as yet only half formed, can at least do no harm. I think, then, that there was, some 1000 years before Christ, a man, an Ionian Greek, who designed and composed two poems, one about Achilles' bad temper and want of self-control, and the other about Ulysses' good temper and patience. He taught the two poems to his sons, and they to their sons, who made additions to the poems, and inserted episodes and new stories. There was in this way no stitching together of old ballads, but only interpolation of many new verses. There was unity of design in those two original poems, and the man who made them is *my* Homer. I suspect that 'Homer' is not a real name any more than 'Achilles,' "whose wrath brought woe on the fighting men" ἄχη λαοῖς, or than 'Odysseus,' "against whom Poseidon was wroth and made him wander ten years" ὠδύσσατο, the poet's own derivation in another way, *Od.* 19. 409, or than 'Hector,' "the man who held Troy," Ἐκτορ, φῆς που ἄτερ λαῶν πόλιν ἔξεμεν, *Il.* 5. 472, 3. There are other names of this kind, e. g., Nireus "Sparkling Water, son of Radiant Beauty and King Bright Eyes." Then there are names like Charybdis, "the Yawning Swallower," from χα and ροιβ-

δεῖν and Amphitrite from ἀμφὶ and τρύω, 'the sea that has an opening on both sides, at the Hellespont and at the pillars of Hercules.' Perhaps the poet's real name was Σάγρος, for Aelian Var. Hist. 14. 21 says that a poet so named "coming next after Orpheus and Musaeus ventured, ἐπιτολήσας, to compose a poem on the great argument of the Trojan War." But Σάγρος—

O Amos Cottle,—Phoebus! what a name
To fill the speaking trump of future fame!—

(if that, or the like, was the poet's name) would not be likely to put forward his name very prominently. So I suspect that Ὀμηρος is the herald who goes along with you, κῆρυξ ὁμήρησε, Odyss. 16. 468, 9, into the turbulent and dangerous scene, as Virgil with Dante through the Inferno and Purgatorio, and as Athene with the imaginary spectator of the turmoil of Trojan battle in the Fourth Book of the Iliad, v. 540, and shows you, unhurt by sword or spear, the story of the beings whom his fancy created. And he does this with a most clearly marked moral purpose, such as all beautiful poems *must* have, and as the Greeks themselves believed of these particular poems. To put that purpose into one sentence: he shows how the hero paramount Achilles, though you might think he was likely to be the happiest of men, nevertheless is not, through the one great fault of not controlling his passion; and how the not-dazzling Ulysses, whom you would not take to be the best and happiest of men, nevertheless most surely is, because he has that one best virtue of never acting from impulse, but with dispassionate judgment. And yet the poet loved well his bold, bad, wayward boy, the φαίδιμος Ἀχιλλεύς, and never forgives bully Agamemnon for angering him, as you may see from Odyss. 24. 96 foll. The lesson of goodness is, nevertheless, worked out to its fullest completion, and the ἀρετὴ of Penelope and Ulysses is that whose glory shall never perish, and about which 'immortals,' (the poet himself being 'the immortal') shall make beauteous song for the dwellers upon the earth:

τῷ οἱ κλέος οὔ ποτ' ὀλεῖται
 ἥς ἀρετῆς· τεύξουσιν δ' ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀοιδὴν
 ἀθάνατοι χαρίεσσαν ἐχέφρονι Πηνελοπείῃ.—*Odyss.* 24. 296.

Mr. Paley's opinion is entitled to so much respect and deference that I feel bound to make some further allusion to it. It seemed to me as I read his arguments "for the Comparatively Late Date and Composite Character of our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*" that a prompt answer could easily be given to each of the arguments, "*Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, Vol. XI., Part 2, No. 7." Mr. Paley's objections appear to me to be so trivial that it would be quite impossible to make their refutation at all readable or interesting. I cannot see that Mr. Paley has even the least reason to be "prepared," as he says he is, "to accept the view that the ultimate origin of the Homeric epics may be Indian, and possibly connected with the worship of the sun or the elements." This mention of sun-worship points, of course, to ancient Persia; but there is nothing in the old Persian literature that is at all like the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, either in kind or quality. Sir John Chardin has given a most copious and elaborate account of it, and of every thing that the most learned Persians knew about it. There is no trace in his account of any thing like Homer's poems. I have made frequent inquiries of those who know Sanscrit and other Indian languages, and they give me a similar account. There is nothing Oriental about either the phrase or cast of thought of Homer. You might as well look for Homer among the Aztecs as in either Persia or Hindostan. Aelian, it is true, records, V. H. 12. 48, that translations¹ of Homer's poems were made into Persian and other barbarous tongues as early as the time of the Persian kings who invaded Greece. The most that you can suspect with reason is that the

¹ Most Oriental scholars are agreed that the resemblances to Ulysses' story of his adventures, which occur in the Arabian tales, 'Es-Sindebad of the Sea,' and 'The City of Brass,' were

not derived from any translation of the *Odyssey*, but from the *Odyssey* itself. See Lane's "*Thousand and One Nights*," Vol. III., p. 683.

translations may turn up. No, the Iliad and the Odyssey are as genuine works of the Greeks as the victory of Salamis. The Easterns (Tartars, Persians, Hindoos) created a literature of their own, and it is quite unlike the Greek; the Greeks created a literature of their own, and it is quite unlike the Eastern. No other nations have created literatures. Our modern civilisation and literature began with that first twang of Homer's golden harpstrings which is represented by *μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά*, and they were confirmed to us in prospect, and sealed with much red blood of Greeks, at Salamis. When I read in 'The Famous Pastorall of Julietta' (A.D. 1588, Done into English by Robert Tofte, Gentleman, A.D. 1610) "the works of Homer are full of Judgement and Learning, from whence, as from a deepe Fountaine, every great Schollar draweth forth his learning, and without his books, grosse Ignorance had darkened the whole world with her blacke gloomie Cloudes: he is counted the Author of all Arts and Sciences," it seems to be a just and temperate statement of what no thoughtful person will be disposed to doubt.

To return to my cakes. It cannot be shown that Homer's *ἄρτοι* means 'loaves,' but the eating of cold barley paste, like an uncooked electuary, will excite no surprise in any one who remembers Thuc. 3. 49 *ὥστε ἡσθιόν τε ἅμα ἐλαύνοντες οἶνω καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἄλφιστα πεφυραμένα*, "so that as they rowed they also ate barley meal mixed up with oil and wine." There is, besides, Xen. Cyr. 6. 16, a very clearly expressed and important passage to show that *ἀλφιτοσιτεῖν* and *ἀρτοσιτεῖν* are such as I have represented them: *καὶ γὰρ ὅστις ἀλφιτοσιτεῖ ὕδατι μεμιγμένην ἀεὶ τὴν μᾶζαν ἐσθίει, καὶ ὅστις ἀρτοσιτεῖ ὕδατι δεδευμένον τὸν ἄρτον*, "every one who eats barley meal eats it mixed with water, and he who eats loaf eats it dipped in water." Their bread seems to have been hard; as Edward Wortley Montague, when in the course of his roving he was a muleteer's servant-boy in Spain, found the bread to be "so hard that he was forced to dip it in water to soften it, before he was able to bite it." *Memoirs*, Vol. I. p. 53, 1779, Dublin. I have already said

that *māza*, Xenophon's word just quoted, does not necessarily mean a barley loaf or baked cake; on the contrary, it seems to almost exclude the notion of baking. *Māza* is the slave's food, given to him both by Greeks and Romans in the form of meal. It is a *māza* that the beetle eats in Aristophanes Pax, and surely *that māza* was only a moist mass of uncooked food. Cleon intercepts a *māzan μεμαγμένην*, as if it was on the way to the bake-house. And I take Hes. Op. 588, *māzā τ' ἀμολγαίη*, although there *was* baking in Hesiod's time, to mean the darkish mixture of barley meal, with the bran, and water. I believe *ἀμολγός* to be an old word for 'darkness,' and the *μαστὸν ἀμολγαῖον* of the Anthology to be the udder of a black ewe, with the milk from which a shepherd is requested to sprinkle a grave. Compare the "atri velleris agnam," Virg. Aen. 6. 249, the proper offering to deities and spirits below.

I have now done with this argument that Homer's men did not eat bread, and that *ἀλφειστής* means 'barley meal eating,' and I close the *Seber*, to which I have been so much indebted, with the remark that the most classical of English poets valued his *Seber* very highly. I do not mean classical in the sense in which you call Milton classical; that is, full of Latin and Greek phrases, allusions, imitations, pickings, stealings, and borrowings: to such a degree full of them, that no one but a right good Latin and Greek scholar has the least chance of understanding Milton. I mean classical from an English point of view and in the Horatian sense; "whose verses have been chastised ten times over, and brought by the severest tests into absolute perfection." For Milton not only showed sad want of judgment in choosing his subject but he is careless and diffuse: careless and diffuse like Shakspeare¹ who

¹ I have since found that in my depreciation of the educational value of Natural and Experimental Sciences, I may take shelter under the towering shield of a son of Telamon. Mr. Gladstone is willing to throw Paganini's

violin into the scale, to compete, as a triumph of genius, with the steam-engine of James Watt. I, too, would stand by the fiddle and not by the bagmen. In my protest against the common estimate of Shakspeare as a dra-

insults you by putting into his everlasting Henry Fourths, Fifths, Sixths, &c., every thought and every word that came into his naughty head : just as the main pipe of a reservoir lets out, along with the ἀγλαὸν ὕδωρ, little frogs, horse-leeches, putrid birds, rotten rats, decayed wood, worms, moss, mud, and various other curious forms of rubbish and abomination. I mean classical in the sense in which Thomas Campbell was classical, a poet who could hold his peace for ten years, and then speak like Cinderella's good fairy.

Well, it was the poet Gray's copy of Seber that I closed. It is of the Editio Princeps 1604, A. D., and wants the title page and table of contents. It is printed on very poor paper, the veriest refuse of rough, dirty-white, porous paper. But the author of the Elegy got it bound in the handsomest dark walnut stained calf that I ever saw, and tooled wherever the tooling had any excuse to go, back, sides and borders, in and outside of the covers ; he had the Title and "Editio Princeps" stamped on it in the deepest gilding, and gilt ornamental lines run wherever there was room ; and he wrote the proper title and table of contents, two quarto pages of Latin and carefully accented Greek, with his own immortal hand. Would any small poet, I wonder, or, indeed, many poets such as the corn-giving earth now produces, treat so royally a wretched lot of Greek Index printed leaves ? But he who wrote :—

"No children run to lisp their sire's return,
Or climb his knees the envied kiss to share,"

had read, after looking out the passage, perhaps, in this volume :

οὐδέ τι μιν παῖδες ποτὶ γούνασι παππάζουσιν
ἐλθόντ' ἐκ πολέμοιο καὶ αἰνῆς δηϊότητος.

matist, I can also refer, as most persons know, to Voltaire, Alfieri, Byron, and Dickens, who were of opinion that Shakspeare is greatly overrated. However splendid the negligence of Shak-

speare, it cannot stand comparison with the splendid accuracy and finish of Alfieri. Shakspeare wrote fine passages ; Alfieri, fine tragedies.

CRITICISM ON MR. PALEY'S PROPERTIUS. By ARTHUR PALMER, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin.

THE first edition of Mr. Paley's Propertius, published in 1853, can hardly be said to have been a valuable work, although it was in this respect valuable, that it was an attempt at a critical edition of an author who had been treated with unmerited neglect in England. As a popular compendium of the results of previous criticism, the edition deserved some praise. The works of German scholars, from the judicious edition of Barth (1777), to the elaborate volumes of Hertzberg (1844), had been compared, and the results placed before the reader in the notes. The readings of the manuscripts were, as a rule, noted in corrupt places; no very difficult passage was passed over without an explanation being attempted. But this is all that can be said in favour of the first edition. As an independent work it must be considered a total failure. Very little original interpretation, and that generally erroneous, still less original criticism was attempted. When Mr. Paley had told the reader what Kuinoel, Barth, Lachmann, Jacob, and Hertzberg had written, he seemed to think he had done his duty. The notes assumed the character of a history of the opinions of previous commentators, and were overloaded with contending interpretations, among which the true one was often conspicuous by its absence. Accordingly, the edition, though a useful hand-book for a future editor, was extremely disappointing to the student, by whom the obscurity of the commentary was often found to be as great as that of the text.

The second edition, however, has at last made its appearance, nineteen years after the first. During this long

interval "it may be supposed that I have been enabled to make many important improvements," says Mr. Paley. Room for improvement, we grant, was not absolutely excluded: and we do observe with pleasure a certain improvement actually attained. Take, for instance, III. xvii. 35:—

At si saecula forent antiquis grata puellis.

On this not very difficult line, in the first edition, there is a long note after the manner of that edition. In it we are told that Kuinoel's view of the passage is startling (which it is), that Lachmann gives up the verse altogether, that Jacob suggests an explanation, which is not given, but 'which it is impossible to recommend to the reader;' and that Hertzberg alone gives a plausible explanation, and 'acutely observes' something which is not now apparently thought acute by Mr. Paley, for it has disappeared from the notes, and then a wrong explanation is offered. In the new edition the note is shortened by one-half, the true explanation is given, and the reference to previous commentators reduced to a minimum. The line, by the way, hardly wants a note at all, if a comma be placed after *forent*, to show it is the predicate: 'If the times (or fashions) now were, which girls of old liked well.'

But though the present edition is a great improvement on its predecessor, it is far from being perfect. Much more might have been done in the long interval since the first edition. The recension is by no means thorough; although some positive errors of interpretation have been corrected, there are still many remaining, and some new ones have been introduced; so that, on the whole, the edition can hardly yet be considered perfect, or even satisfactory.

Mr. Paley, indeed, is himself sensible of his shortcomings, and apologises for them on the ground that 'the work of editing is so hard.' This statement will surprise most people as coming from Mr. Paley. He is by far the most voluminous of classical writers in England, and it is

like Gracchus complaining of sedition, for Mr. Paley to complain of the labour of editing. If editing was not originally a labour of love, it ought to have become easy by practice to the editor of Aeschylus, Euripides, Hesiod, Homer, Theocritus, Propertius, and Martial—the editions of which authors by Mr. Paley are the regular text-books of classical students throughout the three kingdoms. Indeed, Mr. Paley has done so much for classical studies that it is a pity that the highest praise cannot be awarded to all his works. But I protest against his apologising for deficiencies on the ground of difficulty. The task which Mr. Paley essayed was a difficult one, no doubt; but it was self-imposed; and if it would be absurd for a practising barrister to accept a brief and refuse to read it on the ground that ‘reading briefs was so hard,’ it is not less so for an editor to defend deficiencies in his work by pleading the difficulty of editing. I willingly admit, however, that the labour spent by Mr. Paley on Propertius has been both considerable and fruitful. It is no disparagement to what he has done to say he might have done more.

One of the most striking features in Mr. Paley’s notes is indecision, or unwillingness to decide between contending interpretations or readings. Of course passages will occur where arguments on both sides so nearly balance each other as to puzzle an editor, but this ought to occur very seldom. With Mr. Paley this hesitation occurs very often. Now it is evident that, as there can be but one true interpretation of a passage, he approaches most nearly to the idea of an editor who produces the most plausible arguments in favour of one interpretation, while mentioning and refuting others. But there is too often a ‘iudicent peritiores’ to be understood after Mr. Paley’s notes. One instance, among a multitude, is his note on I. vi. 34 :—

Ibis et accepti pars eris imperii.

Mr. Paley tells us Hertzberg’s explanation is satisfactory :

'pars eris imperii grati tibi, utpote viro bellicoso: unus imperantium eris.'

If an explanation be *satisfactory*, no other can be wanted. But Mr. Paley proceeds: '*accepti* might, perhaps, be explained, *accepti a te, i. e. tibi commissi*,' and he quotes in support of his interpretation, v. xi. 34, which passage, by the way, he appears to misunderstand. In my opinion, Hertzberg's translation should have been refuted, or, at least, not praised, when another, inconsistent with it, was put forward. As to the interpretations themselves, I think they are both wrong, and that *accepti* means '*accepti a sociis*,' 'you will form one unit in the governing staff received (or welcomed) by our allies.' So Juvenal, '*Expectata diu tandem provincia quum te Rectorem accipiet*,' Sat. viii. 87. In the magnificent passage which there follows, the satirist was only developing two lines of this very elegy, 19, 20:

Tu patrui meritis conare anteire secures,
Et vetera oblitis iura refer sociis.

Mr. Paley's explanation is inconsistent with *pars*; at least, he should have explained how a man can be said to form a part of an office received by himself. The same objection applies to Hertzberg's interpretation. This indecision is an old fault of Mr. Paley's; many, I am aware, may not consider it a fault. I had lately occasion to consult his Aeschylus as to a disputed reading in Supp. 247. His oracular sentence was: 'although Canter's suggestion Πελασγός is highly probable, yet we should take care lest in rejecting Πελασγοῦ we may be altering the very words of Aeschylus.'

There is a notable lack of illustration from Latin authors in the notes. This is a grievous fault. It may arise from the fact that parallel passages are so fresh in Mr. Paley's memory, that he thinks they are equally familiar to the reader, and that therefore it would be superfluous to remind him of them. But this is far from being the

case: it is difficult to err on the side of excess in illustration. The old editors of the school of Ruhnken 'hoc stabant hoc sunt imitandi.' Mr. Paley seems not to value this portion of an editor's work, for he often tells the reader the commentators refer to such and such a passage, without quoting it. Thus, on I. xix. 5:—

Non adeo leviter nostris puer haesit ocellis,

he says: 'The metaphor, according to Hertzberg, who quotes from the Greek Anthology to prove it, is taken from aucupium or birdlime. This is, *perhaps*, correct, and the image is worth attention. The lover goes about with his eyes smeared to catch Cupid as he flies, and so is unable to shake him off again.' If this curious conceit is intended, the passages from the Anthology that establish it ought not to have been withheld.

On the other hand, there is much matter in the notes that might be left out. It is hard to see what is the object of so frequently expressing a simple Greek myth in the original words of Apollodorus, unless it is to give a learned look to the note. I may refer to the notes on I. 15, 17,; I. 20, 20, for illustrations of this absurd practice. Sometimes, I admit, the Greek version may be used with advantage, as in the note on III. 18, 47, where the myth is less known than usual, or where terseness, or the veil of a learned language, is desired. But can anything be more ridiculous than this: "Helle was the daughter of Athamas. Apollodor., i. 9. 1, τῶν δὲ Αἰόλου παίδων Αθάμας δυναστεύων Βοιωτίας ἐκ Νεφέλης τεκνοῖ μὲν παῖδα Φρίξον θυγατέρα δὲ Ἑλλην."'

We could also spare the scraps of philology which we meet with occasionally, chiefly from Donaldson's Varronianus; and I doubt if any reader will have his knowledge of Roman antiquities much increased by the information that the "*flabellum* was used as it is now in hot countries for making a cool breeze;" or this, "that the government of a Roman province was a most lucrative one, is certain

from abundant testimonies." Neither do I think classics needs the assistance of statics, by means of which science Mr. Paley has a remarkable explanation of *fulcire pruinas*, I. viii. 7: "*fulcire*, 'to press,' ἐρείδεν: this is a remarkable use of a word which usually means to 'support,' as a pillar props a roof. It may be explained on the statical principle, that resistance is equal to thrust, i. e. if the roof presses on the pillar, the pillar presents the same counter-thrust both to the roof above, and to the earth below." This may be said σοφῶς, but it is not said σαφῶς:

εὖ νὴ τὸν Ἑρμῆν. ὅτι λέγεις δ' οὐ μανθάνω.

I do not see what the earth below has to do with a thrust and counter-thrust between roof and pillar. But, apart from the wording of the note, is the statical law, I ask, of the equality of thrust to resistance so universally known as to form, even unconsciously, the foundation of any linguistic usage? If not, the introduction of statics into the note is useless. Mr. Paley says immediately afterwards, and I think correctly, that 'this double sense of a verb, arising from the association of ideas, is not without examples.' This may be true; but it is a different thing from the statical law that resistance is equal to pressure. As to the reading *fulcire pruinas*, it is, I think, not Latin, and, therefore, unsound; and the true reading is *calcare*, which will occur to every one on reading the line the first time. But, before we admit the easy *calcare*, it is our duty to explain how the difficult *fulcire* came in. This is inexplicable, until we find, that instead of *pruinas*, the better MSS. read *ruinas*, of which fact Mr. Paley makes no use, but gives us a dissertation on statical laws instead. This explains everything: *pruinas* being first corrupted into *ruinas*, the copyist, seeing that *calcare ruinas* was nonsense, tried to put in a word that would suit *ruinas*, without thinking whether he gave a good sense to the whole line, or not. *Fulcire* was the nearest word that would

suit, and may have been suggested to the copyist by Juvenal, III. 193, sqq. :—

Nos urbem colimus tenui tibicine *fultam*
 Magna parte sui : nam sic labentibus obstat
 Villicus, et veteris rimae cum texit hiatum
 Securos dormire iubet pendente *ruina* :

or by some other passage where *fulcire* is joined with *ruinas*, as Cic. in Senat. 8. The only passage supporting *fulcire pruinas* is given by Scaliger from Celsus : ‘linimenta super non fulcienda sed leviter tantum imponenda.’ A solitary passage from Celsus is not worth much, even if *fulcienda* be sound; the passage, however, is not mentioned by Mr. Paley.

The lateness of the existing MSS. of Propertius, none of them apparently being older than the 14th century, fully accounts for the corruption of the text, which has been altered by the copyists in a vast multitude of places, many, certainly, yet unsuspected. We may form a good estimate of the amount of these changes by comparing the case of the Epistles of Ovid with that of the Elegies of Propertius. There is a ‘magna farrago’ of late manuscripts of Ovid as there is of Propertius. But in the case of the former there is also an excellent ancient MS. of the 10th century—the Codex Puteaneus—on which the recension of the text entirely depends; and we can estimate how far the present text of Propertius is genuine, by considering what the text of the Heroides would be, were the Codex Puteaneus non-existent, and did the recension depend on MSS. coeval with those of Propertius. As a general rule, the copyists of the 13th and 14th centuries, if they found a hard word which they did not understand, changed it into a word as similar to it as possible. Often, too, they understood the explanatory gloss (generally written over or after a word), and almost invariably wrote down the gloss, instead of the genuine word; remodelling the line, if necessary, to suit the gloss. These glosses in

the old archetypes must have been very numerous. In Ovid I have detected, I think, several. And I believe the present text of Propertius to contain a good many.

Mr. Paley thinks, or thought, that the corruption of the text of Propertius has been overrated. I believe, on the contrary, that it has been underrated. In support of this statement, I will put forward a few passages which have hitherto apparently been unsuspected, but which are certainly corrupt: and if they are, it is probable that there are many more like them, which I have not been able to detect. The references are to Mr. Paley's second edition.

IV. xxv. 5:—

Nil moveor lacrimis : ista sum captus ab arte.
Semper ab insidiis Cynthia flere soles.

Now, the first line here is corrupt; for it is either self-contradictory, or it announces an untruth. Propertius was captivated by the eyes of Cynthia, it is true, but there were no tears then dimming that bright glance. Read:—

Nil moveor lacrimis : ista sum CAUTUS ab arte.

‘I am not moved by tears: I am on my guard against that artifice: you always cry, Cynthia, when you are laying some plot.’ If this wanted confirmation, which it does not, compare Ovid, Rem. Am. 699:—

Neve puellarum lacrimis moveare, *caveto*.

III. xxv. 12:—

Ah quotiens quernis laesisti frondibus ora
Mansisti stabulis abdita pasta tuis.

These lines are addressed to Io, transformed into a cow. The second line: ‘How often after feeding did you remain shut up in your stall?’ is corrupt; no Roman poet would

use *abdita, pasta*, one after the other, both agreeing with the same noun. Read:—

MANDISTI stabulis abdita pasta tuis.

'How often shut up in your stall, did you chew the cud of what you had eaten.' The copyists, of course, changed the rarer word *mandisti* to the familiar *mansisti*. *Pasta* is the plural accusative, in a passive sense. So Ovid says of a cow, *Am. III. v. 17, 18*:—

Dum iacet et lente revocatas ruminat herbas
Atque iterum *pasto* pascitur ante cibo.

IV. xvii. 27.

The emendation of the next passage is not quite so simple. It is, however, a fair example of the influence of a gloss on the text. The poet addressing Bacchus, says:—

Curvae Tyrrhenos delphinum corpora nautas
In vada pampinea desiluisse rate,
Et tibi per mediam bene olentia flumina Naxon
Unde tuum potat Naxia turba merum.

In the first couplet, the beautiful fable of the transformation by Bacchus into dolphins of the sailors who conspired against him is expressed; in the second, the legend that sweet-smelling springs of wine issued forth at his command in Naxos.

Now, either the third or fourth line is here corrupt, for it is most unpoetical to use *Naxia turba* immediately after *Naxos*. The fault is in the third line, and as emended the couplet will run thus:—

Et tibi per DIAM bene olentia flumina SAXIS,
Unde tuum potat Naxia turba merum.

Dia was the old poetical name for the island of Naxos, used, for instance, by Ovid several times in the *Metamor-*

phoses. In the passage before us, *Naxon* was probably written in the margin as an explanatory gloss on *Diam*. *Diam* was not understood by a subsequent copyist, who changed it into *mediam*, agreeing with the gloss *Naxon*, which, at the same time expelled the genuine word *saxis*, which so closely resembled it as to excuse the change. Now, the syntax is improved by this emendation. Mr. Paley says *effluxisse* is to be supplied in the third line. As I have emended, there is no verb to be supplied at all, the very most approximate verb in the language being expressed. The verb is *desiluisse*, in line 2, which is carried on to line 3. *Desiluisse* could not well have been carried on as the text hitherto stood, as an ablative corresponding to *rate* was wanting. I have supplied the ablative in *saxis*. There are two other points to be observed: (1) The mention of rocks is appropriate. Cf. Eur. Bacch. 704:—

θύρσον δέ τις λαβοῦσ' ἔπαισεν ἐς πέτραν
ᾧθεν δροσώδης ὕδατος ἐκπηδᾷ νοτίς.

(2). *Desilire*, like ἐκπηδᾶν, is the proper word for gushing, falling streams; cf. Hor. Od. III. xiii. 16, where it is joined with *saxis*:—

Me dicente cavis impositam ilicem
Saxis, unde loquaces
Lymphae desiliunt tuae.

Cf. Id. Epod. xvi. 48. There is a sort of zeugma in *desiluisse*, which the reader will observe is marked by the introduction of *tibi*, 'at thy command,' in line 3.

It is curious that the copyists so often stumbled at the word *Dia*, when used for *Naxos*. In Ovid, Her. x. 86, there is a monstrous line; Ariadne, abandoned in *Naxos*, asks whether there are any tigers in the island:—

Quis scit an et saevas tigridas insula habet?

which contains an offence against syntax, *habet* for *habeat*,

and an offence against metrical elegance, the awkward elision. Nothing can be more certain than that *insula* was here a gloss on *Dia*, as Heinsius saw. The gloss *insula* was then copied down instead of *Dia*, and the line was (very badly) reconstructed to suit *insula*. The line as corrected by an Eton Editor, improving on Heinsius, ran:—

Quis scit an et saevam tigrida Dia ferat?

Dia was sufficiently like *-da*, the last syllable of *tigrida*, to cause the insertor of *insula* to believe *Dia* was an accidental repetition of that syllable; just as in the passage before us *Naxon* is sufficiently like *saxis* to allow the emendator to suppose that *Naxon*, the gloss, was a correction of *saxis*. Strange to say, the correction of the passage in the *Heroides* has not been adopted by a single modern editor; a fact which makes the emendator almost despair.

The preceding emendations illustrate the corruption of the text of Propertius in unsuspected passages; the following are attempts to restore passages long condemned.

III. xvii. 17:—

Propertius is speaking of the long suffering nature of his love for Cynthia:—

Sed tamen obsistam: teritur rubigine mucro
 Ferreus, et parvo saepe liquore silex.
 At nullo dominae teritur sub limine amor qui
 Restat et immerita sustinet aure minas.

Of the third line, Jacob says it is 'desperatus versus,' and as it stands it certainly is absolutely unintelligible. Instead of *dominae*, the Groningen MS. has *de me*. It has been apparent to editors that an ablative of the instrument without a preposition is wanted after *teritur*, in the third verse, corresponding to *rubigine* and *liquore*, in the first and second verses. That word must have been a rare one, and capable of being corrupted into *sub limine*. There is

only one word in the Latin language that satisfies these conditions ; that word is SUFFLAMINE. *Sufflamen* was properly a drag for the wheel of a carriage : and in this its literal sense it is used by Juvenal, viii. 148 :—

Ipse rotam adstringit multo *sufflamine* consul.

But Juvenal also uses it in another passage, in the metaphorical sense of 'wearing, wearying, delay,' in a passage which is very much to the point ; xvi. 50 :—

Nec res *atteritur* longo *sufflamine* litis.

'Nor is their property wasted by the long drag of a lawsuit.' The coincidence of *atteritur* with *teritur*, in the passage before us, is very striking.

Read, therefore, giving *demens* (*demē*) for *de me* :—

At nullo DEMENS teritur SUFFLAMINE amor qui
Restat et immerita sustinet aure minas.

'But by no drag is that mad love worn away, which remains faithful, and patiently endures threats with innocent ears.'

The metaphor of a drag is as applicable to a suit in love, as to a suit at law. That Juvenal both knew and copied the writings of Propertius as well as Ovid, is certain ; but I cannot here stop to develop this point. I will only quote two passages, which are almost quotations from Propertius : (1) Sat. II. 149 (according to the best reading) :—

Esse *aliquid manes* et subterranea regna,

is taken from the first line of the Elegy on the death of Cynthia :—

Sunt *aliquid manes* : letum non omnia finit.

(2). Juv. VIII. 254 :—

Plebeiae *Deciorum animae*.

Cf. Prop. v. i. 45 :—

Tunc animi venere Deci.

These quotations alone show a close study and imitation of the writings of Propertius by Juvenal.

I. xi. 11.

Propertius "addresses Cynthia while absent at Baiae, and warns her to beware of the snares and gaieties of that much-frequented watering place" :—

Atque utinam mage te remis confisa minutis
Parvula Lucrina cymba moretur aqua.
Aut teneat clausam tenui Teuthrantis in unda
Alternae facilis cedere lympa manu,
Quam vacet alterius blandos audire susurros
Molliter in tacito litore compositam ;

which means, as Mr. Paley expresses it, "I had rather you were cruising in the Lucrine bay, or indulging in the retired baths of Cumae, than listening to whispered vows while seated on the shore of Baiae." He proceeds : "It is altogether uncertain what is meant by *Teuthrantis in unda* : the reading itself is but a conjecture of Scaliger's for *tentantis*, or *teutantis*, of the MSS. Teuthras was a king of Mysia, where there was a city called Cumae, which, together with that near Baiae, was a colony of Chalcidians ; hence, both cities *may* have been called after this king." A worse conjecture, then, than *Teuthrantis* cannot well be imagined : for nothing is obtained by the conjecture, but another uncertainty. The line is radically corrupt. I propose the following :—

Aut teneat clausam SINUESSAE NANTIS in unda
Alternae facilis cedere lympa manu.

'Or would that at Sinuessa a bath easily yielding to the alternate strokes of your arm as you swim in the water kept you shut in.' Now, the process of corruption was

this: *Sinuessae* (written *Senuesse*; *i* and *e* are confounded as often as not) was influenced by *teneat*, and became *tenuisse*. The remaining steps were alterations by successive copyists to make sense: *tenuis se nantis*, *tenui se nantis*, *tenui te nantis*, and, finally, *tenui tentantis*, or *teutantis*, of the MSS. The fact, that in the third line of the quatrain, the Groningen MS. reads *tenues*, instead of *blandos*, makes for my emendation. For I hold that *tenues* is there the true reading; and that it was changed to *blandos* in other MSS., after *tenui* had invaded the first line, to avoid the recurrence: and that it was itself, along with *teneat*, the cause of the first syllable of *Sinuessae* being corrupted to *ten-*. But why *Sinuessae*? Because next, and next only, to Baiae, Sinuessa was the most famous watering-place in Italy. But there was this difference: whereas Baiae was the gayest and most wanton place in Italy, Sinuessa was a comparatively quiet place. Its baths were said to be useful in removing sterility; and we may, therefore, suppose it was resorted to by respectable married women. In Martial, xi. 7, a married woman is supposed to excuse her absence from home by the plea of a visit to the baths of Sinuessa:—

Dicet et hystericam se forsitan altera moecha
In Sinuessano velle sedere lacu.

The fact that Sinuessa was a quiet place accounts for the poet's wish that Cynthia should be there.

There are three other objections to the received reading:—First, the alliteration, *teneat*, *tenui*, *Teuthrantis*; secondly, that *tenuis*, 'shallow,' would hardly be applied to the swimming-bath, the deepest of all baths; thirdly, that *in unda* requires some word like *nantis* closely joined with it, to prevent the tautology of *lymp̄ha in unda*.

Here is another instance of a purely conjectural reading, which gives very bad sense, and yet is nearly universally accepted:—

IV. 22, 15.

Et si qua Ortygiae visenda est ora Caystri
Et qua septenas temperat unda vias.

The meaning, generally, is : 'If you visit the Caystrus, and the Nile.' 'Ortygiae' is explained by Mr. Paley in the dative of place 'at Ortygia.' 'Ortygia was an ancient name for Ephesus, or rather, of a grove near that city.' But this obscure grove has as much right to its place in the line as the oil-flask in the prologues of Euripides :—

τουτὶ τὶ ἦν τὸ λεκύθιον ; οὐ κλαύσεται ;

The copies give, according to Mr. Paley, *Orige*, *Origae*, *Origiae*, *Ogygiae*, or *Gygaei*. Now, the Caystrus was, as is well known, the river of swans ; the swan is called 'Caystrius ales' by Ovid. In fact, the river is more frequently mentioned in Latin poetry in connexion with swans, than without them. It seems hardly necessary to observe that the corruptions in the MSS. point in a double manner to the true reading. *Orige* and its fellows are corruptions of *olorigeri*, 'swan-bearing;' *gygaei* is a corruption of *cygnei*, 'of or belonging to swans;' while *ogygiae* is a mixture of both. *Orige* is the mutilated remainder of *olorigeri*, the extremities having been swallowed up by their neighbouring syllables. I believe *cygnei* was the poetical effort of a copyist to represent *olorigeri*; and, therefore, leaving out *qua*, which spoils the line, and was only brought in after the corruption, for choice, read, restoring *tibi* :—

Si tibi OLORIGERI visenda est ora Caystri
Et quae septenas temperat unda vias.

I had conjectured *cygnei* before I found from Hertzberg's recension, that *olorigeri* was actually written in the margin of the Aldine edition as a correction : and from Barth's note I find that *cygnei* was long ago conjectured by Lipsius. Of these important facts Mr. Paley takes no notice. Sca-

liger, indeed, says of *olorigeri*, and another reading *Gygæi*, in his choicest terms of abuse: "Haec omnia stolidorum et oscitantium hominum commenta sunt." His own reading is *quadrigae*, which he explains to mean the four great towns near the Caystrus, Smyrna, Ephesus, Colophon, and Miletus; the *quadrilateral* of the Caystrus! Mr. Ellis, in a paper in the Academy on Paley's Propertius, asks, 'could Scaliger have proposed as bad an emendation as L. Muller?' What does he say to *quadrigæ*?

v. iii. 10. Arethusa says, writing to her soldier-husband, that all the world has seen him:—

Hibernique Getae pictoque Britannia curru
Ustus et Eoa discolor Indus aqua.

The latter line has been variously explained. Mr. Paley assents to Lachmann's explanation of *Eoa aqua* = *ad aquam Eoam*, and thus translates: 'The sun-burnt swarthy Indian by the eastern sea.' He says, 'others take Indus for the name of the river, which makes it hard to explain *ustus* and *discolor*.' With all submission, I hold that the only way of interpreting 'discolor' correctly is by understanding Indus to be the river. The meaning is, that the mighty Indus carries its waters far out to sea, and that the colour of the river is distinguishable in the ocean. *Ustus* is, however, corrupt: read, adding a single letter, and the line will be second to none in Propertius in grandeur:—

VASTUS et Eoa discolor Indus aqua:

'And the vast Indus of a different tint from the Indian Ocean.' So we have 'pelago discolor amnis,' in Statius, Theb. ix. 338. The application of *vastus* to the Indus, called by Cicero *omnium fluminum maximus*, is peculiarly appropriate: cf. Lucan, Phars. iii. 237, in a passage of similar import:—

Vastis Indus aquis mixtum non sentit Hydaspem.

The corruption *ustus*, if not accidental, arose from a transcriber taking Indus for the Gentile name. Mr. Paley ought to have remarked that *discolor* should be changed to *decolor*, if 'sun-burnt Indian' was intended: *discolor* being 'of various or different colour,' *decolor*, 'deprived of (natural) colour, darkened, browned.' Accordingly, Ovid, Art. A. iii. 130, Trist. v. iii. 24, uses *decolor* with Indus when he means the sun-burnt Indian. As to the preservation of its colour by the Indus far out to the sea, I have not consulted geographers, ancient or modern; it is probable they say something about it. I am informed, however, that it has a very rapid current, too rapid to permit of its ever being a great commercial river; so that the allusion of the poet is, probably, not a mere fanciful one.

Of the above emendations I consider that the substitutions of *cautus* for *captus*, *mandisti* for *mansisti*, and *vastus* for *ustus*, are perfectly certain; yet the manuscripts have preserved no trace whatever of the real words (except in the case of *vastus*, where I find an inferior codex has *vestus*). Now, if there is total disappearance from the MSS. of the true reading in the case of ordinary Latin words, what amount of corruption should we be prepared to find in passages where corruption generally invades even good copies? I mean the passages where the rarer proper names occur. We must, I think, be prepared to find radical and complete corruption in such passages.

I think it proper to make this reflection before entering on the consideration of a passage which has exercised the skill of editors as much, at least, as any in Propertius.

It is II. ii. 5, sqq. :—

Fulva coma est longaeque manus et maxima toto
 Corpore, et incedit vel Iove digna soror;
 Aut cum Dulichias Pallas spatatur ad aras
 Gorgonis anguiferae pectus operta comis.

Qualis et Ischomache, Lapithae genus, heroine,
 Centauris medio grata rapina mero
Mercurio Sais fertur Boebeidos undis
Virgineun primo composuisse latus.

For *Sais*, in the last line but one, some MSS. have *satis*. Hertzberg reads *et Sais* from Pucci.

Turnebus, long ago, for *primo*, in the last line, conjectured *Brimo*; and Scaliger claims to have made the same correction, both here and in Stat. Sylv. II. iii. 38, where he substituted Brimo for Bromium, in the line 'Immitem Bromium stagna invida, et invida tela.'

'That *Brimo* is right,' says Prof. Ellis,¹ 'no one will at the present day doubt; and we may start from this as a basis of interpretation for the preceding line.' By *Brimo* the commentators understand Proserpine to be intended. If *Brimo* is adopted, *sanctis* is usually read in the preceding line: and the meaning is generally given out to be: "and such a one as (qualis being carried on from the preceding distich), Proserpine is said to have been, when she laid her virgin side by Mercury near the sacred waters of the Boebian lake." If *Sais* is read with *Brimo*, Mr. Ellis would understand it to be an adjective from Saos, in Thrace or Samothrace, where he shows from Lycophron that Hecate was worshipped.

But it seems to me that the smartness of the conjecture *Brimo* has caused those who have adopted it to ignore the immense difficulties it introduces. These are four or five at the very least:—(1) *Brimo* is known as a name rather of Hecate, or Diana² than of Proserpine; (2) Mercury did not succeed in his attempt on Proserpine; (3) There is no mention of the Boebian lake in the accounts of that attempt; (4) The corruption in *Sais* still remains, for Mr. Ellis' attempt to join

¹ Professorial Dissertations of the University of London, 1871-72.

² There is, it is true, a confusion between Hecate and Proserpine: cf. Tzetzes ad Lycophr., 698: 'Hecate Brimo vocata est, quod Mercurio illi in

venatione vim inferenti minata fuerit, sicque Mercurius cessaverit. Persephone vero etiam Brimo dicitur. Mihi autem eadem videtur esse Hecate ac Proserpina.'

Sais Brimo 'the Samothracian Brimo,' involves the introduction of two recondite and obscure names, which is very unlikely. (5) The asyndeton by which *qualis* is carried on is intolerable; and, lastly, and generally, is it likely that Propertius would compare the bright Cynthia to a dark mysterious goddess like Proserpine? As to Hertzberg's theory derived from Beroaldus, that *Sais* is the Egyptian Minerva, it may, with all respect to this great commentator, be pooh-poohed at once.

Now, I venture to state, in the first place, that the comparison in the last two lines is still with Ischomache, the wife of Pirothous, whom the centaurs tried to ravish. The sentence was not completed at *mero*. The mention of the lake Boebeis points to this, as it was in the district bordering on that lake that Ischomache, or Hippodame, was married to Pirithous. But the word of which *Sais* is probably a corruption points to this more clearly still. That word is *Ossaeis*. The initial *o* was absorbed by the *o* ending the previous word. Now, Lucan, speaking of this very Boebian lake, has, vii. 176:—

Ire per *Ossaeam* rapidus *Boebeida* sanguis;

and Ovid, describing the battle between the Centaurs and Lapithae, at the nuptials of this very Ischomache, uses the adjective *Ossaeus*, Met. xii. 319:—

Fusus in *Ossaeae* villosis pellibus ursae.

The Lapithae lived about Pelion and Ossa, and the shores of the lake Boebeis. As to *Mercurio*, I reject it altogether, as a correction for *Pirithoo*, which may have been influenced by *mero*. The last four lines then will simply describe the union of Ischomache to Pirithous.

I read:—

Qualis et Ischomache, Lapithae genus, heroine,
Centaurs medio grata rapina mero,
PERITHOO OSSAEIS fertur Boebeidos undis
Virgineum primo composuisse latus.

Here is a daring attempt to bring sense into an unmeaning passage by supposing a gloss. Tarpeia intends to betray the Capitol to Tatius, and she selects a day when the Romans are to be engaged in a festival. But strangely, the line v. iv. 47, where she is represented as addressing Tatius (either in fancy or really) says nothing of a festival, but the very opposite—a general fight on the morrow:—

Cras ut rumor ait, tota *pugnabitur* urbe.

I propose:—

Cras ut rumor ait, tota *CESSABITUR* urbe.

Pugna (the abl.) was put as a gloss to explain *cessabitur*, thus: *pugna cessabitur*. 'The Romans will cease from fighting.' The next copyists thought this was intended as a correction of *cessabitur* into *pugnabitur*, and wrote down the latter. '*Cessare*' is the regular word 'to leave off work:' 'to idle;' 'to keep holiday.' '*Cessabitur*' is therefore the very word wanted here.

I have a few more emendations to offer, but I must postpone their publication to a future occasion. I will therefore proceed to examine a few of Mr. Paley's interpretations of disputed passages. And I shall begin by saying that I regret it is the duty of a reviewer to select those passages for criticism which he conceives to be wrongly interpreted: those passages only wherein he differs from an editor. I must therefore be excused in passing over for the most part with a silent tribute of praise the many correct interpretations of obscure passages put forward by Mr. Paley. Mr. Paley has indeed cut the ground of praise away in a peculiar manner, by the fact that he so seldom boldly takes a stand on one interpretation against other editors. Had he done so, a reviewer could side with him, now and then at least. But his correct interpretations are generally spoiled by a 'perhaps' introducing an incorrect one. He thus lays himself open to censure if he does not give a correct interpretation: while he deserve no praise if he does give it.

On I. xiii. 29, 30, Mr. Paley seems to me to have given a completely erroneous note:

Nec mirum quum sit Jove digna et proxima Ledaë,
Et Ledaë partu gratior, una tribus.

The meaning of that is simply, that this woman about whom Propertius writes is 'worthy to be loved by Jupiter, and approximates Leda in charms, and is more pleasing than Leda's offspring, one more pleasing than all three:' viz: Leda's *three daughters*, *Helen*, *Clytaemnestra*, and *Phoebe*. Now Mr. Paley (and to do him justice all the Germans he consulted), forgetting that Leda had *three* daughters, and thinking only of Helen and Clytaemnestra, finds this easy passage difficult, and well he might. This is the way he explains it. He makes *partu* the dative, and governed by *proxima*: He also puts the comma at *partu*: and he makes *tribus* to refer to Leda and her two daughters Helen and Clytaemnestra. Thus in a long note, instead of simplifying, he creates a serious difficulty where it did not exist. This is the more inexcusable in Mr. Paley as he had edited Euripides. In the Iphigenia in Aulis, v. 49, Phoebe, Clytaemnestra, and Helen are enumerated as the three daughters of Leda. ἐγένοντο Λήδα Θεστιάδι τρεῖς παρθένοι Φοίβη Κλυταιμνήστρα τ' ἐμὴ συνάορος Ἑλένη τε. Phoebe is also mentioned by Ovid, Her. viii. 77. She does not, it is true, make a figure among the Heroines like her sisters, but there is no reason to doubt that she was possessed of personal attractions of a high order.

I willingly stop at I. xv. 29 to express approbation of Mr. Paley's rendering, and the rare firmness of attitude he assumes.

Multa prius vasto labentur flumina ponto.

'Many rivers shall sooner flow *from* the waste sea.' He rightly objects to '*mula*' adopted by the majority of editors from Muretus. "It is all but absurd to say 'sooner shall rivers flow noiselessly to the sea, than, etc.,' because

that is what half the rivers in the world do already." Add to Mr. Paley's illustration Ovid. Her. v. 30.

We pass by Muller's conjecture 'figere theta loco' in xvi. 37, with a murmur of compassion, express our dissent from the forced meaning given by Mr. Paley to *alloquor* in xvii. 2, and conjecture that Cassiopea's *chair* (*solium*, *θρόνος*) may underlie the corruption *solito* in the next line. xx. 3, should be printed between inverted commas as the very words of the river of Ascanius: this is shown by 'id' = *ἐκεῖνο* 'the following saying,' and *dixerit* in the next line, which is = 'so suppose the river to have said.'

We come to the famous passage I. xx. 25, sqq. the loss of Hylas,

Ille sub extrema pendens secluditur ala
Et volucres ramo submovet insidias.

Here I can only say that I agree with Mr. Paley's interpretation in his first edition, and disagree totally with Mr. Wratishaw, whom Mr. Paley now follows, in understanding *pendens*, 'standing on tip-toe,' and *ala* 'arm.' The whole passage makes for the supposition that the sons of Boreas lifted Hylas from the ground and turned up his face to snatch kisses from it, vs. 28. Is it likely that in a passage referring to winged movements, the poet would use the words *ala* and *pendens* in a metaphorical sense when the literal sense would of course first strike the reader? Again '*ala*,' the 'armpit,' is never joined with '*extrema*.' I cannot imagine a Latin poet using '*extrema ala*,' any more than I could understand 'the extremity of the armpit' in English. Thirdly, it is quite gratuitous to say Hylas hid his *head* 'sub *ala*.' '*Ille secluditur*' is 'he hides himself,' all of him, or at any rate the greater part of him, not only his head, 'sub *ala*,' under the wing of Zetes or Calais. Although of course the head is chiefly intended, the literal translation must not be an absurdity, and I am inclined to believe it would be a sufficiently hard task for Hylas to hide his

head under his arm, but to hide himself there is a task I must pronounce him altogether incapable of, much as I respect the heroic age. Fourthly, is *ala* in the sense of 'armpit,' a word used in refined poetry? I ask for information, but I doubt whether it be.

In the third book on i. 23, 'laudis conscendere carmen,' Mr. Paley suggests *currum*, which is probable, and had occurred to me, and it is, I find, mentioned by Barth. Cf. ix. 13 of the same book.

On III. iii. 3, Mr. Paley has a very bad note—

Quicumque ille fuit puerum qui pinxit amorem

Nonne putas miras hunc habuisse manus?

Hic primum vidit sine sensu vivere amantes :

Mr. Paley says on '*sine sensu* : 'ἀφροντίστως, ἀναισθήτως. Is the allusion to love being blind'? It is unnecessary to point out that the allusion is to love being painted *puer*, as a boy, a child: Propertius says the person who first painted love as a child was a clever designer; for he saw that lovers were mere heedless children. Mr. Paley does not see that *puerum* is the predicate: accordingly he does not understand vs. 13 :

In me tela manent, manet et *puerilis imago*

Sed certe pennas perdit ille suas.

The meaning being; 'in my case love still has the arrows, and the childish form with which he was painted: but he has lost his wings, for he never flies away from me.' Mr. Paley says on '*puerilis imago* : "he appears to mean *Cupid himself*, but adds *imago* because he is describing the details of his image or picture." The poet does *not* mean Cupid himself: he means his particular attribute of a childish form.

There is a much worse note than this on III. vii. 12,

Cynthia non sequitur fasces, nec curat honores

Semper amatorum ponderat illa sinus.

In the first edition Mr. Paley totally mistook the meaning of *sinus* in the second line. He rendered it 'Cynthia

cares only for *affection*, the meaning being nearly the opposite: 'Cynthia always weighs *the purses* of her lovers.' Now Mr. Paley sees his error but, it to be regretted, does not fully and freely retract it. He now correctly translates, 'Cynthia always weighs the pockets of her lovers to see if they are heavy.' But he goes on: 'There is perhaps a double sense in *sinus*, the folds of the toga and the feelings of the heart; and if so, he ironically means that Cynthia does not care for the devotion of lovers, but only for their wealth.' This is the most successful attempt at confusing a simple passage that I have ever met with.

I do not think much of Mr. Paley's suggestion *mussem* (which, by the way, was also suggested by Palmer more than a hundred years ago) for *mutem* in III. x. 31. I prefer Jacob's *metuam* and would suggest *valet* for *velit* in the next line. The quatrain will run thus:—

Sic me nec solae poterunt avertere silvae,
Nec vaga muscosis flumina fusa iugis,
Quin ego in assidua metuam tua nomina lingua:
Absenti nemo non nocuisse VALET.

'So even this solitude will not prevent my being so jealous about you, as to fear your name on everybody's tongue: *every one can injure the absent*;' i.e. 'I will imagine every one a successful rival to me, in my absence.' With the structure of the last line, cf. III. XX. 30,

Primus erit nulla non tribuente locus.

In III. xi. 8 there can be little doubt that *lacrimas defluit*, which Mr. Paley has obelized, is nevertheless sound. It is a very easy Graecism: and is, moreover, strongly supported by Ovid, Met. vi. 312, where speaking of the transformation of this very Niobe, he says,

Liquitur et lacrimas etiamnum marmora manant.

Differet III. xiv. 17, is wrongly translated 'She will abuse you.' *Differo* in that sense always is determined by an

explanatory context, as Plaut. Aul. III. ii. 32, 'te pipulo hic differam ante aedes,' and in the passages referred to by Mr. Paley. Here, where it is used absolutely, it means 'she will put you off to another time.' Cf. Priapea, 4. (Mueller's Ed.)

Et nec dat nihi, nec negat daturam,
Causasque invenit usque *differendi*.

In xv. III. 4, *ingenuis* which seems to be Mr. Paley's own, instead of *ingenuus*, is undoubtedly true. But the meaning of the line 'aut pudor ingenuis, aut reticendus amor' seems to me to depend on a sort of zeugma in *reticendus*: 'Men of birth must resign all pretensions to shame, or they must not talk of their loves.'

The note on III. xv. 8,

Urerer et quamvis, nomine verba darem,

shows a great improvement, and the passage is now explained by Mr. Paley: 'and no matter how much in love I might be, I should escape notice by concealment of my name.' This is as good an explanation as the passage admits of in its present shape. But even this is unsatisfactory. *Verba darem* without a dative expressed is harsh: and *nomine* for 'concealment of name' is still more so. For *nomine* read, with very little change '*non mihi*,' and a good sense is obtained, and the construction is completed:

Nec sic per totam infamis traducerer urbem,
Urerer et quamvis, NON MIHI verba darem.

The meaning of the whole passage is: If Cynthia were an ordinary meretrix, I would not write about her and make myself notorious throughout the city: and no matter how much I might be in love with *her*, I would not make a fool of myself by supposing she was in love with *me*. 'Tam facilis' in vs. 5 is 'as compliant' as one of the 'viles puellae' mentioned in vs. 9: and is wrongly explained, I

think, by Mr. Paley. The interpretation I propose for the passage is supported by the last line of the poem:—

Fallaci dominae iam pudet esse iocum.

On vs. 12 of the same elegy Mr. Paley suggests that the *pila* held in the hands of Roman ladies to keep them cool was rock crystal with water inside. This may be true: but what is the meaning of this? ‘*the cold feel*, attributed to crystal, arose *from the notion* of its being mineralised ice.’ Bolingbroke asks:

Oh, who can hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?

And since the time of Shakspeare it has been allowed that it is difficult to become warm, by thinking of intense cold. It is not difficult however, it seems, to become cool by the same process. For according to Mr. Paley's words, it was possible for the Roman ladies to cool their hands by imagining they held ice in them, while really holding rock crystal. I do not, however, seriously suppose Mr. Paley to intend this: but of his exact meaning I am uncertain.

Müller, the latest and worst editor of Propertius, has exhibited much ingenuity in unnecessarily altering the text, but nowhere has his perversity been more conspicuous than on III. xxiv. 49, 50:

Tu prius et fluctus poteris siccare marinos
Altaque mortali deligere astra manu.

The second of these lines is one of the finest in Propertius. *Deligere* is a word properly applicable to gathering flowers or fruits: so Ovid Her. iv. 30, ‘*tenui primam deligere ungue rosam.*’ Rem. Am. 190: ‘*Temporibus certis maturam rusticus uvam Deligit.*’ Hence ‘gathering the stars, set high in heaven, with mortal hand’ is to my mind a very beautiful metaphor to express an impossibility.

Müller however objects to it, and spoils the line by reading *deripere*, and Mr. Paley declines to stand forward in defence of *deligere*.

One of the few conjectures not absolutely irritating made by L. Müller on Propertius is his reading *epe Chii* for *Erethei* or *Erechtii* of the MSS. in III. xxvi. 28, not that it is a good emendation, but that an emendation is wanted here. The common reading there is:

Aut quid Erethei tibi prosunt carmina lecta?

Nil iuvat in magno vester amore senex.

'Erethei' is explained 'Athenian,' i. e. Aeschylus. The obvious objection to this is that there were many illustrious Athenian poets besides Aeschylus, and therefore he could not justly usurp the title of *the* Athenian. *Epe* cannot, however, stand in the line at present along with *carmina*. Müller would have had to show that *carmina* was an explanatory gloss on the Greek word *epe* and that *poetae* was expelled on the introduction of *carmina*. But this demands too many alterations. I have little doubt that Epimenides of Crete is the poet referred to, and read *Cretaei* with Kuinoel and Jacob and the Ed. Rhég. and *zatis* for *lecta* with the Naples MS.

On 'longas manus' in IV. vii. 60, Mr. Paley has not brought forward any new light. The line can hardly be sound.

On IV. v. 7:

O prima infelix fingenti terra Prometheo!

Mr. Paley tells us there is an allusion in 'prima terra' to the 'princeps lutus' of Hor. Od. i. 16, 13. Is this a misprint, which has lasted through the first edition to be repeated in the second? Or has Mr. Paley mixed up Horace's clay (*limus*) with Juvenal's mud (*lutum*)?

Mr. Paley, in his first edition, stood by *terunt*, in IV. xiii. 10.

Quaeque terunt fastus Icarioti tuos:

which he explained by the common saying, 'to take the shine out of a person.' The meaning would then be 'girls who outdo Penelope in disdain,' or 'throw her into the shade.' This I think was correct, and I regret that Mr. Paley now reads the easy *gerunt* from Guet. In most cases it is a dangerous thing to prefer an easy common word to a difficult one in the MSS., and *terunt* is quite sufficiently supported by Tac. Ag. 9: 'et vincere inglorium et *atteri* sordidum arbitrabatur.' *Iterant* would be better than *gerunt*.

The commentary in the fifth book is the most improved part of the new edition. It is on the whole very well edited, good points are frequently made, illustrations and translations are more abundant. Mr. Paley, in 1866, published some verse translations from the fifth book, of considerable merit, and he has interspersed some of his poetical renderings through the notes with good effect, and the book contains at least one certain restoration by him, *Doryxenium* for *Dorozantium* in v. 21.

It is a pity, however, that there should be a refined blunder in the very first line:—

Hoc, quodcunque vides, hospes, qua maxima Roma est,
Ante Phrygem Aenean collis et herba fuit.

The first line seemed to defy mistranslation: 'All, far as your eye can reach, stranger, where mighty Rome now stands.' Mr. Paley translates '*quodcunque vides*'—'*whatever it may appear in your eyes, large or small*.' 'Degitur hoc vitae quodcunque est,' which he quotes from Lucretius, would not establish the sense he gives, even if Lucan had not written 'Jupiter est, *quodcunque vides*.' The most ridiculous mistranslation, however, in the book is on v. 6. 27, where the legend of the floating isle of Delos, fixed by Apollo, is mentioned (cf. Aen. iii. 75):

Cum Phoebus linquens stantem se vindice Delon,
where *se vindice* is thus explained, 'under threat of his

vengeance', meaning, says Mr. Paley, 'that he would *have punished it for not standing*, by finally reducing it to the former condition of instability.' This is too absurd. Fancy Arcitenens menacing the island: 'Now, Delos, look here, I've steadied you once, but, by the waters of Styx, I'll never steady you again!' 'Se vindice' is 'through his interference,' 'through his championship,' and was a common legal expression in this sense: 'se assertore,' as Barth correctly explains it. Mr. Paley, as usual, has a second string: *or, perhaps*, 'under his protection,' which is nearly the meaning.

On v. 4. 22, *Excidit* is wrongly explained, 'she forgot to take up the pitcher.' It is 'the pitcher slipped from her grasp through her forgetful hands' (and in all probability, was broken). The passage quoted by Mr. Paley *proves* this to be the meaning, and *disproves* the interpretation he gives to the line.

V. i. 33:—

Quippe suburbanæ parva minus urbe Bovillæ.

Mr. Paley was here content with one interpretation, and that, I think, the true one, in his first edition: 'Bovillæ was less of a suburb when Rome was small,' just as a century ago Richmond was less of a suburb to London, or Kingstown to Dublin, than at present. He now adds another, taking '*parva urbe*' for the ablative of quality: 'Bovillæ was of a less small and insignificant size.' To this there are two objections besides the objection that ablative of quality must not include the whole comprehension of the subject: first, there is nothing to mark the period referred to, if '*parva urbe*' is not taken as the ablative absolute; secondly, I doubt whether *urbe* could be applied to Bovillæ in any case.

In line 36, I think *tibi* should be read for *ubi*:

Et stetit Alba potens, albae suis omine nata:
Hac TIBI Fidenas longe erat ire via.

'And Alba then *was standing a powerful town*, &c.; by yonder road *you had* a long distance to travel to Fidenæ;' because, like Bovillæ, Fidenæ was then considered to be a good way from Rome. It was five miles. Or perhaps a period is indicated before the Via Salaria existed, and the time may denote the sinuous course of the old road, so that it really took one a long time to get Fidenæ. Mr. Paley does not observe that both *stetit* and *potens*, in 35, are strong predicates. Alba was destroyed by Tullus, and never was rebuilt. The corruption *ubi* arose from the copyists making the same mistake as Mr. Paley about *stetit*, and thinking that the position of the town of Alba was here described. Mr. Paley's translation will best explain the error: 'Alba stood on the road which brought you to Fidenæ by a long route.' This, as Mr. Paley himself observes, is not likely to be genuine, as Fidenæ lay in an *opposite direction* to Alba from Rome. In support of *tibi*, compare *quodcumque vides*, in v. 1, and *ista* (*yonder*), v. 9. The objects around are being pointed out to a stranger. It is, however, just possible to give a good translation to the text as it stands, by translating '*ubi*' *when*, not *where*: 'And Alba was then standing, a powerful town, what time it was a long journey to Fidenæ by yonder road.'

There are many other passages which call for comment from a reviewer, but those which have been criticised will serve to bear out the statement I have advanced, that the present edition still falls very far short of being a perfect or even a satisfactory edition of the poems of Propertius. I should however, feel guilty of ingratitude, if the remarks I have felt called upon to make should chance to hurt the feelings of a scholar to whom, in common with all classical students of this generation, I owe so much; they are written with no such intention, but in the hope that he will soon issue a third edition, and reconsider the passages to which exception has been taken. And these poems well deserve to be presented to the reader in as perfect a form as possible. For Propertius is a poet

of the first rank. Although one may find it difficult to agree with the numerous praises lavished on the elegies by Mr. Paley, to whom nearly every second one is exquisite, pathetic, or graceful; although one may admit even that four-fifths of the elegies are uninteresting from want of connexion, paucity of sentiment, and sameness of subject, there is left a noble residue that indeed redeems the author. It may fairly be doubted whether there are in the whole of Latin literature three poems which are of the same length and at the same time equal in merit to those three immortal elegies in the fifth book, the Vision of Cynthia, the Feast with the two girls on the Esquiline, and the Elegy on Cornelia. Can anything be more pathetic than the words in which the shade of the unfortunate courtesan intercedes with her old lover for her servants, and entreats him to burn the poems he had written in her praise.

Nutrix in tremulis ne quid desideret annis
 Parthenie: patuit, nec tibi avara fuit.
 Deliciae meae Latris cui nomen ab usu est
 Ne speculum dominae porrigat illa novae.
 Et quoscumque meo fecisti nomine versus
 Ure mihi: laudes desine habere meas.

The effect of *ure mihi* is inexpressible. If Mr. Paley had paused to call attention to the pathos of this passage, no one would have quarrelled with him. There is a ghastly reality and minuteness in the way in which Propertius dwells upon the funeral rites of Cynthia, which makes this poem unique, and which appears to me more than anything else to testify to the reality and long abiding nature of the passion, which allowed his mind to dwell morbidly upon subjects from which most men would shrink.

A strong contrast to the Vision is the Feast with the two girls. In this poem the descriptive powers of the poet are seen at their highest, from vs. 20-70. Cynthia

had gone to Lanuvium with a rival of the poet in his dog-cart, and Propertius determined to revenge himself.

Cum fieret nostro totiens iniuria lecto
Mutato volui castra movere toro.

Accordingly he invites two merry girls to sup with him. The description of the banquet that follows is inimitable: the light summer service of glass, the dry Greek wine, Phyllis playing on the castanets, to which a dancing dwarf kept time—all the materials for mirth and enjoyment were there. But the poet's heart was heavy. Everything was wrong. The lamps went out. The table was upset. The poet tried for an omen by dice, and invariably threw aces. The charms of Phyllis and her companion were thrown away. The secret cause of it all at last comes out: he was thinking of his faithless Cynthia at Lanuvium.

Cantabant surdo nudabant pectora caeco:
Lanuvii ad portas, hei mihi, solus eram.

The famous elegy on Cornelia has from first to last a sustained grandeur that well corresponds with the high birth and character of the matron whose stately Roman virtues it is written to celebrate. It is generally considered to be 'the masterpiece of the poet's genius:' I myself prefer the Vision.

The above three poems are sufficient to entitle Propertius to a place in the highest rank of poets. Passages of equal beauty are not to be expected often: and there are not many more at all approaching them in the poems of Propertius. But Propertius is never mean. His own estimate of his poetry is accurately true:

Me quoque non humilem mirabere saepe poetam.

In all his writings there is dignity of language at the least, and all his poems may be read with pleasure if only on account of the sounding grandeur of his diction in indi-

vidual lines. Take for instance the following line taken almost at random :

Nunc, O Bacche, tuis humiles advolvimur aris.

or this couplet,

Cerne ducem, modo qui fremitu complevit inani
Actia damnatis aequora militibus.

or this,

Milanion nullos fugiendo, Tulle, labores
Saevitiam durae contudit Iasidos.

or the fine line, quoted by Merivale, with others, to prove that Propertius alone knew how to handle the Latin pentameter :

Viximus insignes inter utramque facem.

All these are specimens of vigour in the mere construction of this verse, which is only attained in an equal degree by one other ancient author, Juvenal.

PLATO'S OBLIGATIONS TO THE IONIC AND ELEATIC SCHOOLS.¹ By THOMAS MAGUIRE, LL. D., University of Dublin; Professor of Latin, Queen's College, Galway.

THE following paper is not offered as a history of the prae-Platonic philosophy; it merely points out the elements which Plato worked into his own system, and for which he was indebted to the Ionic and Eleatic Schools.

THALES, the father of Greek Philosophy, derived the sensible universe from water. Everything drew its origin from water, and into water everything was finally resolved. But Thales was no materialist; while water was the primordial material, mind was the primordial agent which gave shape to the liquid mass, the entire extent of which was pervaded by the plastic mind. Mind however did not exist apart from the material on which it worked. We thus find in the very outset of philosophy the two great factors Matter and Form—*τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ πῆρας*—but as yet they appear only in the concrete.

To Thales succeeded ANAXIMANDER, who substituted in place of water a more attenuated material. To this primitive essence, which he termed *ἀρχή*, he added the property of perpetual motion, so that the sum of the primitive mobility remained the same in bulk, while its inherent motivity kept exhibiting the various sensible qualities. The primitive essence possessed the accident of infinitude *ἄπειρον*. But this term, which appears for the first time in philosophy, represented rather the inexhaustibleness of the available material than either the mathematical or metaphysical concept. The function of the

¹ The authorities may all be found in Mullach; *Frag. Gr. Philos.* Didot.

infinite material, which was not actually employed in production, was to enclose the sensible scheme of things. In this scheme he posited as phenomenal antinomies Heat and Cold, Dryness and Moisture. The view that these antinomies exist merely as phenomena without reaching back to ultimate essence is the theory which elicits the praise of the veteran Parmenides in the dialogue so-called. For this view and the notion ἀρχή—something which precedes but which is not preceded by anything in question—Plato is indebted to Anaximander. But, by making formative activity an inherent property of matter, Anaximander originated philosophical atheism. The law of parsimony rejects a creator, as matter in its own infinitude and by its own activity does all the work.

Anaximander was succeeded by ANAXIMENES, for the greater definiteness of his conceptions shows that he improved on the metaphysics of Anaximander and not *vice versa*. His primordial material was air; air was infinite i. e. infinite in quantity; and infinity was the logical essence of being. Here, for the first time, we meet with infinity, ἄπειρον, in its strict mathematical application to modes of quantity. The process of thought which construed air as infinite is obvious to any one who understands the argument for the infinity of space; and air, is popularly the symbol of vacuity. But this infinite air although boundless in its essence or substance, was yet, according to Anaximenes, determinate in its qualities or manifestations. We here find the indefinite element and the definite things, τὸ ἄπειρον and τὰ πεπερασμένα, familiar to the student of the Philebus.

According to HERACLITUS, the primordial material was fire. Fire by its modifications originated sensible bodies according to a progressive scale of densities in a certain direction. And these sensible bodies were resolved into fire by a movement in the contrary direction. In the concrete language of Heraclitus, "the road up and the road down is one and the same." According to this system,

nothing really existed, that is taking existence to signify stationary and identical existence. Everything was a mere becoming; again to quote Heraclitus, "a man could not dip twice in the same stream." Strictly speaking, he could not dip even once, as the man who bathed only appeared to be the same, but in fact was renewed during (as well as before and after) the bathing process. But as all modes of production and decay are contraries—mere tendencies upwards and downwards from the primordial fire back to primordial fire—all contraries are really identical. This mode of thinking was adopted in its integrity by Plato in his youth, but was afterwards confined by him to sensible phenomena.

We have hitherto seen τὸ ἄπειρον only as the indefinitely great, but ANAXAGORAS presents it to us as also indefinitely little. The two together—the indefinitely great and the indefinitely little—are merely opposite tendencies of the one prime material, and when united under the presidency of mind make up the aggregate—τὸ ἕν. It is to Anaxagoras that mind owes the first recognition of nearly all its metaphysical prerogatives. Thales had recognised its activity, but had inseparably combined it with water. Anaxagoras set it in a sphere apart and assigned to it unique properties. Mind alone was strictly infinite, i. e. unlimited or untrammelled by anything else, and subsisted by its own inherent strength. Mind was homogeneous, and was the only kind of real existence. All production was a selection of similarities; all dissolution was a process of disintegration; but mind alone was a substance in the modern sense which supported its own accidents or qualities. All sensible qualities were merely preponderances of homogeneous particles, and the student of Plato will easily discern in this distinction between mind and other things, the Being and Seeming, which are so frequently contrasted in the Platonic writings. But with reference to sensible things, the function of mind, according to Anaxagoras, was strictly confined to arrange-

ment. Hence the complaint of the Platonic Socrates in the *Phaedo*, that Anaxagoras did not make the most of his conception of a presiding and arranging mind. In modern language we might say that the dualism of Anaxagoras could not satisfy the exigencies of idealism. And in the presence of production and decay which are opposite phases of the one evolution, we can discern in their physical aspect the Great τὸ μέγα and the Small τὸ μικρόν—the Indefinite Dyad of Plato. But as Anaxagoras brings us down to Socrates, we may now recapitulate:—Thales originates the distinction of Agent and Material in the concrete; Anaximander introduces the terms ἀρχή and ἄπειρον, the latter only as an adjective; Anaximenes makes infinitude a substantive and posits it as the essence of the universe, and both philosophers recognise and provide for sensible antinomies; Anaxagoras analyses sensible things into aggregations of molecules with two opposite tendencies which are arranged by mind, while mind is the only substantive existence, is unique in properties, is subject to no control from anything outside itself, and occupies a sphere of its own. We have thus traced one stream of Greek thought down to Plato: we must now ascend to another source which is equally native, and to which he is also largely indebted.

The philosophers, whom we have just enumerated, seek to do for the enquirer more or less imperfectly what Newton effects by his law of gravity, to explain the outward phenomena of the universe. Thus a disciple of Thales would be as much satisfied by referring any strange appearance, such as the ascent of a balloon, to the agency of water, as a Newtonian would be by an appeal to gravitation. Of course the cogency of the appeal in each case is quite distinct from the urgency of the want, which Thales and Newton professed to satisfy. But we come now to a totally different school of thought. If of the physical school Anaximander founded philosophical atheism, so XENOPHANES originated philosophic theism.

Rejecting as immoral the popular theology of Homer and the poets, and retaining his belief in the existence of deity, Xenophanes laid down as an axiom that the nature of Deity is of paramount excellence. From this theological axiom Xenophanes evolved his metaphysics. As follows:—Existence of the highest kind can have no γένεσις or production in time, and by parity of reasoning it can have no end, because whatever is produced is produced by something, and therefore the thing produced must be inferior in excellence to its producer. In the same way a thing which receives termination can only be terminated by something superior. But as the divine nature is of paramount excellence, the divine nature must be unique, for two or more paramount excellences would be an absurdity, as each would hamper the other. This argument is still employed by theists in opposition to the Manichean doctrine of the Two Principles. But, as one, the divine essence is uniform, and, as uniform, admits of no modification—no shadow of turning—either by way of motion or of change. This is a favourite topic of Greek Metaphysics, and is much used by Plato. It may be modernised as follows:—the perception of change involves a succession of notions, and a succession implies at least two members contrasted in the series. Hence then, as modification or change was supposed to depend on the more subtile movement of the component particles, it follows, that any essence, which is uniform through its entire extent and which reigns unique, admits of no modification either from within or without. Not from within, for it is in itself essentially uniform; not from without, for there is nothing to control it. But as the divine essence is thus uniform in every direction and is thus in itself complete, Xenophanes, expressing his religious views in the conceptions of Geometry, held that deity was spherical in figure. But he distinctly refuses to apply to divinity either of the predicates, Finite or Infinite. Not finite, for finiteness or limitation must be imposed by some other essence, and a se-

cond essence is, as we have seen, an absurdity. Not infinite, as infinite has no objective existence. This, which is one of the two cardinal doctrines of Parmenides, was arrived at by some such reasoning as this: the infinite— $\tau\acute{o}$ $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{o}\nu$ —is a negation of $\tau\acute{o}$ $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$; and every negation is a negation of the ultimate predicate existence; in other words non-existence is not existence, and so non-existence cannot exist. The reader of the Theaetetus and the Sophistes will recollect how far Plato modifies the Eleatic dogma. Non-existence, according to him, $\tau\acute{o}$ $\mu\grave{\eta}$ $\acute{o}\nu$ exists $\pi\eta$, i. e., in the mind of the denier.

We have seen that Xenophanes affixed to the divine essence the predicate unity. Out of this predicate PARMENIDES evolved his system. Identifying subject and predicate—in psychological language, subject and object—Parmenides proclaimed that unity is unity, while unity consisted in intelligence, which being unity was the only real existence. In other words, the unity of subject and object in the act of thinking was the only real essence. Now, real existence is not non-existence, and as unity and real existence are identical, unity is therefore what we would call the logical as well as the metaphysical essence of being. This unity is not subject to beginning or end, for it is the highest kind of being, and, as being one, it is uniform; being uniform and without beginning or end, it is complete: and being devoid of any modification, it admits of no termination. But unity, although without termination, is not infinite, $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{o}\nu$. On the contrary, as the perfection of completeness, unity in the language of extension is spherical.

MELISSUS made being, $\tau\acute{o}$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, the logical essence of existence; and from this essence he deduced his system. Essence, $\tau\acute{o}$ $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$, is not $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$; it is therefore, as Parmenides and Xenophanes had argued, eternal. But Melissus differed from Parmenides and Xenophanes in making essence infinite $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{o}\nu$. But as essence is $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{o}\nu$, that is, has neither beginning nor end, essence must be one; for

two infinite essences are impossible, as in that case each would impose finiteness on the other, which is a contradiction. Being, as one, is uniform, and, therefore, as before, motionless, and so without affections or modifications of any kind.

And finally ZENO, the disciple and friend of Parmenides, supported the unitarianism of his master by negative arguments, that is, by reducing to absurdity the counter-scheme of Pluralism. Parmenides had maintained that unity is existence and conversely that existence is unity, while Zeno argued that if existence were not unity, that is, if existence were plurality, unity would be plurality, which is absurd.

With regard to τὸ ἓν the difference of the four unitarians may be stated thus :

1. Xenophanes deduced Unity from the theological notion of Moral Perfection, and made unity a predicate of essence :
2. Parmenides, by identifying subject and object, made Unity both the logical and substantive essence of all real existence :
3. Melissus made Unity a predicate, but deduced it from infinity, while
4. Zeno inferentially defended Unity by proving Pluralism impossible.

With regard to the infinite, τὸ ἄπειρον, Anaximander, who introduced the term, made it an adjective in the sense of inexhaustible ; Anaximenes made it a substantive in Locke's sense of endless addibility as applied to extension ; Xenophanes applied the term to the physical element, earth, seemingly in the sense of formless ; with Parmenides it was a subjective figment which had no objective counterpart : while with Melissus the infinite was in the highest sense objective, for it was the logical as well as substantive essence of existence.

Plato in his Sophistes gives a sketch of the antecedent systems of philosophy. He divides them into three classes,

videlicet, pluralism, unitarianism, and a combination of both. He states that the eclectic scheme was the work of the Ionian and subsequently of the Sicilian Muse, that is, of Heraclitus and Empedocles. To this scheme of eclecticism he gives in his adhesion. The Eleatic school had proclaimed existence to be one; the Physical school had maintained existence was essentially plural; Plato combined the two into one formula—existence is *ἐν καὶ πολλά*. His obligations to Pythagoras are too obvious to require specification. The greatness of his genius is best shown by his having assimilated something from every preceding thinker.

NOTES ON THE LETTERS OF CICERO TO ATTICUS.

By ROBERT VELVERTON TYRRELL, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Latin in the University of Dublin.

THE edition of the Letters of Cicero to Atticus, published by I. C. G. Boot at Amsterdam in 1865, was a great boon to students of Cicero. If we except the brief explanatory notes of Ernesti, and the School Editions by Matthiae and Hofmann of a selection from the Letters, no explanatory notes on this portion of the works of Cicero had ever been essayed except by Schütz and Billerbeck. But thorough criticism must precede exegesis, and this proposition, true of all the remains of classical antiquity, is especially true in the case of Cicero's Letters, where the context often affords so little aid, that the discovery of the true reading depends solely on the proper estimating of the respective values of different MSS. Schütz found the criticism of his author in a very imperfect state, and he cannot be said to have left it very much improved. Wild conjecture was carrying on a *γραφὴ ξενίας* against Cicero's own words, and judgment was going by default. Each of the successive editors felt that unless he had attacked some passage hitherto unpugned, he had lost a day; "what the canker-worm had left, the palmer-worm had eaten;" and we should soon have had to be content with a little Cicero to relish our Bosius (whose very clever guesses were constantly being introduced into the text on the faith of his MSS. with ponderous Latin eulogies), were it not that it was discovered by Theodor Mommsen that of his three *codices* he had invented two, and misrepresented the third. This was indeed a strange state of mind which led Bosius to feign MSS. of Cicero, and Henri Etienne to fabricate *codices* of

Euripides, for the purpose of recommending their own conjectures. One can hardly suppose that desire of fame dictated the fabrication, for surely to gather from the context, or from some parallel passage, or from some ancient testimony, or from perfect sympathy and *rapport* with one's author, or from the conflicting testimony of confessedly wrong MSS., a word or words which the *consensus* of scholars would recognise as being certainly or even probably the very words of the writer on whom one is engaged, must be regarded as a greater intellectual feat than to have seen those words in a MS. which no one else ever saw or could have seen. But perhaps fame for erudition was then coveted rather than fame for cleverness, or (to take the most charitable view) perhaps Bosius or Stephens feeling unmixed confidence in the soundness of his conjectures thought any fraud pious which should vindicate for Cicero or Euripides words which they believed to be the genuine and authentic utterances of those two great masters of style.

When Boot set about his edition of the Letters of Cicero to Atticus the condition of the text was very much improved. He had before him the results of the critical labours of Wesenberg, Klotz, and of "magnus ille Turicensis" Orelli. The great Zurich critic would probably have left little to be added by his successors, but that he was not aware of the fictitious character of the codices of Bosius. And yet Bosius' own account of the manner in which he gained possession of his *vetustissimi codices* might have excited suspicion. His Codex Decurtatus (commonly called Y) he obtained "a gregario quodam milite cum aliis aliquot libris calamo exaratis, ex bibliothecae cuiusdam sacrae direptione, tamquam e periculosissimo naufragio, servatum." His Codex Crusellinus (X) he thus describes:—"adiutus sum praeterea codice quodam excuso Lugduni, qui olim fuerat Petri Cruselli, medici apud nostrates celeberrimi; ad cuius libri oras doctus ille vir varias lectiones appinxerat, a se, ut ipse dicebat, diligentissime et summa

fide e vetustissimo et castigatissimo libro Novioduni descriptas."

Bosius' readings when not conjectures are taken from R, the *Editio princeps Romana*, or from readings of R given in the margin of the Edition of Cratander. Now R is founded on the Med., and so is I, the *Editio princeps Iensoniana* published in Venice; R generally gives the reading of M *a prima manu*, while I as a rule accepts the marginal or superscribed corrections. So that X and Y having been exploded, we must rest in the last resort on the authority of Med., except in so far as we have some little help in the few *variae lectiones* cited from the Codex Tor-naesianus (Z) by Lambinus and Turnebus, for we cannot rely on those quoted as from Z by Bosius.

Boot has, as a rule, shown great sagacity both in deciding between rival conjectures and in rejecting all when he has something better of his own to propose. I shall refer (confining my observations for the present to Books I.-VI.) only to those passages in the criticism or explanation of which I take a different view from his.*

I. i. 5.

"Hermathena tua valde me delectat, et posita ita belle est ut totum gymnasium eliu anaθma esse videatur."

On the *vulg.* ἡλίου ἀνάθημα Boot justly remarks that whether we interpret these words to mean *solis donarium* or *locus soli consecratus*, he does not understand why Cicero should have expressed himself so obscurely. Yet few will award to his own conjecture the praise of superior perspicuity. Reading *eius ἀνάθημα* he explains: "Hermathena illa ita excellebat inter cetera ornamenta gymnasii, ut hoc eius causa exstructum, ei dedicatum videretur." There is no other attempt to correct without remodelling the whole sentence.

* I have in every case given the reading of the Medicean (M), in a few cases adding those of R, I, or Z.

In the absence, as it seems to me, of any plausible conjecture on this passage, I would suggest ἡλίου ἄναμμα, 'a blaze of sunshine.' The word ἄναμμα is one common in the Stoic philosophy, with which Cicero was very familiar. The Sun was described by the Stoics in a phrase attributed to Heraclitus as ἄναμμα νοερόν ἐκ θαλάττης. Light and brilliancy were regarded by the Romans as the best qualities in a house. In Plaut. *Most.* III. i. 105-110 Tranio tells Theuropides that Philolaches has bought a house; Theuropides asks, what kind of a house; Tranio replies, *speculo claras, clarorem merum*, to which *bene hercle factum* is the answer. *Claror merus* applied to a house seems to me a very similar expression to ἡλίου ἄναμμα applied to a gallery of *objets d'art*.

Isolated Greek words are always found in the Med. written in Roman characters. It is singular that Med. is here reported to have a Greek Θ while the other characters are Roman. How does this happen? I have little doubt that this is a case of misreading of the MS. The Roman M in manuscripts was very like a Θ with a vertical instead of a horizontal stroke, or rather, like a Θ lying on its side. How could a Θ stand among the Roman characters? Not because there is no one symbol for Θ in Latin; for would a copyist hesitate to represent Θ by *th*, who in the preceding word *eliu* had represented ου by the Latin equivalent *u*?

I. 16. 13.

"Sed heus tu! videsne consulatum illum nostrum quem Curio ἀποθέωσιν vocabat, si hic factus erit, fabam mimum futurum."

The attempts to explain *fabam mimum* and the conjecture *famam mimum* rest on a corrupt passage of Seneca, and are forced in the highest degree. Perhaps *fabam* should be *fabulam*, and *mimum* a gloss on *fabulam*. If it were one of those interlinear glosses which abound in Med., this would account for the misreading of *fabulam*. The sentence would then mean, "the rank enjoyed by us Consulars, which Curio used to call a deification, will be a by-word." *Mimum* could not have been Cicero's word.

It would be a post-Ciceronian form of speech to say that the consular rank would be "a mere farce" (*mimum*), though Suetonius uses *mimus* exactly in this way. Cicero in using *fabula* would mean 'a by-word,' as Persius (v. 152) in the words *cinis et manes et fabula fies*, and Seneca in the passage (Troad. 403):—

Rumores vacui verbaque inania
Et par sollicito fabula somnio:

According to this view the gloss writer must be supposed to have explained the word *fabulam* wrongly, when he explained it to mean 'a farce.'

I. 19. 3.

"Et, τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ φακῇ μύρον, Lentulus."

None of the commentators, so far as I know, quote on this expression the verse confirming the usual comment (founded only on the context) that it is a proverb indicating "pains thrown away." The verse is from Strattis (Phoenissae) and is preserved in Athenaeus:

παραινέσαι δὲ σφῶν τι βούλομαι σοφὸν,
ὅταν φακῇν ἔψητε, μὴ 'πιχεῖν μύρον.

Suidas gives a different account of the proverb. He says (and a Schol. on Ar. Plut. agrees with him), that the proverb refers to a *nouveau riche*; abandoning his lentil fare the *nouveau riche* can now afford unguents. So Ar. Plut. 1005:

ἔπειτα πλουτῶν οὐκέθ' ἡδεται φακῇ,
προτοῦ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς πενίας ἅπαντ' ἐπήσθη.

II. 1. 8.

"Dicit enim tamquam in Platonis πολιτεία non tamquam in Romuli faece sententiam."

This famous criticism of Cicero on the political attitude of Cato seems to me to be very strangely expressed. 'The

dregs of Romulus' is "a vile phrase," reminding one of the Plautine *hallex viri*. Yet all the editors acquiesce, deceived, perhaps, by the apparently (but by no means really) correct antithesis between *Platonis* and *Romuli*. It might perhaps be said that Juvenal's *turba Remi* is a similar expression to *faex Romuli*; for my part I do not think Cicero would have said *turba Romuli*; and moreover *faex* unqualified does *not* mean the same thing as *turba*, but only when qualified as in the expression *faex urbis* in Cic. ad Att. I. 16. It may be argued that *faex Romuli* means 'that *colluvio* brought together by Romulus, to form the population of the city at its foundation;' but this is quite foreign to the antithesis. It is to the degenerate Rome of the present day that his remark refers.

I must therefore profess myself dissatisfied with the expression, though there is very strong evidence for the genuineness of the words in the fact that Plutarch (Phoc. 3) uses the expression ἐν τῇ Ρωμύλου ὑποστάθμῃ, apparently a translation of *in Romuli faece*, which seems to show that if there is an error it is older than Plutarch.

If however Cicero wrote *in ROMULAE faece*, the corruption would be sure and speedy. We have the most favourable condition of a depravation, a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον closely resembling such a common word as *Romuli*. The sentence would then mean, "Cato speaks as if he were in the Fair City of Plato, not amid the very lees of our degenerate Rome." *Faex Romulae* would be just the same as *faex Urbis* in I. 16. It is well known that the diminutive form often conveys contempt, as in *homunculus*, *homullus*; so in Plautus *dicax* is 'witty,' *dicaculus* is 'loquacious.' If Cicero wrote *Romulea*, it would not be inconsistent with Plutarch's translation—which; ὁδοῦ πάρεργον, is not quoted by any of the commentators on this passage—but Cicero would perhaps hardly use the adjective *Romuleus*, or *Romulus* (as Horace does). I may here observe that it seems to me a great mistake to ascribe carelessness to Cicero's Letters. His style is to some extent colloquial, and often

finds its parallel in the language of the Comic Drama—a fact too much overlooked in the criticism of the Letters. For is it not to be expected *a priori* that the language of familiar conversation would closely resemble the language of familiar letter-writing? A Plautine analogue, therefore, may vindicate a phrase in Cicero's Letters, though by no means in his Orations or Philosophical works. But let no one say that his Letters are written carelessly, who remembers the passage (vii. 3. 10) where he so earnestly defends his use of *in* before *Piræcum* (while he avows with shame that he should have written *Piræcum* not *Piræca*) on the ground that Piræeus cannot be regarded as a town; citing in defence of his usage the opinions of Dionysius and Nicias, and quoting a passage in point from Caecilius, whom he candidly allows to be but a poor authority, as well as from Terence, whose *elephantia* he considers beyond dispute. All this, too, at a time when one might have supposed that he would have been more concerned in deciding on the political position to be assumed by him on his return to Rome, which he was fast approaching, and from which were constantly reaching him "*miri terrores Caesariani*," and "*falsa, spero, sed certe horribilia*."

I. 3. 1.

"Id iudicium Attilio condonatum putabatur. Et Epicratem suspicor, ut scribis, lascivum fuisse; etenim mihi caligae eius, ut fasciae cretatae, non placebant."

Here, and here only, Cicero refers to Pompeius under the name Epicrates. In a letter to Tiro (Epp. ad Fam. xvi. 21) he speaks of a friend of his at Athens named Epicrates; and in the Verrine Orations he speaks of an Epicrates of Agyrium, and of another of the same name, a native of Bidis, both victims of the oppression of Verres; but of course none of these furnish any analogue to Pompeius, nor can be supposed in any way to have suggested to Cicero the application of the name Epicrates to Pompeius.

Now it is of course possible that he chooses here, as he might anywhere else, to call Pompeius "our influential (or successful) friend," or it may be said that Cicero calls Pompeius "Prince Paramount," wishing to hint at some excessive use of his influence at the recent trials. But *Epicratem* is not highly coloured enough to give this meaning. There is always more point in Cicero's *soubriquets*. He calls the same Pompeius Hiesosolymarius in ironical glorification of his Eastern expeditions; so one might call an Englishman who made rather too much of some exploits in Japan "our friend, the Mikado." On the same principle Pompeius is called Alabarches or "the Sheik" in other places. But why Epicrates here?

I think it may be that the word which should stand here is not *Epicratem* but *Iphicratem*. The Athenian Iphicrates is well known to have invented a new sort of legging or military boot, commonly called Ἰφικρατίδες after his name; so that Wellington and Blucher were not the first Generals who gave their names to a species of boot. Pompeius must have affected some singularity in the colour or shape of his *caligae* and *fasciae*—for the mere wearing of *caligae* and *fasciae* was usual, and would not have provoked remark—and hence Cicero calls him "our Iphicrates." It is well known that E and I are often confused in Latin MSS. the horizontal strokes in the letter E were very short indeed, especially the middle one. I having been changed to E, the *h* would naturally be omitted, as Ephicrates does not occur, while Epicrates is found three times in Cicero. In Virg. Aen. II. 340 Epytus and Iphytus are variants for the same name.

II. 17. 3.

Alabarches has, of course, no connexion with the word ἄλαβα, 'ink,' found in Hesychius, and often supposed to afford the etymology of this word. Nor is there any need to discuss the question between *Alabarches* and *Arabarches*. Alabarches is Arabarches, just as Parilia is Palilia, *r* in

the first syllable being changed to *l* on account of the recurrence of *r* at the end of the word. The same sensitiveness about the recurrence of *r* and *l* changed *caeluleus* to *caeruleus*, *peregrinus* to *pellegrino*, *altare* to *autel*, &c.

IV. 10. 2.

“ Ut possim tibi aliquid in eo genere respondere.”

Boot conjectures *reponere*, but *respondere* means ‘to make a return to one for a thing,’ in the phrase *subsidiis amicorum respondemus*, IV. 3. 6.

IV. 15. 4.

“ Debemus patrem familias domi suae occidere nolle.”

Occidere is ‘to be murdered,’ as in Milo VII., *si unus ille occidisset Milo*; cf. ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἀποθανών, ‘having been murdered by his brother,’ Ar. Pol. V. Therefore Boot’s suggested change of *occidere* to *occidi* is unnecessary.

IV. 16. 6.

“ At Senatus decrevit, ut tacitum iudicium ante comitia fieret quae erant ** sortita in singulos candidatos.”

Sortita passive is hardly to be ascribed to Cicero, and Boot suggests *sorte ducta*; but the difficulty is avoided by regarding the words TACITUM—CANDIDATOS as the words of the decree, and indicating this by printing them in capitals. The language of laws, &c., is always archaic. *Sortitus* is passive in Propertius and Statius, but this would not defend such an usage in Cicero. One might almost lay down as the essential difference of Old Latin as compared with the language of the golden age, the *activising* of *deponent* verbs. *Sortio*, *potio*, *amplecto*, *frustro*, *contemplo*, *intermino*, *cuncto*, are found in Plautus, and the Fragments of Livius Andronicus, Ennius, Naevius, Pacuvius, Afranius, Titinius afford many instances of active forms of verbs used only as *deponent* in later Latin.

IV. 18. 1.

“ Quae (litterae) tantum habent mysteriorum ut eas ne librariis quidem fere committamus lepidum quo excidat.”

The last three words are generally disjoined from the preceding, and *excidat* is changed to *exedar*, the conjecture of Bosius; *lepidum quo exedar* is then made to refer to the next sentences which describe the disgrace incurred by the consuls on the publication of their infamous bargain with Memmius and Domitius. It would be hard to frame words more unlikely to have been used by Cicero, or a context more inappropriate to them. Connect the disputed words closely with the preceding, and insert between *lepidum* and *quo* in the MS. the words *quid ne*. The sentence will then run: ut 'eas ne librariis quidem fere committamus, lepidum QUID NE quo excidat.' 'Lest some joke of mine should get wind anywhere' (literally, *in any direction*, motion being implied in the verb *excidat*). The copyist saw that *lepidum* was followed by a word beginning with *qu*, perhaps raised his eyes for a moment, and on resuming his task went on at the wrong one of the two closely resembling words *quid* and *quo*. This is perhaps the error oftenest made by the ancient copyists, except the omission of one of two similar letter or syllables standing in juxtaposition. For the meaning of *excidat* cf. de Or. I. 94, *libello qui me imprudente et invito excidit, et pervenit in manus hominum*.

VI. 1. 2.

"Quod meam βαθύτητα in Appio tibi libertatem (*liberalitatem* Med., *correctum in Victoriana*) etiam in Bruto probo vehementer gaudeo."

It seems to me that *in* should be omitted before *Appio*. The sentence would then mean 'I am very glad to find that Appius gives me credit for my self-restraint, and that I have your approval of my independence even in the case of your friend Brutus.' For he goes on to say, "αὐτὸν ἔτι καὶ ὑπομνημάτων litteras miserat Sed modo succenset, modo gratias agit; nihil enim a me fit cum ulla illius contumelia Sin Appius, ut Bruti litterae quas ad te misit significabant, gratias nobis agit, non moleste fero."

Cicero would hardly say that he was rejoiced to find that he had the approval of Atticus for the self-restraint and dignified courtesy with which in reversing many of the acts of Appius, he completely refrained from any token of disrespect for his predecessor, whom he might have offended with impunity, and whose administration must have been strongly condemned by the writer of the *Sex Libri de Republica*. On the other hand it is naturally satisfactory to Cicero to find that the courtesy of his bearing was recognised by Appius, even though the latter could not regard with satisfaction the rescinding of his measures by his successor. Cicero knew well that his conduct must meet the approbation of Atticus, but he congratulated himself that he now saw reason to infer from the letter of Brutus that the querulousness of Appius' letters to him was only the querulousness of the physician who sees with jealousy the changed *regimen* prescribed by his successor. Appius had employed *depletion* on the province, and he did not like to see the patient fed up (*προσανατρεφόμενην*) by his successor. "But," says Cicero, "if Appius expresses his obligation to me for refraining from any disrespect to him (*nihil enim a me fit cum ulla illius contumelia*) then I am quite satisfied." *Ac putaram secus; Appius ENIM, &c.*, is hard to understand, if the *vulg.* be retained.

VI. 1. 17.

"De statua Africani . . . ain' tu? Scipio hic Metellus proavum suum nescit censorem non fuisse? Atqui nihil habuit aliud inscriptum nisi CENS. ea statua qua ad Opis † per te posita in excelso est. In illa autem quae est ad Πολυκλέους Herculem inscriptum est COS-, quam esse eiusdem status amictus annulus imago ipsa declarat."

I may premise that I am not about to comment on the words which I have obelised. I accept the reading of I, the Venetian *Editio princeps* called *Editio Iensoniana*. It seems to have been copied from the Med., but generally to have accepted the marginal or interlinear correction of the

same. For *ad Opis per te* I has *ab Opis parte*, and perhaps we should with Orelli add *dextra* or *sinistra* before *parte*.

We have it on the authority of Macrobius, Saturn. i. 4., that in the De Rep. Cicero makes Laelius regret that there was no public statue of Scipio Nasica Serapion, the slayer of Tib. Gracchus. Now Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio, the great-grandson of Serapion, had placed in the Capitol, near the Temple of Ops, a statue of his great-grandfather, as he supposed; and accordingly he drew Atticus' attention to what he regarded as an error made by Cicero. But, argues Cicero, it was Metellus Scipio himself who made the mistake, for the statue which he had placed in the Capitol, supposing it to be a statue of his great-grandfather Serapion, was really a statue of another person, which he might have known, had he remembered that Serapion had never been a Censor.

So far all is plain; but it is evident that for the argument it is essential that Cicero should go on to prove that the statue erroneously supposed by Scipio Metellus to be the statue of his ancestor, was really the statue of a man who *had been* a Censor. Now, according to the Med., as given above, Cicero does indeed go on to state that the statue placed in the Capitol by Scipio Metellus was the statue of one who had been a Censor, for it bore the inscription CENS.; but why does he say this statue had *no other inscription but CENS.*, and why does he introduce at all the mention of the other statue near the Hercules of Polycles? The solution of the difficulty is, in my mind, this:—CENS. and COS. *should change places*. The copyist of Med. saw that the argument required that the statue supposed by Scipio Metellus to be that of his ancestor should be shown to be that of one who had been Censor, and so was in a hurry to introduce CENS., not much troubling himself about the logic analysis of the whole sentence. Copyists do not, as a rule, go beyond the first step in any process of thought. If, therefore, COS. be put in the place of CENS., and CENS. in the place of COS., the whole argument

may be thus paraphrased: "Is it possible that Scipio Metellus is not aware that his great-grandfather was never Censor? It is true, indeed, that the statue placed by him near the temple of Ops, and supposed by him to be the statue of his ancestor, had no inscription on it but COS., showing that it was the statue of a person who had been Consul. [This indeed would not have shown the statue not to have been the statue of Serapion, who was Consul.] But another statue standing near the Hercules of Polycles had the inscription CENS.; and it can be proved that it commemorates the same person as the statue placed by Metellus near the temple of Ops. That the two statues are statues of the same man is proved by the *pose*, the dress, the ring, in fine, the whole work."

Both are statues of the same man; therefore, as the statue near Polycles' Hercules had the inscription CENS., the man commemorated by the two statues must have been a Censor, but Scipio Nasica Serapion had never been a Censor; therefore Scipio Metellus has made a mistake about his own great-grand-father, and the remark put by Cicero into the mouth of Laelius has not been shown to be incorrect.

Both are, in Cicero's opinion, statues of Scipio Africanus Minor, who was not only consul, *but Censor* with Mummius in 612 (see xvi. 13. 2, *videor mihi audisse P. Africano L. Mummiio Censoribus.*)

Cicero then goes on to say that when he saw the statue of Africanus with the name of Serapion written under it, he thought it was a mistake on the part of the sculptor, but he now sees it was Metellus Scipio who made the error.

Orelli was not aware that X and Y are figments of Bosius. He is not, therefore, conscious that in introducing the readings of X and Y—COS in both places, and *item* for *autem*—he has foisted on Cicero the (in this case) stupid conjecture of the generally clever but never very scrupulous Frenchman.

Boot reads CENS. in both places, and gives *item* for *autem*. This is (1) a greater change than that which I propose,

(2) it renders otiose the statement that the first-mentioned statue had inscribed on it *nothing else but CENS.*, (3) the establishing of the identity of the person commemorated by the two statues, a point much dwelt on by Cicero, is in this case superfluous, for if the statue placed in the Capitol by Metellus Scipio had the inscription *CENS.*, the proof was already complete, that it could not be a statue of Serapion, who never was Censor.

VI. 2. 7.

"Numerabantur nummi. Noluit Scaptius. Tu, qui ais Brutum cupere aliquid perdere."

Orelli again accepts the reading of X. Boot gives 'ubi tu qui ais.' I propose '*tu quid qui ais.*' 'What have you (to say) now, you who always say that Brutus wishes to submit to a loss.'

VI. 4. 3.

"εἷς δῆπου τοῦτο δὴ περισκεψάμενος, τὰ λοιπὰ ἐξασφάλισαι."

Orelli conjectures ἐν for εἷς, Valcknaer Οἰδίπου for εἷς δῆπου. But εἷς δῆπου is surely right, for in VI. 9. 2, Cicero says, 'παραφύλαξον, si me amas, τὴν τοῦ φυρατοῦ φιλοτιμίαν αὐτότατα, where αὐτότατα means exactly the same as εἷς δῆπου here.

VI. 6. 4.

"At Caelius, non dico equidem, quod (*quid* Edd. Romana et Iensoniana) egerit, sed tamen multo minus laboro."

If NON were inserted before *quid egerit*, the ellipse of *laboro* would not be too harsh; 'non dico equidem non (sc. laboro) quid egerit, sed tamen multo minus laboro.' *Non* might have fallen out, coming so soon after another *non*.

VI. 8. 5.

"Bibulus, qui, dum unus hostis in Syria fuit, pedem non plus extulit quam domo sua."

Schütz says, "Necessario scribendum vel *quam olim domo sua*, vel *quam consul domo sua*." There is plainly an allusion to the consulship of Bibulus and Cæsar, when the former did not leave his house for eight months. But instead of *olim* or *consul* I suggest DOMI, a word which would have been very likely to fall out before *domo*. *Domi* means at Rome, as opposed to the present *militia* of Bibulus. So Ter. Ad. 3. 4. 49, *una semper militiae et domi fuimus*; so also Liv. XXVIII. 12. *in hostium terra per annos tredecim tam procul ab domo*, and, in the same chapter, *nec ab domo quidquam mittebatur*—that is, 'no supplies were sent to them from home' (from Carthage).

ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE SCIENCE OF NUMBER,
 ACCORDING TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT. By
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THERE is no part of the Philosophy of Kant more deserving of unqualified admiration than the account which that philosopher gives of the nature and foundation of the science of Mathematics. The existence of that science had, up to the time of Kant, been an insoluble puzzle. Philosophers had to account, on the one hand, for the number and variety of the truths which it embraced, its great value, and extensive application to objects of experience, and on the other, for its necessity, its dependence on principles immediately evident to the mind of every man, and the theoretical possibility of its being completely evolved from the cogitations of a solitary individual without any external aid whatever. The majority of philosophers appear to have been so much influenced by the characteristics of the latter class as to ignore those of the former. Archbishop Whately, in his Treatise on Logic, went so far as to maintain that Geometrical truths are deduced from arbitrary hypotheses by processes of pure reasoning. That such a theory could have been propounded by a writer of such high character, half a century after the publication of the "Critique of the Pure Reason," may well excite our astonishment.

At present, no one having any pretensions to a knowledge of mental science would assent to Whately's theory. The followers of Kant and his opponents—those who admit, and those who deny *a priori* elements in human knowledge, now agree in admitting that the axioms on

which Geometry is based are essentially synthetical, and must be arrived at by intuitions in space.

It has not, however, been pointed out with sufficient clearness by any writer with whom I am acquainted, except Kant, that after the definitions have been laid down, and the axioms assented to, no progress could be made by means of a train of reasoning alone. Pure reasoning is not, indeed, more intimately connected with Geometry than with any other science. The essential element in a Geometrical demonstration, as Kant has pointed out with great clearness, is the construction. By means of the construction, a number of properties of space are perceived by immediate intuition, and these are connected together by a train of reasoning so as to lead to the property required. There are, I believe, only two propositions in the first book of Euclid which are deduced from the preceding by reasoning alone. In general, the process by which Geometrical truths are arrived at is no more a train of pure reasoning, than that by which a grocer arrives at the conclusion that the parcel of tea he is selling weighs a pound.

To consider why, and in what sense, Geometry is peculiarly a *demonstrative* science would lead me too far from my present subject. The question is discussed in the most complete manner by Kant.

Geometry, then, it is allowed by 'all, rests on intuitions in space; and the only question now at issue between different schools of philosophy is, whether these intuitions are *a priori* or not.

With respect to the other department of Mathematics, no such uniformity of opinion exists. Even those philosophers who profess to follow Kant are at variance, some holding, with Mansel and Kuno Fischer, that arithmetical truths are dependent on the laws of Time; others maintaining, with Mr. Mahaffy and Mr. Monck, that they must be based on intuitions in Space.

It becomes, then, an interesting question to examine

which of these theories is correct, and to inquire what was the opinion of Kant himself on this matter.

The science of number contains two kinds of truths—those relating to the composition of particular numbers, such as $5 + 2 = 7$; $3 \times 4 = 12$, and those which are true of any numbers whatever, such as $ab = ba$; $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$.

Algebra is principally concerned with truths of the latter class; while Arithmetic, as distinguished from Algebra, is chiefly occupied with those of the former. It must be remembered, however, that without making use of some general principles, our knowledge with respect to particular numbers would be extremely limited. If no general principles were made use of, the sum of two large numbers would be practically unattainable, as it would be necessary to add each unit separately. Thus, to find the sum of 4678 and 3784 would require at least two hours, and the calculator would be almost certain to make mistakes.

Mansel appears to have overlooked the important truth stated above, and, consequently, fails altogether in accounting for the formation of judgments with respect to large numbers. He also, as it seems to me, is in error in stating that pure Arithmetic contains no demonstration.¹ His general theory that Arithmetic is dependent on intuitions in time, I believe to be correct, and I shall now endeavour to show that intuitions in space are not required to enable us to arrive at the truths belonging to either of the classes which I have mentioned, but that the whole science of number may be based on intuitions in time alone.

A number is a collection of homogeneous units.

Any series of distinct mental states capable of being separate objects of attention (for example, the sensations caused by a series of similar sounds) will supply the units; and when, by an act of the Understanding, an unity is attributed to the series, a notion of the corresponding

¹ Mansel's "*Prolegomena Logica*," p. 115.

number is obtained. In this manner, by means of a series of similar sounds, the notions of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c., would be reached.

By the application of language, an immense assistance might be given to the memory, and the readiest way of producing the series would be by the use of the calculator's voice. Thus, by *saying* one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, a notion of the number ten would be obtained just as well as by placing ten visible objects successively next each other. As a matter of fact, those who are not very practised arithmeticians obtain the sum of two numbers by successive acts of addition, each of which indicates a new homogeneous unit; thus, an inexperienced arithmetician, when adding 7 and 5, would *say* seven and one are eight, seven and two are nine, &c.; arriving finally at seven and five are twelve. No appeal to visible objects would be necessary, and the certainty produced would be just as great as if seven balls were placed beside five balls, and the whole collection then counted.

Having obtained the notions of several numbers, the next step would be to perceive that the addition of two smaller numbers would produce a larger number which could be reached otherwise by a series of homogeneous units. Thus, it could be ascertained that $2 + 1 = 3$; $2 + 2 = 4$, &c. Conversely a larger number could be analysed into a collection of smaller ones, and the general principle obtained that every number might be considered as the sum of a series of smaller numbers.

I have here made use of the word analysed, but I do not mean that such a judgment as $10 = 7 + 3$ is analytical in the Kantian sense. It results from the analysis of an intuition, but could never be reached by the analysis of a mere notion. When 7 is removed from the series of 10 homogeneous units, it is necessary to *count* to ascertain how many remain; and this would be so if 10, 7, and 3 were all given beforehand. The remark just made supplies, as it appears to me, a defect in Mansel's argu-

ment against Leibnitz and Hegel.¹ Addition repeated several times would obviously lead to multiplication, and this again to division as its converse. We have now reached the point at which the two great general laws of numerical operations present themselves. Neither of these laws has, so far as I am aware, been taken notice of by any psychological writer except Mr. Monck. This is the less to be wondered at as it is only within a comparatively recent period that their importance has been recognised by Mathematicians. The two principles to which I allude are the Commutative and Distributive Laws, which, stated algebraically, are $ab = ba$, $a(b + c + d + \&c) = ab + ac + ad + \&c$. Mr. Monck observes that the commutative law could not be reached without an intuition in space, but with this opinion I cannot agree.

We may suppose that our calculator has acquired the notions of 6, 3 and 2, and has observed that 6 may be regarded either as 3 times 2 or as 2 times 3, and hence that $3 \times 2 = 2 \times 3$. He has now only to generalise what he has observed in this instance, and this he can do as follows:—3 times 2 is a series composed of 3 sets of 2 units; and if the units which come first in each set be mentally connected together, the whole series may be contemplated as each unit of 2 repeated 3 times, or 3 taken as often as there are units in 2, or as 2 times 3. This reasoning is perfectly general, and shows that any intuition whose constitution is like that of 3 times 2 may be analysed in a similar manner. In fact, if a and b be substituted for 3 and 2 it will prove that $ab = ba$.

A particular case of the distributive law enters the above-mentioned proof of the commutative, and it is now easy to show that the distributive law is generally true, $a(b + c + d + \&c)$ by the commutative law is equal to $(b + c + d + \&c) a = a$ repeated as often as there are units in $b + c + d + \&c$, but this operation of repeating a may be regarded as made up of several operations, in the first of

¹ Prolegom. Log., p. 123.

which a is repeated b times, in the second c times, &c. Thus we obtain $ba + ca + \&c.$, which finally by another application of the commutative law is equal to $ab + ac + \&c.$

The whole of Algebra, so far as it is dependent on general principles, results from the commutative and distributive laws.

Two questions deserving of special attention remain to be considered. The first relates to the nature and laws of fractions, the second to the mode in which judgments with respect to large numbers are formed.

Mr. Mahaffy is of opinion that the existence of fractions renders untenable the theory which bases the science of number on intuitions in time alone. He seems to think that the mental representation of a fraction is derived from the intuition of a continuous quantity capable of division into equal parts, and that such a representation can be reached only in space. There is no question that this mode of representing fractions is what renders them of so much value; yet it seems to me to belong rather to the science of number as applied to quantities than to the science of pure number itself: and were it true that intuitions in space are required to give continuous quantities, the theory that the science of pure number can be deduced from intuitions in time alone would not be invalidated. It is plain that 6 being known as 3 times 2, conversely 2 is known as 6 divided by 3, or as one third of 6, and 4 being previously known as twice 2 is now known as two thirds of 6, or adopting the usual notation $4 = \frac{2}{3} \times 6$. It is easy to see that in this way fractions could be arrived at; and in reference to a number having several factors, there would be a variety of fractions having different denominators, thus :—

$$12 = \frac{4}{7} \times 21$$

$$14 = \frac{2}{3} \times 21$$

The problems of addition and subtraction would then present themselves, and it is unnecessary to spend time in

showing that the ordinary rules would readily be arrived at. There is no difficulty in seeing that in a similar manner the notion of a fraction of a fraction, or the product of two fractions and a fraction divided by a fraction, could be reached thus—

$$\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{4}{7} \times 21 = 6$$

$$\frac{\frac{1}{3} \times 18}{\frac{1}{6} \times 18} = 2 :$$

and the truth of the rules for multiplication and division could easily be seen.

If the representation of a continuous quantity capable of division into any number of equal parts were gained subsequently, it would be seen that each of these parts might be regarded as a homogeneous unit, and that any number of them might be considered as a fraction of the whole collection, and the essential condition for applying the rules of fractions to portions of a continuous quantity would be its capability of division into precisely similar parts, which could be regarded as separate objects of attention. Were it then true that the representation of a continuous quantity could be reached only in space, it would still be correct to assert that the science of number can be based on intuitions in time alone.

It would seem, indeed, that without any reference to space, the representation of a continuous quantity could readily be formed. By listening, for example, to a continued sound; and by comparing it with one of shorter duration, it would seem that we could arrive at the representations of two continuous quantities (the portions of time occupied by the sounds), one forming a part of the other, and that from thence we could reach the representation of a continuous quantity, capable of division into a number of equal parts. To assert, however, that such is the case, is more than would be warranted by the philosophy of Kant. I

hope in a subsequent part of this essay, when considering the opinions of Kant himself, to enter into a detailed examination of this question. At present I am merely anxious to show that the whole science of number, including fractions, can be based on intuitions in time alone, and that even if the representation of a continuous quantity is to be had only in space, such a representation is not to be regarded as the basis of the science of number, but merely as fulfilling the conditions which are requisite, in order that the application of the science of number should be possible.

The account which Mansel gives¹ of the mode in which our judgments with respect to large numbers is formed is so very unsatisfactory, that I have thought it well to say a few words on the subject here.

The fundamental representation of a large number differs somewhat from that of a small one in character. The latter is merely a collection of homogeneous units; the former is regarded as the sum of several numbers, of which one is a collection of units, another is formed by the repetition of a given number, another by the repetition of a still larger number, and so on. This mode of representing large numbers is not merely the result of a superior system of notation such as we possess. It is indicated by the language of every people which has made any advance in civilization, and without it the representation of a large number would practically be impossible. It is now easy to see how addition, &c. is performed. For example, to add seven hundred and fifty-three to four hundred and thirty-five

$$4 \times 100 + 7 \times 100 = (4 + 7) 100$$

by the distributive law.

In like manner $5 + 10 \times 3 \times 10 = (5 + 3) \times 10$ and $3 + 5 = 8$. Thus we obtain eleven hundred and eighty-eight. It is plain, then, that intuition is required only to furnish us with results with respect to small numbers; and to teach us

¹ Mansel's *Prolegomena Logica*, p. 117.

the general laws which are applicable to all, it is by no means necessary, as Mansel would seem to imply, that each unit of a large number must be intuited separately.

It has now, I think, been shown that the whole science of number may be based on intuitions in time alone. We have next to consider whether it cannot be independently deduced from intuitions in space. If not, why is it so much easier to see the truth of the commutative law by means of a rectangle of dots or other objects in space than in any other way? How can we account for the fact that after proving that the area of a rectangle is represented numerically by the product of the sides, we may at once deduce from the intuition of a figure in space that the square of the sum of two numbers is equal to the sum of their squares, together with twice their product and other theorems of a similar character? Does it not appear from these instances that truths relating to numbers can be deduced from intuitions in space alone without any reference to time?

It is not difficult to account for the fact that the truth of the commutative law is most easily seen by means of an intuition in space.

In the first place the collection of units to be analysed is rendered permanent, which is a great assistance to the memory, and in the second place, by means of the artificial arrangement of the units in a rectangle, each is actually seen to belong to two different sets simultaneously existing. The possibility of making such an arrangement is a consequence of space having more than one dimension. In a similar manner, by arranging dots in a rectangular parallelepiped, it could be made immediately evident that in the product of three numbers their order is indifferent, but no such immediate intuition could be had for four numbers or any larger number.

From the very fact that the dots form a number, they are capable of being objects of distinct acts of perception in time. A certain set of permanent objects can be successively apprehended in a variety of different

orders, and so the different ways in which the time series is capable of being formed can be actually realized, but the whole series remaining the same, it might have been seen, *a priori*, that this must be so, as it is not necessary actually to realise the different orders; it is sufficient to see that the arrangement of the perfectly homogeneous units may be contemplated from two different points of view; yet the assertion of the fact that they can be so contemplated is not an analytical judgment. It appears, then, that if it be assumed that the science of number depends altogether on time and its laws, and not at all on the independent laws of space, yet a set of objects in space must exemplify its truths, and can be so arranged as to exhibit the truth of the commutative law in a peculiarly striking manner.

The second question which was proposed seems more difficult of solution. The figure which shows that the square of a line is equal to the sum of the squares of its two parts, and twice the rectangle under them shows equally that the square of the sum of two numbers is equal to the sum of their squares, together with twice their product, and yet the units of the numbers are not exhibited as separate objects, nor does it seem easy to see how the mode in which the figure in space is constituted can be the result of the laws of time. That such, however, is the case can, I think, be made apparent to the student of Kant's philosophy.

Time is the primitive quantum, and all other quanta are such only in so far as they can be generated by a synthesis in time.

In space all objects are quanta, and are cogitable only through the synthesis that is the successive contemplation and conjunction of their parts. Number is the pure schema of quantity, and may be regarded either subjectively or objectively. Regarded subjectively, it is the act of *successively* intuiting a series of homogeneous units, and of combining them into a whole; regarded objectively, it is the result of such an act. In either case it includes a relation to time,

and cannot therefore be reduced to an image which is purely spatial (Kant Critique of the Pure Reason, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, p. 110). Yet an image (such as an aggregate of dots in space) considered as representing a collection of units can be cogitated only by successively intuiting the units in time, and, being always capable of being so cogitated, it must exhibit the laws of time. As exhibiting the laws of time, and as suggesting and requiring the successive intuition of its units, a collection of dots in space may be termed an image of the number (Critique, p. 109). The synthesis by which such a collection of units is cogitated differs, as Kant (p. 128) observes, from that which generates a continuous quantum in that it is interrupted. Nevertheless, by selecting a definite portion of the continuous quantum as unit, the continuous synthesis may be regarded as broken up into successive repetitions of this unit, and it is only in this way that the magnitude of the quantum can be estimated (Critique, p. 181). Number, considered subjectively, is thus the "representation of the general procedure of the imagination to present its image to the concept" (Critique, p. 109) of quantity, and is, therefore, as has been before stated, the schema of quantity. To the laws of number, then, every quantum must be subject; and if its quantity is discoverable in apprehension (Critique, p. 127), in other words, if it is extensive, numerical truths will be discoverable in it intuitively.

Having already, as I believe, shown that the whole science of number might be deduced from intuitions in time alone, I have now further shown that those facts which might lead us to conclude that it could also be based on the *independent* laws of space do not warrant such a conclusion.

It is easy to advance another step, and to assert that in every case numerical truths are the result of laws of time. How, indeed, could they be otherwise? A number, as such, cannot be cognized except by counting, and counting is an act which must take place in time, and be subject to its laws.

If it be asserted that on the theory of Sir W. Hamilton we can be conscious of as many as six objects simultaneously, it may be replied that this is undoubtedly true, if the six objects be regarded as producing a single sensation which indicates that there are six (just as a perception of sight may indicate that the visible object is rough to the touch), but that it is not true that the representation of six, as six, can be originally gained by a single glance without counting the units separately.

It may still be said that we must be conscious at least of two as two simultaneously, for that otherwise all comparison would be impossible. Mr. Mill has, I think, disposed of this argument. Comparison is probably nothing more than a rapid change from one state of consciousness to another. When the nature of the change is stated we are said to compare the two representations. For example, when we compare two sounds, and say one is louder than the other, we mean that in passing from one sensation to the other a certain change would take place, and similarly in other cases. Without however entering into the merits of the controversy between Hamilton and Stewart, this at least may be regarded as certain, that in any case where more than one object is present, we *can* attend to each separately and successively, and that it is because we can do this that we judge that a *number* of objects is present.

There are laws of space which may be said to be independent of time, such as, space has three dimensions; two points determine a right line, &c.; though even these contain some reference to time, but it is not on such laws that the numerical properties of space depend.

It remains only to inquire what was the opinion of Kant himself. Mr. Mahaffy, who probably knows more of Kant than any other English author, maintains that Kant bases arithmetic not on time but on space (Fischer on Kant's Critick, translated by J. P. Mahaffy, with notes, &c., ps. xxix, 15, 95).

In his recent work (*The Critical Philosophy for English Readers*) Mr. Mahaffy adheres to the same opinion, and seems to think that his remarks in the notes to Fischer have put an end to all controversy on the subject. In this opinion I am unable to coincide, and in refuting Mr. Mahaffy, which I hope to be able to do, I shall gladly avail myself of the assistance afforded by his notes to Fischer on Kant.

The quotations which I shall make from Kant himself are taken from Mr. Meiklejohn's translation of the *Critique of the Pure Reason*.

Mr. Mahaffy's first reference to Kant's theory of the nature of Arithmetical truths is in p. xxix of the Introduction to Fischer's Commentary, from which I quote the following:—

"In basing arithmetic on synthetical axioms, Kant seems not to have considered these axioms to extend to any numbers beyond the range of ordinary intuition. If, as Sir William Hamilton thinks, we can intuit six objects simultaneously, then the original axioms will be limited to the addition and subtraction of units within this number. But within the sum, whatever it may be, which can be intuited at once, the adding and subtracting of numbers is a process directly intuitive, and we should be careful how we speak of the act of adding or the result produced, as if there were any mediate inference or manipulation of the units during which they did not each and all remain, actually before us. * * * * * When we come to higher numbers, the association school seems to think our principle is at fault, for that we add and subtract large numbers with equal certainty is obvious, and surely we can never have any evidence on the subject from direct intuition. Mr. Mansel, who bases arithmetic on time, says that we must have been conscious of even these large numbers at some time or other in some succession of thoughts, and that this is sufficient. Sufficient it certainly would be, but its truth is very doubtful. Kant appears

more correct in deducing arithmetic from space, and on this view we may hold that our knowledge of all the higher numbers and the processes we perform with them, are mere *cogitationes caecae sive symbolicae*."

The theory here put forward by Mr. Mahaffy as that of Kant seems to be that, by looking at a collection of objects, we gain instantaneously a representation of the corresponding number, and that when in this way a knowledge of two numbers has been obtained, by putting the two collections together, and looking at the result, we instantaneously arrive at a knowledge of the number which is the sum of the two former, but that this mode of procedure is applied only to numbers whose sum is not greater than six, and that beyond this point our knowledge with respect to numbers is merely a *cogitatio caeca sive symbolica*. I am not at present concerned with the absolute truth or falsehood of this theory, but merely with the question as to whether it was held by Kant.

It is an unfortunate circumstance for Mr. Mahaffy, that the example selected by Kant in the first passage, where he speaks of the mode of arriving at arithmetical truths, introduces so large a number as twelve, which, on Mr. Mahaffy's principles, is beyond the reach of anything but a *cogitatio caeca sive symbolica*. However, as the limit of direct intuition is taken from Hamilton, not Kant, we can not lay very great stress on this point.

Let us now examine the mode in which Kant describes the origin of the judgment $7 + 5 = 12$ (Critique, p. 10). "I first take the number 7," says Kant, "and, for the conception of 5, calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up the number 5, *gradually*, now, by means of the material image, my hand, to the number 7, and by this process I *at length* see the number 12 arise. Arithmetical propositions are, therefore, always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying large numbers."

Kant, then, plainly held that each unit must be added separately, and that the same process might be applied to large numbers as to small. Thus, if we desired to find the sum of 25 and 27, we might do so by direct counting, by saying 25 and 1 are 26, 25 and 2 are 27, 25 and 3 are 28, &c. Theoretically, this method is always applicable, though never used in practice, except for small numbers; but on Mr. Mahaffy's principles it is absolutely and altogether impossible beyond a certain limit. We are not to suppose that Kant fell into Mansel's error in reference to large numbers any more than into Mr. Mahaffy's. In p. 63 he says: "Thus our enumeration—and this is more observable in large numbers—is a synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according to a common basis of unity—for example the decade."

The more closely we consider the first passage quoted from Kant the more we find it opposed to Mr. Mahaffy's theory. Kant is arguing against the possibility of basing Arithmetic on the mere analysis of concepts, and says that we must have recourse to an intuition. He does not say an intuition in space, and he seems to consider that external objects are required only for the purpose of indicating a definite number of distinct units. We may have recourse, he says, to five points, or our five fingers, and by gradually adding the units so indicated, at length we see the number 12 arise. It does not by any means appear that we must take in the whole collection of objects corresponding to the sum at one simultaneous glance. In order to do this, the objects added ought to be similar, and capable of being compactly arranged in space. There are no objects similar to my five fingers under my control except the five fingers of my other hand, and in the example considered by Kant five has to be added to *seven*, besides which, Kant says five points will do as well. Moreover—and this is decisive against Mr. Mahaffy—Kant does not think that there need be any intuition corresponding to 7 at all. "We must," says Kant, "go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse

to an intuition which corresponds to *one* of the two." If there is no intuition of 7 there can be none of 12. The theory of Kant is confirmed by the ordinary practice of inexperienced arithmeticians. Such a person, if desirous of knowing the sum of 7 and 5, would not count one, two, three, four, &c., up to seven, but would say at once seven and one are eight, seven and two are nine, &c., and finally, seven and five are twelve. The process indicated by Kant is precisely similar, and differs only in this, that the separate units of one number are indicated by objects in space instead of by sounds.

If Mr. Mahaffy's theory were correct, a person who forgot anything in his addition table would have to perform a complicated experiment requiring extraordinary rapidity and acuteness of vision in order to obtain the required information, except, indeed, he had recourse to a *cogitatio caeca sive symbolica*. I would not wish to cast any imputation on Mr. Mahaffy's character, yet I fear that he, as well as Mr. Mill, exhibits unmistakeable symptoms of having been "debauched" by philosophy. Were I criticizing Mr. Mahaffy's theory in itself, and not merely considering whether he is correct in attributing it to Kant, it would be necessary to take notice of the remarks on Mansel: for here Mr. Mahaffy seems to admit that intuitions in time, if we only could get them, would be sufficient for everything.

In the note to p. 15 of Fischer's Commentary, Mr. Mahaffy mentions the passages in Kant on which he relies. The first is that in p. 10 of the Critique, which I have already considered at length. Mr. Mahaffy then observes, that in the transcendental exposition of time Kant makes no mention of arithmetic, and concludes that it must be founded on space. This argument does not appear to be worth much, for arithmetic is not mentioned in the transcendental exposition of space any more than in that of time. Kant mentions in each case only *general* self-evident propositions, and he thought, as appears from the Critique, p. 124, that

there are no such propositions relating to numbers. He plainly regarded Geometry as the most important branch of Mathematics, and the one which most readily exhibited the truth of his philosophical principles. His account of the method of Algebra (pp. 437, 447) is extremely brief, compared with his account of that of Geometry. In p. 442, he almost identifies Geometry with Mathematics in general.

It is not surprising that the importance of the commutative and distributive laws was not noticed by Kant. He naturally took for granted that the fundamental principles of Mathematics were those recognised by the professed masters of the science. When Mansel and Mr. Mill, contemporaries of Professor Boole, with the Calculus of Operations an actually existing science, make no mention of the commutative and distributive laws, can we wonder that Kant did not anticipate the discoveries of posterity?

Mr. Mahaffy next refers to pp. 177 and 180 of the Critique.

The passage in p. 177 is as follows: "With the same ease can it be demonstrated that the possibility of things as quantities, and consequently the objective reality of the category of quantity, can be grounded only in external intuition, and that by its means alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal sense." In this passage there is a mistranslation. The latter part should be, "and by its means alone hereafter applied also to the internal sense."

There is not a word about "the notion of quantity" in the original. It is the possibility of *things* as quantities that Kant is considering, and it is the *objective reality* of the category of quantity which cannot be applied to the internal sense, except by means of external intuition. The meaning of the passage will be better understood if it be taken in connexion with what goes before. In p. 176, Kant observes "that to understand the possibility of things according to the categories, and thus to demonstrate the objective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions but external intuitions." He then goes on to show the truth of this re-

mark in the case of several categories, and among them that of quantity. The whole discussion is intimately connected with Kant's refutation of Idealism, and rests on the general principle that neither time itself, regarded as the permanent substratum of events nor its objective reality as a quantum, nor any determination of time, can be cogitated without external intuition. "We cannot," says Kant, p. 94, "cogitate time unless, in drawing a straight line (which is to serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, *whereby we determine successively* the internal sense, and thus attend also to the succession of this determination. Motion, as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we make abstraction of space, and attend merely to the act by which we determine the internal sense according to its form, is that which produces the conception of succession." Time, being merely the form of the internal sense, and having in itself no content, cannot be in itself an object of perception, nor be cogitated except by the apprehension of something in time. A right line being perfectly simple, homogeneous, and continuous, and being, moreover, an *a priori* representation made up of parts whose synthesis, starting from a given point, is possible continuously in only one way, is the most perfect image of time which is possible, and, therefore, in order to cogitate time, we generate a right line in time, or, in other words, successively apprehend or contemplate its parts. This successive contemplation of the parts of space is what Kant means by motion as an act of the subject. In the note, p. 95, he observes, that it belongs not only to geometry but even to transcendental philosophy. It is on this account that geometry must (as we have already seen at length) be in accordance with the laws of time.

In order to ascertain whether the laws of quantity rest ultimately on space or time, we must ask what is the condition which an object must fulfil in order to be a quan-

tum. It is not difficult to determine the answer which Kant would give to this question. In p. 181 he says, "The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is placed in it. But this how many times is based on successive repetition; consequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous therein." In p. 128 we are told that "when the synthesis of the manifold of a phenomenon is interrupted, there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not properly a phenomenon as a quantity." From these two passages we may collect that, in order to be a quantum, an object must be capable of being generated by a continuous synthesis in time. This is the only condition required; there is no reference to space.

This result is confirmed by the proof of the Anticipations of Perception. Mr. Mahaffy observes, in the note p. 96 of Fischer's Commentary, that we consider reality as a quantum "by regarding it as the result of a gradual increase of degrees of sensation generated in successive moments of time from 0 upwards." The possibility then of generating a phenomenon by means of a continuous synthesis in time renders it a quantum without any reference to space. In p. 134 Kant informs us that the two Mathematical Principles of the Understanding "instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently numerical quantities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might compose and give *a priori*, that is construct the degree of our sensations of the sun light." Were the science of quantity dependent on space, the laws of quantity could not be applied to the intensity of a sensation which does not occupy space. Objects in space must indeed exhibit the laws of quantity, but such objects are

not merely quanta, they are quanta of a particular kind, and as such are subject to laws peculiarly spatial, such as "two points determine a right line." What has been said enables us to see the exact state of the case in reference to fractions. A fraction, as a portion of a permanent quantum, cannot be cogitated without an original reference to space; nevertheless the laws of such a quantum are laws not of space but of time; and when by means of an intuition in space time has been cogitated as an objective reality, we recognise time itself as the primitive quantum, and fractions can be applied to definite portions of time, marked out by the help of external intuitions, and not only to portions of time, but to all objects capable of being generated by a synthesis in time.

The only passage in Kant referred to by Mr. Mahaffy in the note to pp. 15, 16, which I have not considered, is that in p. 180. I am surprised that Mr. Mahaffy should lay any stress on this passage. If his mode of arguing from it were valid, it would prove that the whole science of Mathematics, according to Kant, rests merely on the evidence of the senses, and is not *a priori* at all.

If it be true that children learn arithmetic through the intuition of space, it is in no way opposed to the theory which I have been endeavouring to establish; but I am very sure that arithmetic never was learned by means of lightning glances as far as 6, and beyond that number by a *cogitatio caeca sive symbolica*.

In the note to p. 95 of Fischer's Commentary, Mr. Mahaffy endeavours to account for what he calls the mistake of Mr. Mansel and Dr. Fischer. I have already, in a former part of this essay, considered fully the passages in Kant on number as the schema of quantity, and have adopted Mr. Mahaffy's definition of number with a slight alteration. I have only to add here, that Kant's implied statement that number, as the pure schema of quantity, cannot be reduced to any image, is so far from being favourable to Mr. Mahaffy, that it shows, perhaps, more clearly than any other

passage, the absolute impossibility, in Kant's opinion, of cogitating number as number, except by a *successive* apprehension and synthesis of its units in *time*.

Mr. Mahaffy seems to think that the apprehension of a set of objects as a number need not occupy time, and that when it does occupy time there is something peculiar in the mode of apprehension. There is no passage in Kant which I can find supporting this opinion. There is, indeed, one in p. 33, which as rendered by Mr. Meiklejohn, is opposed to my theory. The following is the passage to which I refer: "Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge from which, *a priori*, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations which form the foundation of pure mathematics." I find, on referring to the original, that his passage has been mistranslated, which is, perhaps, the reason why it has not been quoted by Mr. Mahaffy. The literal translation is as follows:

"Time and space are, therefore, two sources of cognition from which, *a priori*, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn; as especially pure Mathematic, in respect of the cognitions of space, and its relations, gives a brilliant example."

Kant plainly regarded geometry as the portion of Mathematical science, which exhibited most easily and strikingly the truth of his philosophical system. That he did not confine Mathematics to space and its relations is plain from what has been said already, and is explicitly stated in p. 441, "To determine, *a priori*, an intuition in space (its figure), to *divide time into periods*, or merely to cognize the quantity of an intuition in space and time, and to determine it by number, all this is an operation of reason by means of the construction of conceptions, and is called mathematical."

The whole theory of Kant, in reference to the foundation of the science of quantity, may, I believe, be thus summed up.

It is only in external intuition that we learn the objective reality of things as quanta; through it only can we be assured of the objective reality of time itself as the permanent substratum of events, or cogitate time in general as an objective quantum, and definite portions of time as definite quanta; but if we consider why quantity is attributed to certain objects, we find it is because they are capable of being generated by a synthesis in time, and that through such a synthesis only can they be cogitated as quanta. Thus considered logically, as Cousin would say, time is the primitive quantum, and its laws must be binding on all quanta. Number is altogether incogitable as number, except by the successive apprehension and synthesis of its units in space. It is the pure schema of quantity, for the concept of quantity cannot be explained except by saying it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is placed in it. Numerical truths are based on intuitions in time, and must be exhibited by every collection of objects capable of being regarded as distinct, as well as by all quanta whose quantity is discoverable in apprehension. They are valid in reference to all quanta without exception.

In conclusion, I have only to add, that Kant's remarks, pp. 437, 447, on the method of Algebra, and Mr. Mahaffy's observations on them (note, p. 279, Fischer's Commentary), are most valuable, and tend to confirm the theory put forward in this essay.

By using letters to indicate what we regard as simple quanta, we can by means of the signs $+$ $-$ &c., express symbolically the mode in which complex quanta may be constructed in time. By applying operations according to laws, already discovered by analysing intuitions in time, we discover the modes in which new quanta may be generated, and are able to prove that the same quantum may be generated in different ways. Results far too complicated to be discoverable by direct intuition may thus be reached, and, as the whole process is kept steadily before us, and

submitted to ocular inspection by means of the symbols, we are secured from error in our deductions. The absolute universality of laws of time, as binding on all phenomena whatever, enables us to discover results, as Mr. Mill has observed, by direct intuition of the symbols themselves. Thus we ascertain how often a particular term occurs in a result by direct counting. By the power which we have of regarding a quantum as simple or complex at will, and of expressing this by the symbols used, we are enabled to concentrate our attention on some particular mode of generating a complex quantum, and to show that it leads to the same result as some other mode.

It is worthy of remark, as confirming to some extent the theory put forward in this essay, that in Algebra, the science of Quantity, there are no signs indicating operations or results of a purely spatial character. If the science of Quantity were altogether dependent on space this would be remarkable. It does not result from any inherent impossibility of expressing spatial relations symbolically, for, as is well known, this has been done in the Quaternion system of Sir W. R. Hamilton, where $a + b$ means not the sum of two quanta, but the diagonal of the parallelogram whose sides are a and b .

TACITUS AND VIRGIL. By THOMAS J. B. BRADY, A. M.,
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THE commentators on Tacitus and Virgil have noticed several passages in which the historian has evidently availed himself of the phraseology and thoughts of Virgil, but it does not seem to have occurred to any one to collect the parallel expressions, and present them at one view to the reader. The passages quoted in the present paper, though not forming an exhaustive list, nevertheless show that these echoes of Virgil are a marked and interesting feature in the writings of Tacitus, and prove an intimate acquaintance with, and appreciation of, the poet by the historian. The enthusiastic manner in which Virgil is spoken of in the *Dialogus de Oratoribus* would (if this work be really one of the writings of Tacitus) prepare us to find traces of the influence of the poet on the mind of the historian (*Dial. de Oratoribus*, chaps. 12, 13, and 20). Although the interest attaching to these parallelisms is chiefly literary, yet it would appear that they sometimes possess a critical value. In the case of disputed readings, if it be found that one reading recalls a Virgilian expression, it may fairly be preferred, even if less supported by MS. authority than others. Two passages may be here referred to. In *Annals*, XIII. 55, where the Medicean MS. has the corrupt reading "*quotam partem campi iacere*," the emendation of Lipsius (adopted by Orelli, Halm, and others), "*quo tantam partem campi iacere?*" appears greatly supported by Virgil, *Georgics*, III. 343, "*tantum campi iacet*." In the *Histories*, II. 21, "*nox parandis operibus assumpta*," the MS. is well supported against the emendation "*absumpta*" by the Virgilian parallel, *Aen.*

VIII. 411, "noctem addens operi." The meaning is, "night *also* was employed in preparing the war-engines." As the present remarks are intended rather to draw attention to the subject than to give it a complete discussion, I subjoin the passages, hoping that the list will be increased by the observation of students of Virgil and Tacitus.

<i>Agricola</i> , 29. Quibus cruda ac viridis senectus.	<i>Aeneid</i> , VI. 304. Cruda deo viridisque senectus.
<i>Agricola</i> , 37. Et aliquando etiam victis ira virtusque.	<i>Aeneid</i> , II. 367. Quondam etiam victis redit in prae-cordia virtus.
<i>Germania</i> , 35. Hactenus in occidentem Germaniam novimus, in septemtrionem ingenti flexu redit.	<i>Georgics</i> , III. 351. Quaque redit medium Rhodope por-recta sub axem.
<i>Histories</i> , I. 52. Panderet modo sinum et venienti fortunae occurrerit.	<i>Aeneid</i> , VIII. 112. Pandentemque sinus et tota veste vo-cantem . . . victos.
<i>Histories</i> , II. 20. Bracas barbarum tegmen indutus.	<i>Aeneid</i> , XI. 111. Pictus acu tunicas et barbara tegmina crurum.
<i>Histories</i> , II. 21. Nox parandis operibus assumpta (al. assumpta).	<i>Aeneid</i> , VIII. 41. Noctem addens operi.
<i>Histories</i> , II. 41. A paucioribus Othonianis quominus in vallum impingerentur Italicae legionis virtute deterriti.	<i>Aeneid</i> , V. 805. Exanimata sequens impingeret agmina muris.
<i>Histories</i> , II. 86. (P. Antonius) seditionibus potens.	<i>Aeneid</i> , XI. 340. (Drances) seditione potens.
<i>Histories</i> , II. 88. Tergis ferarum et ingentibus telis horrentes.	<i>Aeneid</i> , V. 37. Horridus in iaculis et pelle Libystidis ursae.
<i>Histories</i> , III. 74. Aramque posuit casus suos in mar-more expressam.	<i>Bucolics</i> , III. 106. Inscripti nomina regum flores.

<i>Histories</i> , III. 81. Incendio Capitolii dirempta belli com- mercia.	}	<i>Aeneid</i> , X. 531. Belli commercia Turnus sustulit.
<i>Annales</i> , XIV. 33. Belli commercium.		
<i>Histories</i> , IV. 53. Super caespitem redditis extis.		<i>Georgics</i> , II. 194. Lancibus et pandis fumantia reddimus exta.
<i>Annales</i> , XI. 1. Didita per provincias fama.		<i>Aeneid</i> , VIII. 131. Tua terris didita fama.
<i>Annales</i> , XII. 58. Romanum Troia demissum.		<i>Aeneid</i> , I. 288. Iulius a magno demissum nomen Iulo. cf. Hor. Sat. 25, 63.
<i>Annales</i> , XII. 12. Non comminus Mesopotamian petivit.		<i>Georgics</i> , I. 104. Iacto qui semine comminus arva Inse- quitur; where Servius explains com- minus by "at once" vid. Orell Tac. l.c.
<i>Annales</i> , XII. 20. Ita maioribus placitum, quanta per- vicacia in hostem, tanta beneficentia adversus supplices utendum.		<i>Aeneid</i> , VI. 854. Parcere subiectis et debellare super- bos.
<i>Annales</i> , XII. 63. Vis piscium immensa Pontum erum- pens.		<i>Aeneid</i> , I. 580. Erumpere nubem ardebant.
<i>Annales</i> , XIII. 55. Quo tantam partem campi iacere? al quotam.		<i>Georgics</i> , III. 343. Tantum campi iacet.
<i>Annales</i> , XV. 5. Vis locustarum ambederat quidquid herbidum.	}	<i>Aeneid</i> , III. 257. Ambesas . . . mensas. <i>Aeneid</i> , V. 752. Ambesa robora.
<i>Annales</i> , XV. 14. Quid de Armenia cernerent (= de- cernerent.)		<i>Aeneid</i> , XII. 709. Cernere ferro.
<i>Annales</i> , XV. 72. Nam et ipse (Nymphidius) pars Ro- manarum cladum erit.		<i>Aeneid</i> , II. 6. Quorum pars magna fui.

I append a few reminiscences of Horace which I have noticed in Tacitus.

Agricola, 46.

Nam multos veterum sicut inglorios oblivio obruit, &c.

Hor. Odes, IV. 9, 25.

Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona, &c.

Annales, XV. 37.

Ex illo contaminatorum grege.

Hor. Odes, I. 37, 9.

Contaminato cum grege.

Histories, I. 29.

Fatigabat deos.

Hor. Odes, I. 2, 26.

Prece qua fatigent Vestam.

Histories, II. 71.

Infamibus Vaticani locis.

Hor. Odes, I. 3, 20.

Infames scopulos.

Histories, IV. 47.

Documenta fortunæ summaque et
ma miscentis.

Hor. Odes, I. 34, 12.

Ima summis mutare.

Histories, I. 82.

Lymphatis animis.

Hor. Odes, I. 37, 14.

Mentemque lymphatam Mareotico.

NOTES. By J. P. MAHAFFY, A.M., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, and Professor of Ancient History.

ARISTOPHANES, 'Ιππῆς, vv. 258-65.

ἐν δίκη γ', ἐπεὶ τὰ κοινὰ πρὶν λαχεῖν κατεσθείεις,
 κάποσνκάζεις πιέζων τοὺς ὑπευθύνους, σκοπῶν
 ὅστις αὐτῶν ὥμός ἐστιν ἢ πέπων, ἢ μὴ πέπων·
 κῆν τιν' αὐτῶν γνῶς ἀπράγμον' ὄντα καὶ κεχηνότα,
 καταγαγὼν ἐκ Χερρονήσου διαβαλὼν ἡγκύρισας,
 εἴτ', ἀποστρέψας τὸν ὦμον, αὐτὸν ἐνεκολήβασας,
 καὶ σκοπεῖς γε, τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν
 πλούσιος, καὶ μὴ πόνηρος, καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα,

THIS passage has greatly troubled the commentators. In the first place, the last lines, καὶ σκοπεῖς—πράγματα, are certainly no proper conclusion to the passage, and are, therefore, against the authority of all the MSS., inserted after v. 260, where the repetition of σκοπεῖς γε, immediately after σκοπῶν, makes them very awkward. But, in the second place, almost every word in vv. 262-3 gives rise to doubts and difficulties. Why should Cleon's prey be brought from the Chersonese? What does διαβαλὼν mean? and shall we read διαλαβὼν, making it and ἡγκυρίσας wrestling metaphors? What is meant by turning away the shoulder, and how can ἐνεκολήβασας, of which the meaning seems to be *to swallow*, be reconciled with any process in wrestling? These latter difficulties are, in my opinion, all produced by the false assumption of some of the scholiasts, that Aristophanes jumped from the metaphor of pulling figs into that of wrestling. The passage is far simpler without this assumption, and does not require its words to be tortured. We only require to accentuate ὦμόν (v. 263)

instead of ὤμον, and to repudiate the unwarranted transposition of the last verses (264-5) into the middle of the metaphor, where they dislocate well-connected lines.

From this point of view, κεχηνότα refers, most aptly, to the gaping of the overripe fruit. καταγαγὼν ἐκ Χερρονήσου means 'drawing him down from Chersonesus' (where he had, probably, gone on private business) as from a high branch of the tree. εἰς Αἴμνον πλεῖν was a proverb for men evading a legal summons on pleas of private business. I suppose the cleruchies in the Chersonese afforded similar causes of absence. διαβαλὼν ἀγκύρισας is difficult, but not the latter word, which points to the ἀγκύρισμα, or fig hook, as Hesychius says. The words therefore mean, 'having hooked him by calumny.' Most later editors have διαλαβὼν and ἠγκύρισας, to which I object, as it introduces two changes in the text unnecessarily, and the former merely to support a false theory of explanation.

Ἀποστρέψας τὸν ὤμόν, is not, as the commentators strangely believe, 'turning away his shoulder,' or 'your own shoulder,' either of which operations is unknown in wrestling, and both equally absurd; but it is '*turning aside the unripe fig*,' so as not to pull it with the ripe one. Figs often grow in pairs on the tree, but never I think in large clusters. I have never seen more than three together. αὐτὸν ἐνεκολήβασας, 'you gulp down the ripe one.' There is no other proper meaning for ἐγκοληβάζω than this, given by Hesychius, and it perfectly accords with the sense. The *retrospective* sense given to αὐτὸν, referring it to the ripe fig, and not the raw, will offend no scholar acquainted with the use of the pronoun in Aristophanes, *ex gr.* Σφήκες, 239:—

τῆς ἀρτοπώλιδος λαθόντ' ἐκλέψαμεν τὸν ὄλμον
καὶ θ' ἤψαμεν τοῦ κορκόρου, κατασχίσαντες αὐτὸν (*sc.* τὸν ὄλμον).

The last two lines are, I think, in their right place. After describing, under the metaphor of the gathering of figs, Cleon's treatment of the ὑπέυθυνοι, who were by far

the most obvious subjects for his extortion, the chorus adds: 'You keep a look out too, as to who is rich and silly among the citizens' *generally*, as opposed to the special class just noted. But before they conclude the sentence Cleon interrupts them, and so they end with an unwilling aposiopesis, to which, however, every hearer could supply the remainder.

I do not think that this analysis leaves any difficulty unsolved. I may add that the Scholiasts, as well as Hesychius, have an inkling of this rendering of the whole passage, and after accommodating each word to the wrestling metaphor, add its meaning in relation to figs. But both they and all the modern commentators have bound themselves slavishly to the former interpretation. I submit that my rendering of the words ἀποστρέψας—ἐνεκολήβασεν, as compared with their absurdities about people's shoulders when wrestling, is almost decisive. Suidas is quoted (though I cannot find the passage in Bernhardt's Edition) as translating the last word ἐπὶ κόλῳ βαίνειν. I hardly think any one will accept this explanation as more than a random guess, suggested by a false view of this very passage.

EURIPIDES, *Medea*, 68.

πίεσσους προσελθὼν ἔνθα δὴ παλαίτατοι
θάσσουσι.

This line has been universally understood by commentators to mean, 'going to the place for playing draughts, where the elders sit'—a very extraordinary version if we consider the manners of the Greeks. That old Greek gentlemen should sit and play draughts in public must have been thought highly unseemly. Pindar indeed allows the happy departed in the islands of the blest to indulge in them, and Plato somewhere in his *Laws* permits them as a recreation for old age; but there is nothing else more definite to support this translation, in itself strange enough. The real

meaning will appear from the following considerations :—
 (1) It was the habit of elders, from Homeric times downward, to sit on a circle of smooth stones, the primitive judgment-seats of the ἀγόρα. I need not quote passages in support of so well-known a fact. (2) A Fragment of Cratinus ('Αρχ. fr.: 4) says :

ἔνθα Διὸς μεγάλου θώκοι, πέσσοι τε καλοῦνται,

and this proves that a certain set of stone seats at Athens were called πέσσοι. But in this line I think we should construe Διὸς μεγάλου with both substantives ; for (3) under the expression Διὸς ψῆφος, Suidas explains that this was the name of a certain place at Athens, where Zeus was said to have decided a dispute between Poseidon and Athene by his vote. I conceive the large smooth stones in the 'sacred circle' to have suggested by their shape huge voting pebbles as well as huge draughtsmen, and so 'Jove's voting pebbles' was applied to these stones, just as in Ireland a gap in a mountain is called 'the devil's punchbowl,' or a huge round rock a 'giant's marble.' (4) It is certain that in later Greek πέσσοι sometimes meant a large stone, as well as a pebble for playing draughts. Strabo uses it for the square base of a pillar in large buildings. The line then in question clearly means : 'Going to the πέσσοι, or smooth stone seats, where the elders are in the habit of sitting.'

Mr. Tyrrell observed that in a line corresponding to this in the *Christus Patiens* (which is a cento from plays of Euripides), the reading is θώκου instead of πέσσου—the rest of the line being exactly the same—which clearly shows the opinion of the author, or the tradition of his day, to have been in agreement with the translation I have suggested.

TACITUS, ANNAL. XI. 29.

The historian is speaking of the plans of Callistus, Narcissus, and Pallas, who, he says :—

‘Agitavere, num Messalinam secretis minis depellerent amore Sili, cuncta alia dissimulantes. Dein metu, ne ad peritiam ultro traherentur, desistunt Pallas per ignaviam, Callistus prioris quoque regiae peritus; . . . (marks of omission) perstitit Narcissus, *ut solum id immutans*, ne quo sermone praesciam criminis et accusatoris faceret.’

The italicised words are evidently not sound. Halm suggests *set solum*, Nipperdey (with his usual daring) *consilium dissimulans*. Orelli simply omits the *ut*; Heinsius and Haase, *ut solum id imputans*, which is Tacitean, but far-fetched. Gronovius had formerly suggested *at solum*, which is close to the MSS., but gives a bad sense, as the *whole plan* of Narcissus was changed. The MSS. quoted by Orelli read (M) *ut solum*, as above printed, and (G) *et solum*, in which the *et* is otiose.

It appears, then, that there is still place for an emendation which will carry conviction. Strangely enough, the most obvious one has never been suggested, viz.: ‘perstitit Narcissus, *UT SOLUS* id immutans,’ &c. This emendation only changes one letter of the best MS., a letter often expressed by abbreviation, and gives an adequate sense. The three powerful freedmen, when in combination, had proposed to threaten Messalina secretly with their enmity, should she not abandon Silius. Their conjoint power was such, that they were not afraid to let her know their sentiments. But when two of them would not venture into action, from the reasons assigned, and Narcissus was left alone, he persisted in his accusation, making this alteration, *as he was now single-handed (ut solus)*, namely, that Messalina should be given no previous hint of what the charge against her would be, or who was her accuser. This precaution was necessary, as he was not strong enough

to resist her if she had discovered his plan. This use of *ut* is peculiarly Tacitean, and will not require citations to support it. If my view of the argument be correct, the expression *secretis minis* in the preceding sentence will mean not 'threats reaching Messalina,' of which she could not discover the authors, but merely '*private* threats,' that is, not made known to the public. So *secreta imperii*, &c.

As to the substitution of *s* for *m* in my emendation, it should be added that in the uncial character they are so similar as to be easily confused, viz. S = ς and M = ∞ .

NOTE ON A PASSAGE IN THE PROTAGORAS. By GEORGE
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COMMENTATORS have found a difficulty in a passage in the Protagoras, where there seems to me to be none. The following is the passage to which I refer:—Οὐκοῦν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ πάλιν, πονηρὰ δὲ αὐτὰ πῇ φατε εἶναι; πότερον ὅτι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδύ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλὰ παρασκευάζει; ἢ κὰν εἰ τι τούτων εἰς τὸ ὕστερον μηδὲν παρασκευάζει, χαίρειν δὲ μόνον ποιεῖ, ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν, ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὀπηοῦν; *Protagoras*, ch. xxxvi. (354, C. D.). In establishing the thesis that virtue consists in knowledge, Socrates considers the case of those who are spoken of as "overcome by pleasures," who might be thought to err, not through ignorance, but for want of power to resist evil temptation. But in the case of such he contends that ignorance is the real cause of error. They pursue pleasure, thinking it to be a good, and not seeing that it is evil on account of its disastrous consequences. In what respect, he asks, are sensual enjoyments evil? Is it because they produce pleasure at the moment, or because they occasion disease and poverty, and other evil results afterwards; or, he goes on to say, would it be maintained that if they led to no such evil results, but only made a man feel enjoyment, they would still be evil, merely because they made a man feel enjoyment even in any degree (ὅτι μαθόντα χαίρειν ποιεῖ καὶ ὀπηοῦν)? It is the word *μαθόντα* here which has perplexed commentators. Stallbaum thinks that *παθόντα* must be the true reading, and, taking *ὀπηοῦν* with *παθόντα*, thus explains the passage "quia faciunt, ut quis quomodocunque affectus gaudeat,"

i. e. "quia faciunt, ut qui gaudeat, is afficiatur sensibus quibuslibet, etiam turpibus et parum honestis." As to this interpretation of the words, few, I think, would concur in Stallbaum's complacent remark "hoc modo argumentationem deinceps optime procedere." Ast explains the common reading μαθόντα, "quod scientem (h. e. γιγνώσκοντα, ὅτι πονηρὸν ἐστὶ τὸ χαίρειν, et tamen iis se dedentem) afficiunt voluptate." This view of the meaning of μαθόντα seems to me most unnatural. Mr. Jowett translates the passage, "would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they gave the consciousness of pleasure," thus understanding μαθόντα χαίρειν to mean "to have the consciousness of pleasure," a sense which I think the words could not yield.

The fact is, that whether we read μαθόντα or παθόντα, if we suppose that the participle agrees with the subject of χαίρειν, the word merely encumbers the clause; but to me it seems perfectly clear, that the participle agrees, not with the subject of χαίρειν, but with that of ποιεῖ, and that the words ὅτι μαθόντα are to be taken together, the phrase being an instance in the plural form of the very common Platonic idiom ὅτι μαθών = "quia."

Other instances are found of the idiom where the participle is plural. I do not recollect any other passage where the participle is neuter. The phrase would, I suppose, in strict propriety be used only when the subject of the verb following was a person. Here indeed it might be said, that a sort of personal agency is attributed to the subject of the sentence, as the verb ποιεῖ shows.

A passage in which the idiom occurs with the participle in the plural is given by Stallbaum in a note on the Apology. It is from Eupolis, quoted by Stobæus:—Serm. iv., p. 53.

εὐθὺν γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πρῶτον ἀπολογήσομαι,
ὅτι μαθόντες τοὺς ξένους μὲν λέγετε ποιήτας σοφούς.

NOTE ON A PASSAGE IN THE PHAEDO OF PLATO. By
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THE passage to which the following suggestion refers is in ch. 47, p. 99 c. It is necessary to remind the reader of the course of the argument in which it occurs. In chaps. 46 and 47, Socrates mentions that, when he found Anaxagoras saying that νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, he was much pleased, and expected to find him applying this principle to the explanation of natural phenomena. I never could have supposed, says he, that a man who said that things were ordered by Mind should, when seeking for the cause of any particular arrangement, assign any other than ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει. But he found on the contrary, that Anaxagoras, as well as others, mistook the instrument for the cause, διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ κ. τ. λ. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὥς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἶονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου "Ἀτλαν. α ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα ξυνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς τὰγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν οἶονται. The spaced words are neglected by most commentators. Stallbaum's note is: h. e. τὴν τοῦ οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι ὥς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν, and Mr. Geddes' note is nearly the same. To say nothing of the double duty imposed upon ὥς by this construction, first as correlative to οὕτω, and next as part of the phrase ὥς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα, the proposed *ordo verborum* is, I think, unprecedented and intolerable. Who ever heard of τὴν τοῦ τοιούτου δύναμιν πράγματος? But, moreover, the sense elicited by this interpretation is quite unsuitable. According to it

the present constitution of things is postulated to be the best possible, and the question resulting from this is as to some *δύναμις* of this. Neither the postulate nor the resulting supposition agrees with the context. The one thing to which Socrates throughout ascribes *δαιμονία* *ισχύς*, the Atlas which he charges philosophers with neglecting, is the perfection of arrangement. It is this which he says they ought to have regarded as the cause of the existence of this arrangement. What they neglected was in fact (as it is expressed at the end of this very sentence) the binding force of *τὰγαθὸν καὶ δέον*, or, in other words, "the efficiency of *τὸ ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα τεθῆναι* in causing *οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι*." This is what is expressed, I think, by the words in question; the words *οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι* being in apposition with the idea of effect suggested by *δύναμιν*, or we may say, if the statement is preferred, that *δύναμις* is used in a pregnant sense, as equivalent to *δύναμιν ποιοῦσαν*. I have not indeed been able to discover any precisely parallel instance; but such a use of *δύναμις* would be somewhat analogous to the application of that word (familiar in Plato) to express the *force* of a term or phrase, &c. We might, I think, say: *ἡ . . . δύναμις ἐστὶ οὕτω νῦν αὐτὰ κεῖσθαι*, and the transition from this to the construction suggested above is not difficult.

I subjoin Professor Jowett's version of the passage:—
 "Any power, which in disposing them as they are disposes them for the best, never enters into their minds." Vol i., p. 448.

MISCELLANEOUS NOTES. BY JOHN K. INGRAM, LL.D.,
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University of Dublin.

ὠλέκρανον.

A STUDENT, consulting his Liddell and Scott on the word *ὠλέκρανον*, finds an article, which begins as follows:—
“ὠλεκρανον, τό’, properly ὠλενόκρανον, = ὠλένης κρανίον, *the point of the elbow* (ἀγκῶνος κεφαλή, Od. 14. 494).”

If he has the curiosity to examine the passage of the Odyssey here referred to, he will discover with surprise that ἀγκῶνος in that passage does not depend on κεφαλή at all, and that it is an utter delusion to suppose that Homer uses ἀγκῶνος κεφαλή to mean the point of the elbow. The line cited is

ἦ, καὶ ἐπ’ ἀγκῶνος κεφαλὴν σχέθεν, εἶπε τε μῦθον,

and the meaning is simply, “he supported his head on his bent arm.”

The strange error did not originate with Liddell and Scott. Looking into the Thesaurus of Stephanus, we find in the article on ὠλέκρανον,—“Hom. ἀγκῶνος κεφαλὴν hoc ὠλέκρανον vocat, Caput cubiti, ut et ipsum sonat ὠλένης κρανίον.” This statement appears without correction in the new Paris edition of Hase and the Dindorfs. It was no doubt from Stephanus that it was taken by our English lexicographers. In Valpy’s Stephanus the quantity of the word is not given; the Paris editors mark it ὠλέκρανον; why I cannot guess, especially as they seem to follow Stephanus in connecting it with κρανίον.

Focula.

In Dr. William Smith’s Latin Dictionary, under the word *foculus*, we find, in parenthesis, “in plur. focula, orum, n.

Pl. Pers. 1, 3, 24," and lower down in the same article the words of that passage in the *Persa* are quoted,

iam intus uentris fumant focula.

Another example of the same word is given from Pl. Capt. 4, 2, 67.

Epulas foueri foculis feruentibus.

Now it is plainly impossible to believe that *focula* in the *Persa* is a plural of *foculus*, and how the writer of the article could think so, whilst quoting the words, I do not understand. It might be argued that the sense of the passage in the *Captivi* requires rather *foculis* than *foculis*, and so Lindemann and Fleckeisen thought when, against all the MSS., they edited "*foculis in feruentibus*." But this does not justify the writer in the Dictionary, who quotes the line without the preposition. The word *focula*, as some of the editors of Plautus, e. g. Ritschl and Weise on the *Persa*, remark, is given by Nonius Marcellus, with the explanation "*nutrimenta*," which perfectly suits the passage in the *Persa*; and the combination "*foueri foculis*" in the *Captivi* seems to show that the poet meant to use (not *foculis* but) *foculis*, which, like *fomes* and *fomentum*, is obviously connected with *foueo*.

The confusion here pointed out is found already in Forcellini, who, after giving the *foculis* in the passage of the *Captivi* under *focula*, adds, "*alii rectius foculos intelligunt*," and indeed cites the passage in question again under *foculus*.

An Autograph of Milton.

Very few, I believe, are aware, that the library of Trinity College, Dublin, possesses a most interesting autograph of Milton. It is in the volume marked R. dd. 39, which contains several of his controversial Tracts. At the beginning of this volume is the inscription, somewhat injured in the binding, "*Ad doctissim[um] virum Patri[cium] Junium Joann[es] Miltonius hæc sua unum in f[asci]culum coniecta mittit, paucis h[u]jusmodi lectori[bus] contentus.*" The

closing words will remind every one of the "fit audience find, though few," of the *Paradise Lost*. Probably in writing the Latin words, as well as the English, he had before his mind Horace's

"neque te ut miretur turba, labores,
Contentus paucis lectoribus."

The Junius to whom the volume is inscribed must not be confounded with Junius, the philologist, whose name was Francis; the person meant is Patrick Young, whose biography will be found in Smith's *Vitae*.

An Erroneous Reference.

Mr. G. H. Lewes, in his *History of Philosophy* (4th Ed. vol. ii. p. 678), says of Auguste Comte, "He was fond of applying to her [Madame Clotilde de Vaux] the lines of his favorite Dante—

Quella che imparadisa la mia mente,
Ogni basso pensier dal cor m' avulse."

This is a mistake; both the lines are not Dante's. The first is, indeed, in the *Divina Commedia*, Par. xxviii. 3, but the second is Petrarch's, and will be found in his 314th Sonnet. What Mr. Lewes ought to have said is, that the philosopher, by combining the verses, applied to Madame de Vaux, in relation to himself, what the two Italian poets had said, one of his Beatrice, the other of his Laura.

"Compact" in Shakspeare.

Mr. Gladstone, in a note on his address at the Liverpool College (John Murray, 1873), says: "Having given Comte credit for imagination, I must confess that I did not suppose him to be of 'imagination all compact'—(*Midsummer Night's Dream*, v. i.), but rather of imagination all diffuse." I am not sure that I quite understand this statement, and I am not going to examine it as a critical judgment. But the words seem to imply that Mr. Glad-

stone takes a view of the syntax and meaning of the Shakspearian passage referred to, which, *pace tanti viri* I must say, it is impossible to accept. He appears to regard "compact" as an epithet of "imagination," having a sense which can be opposed to "diffuse." But surely when Shakspeare says—

"The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
Are of imagination all compact,"

he means simply that they are wholly *made up* of imagination, and he uses "compact" just as in *As you Like it*, ii., 7.

"If he, compact of jars, grow musical,
We shall have shortly discord in the spheres."

Irish, Welsh, and Basque.

I am sorry to find a writer, who studies minute accuracy so much as Mr. Shilleto, giving his sanction to the often repeated but entirely groundless statement that a Gael (e.g. an Irishman) and a Welshman understand each other's language.—(See his *Thucydides*, Book I. Chap. cii.) If he had consulted Celtic scholars on the subject, he would have found that the fact is not so. The real affinity between the Cymric and Gaelic forms of Celtic speech gives this notion a *prima facie* plausibility, which does not belong to another assertion, sometimes just as positively made, that an Irishman and a Basque understand each other. To go no further back for examples, Victor Hugo in his *L'homme qui rit*, says, "le basque et l'irlandais se comprennent, ils parlent le vieux jargon punique."—(Vol. I., page 74.) This proposition is not only entirely untrue, but, to any one who knows what Basque is, absurd. But it is, of course, useless to reason with a person—even if that person be a man of genius—whose philology is so peculiar that he recognizes no line of demarcation between Semitic and Indo-European, and describes as a "jargon" belonging to the former linguistic family, a well-authenticated and highly respectable member of the latter. Argument is impossible between those who differ on first principles.

MR. HOGAN'S EDITION OF THE MEDEA.¹ BY ROBERT
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THIS edition would have been more valuable if the author
had reflected that the Medea is composed in metrical lan-
guage. On v. 1349,

οὐ παῖδας οὐκ ἔφυσα καὶ ἔθρεψά μιν,

Mr. Hogan says, "I would propose to read *ἐθρεψάμην καὶ ἐ-
φυσά*, so as to make a *ὑστερον πρότερον*." Now if we dismiss
the hypothesis that the Medea is written, not in verse, as
the other dramas of Euripides, but in prose, we are bound to
observe on this arrangement of the line that the dignity
imparted to the rhythm by the violation of the *caesura* thus
introduced is hardly sufficient to reconcile us to the unusual
feature of two trochees in an iambic senarius.

Mr. Hogan says in his Preface, "I have to express my
most grateful thanks to Dr. Veitch of Edinburgh for his kind-
ness in revising the MS. of this work, and for the many
valuable suggestions with which he has favoured me; I have
carefully weighed all his remarks, and while compelled to
disagree with him on some points, have embodied in my
notes many of his suggestions." May we conjecture that the
note on v. 1349, quoted above, was one on which the Editor
was compelled to disagree with that eminent scholar, and
may we refer it to the beneficent influence of the same that
he has after much heart-searching refrained from introduc-
ing an anapaest into the fourth foot of a senarius in v. 494?
On v. 971,

ἰκετεύει, ἑξαίτεϊσθε μὴ φεύγειν χθόνα,

¹ The Medea of Euripides, with Introduction and Explanatory Notes, for Schools, by John H. Hogan. Wil-
liams and Norgate, London, 1873.

we have an instance of that tempered *εποχή* which is the crowning virtue of a scholar; "for *φεύγειν*," says Mr. Hogan, "some read *φυγείν* so as to keep an iambic (*sic*) in the fifth foot of a senarius; but although in this foot the forms *θανείν*, *παθείν*, &c., are more usual, still we also find *θνήσκειν*, *πάσχειν*, &c."

It is a pity that Mr. Hogan did not consult Dr. Veitch on the following abstruse points:—whether when the Scholiast says of a line, "*ἐν Πελοπίδῃ ἐστίν*," he really refers to "a tragedy which was called the Peleus" (p. 106); whether the first syllable of *ἄτη* is short or long (see note on v. 986); whether "*παρέδωκαν*" is "a later Atticism for the regular form *παρέδοσαν*" (n. on v. 627); whether *ὥς* 'thus' should be accented (n. on v. 584); whether *ἀπαλλάσσει* in v. 339, and *κνίζει* in v. 555, may not be the 2nd *pers. sing.*, as has been hitherto assumed, and not the 3rd *pers.*, as Mr. Hogan thinks; whether *ἐρέσθαι* is a part of the verb *εἰπεῖν* (n. on v. 61); whether *ᾶ* in v. 209 may not possibly be the *fem. sing.*, not *neut. plur.*; whether the Greek writers habitually "put *ὅδε* for *οὗτως*" (n. on v. 687); and, finally, it is a pity that he did not put to Dr. Veitch three direct questions:—what is a strophe? what is an antistrophe? what is an enclitic? The note on v. 726 shows the spectacle of an Editor of the *Medea* puzzled by the accent on *οὔ* in the words *οὔ σ' ἄγειν βουλήσομαι*, and in his notes on the choral portions of the play he has betrayed *passim* that he is not aware of the existence of any strophic correspondence. Had Mr. Hogan, with the assistance of Dr. Veitch, solved for us these intricate problems, we could almost have grasped without his aid, and believed without his authority, the following truths:—that "*Ἀργοῦς σκάφος* is put by periphrasis for the ship itself" (n. on v. 1); that "with *δεξιὰς* we must supply *χεῖρας*" (n. on v. 19); that "the student should not confuse *καλὸς*, adj., 'good,' and *κάλως*, subst., 'a rope'" (n. on v. 278); and that "*τοῦμον δέμας* is put by periphrasis for *ἐμὲ*" (n. on v. 529). We could have spared too his correction of v. 1354, in which he makes an

easy line unintelligible by introducing a mark of interrogation ; and his conjecture on v. 1304,

μή μοί τι δράσω' οἱ προσήκοντες γένει,

where he says, "for μοί I have ventured to substitute τοῖς, supplying τέκνοις from the preceding line, from my own conjecture." We fear moreover that in a work like the present we can hardly attribute to the printer εἰρόνεια on p. xli., or οὐκ δ' twice on p. 67.

Mr. Hogan deplors that "the metres of his (Euripides') later plays want the impressive rhythm and majestic beat of the Aeschylean senarius," and in another place he complains of "the laxity of the metre of the senarius" in the hands of Euripides ; but we may hope for a great improvement in the rhythm of the poet, if future Editors follow his example in ignoring strophic correspondence, and introducing trochees into iambic verses. If Mr. Hogan had printed the article of the *Westminster Review* on Euripides *in extenso*, instead of giving it in scraps ushered in by phrases like, "as a writer in the *Westminster Review* ably observes," one might have enjoyed more the perusal of his Introduction ; and if he had carried out in practice the principle (to which in theory he expresses his deference) of acknowledging the source of remarks adopted from the works of others, he would have been less open to a charge of violation of editorial *etiquette*.

We have made the above remarks because we wish to endeavour to induce the Editor to reconsider his determination of "attempting an edition of the Hippolytus of our poet, or possibly an edition of all his plays," until he has made himself acquainted with the rudiments of Greek accidence and the structure of an iambic trimeter.

ON INTEGRATION BY RATIONALIZATION. By BENJAMIN
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THE following method of showing that the various modes of rationalization of the expression $F(x, \sqrt{a+2bx+cx^2}) dx$, (where F is rational and algebraic), are cases of one general transformation, may be worthy of the notice of the student.

It can be easily seen, as is proved in treatises on the Calculus, that any expression of the foregoing form is reducible to

$$L + \frac{M}{\sqrt{a+2bx+cx^2}},$$

where L and M are rational functions of x .

Now suppose α and β to be the roots of the equation $a+2bx+cx^2=0$, then

$$\sqrt{a+2bx+cx^2} = \sqrt{c(x-\alpha)(x-\beta)}.$$

Substitute $\frac{\lambda+2\mu z+\nu z^2}{\lambda'+2\mu'z+\nu'z^2}$ for x , and the radical becomes

$$\frac{\sqrt{c\{\lambda-\alpha\lambda'+2(\mu-\alpha\mu')z+(\nu-\alpha\nu')z^2\}\{\lambda-\beta\lambda'+2(\mu-\beta\mu')z+(\nu-\beta\nu')z^2\}}}{\lambda'+2\mu'z+\nu'z^2} \quad (1)$$

This expression obviously becomes rational if the quadratic factors, under the radical sign, be each made a perfect square.

This requires

$$(\mu-\alpha\mu')^2 = (\lambda-\alpha\lambda')(\nu-\alpha\nu'),$$

or

$$\mu^2 - \lambda\nu + (\lambda\nu' + \nu\lambda' - 2\mu\mu')\alpha + (\mu'^2 - \lambda'\nu')\alpha^2 = 0; \quad (2)$$

This is an application of the general method of Transformation of Jacobi.— See *Fundamenta Nova Theoria Functionum Ellipticarum*.

and a similar equation with β instead of a . Moreover, by hypothesis, a satisfies the equation

$$a + 2ba + ca^2 = 0;$$

accordingly (2) holds, if the constants λ , μ , &c., satisfy the equations

$$\mu^2 - \lambda\nu = Ka, \quad \lambda\nu' + \nu\lambda' - 2\mu\mu' = 2Kb, \quad \mu'^2 - \lambda'\nu' = Kc, \quad (3)$$

where K is any constant.

Again, solving for z from the equation

$$x(\lambda' + 2\mu'z + \nu'z^2) = \lambda + 2\mu z + \nu z^2,$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned} (\nu - x\nu')z + \mu - x\mu' &= \sqrt{\mu^2 - \lambda\nu + (\lambda'\nu + \nu'\lambda - 2\mu\mu')x + (\mu'^2 - \lambda'\nu')x^2} \\ &= \sqrt{K(a + 2bx + cx^2)}. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Also, by differentiation, we get

$$\begin{aligned} (\lambda' + 2\mu'z + \nu'z^2)dx &= 2\{\mu + \nu z - x(\mu' + \nu'z)\}dz \\ &= 2\sqrt{K(a + 2bx + cx^2)}dz, \end{aligned}$$

$$\therefore \frac{dx}{\sqrt{a + 2bx + cx^2}} = \frac{2\sqrt{K}dz}{\lambda' + 2\mu'z + \nu'z^2}. \quad (5)$$

Hence we see that any algebraic expression of the form

$$\frac{f(x)}{\phi(x)} \frac{dx}{\sqrt{a + 2bx + cx^2}}$$

is rendered rational by this substitution, provided λ , μ , &c. are rational quantities for which equations (3) hold.

These equations admit of being satisfied in a number of ways. We proceed to consider the simplest cases :—

[(1). Let a be positive, and we may assume $\nu = 0$, $\mu' = 0$, and $K = 1$; this gives

$$\mu = \sqrt{a}, \quad \lambda\nu' = 2b, \quad \lambda'\nu' = -c.$$

Moreover, without loss of generality, we may assume $\nu' = 1$, which gives

$$\lambda = 2b, \quad \lambda' = -c,$$

and, therefore,

$$x = \frac{2(z\sqrt{a+b})}{z^2 - c}, \text{ and } \frac{dx}{a + 2bx + cx^2} = \frac{2dz}{z^2 - c}. \quad (6)$$

Equation (4) becomes in this case

$$\sqrt{a + 2bx + cx^2} = \sqrt{a - xz},$$

which agrees with the well-known transformation.

(2). Next if we assume $\nu' = 0$, $\mu = 0$, and $\nu = 1$,

we get $\mu' = \sqrt{c}$, $\lambda = -a$, and $\lambda' = 2b$.

This gives

$$x = \frac{z^2 - a}{2(b + z\sqrt{c})} \text{ and } \frac{dx}{\sqrt{a + 2bx + cx^2}} = \frac{dz}{b + z\sqrt{c}}. \quad (7)$$

This agrees with the ordinary assumption

$$\sqrt{a + 2bx + cx^2} = z - x\sqrt{c}.$$

It may be observed that since a and β do not enter into these results, they hold whether the roots be real or imaginary.

Again, when the roots are real, we can rationalize the radical in (1) by making one factor reduce to a constant, and the other to z^2 .

Accordingly let

$$\lambda - a\lambda' = 0, \quad \mu - a\mu' = 0, \quad \mu - \beta\mu' = 0, \quad \nu - \beta\nu' = 0,$$

or

$$(3). \quad \mu = 0, \quad \mu' = 0, \quad \lambda = a\lambda', \quad \nu = \beta\nu'.$$

Hence

$$x = \frac{a\lambda' + \beta\nu'z^2}{\lambda' + \nu'z^2},$$

or

$$x - a = \frac{\nu'}{\lambda'} z^2 (\beta - x);$$

also (5) becomes in this case

$$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{a + 2bx + cx^2}} = \frac{2dz}{\lambda' + \nu'z^2}.$$

This agrees with the other common transformation.

The following application to the reduction of the Elliptic Function

$$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{A(x-a)(x-\beta)(x-\gamma)(x-\delta)}}$$

to the normal form $\frac{d\theta}{\sqrt{1-k^2 \sin^2 \theta}}$ may be worth observ-

ing, as it is in some respects simpler than that usually employed. Let the roots be arranged in order of magnitude, i. e. $a > \beta > \gamma > \delta$: and assume $x = \frac{a - \beta z^2}{1 - z^2}$, then, in accordance with the preceding method, we have

$$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{(x-a)(x-\beta)}} = \frac{dz}{1-z^2},$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dx}{\sqrt{A(x-a)(x-\beta)(x-\gamma)(x-\delta)}} &= \frac{dz}{\sqrt{A(a-\gamma-(\beta-\gamma)z^2)(a-\delta-(\beta-\delta)z^2)}} \\ &= \frac{dz}{\sqrt{(a-\gamma)(a-\delta)} \sqrt{A\left(1 - \frac{\beta-\gamma}{a-\gamma} z^2\right) \left(1 - \frac{\beta-\delta}{a-\delta} z^2\right)}}. \end{aligned}$$

If A be positive, we assume

$$z = y \sqrt{\frac{a-\delta}{\beta-\delta}},$$

and the expression becomes

$$\frac{dy}{\sqrt{(a-\gamma)(\beta-\delta)} \sqrt{A(1-y^2) \left(1 - \frac{(\beta-\gamma)(a-\delta)}{(a-\gamma)(\beta-\delta)} y^4\right)}}.$$

Now, since $\frac{(\beta-\gamma)(a-\delta)}{(a-\gamma)(\beta-\delta)}$ is positive, and less¹ than unity,

¹ This follows at once from the identity

$$\frac{(a-\gamma)(a-\delta)}{(a-\gamma)(\beta-\delta)} + \frac{(a-\beta)(\gamma-\delta)}{(a-\gamma)(\beta-\delta)} = 1,$$

remembering the relations $a > \beta > \gamma > \delta$.

it may be denoted by k^2 ; and, on making $y = \sin \theta$, the expression reduces to the form

$$\frac{d\theta}{L \sqrt{1 - k^2 \sin^2 \theta}}$$

where

$$L = \sqrt{A(a - \gamma)(\beta - \delta)}.$$

Again, if A be negative, we assume $x = \frac{a + \delta z^2}{1 + z^2}$, and the transformed expression is (writing $-A$ instead of A),

$$\frac{dz}{\sqrt{A(a - \beta)(a - \gamma)} \sqrt{\left(1 - \frac{\beta - \delta}{a - \beta} z^2\right) \left(1 - \frac{\gamma - \delta}{a - \gamma} z^2\right)}}.$$

Now, let

$$z = y \sqrt{\frac{a - \beta}{\beta - \delta}},$$

and the expression transforms into

$$\frac{dy}{\sqrt{A(a - \gamma)(\beta - \delta)} \sqrt{1 - y^2} \sqrt{1 - k'^2 y^2}},$$

where

$$k'^2 = \frac{(a - \beta)(\gamma - \delta)}{(a - \gamma)(\beta - \delta)} = 1 - k^2.$$

This is of the required normal form, having its *modulus* the complement of that in the former case.

It may be shown that the ordinary transformation of elliptic integrals of the first species is easily arrived at by the foregoing method.

For, if we rationalize the expression $\frac{dx}{\sqrt{1 - k^2 x^2}}$, by the assumption $x = \frac{2\mu y}{1 + \nu y^2}$, equations (3) become $\mu^2 = K$, and $\nu = K k^2$, or $\nu = \mu^2 k^2$; and the expression

$$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{(1 - x^2)(1 - k^2 x^2)}}$$

becomes

$$\frac{\mu dy}{\sqrt{(1 + \mu^2 k^2 y^2)^2 - 4\mu^2 y^2}}.$$

Comparing this with the expression

$$\frac{\mu dy}{\sqrt{(1-y^2)(1-\lambda^2 y^2)}},$$

we get

$$\lambda^2 = \mu^4 k^4, \text{ or } \lambda = \mu^2 k^2,$$

and

$$1 + \lambda^2 = 4\mu^2 - 2\mu^2 k^2, \text{ or } 1 + 2\lambda + \lambda^2 = 4\mu^2,$$

$$\therefore 1 + \lambda = 2\mu = \frac{2\sqrt{\lambda}}{k}; \text{ or } k = \frac{2\sqrt{\lambda}}{1+\lambda}.$$

Also

$$x = \frac{(1+\lambda)y}{1+\lambda y^2}.$$

If we make $x = \sin \phi$, and $y = \sin \phi_1$, we get

$$\frac{d\phi}{\sqrt{1-k^2 \sin^2 \phi}} = \frac{(1+\lambda) d\phi_1}{\sqrt{1-\lambda^2 \sin^2 \phi_1}}, \quad (8)$$

where

$$k = \frac{2\sqrt{\lambda}}{1+\lambda}, \text{ and } \sin \phi = \frac{(1+\lambda) \sin \phi_1}{1+\lambda \sin^2 \phi_1}.$$

This agrees with Gauss's transformation.

To deduce that of Landen from it, we change x into $x\sqrt{-1}$, and y into $y\sqrt{-1}$, in the equation

$$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{(1-x^2)(1-k^2 x^2)}} = \frac{(1+\lambda) dy}{\sqrt{(1-y^2)(1-\lambda^2 y^2)}},$$

when it becomes

$$\frac{dx}{\sqrt{(1+x^2)(1+k^2 x^2)}} = \frac{(1+\lambda) dy}{\sqrt{(1+y^2)(1+\lambda^2 y^2)}},$$

where

$$x = \frac{(1+\lambda)y}{1-\lambda y^2}.$$

If now we make $x = \tan \theta$, and $y = \tan \theta_1$, we get

$$\frac{d\theta}{\sqrt{\cos^2 \theta + k^2 \sin^2 \theta}} = \frac{(1+\lambda) d\theta_1}{\sqrt{\cos^2 \theta_1 + \lambda^2 \sin^2 \theta_1}}, \quad (9)$$

where
$$\tan \theta = \frac{(1 + \lambda) \tan \theta_1}{1 - \lambda \tan^2 \theta_1}$$

and
$$\frac{2\sqrt{\lambda}}{1 + \lambda} \text{ as before.}$$

Again, equation (9) becomes

$$\frac{d\theta}{\sqrt{1 - k'^2 \sin^2 \theta}} = \frac{(1 + \lambda) d\theta}{\sqrt{1 - \lambda'^2 \sin^2 \theta}},$$

where λ' is *complementary* to λ .

Also from the equation $k = \frac{2\sqrt{\lambda}}{1 + \lambda}$, we get $k' = \frac{1 - \lambda}{1 + \lambda}$, and

$$1 + \lambda = \frac{2}{1 + k'}, \text{ also } \lambda' = \sqrt{1 - \lambda^2} = \frac{2\sqrt{k'}}{1 + k'}.$$

Hence
$$\frac{d\theta}{\sqrt{1 - k'^2 \sin^2 \theta}}$$

transforms into

$$\frac{2}{1 + k'} \frac{d\phi}{\sqrt{1 - \lambda'^2 \sin^2 \phi}},$$

by the substitution

$$\tan \theta = \frac{(1 + \lambda) \tan \phi}{1 - \lambda \tan^2 \phi}.$$

This corresponds to Landen's Transformation.

A SIMPLE METHOD OF DETERMINING THE ANHARMONIC FUNCTION OF A CUBIC. By WILLIAM S. M'CAY, A. M., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin.

1°. "THE several values of the anharmonic ratio determined at any point of the conic $x^2 + y^2 + z^2 = 0$ by its intersections with the conic $ax^2 + by^2 + cz^2 = 0$ are the ratios of differences of a, b, c ." For this anharmonic ratio is determined at an intersection of the conics by the tangent to the first, and the lines to the vertices of the triangle of reference. At the intersection whose co-ordinates are

$$\sqrt{b-c}, \sqrt{c-a}, \sqrt{a-b},$$

the tangent is

$$x\sqrt{b-c} + y\sqrt{c-a} + z\sqrt{a-b} = 0,$$

and one of the other lines is

$$\frac{x}{\sqrt{b-c}} = \frac{y}{\sqrt{c-a}}.$$

So the anharmonic ratio in question is determined on z by these two lines and the vertices zx, zy , and therefore is

$$\frac{a-c}{b-c}.$$

And generally the anharmonic ratio determined at any point of a conic (C), by its intersections with another (C'), is a ratio of differences of the roots of the discriminating equation—

$$\lambda^3 \Delta + \lambda^2 \Theta + \lambda \Theta' + \Delta' = 0.$$

2°. "The points of contact of tangents to a cubic from a point on it are the intersections of the polar conics of the

point with regard to the cubic and its Hessian" (Salmon's *Higher Plane Curves*, Second Edition, p. 199). This is an immediate consequence of the theorem that the tangent to a cubic at a point A meets the cubic again at a point B , determined by the polar line of A with regard to the Hessian; fixing B , A is seen to be an intersection of the conics in question.

Using the canonical form, the Cubic and its Hessian are

$$U \equiv x^3 + y^3 + z^3 + 6mxyz,$$

$$H \equiv -m^2U + (1 + 8m^3)xyz.$$

The form of H shows that the polar conic with regard to the triangle of reference passes through the intersections of the polar conics with regard to U and H .

I shall apply the first theorem to find the anharmonic ratio determined at any point of the polar conic (C), with regard to the cubic by the polar conic (C'), with regard to the triangle of reference of a point on the cubic, this ratio being the required Anharmonic Function of the cubic.

The polar conics are

$$C \equiv x'x^2 + y'y^2 + z'z^2 + 2m(x'y'z + y'xz + z'xy) = 0,$$

$$C' \equiv 2(x'y'z + y'xz + z'xy) = 0.$$

Forming the invariants of C and C' , we find

$$\Delta = -m^2U' + (1 + 8m^3)x'y'z',$$

$$\Theta = 18m^2x'y'z'. \quad \Theta' = 12mx'y'z'$$

$$\Delta' = 2x'y'z'.$$

And when $U' = 0$, the discriminating equation becomes

$$\lambda^3(1 + 8m^3) + 18\lambda^2m^3 + 12\lambda m + 2 = 0.$$

The disappearance of the co-ordinates already indicates the constancy of the anharmonic ratio of four tangents as their intersection moves along the cubic, as first pointed out by Dr. Salmon (*Higher Plane Curves*, Second Edi-

tion, p. 142). Removing the second term of this equation (which does not alter the differences of the roots), putting $\lambda(1 + 8m^3) = t$, and writing S, T for $m^4 - m, 1 - 20m^3 - 8m^6$, the equation becomes

$$t^3 - 12St + 2T = 0.$$

The equation which gives the differences of the roots of this form is well known to be

$$y^3 - 36Sy \pm \sqrt{108} \sqrt{64S^3 - T^2} = 0.$$


Reducing the roots of this by the factor $\sqrt{3S}$, it becomes


$$z^3 - 12z \pm 2\sqrt{\frac{64S^3 - T^2}{S^3}} = 0.$$

The ratios of whose roots are the values of the Anharmonic Function of the cubic.

This is the same equation that Dr. Salmon derives from other considerations (Higher Plane Curves, p. 192).







HERMATHENA,

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
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CONTENTS.

vii

	Page.
The Philebus of Plato and Recent English Critics. By THOMAS MAGUIRE, LL.D., Professor of Latin, Queen's College, Galway	441
Virg. Aen. I. 246. By JAMES HENRY, M.D.	468
On the Nature of the Bounding Surfaces of Bodies. By JOHN H. JELLETT, Senior Fellow of Trinity College	501
A Sketch in the Theory of Screws. By ROBERT BALL, LL.D., Andrews' Professor of Astronomy, and Astronomer Royal of Ireland	506
On a Geometrical Method of Deducing the Central and Diametral Properties of Conics from those belonging to the Focus and Directrix. By FRANCIS A. TARLETON, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College.	520

HERMATHENA.



THE DEGRADATION OF ODYSSEUS IN GREEK LITERATURE.

THERE is no feature in the history of Greek myths, and of their treatment in historical Greece, more curious than the altered aspect of certain Homeric heroes in the Attic age. In the Athenian drama especially, we find an almost studied tendency to give a homely and even low aspect to their lives and motives. In the extant plays of Æschylus this tendency is of course less felt, and almost confined to the incipient habit of altercation, which to us seems a painful trait of vulgarity in these lofty products of Greek genius. But in the refined Sophokles, and still more in Euripides, we find Homeric heroes stripped of all their heroism, and reduced to the level of very mean and common men. It must be noticed that this does not apply indiscriminately. Achilles, Neoptolemus and Ajax* are as great in Greek tragedy as in the Greek Epos; but *wherever the Homeric poems themselves allow any room for the imputation of meanness or dishonesty, we find the flaw fastened upon and enlarged.* Thus, that Menelaus should disturb the world for a faithless woman, and take her back after her Trojan experiences; that

* Mr. Gladstone, in endeavouring all mention of Sophokles' Ajax, a to show how the later Greeks were character far grander than the Ajax entirely unable to appreciate the greatness of Homer in every respect. of the Homeric heroes, leaves out

Odysseus should deliberately lie and deceive for his own advantage, and be praised for it by Pallas Athene—these are the features which the Attic tragedians represented, we should say, in their proper light, while in the Homeric poems they are the acts of noble princes, and of more than mortal men.

But this is not a fair statement of the question. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were the Greek Bible—they were taught to the youth as combining the highest wisdom and loftiest morality. There is no doubt too, that, with all their moral blemishes, the heroes of Homer, and especially Odysseus, were noble and courtly gentlemen; we are, therefore, fairly and naturally surprised to find in the tragedies an attitude so inconsistent with the heroic models, and we are perplexed to know why the tragedians adhered so closely to these models, and yet travestied them. Of these instances Odysseus is the chief. He is in Homer the most perfect specimen of a human hero, not endowed with miraculous strength or divine origin, like Achilles, not commanding a vast empire like Agamemnon, and yet surpassing both in his greatness and in his achievements. Yet this is of all the Homeric characters the most mean and contemptible in Sophokles and Euripides.

It is a difficulty of old standing, and yet unsolved. There is, so far as I know, not even a solution offered, save one of little weight by Mr. Gladstone.* He thinks that the Greek moral sense, and Greek feelings of delicacy and honour, were so degraded in historical times below the Homeric standard, that the tragedians were unable to appreciate the refinement of the heroes, and suggested low and base motives for actions done in simplicity and in earnestness. I hope to shew that this theory exactly reverses the facts of the case, that the Attic standard of morality, the standard of Æschylus and Euripides, like

* *Homer and the Homeric Age*, III. pp. 557, 590.

that of Plato in the next generation, was higher and not lower than that of the Ionic court poets, and that the degradation of the Homeric heroes was partly owing to a moral advance, and not a moral decay, in the Greek nation. But this is almost obvious in the very statement. The real difficulty is to understand how the Greeks came to make the change, how they came to translate Odysseus and his followers from kings into scoundrels; what suggested to them the change, and when did it take place? To attempt an answer to these difficulties is the main object of this paper.

Let me premise that, with their high intelligence, the Greeks were a most critical people, keenly alive to the flaws and weak points of character, delighting in ridicule and satire, and ever ready to join in a laugh against anything, however venerable, which could be presented to them under a comical aspect. Anyone who has made the old Greeks his study will at once feel this truth, and anyone who has not will hardly be convinced by the few citations which I could here allow myself. A perusal of Aristophanes and the Comic Fragments alone will suffice as a convincing argument. Granting, then, this feature in the Greek mind, I say that even though Odysseus might escape for a long time, yet if any celebrated comic author were to take up the weak points of his character, and were to bring out prominently his cheating and lying, his meanness and his cruelty, such an author would certainly find large response in the hearts of a satirical, laughter-loving audience.

I believe that this author and this audience are given us in Epicharmos, the celebrated comedian of the Sicilians. Every scholar knows the character of this portion of the Hellenic race from Cicero. *Hominum genus nimis acutum et suspiciosum*, he says, exactly expressing the feature of which I am speaking (*Div. in Cæc.* 9), and again (*de Orat.* II, 54) *ridicula et salsa multa, nam et Siculi in eo genere excellunt*; and so in other places. The early

appearance of comedy, and the fame of their philosopher-comedian, Epicharmos, proves the same thing more cogently. I will not say that the Athenians would have failed to appreciate him equally, but merely that his literary activity was developed in a congenial soil.

This Epicharmos was one of the greatest figures in Greek literature,* and a man whose works led the *reading* public, perhaps, more than that of any contemporary born in the days of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; his philosophical opinions are quoted with the highest respect, and Plato was accused in early times of having stolen his theories. His influence on Sophokles and Euripides is plain from the number of their plays, whose titles are borrowed from Epicharmos. We have Βάκχαι, Βούσιρις, Διονυσιακὸς (as compared with Διονύσοι), Ἡρακλῆς (ἐπὶ Ταινάρῳ ἀκανθοπλήξ and μαινόμενος), Κύκλωψ, Ὀδυσσεὺς, Σκείρων, Φιλοκτήτης. Of course there may be *arguments* of many plays besides these adopted, with their titles modified. Such I believe to have been the Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος of Sophokles, of which the plot seems to me to breathe Epicharmos himself. But however that may be, it is tolerably certain that when a tragic poet borrowed a name from his predecessor he also borrowed the general plan of the play. Literary men did not then rush in pursuit of originality as they now do. The extant cases of plays on similar subjects by Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides, will amply prove this fact to any scholar. If we grant this influence, it is easy to shew in what characteristics Epicharmos probably led the way for Attic tragedy. Debarred as he was by the despots of the Sicilian cities from treating of politics in his pieces, he devoted himself to combating the popular notions about the gods both as cosmical and as ethical agents, and to purifying public morality by an earnest ridicule of

* He is classed by Plato as the Prince of Comedy, with Homer the Prince of Tragedy (*Theætetus*, 125, E).

'spiritual wickedness in high places.' Thus he stands side by side with Pythagoras and Xenophanes as one of the earliest moral and religious reformers.

Most unfortunately, time has robbed us of all his works, and the few fragments that are rescued by quotation in other authors can hardly give us any idea of his treatment of details. But the titles, which have been almost all preserved, when compared with the extant fragments, prove one conclusion clearly, that his religious and moral teaching was conveyed in the form of travesties on the Greek mythology and Epic poetry. The weaknesses suggested and slightly touched by the rhapsodists were brought into strong relief, and thus comic types of gods and heroes were produced, which, owing to the genius of the poet and the *esprit railleur* of the Greeks, took a permanent hold which they never lost.

There is one case which admits of strict proof. If we consider the titles of his comedies, we find (with the aid of the fragments preserved) that there were at least four on Herakles (Βούσιρις, Ἡβας γάμος, Ἡρακλῆς ὁ παρὰ Φόλῳ, Ἡρ. ὁ ἐπὶ τὸν ζωστῆρα), and the fragments make it plain that the gluttony of Herakles was the leading feature brought out, as also great lists of fish and other delicacies. The poet was evidently satirizing the notorious love of good eating among the Sicilians. Both the features I have mentioned became permanent in Greek literature. The enumerations of dishes in the Attic comedy were in imitation of this model, and so was the conception of Herakles as an excessive eater, which meets us in the *Alkestis* of Euripides and elsewhere. Here, then, is a new aspect given to a great mythical character by Epicharmos,* and an aspect never afterwards lost sight of in Greek literature. Let the reader keep this fully estab-

* I will not deny that this aspect rowed it from them; but it was his of Herakles may have existed long genius that stamped it upon Attic before the popular farces of the literature. Sicilians. Probably Epicharmos bor-

lished case before him, as he follows me into the discussion of a strictly parallel development.

Equally prominent with the pieces about Herakles are the pieces borrowed from the life of Odysseus in the list of Epicharmos' comedies. Putting aside the *Τρώες*, as too vague a name to afford us any argument, we have *Κύκλωψ*, *Σειρήνες*, *Ὀδυσσεὺς ναυαγός*, and above all *Ὀδυσσεὺς αὐτόμολος*; probably also, as I shall show, *Φιλοκτήτης*.

These titles make it plain that, as a parallel character to Herakles the glutton, the poet brought out prominently Odysseus the knave. For if the Odysseus of Homer was to be travestied at all, we cannot possibly err in asserting this to have been the necessary attitude of the comedian. At all epochs and among all Greeks lying and dishonesty were prominent vices, and we cannot imagine a better point of assault both on the faulty morals of the Greek mythology, and on the weakest feature in Greek social life, than the travesty of Homer's greatest and most human, but therefore, most imperfect ideal. Thus there came into existence the new and degraded type of Odysseus, repeated in at least four different pieces of the greatest and most original poet of his age.

It is, I think, a strong confirmation of this view, that the first appearance of the knave Odysseus is in the younger contemporary of Epicharmos, who sojourned much in Sicily, and was in the habit of writing for a Sicilian public. I do not think that the obligations of Pindar to Epicharmos, even so far as we can make them out, have yet been fairly considered, but I fancy that much of his poetry was coloured either by unconscious imitation or conscious opposition to him. I suggest, in passing, the following points:—In *form* the most celebrated feature in Epicharmos was the *gnomic* terseness of his philosophical sayings. This is the most salient feature in Pindar's style also. In *matter* there was the above-mentioned travesty of the myths. In reply to this Pindar

repeatedly advocates an opposed principle (*Ol.* I. 28; VII. 45; IX. 35; *Nem.* VII. 20) that the myths, as told by the Epic poets, are often exaggerated and falsified, and that therefore it is wrong to estimate either gods or heroes by these faulty representations. *Ol.* IX. 35, seems to me directed pointedly against these very travesties of Epicharmos:—

ἀπό μοι λόγον
τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥίψον
ἐπεὶ τό γε λαιδορῆσαι θεοὺς
ἐχθρὰ σοφία, καὶ τὸ καυχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρὸν
μανλαῖσιν ὑποκρέκει.

Pindar's morality being thoroughly conservative, and based upon the Epos and the myths, he must have looked with pain and dismay upon the brilliant satire of his comic rival. He sought to counteract him by drawing deep moral lessons from these very myths, but he was forced to save their morality, just as many orthodox moral teachers do nowadays, by giving a loose interpretation to many of them, and by denying the 'verbal inspiration' of the rhapsodists, who had naively told such scandalous anecdotes about the gods and heroes.

But I must not wander farther from my special point. In two places (*Nem.* VII. and VIII.) Pindar, in addressing Aeginetan victors, whose ancestral hero was Ajax, speaks disparagingly of Odysseus, and hints that Homer has done him far more than justice.

There is, too, in my mind something so casual, and of course, in the manner of Pindar in making this remark, that he seems to refer to an estimate of Odysseus then popular at Aegina and generally received. When he is introducing a new view or interpretation he generally lays stress upon it. Here, then, we find the character of Odysseus suddenly degraded from the Homeric conception, not as I am convinced by any gradual moral declension of the Greeks, for the morals of Pindar are far higher than those of Homer, but owing to the accident

that travesties of great genius had laid hold of the public mind, and made it impossible to mention Odysseus without directly suggesting them. Thus Pindar was able to maintain Herakles, because the comic feature in him was a mere physical peculiarity depending on his great size and strength, but he was obliged to sacrifice Odysseus, and set down as a knave the great protagonist of the Odyssey. We have very similar shifts and difficulties in our own day among the theologians who seek moral lessons among the historical characters of the Old Testament. In former days any act which advanced the cause of God's people was for that reason considered not only right but laudable, and so acts of baseness and treachery were considered heroic on account of their consequences. But now-a-days, that our moral standard has become higher and more sensitive, we reject the deceitful Jael and bloodthirsty Esther from our list of Scriptural worthies and bring them down to their proper level.*

But in later times, the Epicharmian drawing of Herakles carried the day. We have him regularly portrayed as a good-humoured but coarse and uneducated athlete, ever ready to indulge in animal pleasures. Thus, too, what I would call the Epicharmian drawing of Odysseus, the knave Odysseus, the *κρόταλος* (Eurip. *Κύκλωψ*) as opposed to the *δῖος*, became a household figure in Greek literature.

It is most important to observe, that this is not one of the degradations due to the levelling genius of Euripides, as the reader would infer from Mr. Gladstone's discussion.†

* On Jael, cf. J. H. Jellett's *Moral Difficulties of the Old Testament*, and in justification of the epithet given to Esther, cf. the *Book of Esther*, chap. ix. 12, 13.

† I may add, that the character of Odysseus, as drawn in the *Hekabe* of Euripides, and also in his *Philoktetes*, of which the argument is fortunately preserved, is far higher and more gentle-

manly than the Odysseus of Sophokles. This may possibly be owing to an idiosyncrasy of the poet. I fancy Euripides, with his contempt of women, would probably draw Menelaus as a meaner character than Sophokles would; on the other hand, such faults as those of Odysseus would be more repugnant to Sophokles.

I have already cited Pindar, but in Sophokles we find the most striking picture extant of the knave-Ulysses. Strangely enough, too, we have among the titles of Epicharmos' plays a *Φιλοκτήτης*, which must have been before the mind of Sophokles when he wrote, and it is not improbable, that in this play also, the Sicilian poet drew a model of Odysseus, followed by the Attic tragedian. The *Philoktetes* contains the degraded picture in all its completeness. Not even Virgil has anything to add but abusive epithets. Observe, too, that the other heroes from the Trojan legend are in no way disfigured. *Philoktetes*, *Neoptolemus*, and, above all, *Ajax*, are probably greater in Sophokles than in the Epic cycle. I hold, then, that the degraded type of Odysseus in Greek literature is due to no declension in morals, to no want of appreciation, to no decay of genius in Greek poetry, but to the accident, if I may so say, of the great Epicharmos having selected this hero in several of his plays as the subject of comic travesties. This and the *esprit malin et railleur* of the lively Greek are, in my mind, all but adequate to account for so strange a phenomenon.

The remaining straw of weight is to be found in the vast increase of moral depth and moral earnestness among the poets of the lyric and dramatic epochs. I have kept this point back, as it will introduce my refutation of Mr. Gladstone's views. To any scholar that reads with care the works of Pindar and Æschylus, their pure and noble morality, their sober and dignified mythology, will afford a great contrast to the levity and immorality of the Ionic Epos. The later poets were really what they falsely inferred Homer to be—moral teachers and moral reformers. Although they wrote at courts, and were the friends of despots, they held a social position vastly higher and more independent than the rhapsodists, who were servants in the households of the old nobles, and who dared not brand any act of a prince with its deserved ignominy.

I am somewhat impatient of all the fashionable enthusiasm about Homer's grace, and refinement, and delicacy of feeling. Here is some of it in plain English. 'Klytemnestra certainly did commit adultery and then murder her husband, but, after all, she was a real lady, she was of an excellent *naturel*—it was quite surprising and admirable how long she resisted temptation; and had not the bard who was in charge of her been put out of the way, probably she would never have fallen. And then Helen, too—what a charming creature, how lovely and how modest, how pure too, and contrite in spite of all her misfortunes! But, then, what else could you expect; was she not the daughter of Jove himself, and was not Menelaus well paid for his troubles by being made immortal on her account? After all there is nothing like breeding. There was Odysseus, and that man could lie and cheat like no common man; it was a real treat to see him do it. You could not help loving him while he was picking your pocket. And then the rage of Achilles; that *was* rage! If his friends vexed him, you might come and cut their throats before his eyes, and he would'nt so much as raise a finger to help them!' I forbear to translate the morals of the gods in the same way, for there is no question whatever as to their infamy.

This was the teaching that Xenophanes openly attacked, that his follower, and probably friend, Epicharmos, undermined through the veil of ridicule, that Pindar and the other Lyric poets replaced by a larger justice and a purer faith; and yet we hear from Mr. Gladstone about the declension of morals in the historical days of Greece!

But there are other reasons scattered through his Essay of no greater weight. We are told (III. p. 592), that the Homeric characters were so perfect, that they were difficult to appreciate in all their fulness, and therefore the more delicate features dropped out of sight. To say, in the face of the Agamemnon and Klytemnestra of Æschylus, of the Antigone and Ajax of Sophokles, of

the *Medea* of Euripides, that these authors were unable to appreciate Homer perfectly, is indeed so strange an assertion, that it is qualified by saying (p. 591) that the tragic poets, though perhaps not so benighted, were obliged to accommodate themselves to the tastes of the public, and, in fact, to write down to a lower level. It is evident that Mr. Gladstone here forgot what public was in question. It was, perhaps, hard for him to think himself far from the English public, and in presence of the Athenian Demos of the age of Perikles. But though the English public is hardly fit to appreciate any subtle beauty in any branch of art, he should remember that the public who appreciated the tragedies of Æschylus and the odes of Pindar could not have required any simplification of Homer, whom they knew from childhood up, as well as we know the text of our Bible. And when he adds, ingeniously enough, that the requirements of the Attic stage, with its masks and padding, and its vast audiences, were such as to render all delicacy impossible, he has surely confused delicacy of acting with delicacy of composition in the poet. It is, I think, justly argued, in direct contradiction of this view, that imperfection and rudeness of stage-appliances offer a stimulus to a poet of genius to overcome these difficulties by the force and charm of his language, and that the completeness and beauty of our modern stage-effects are likely to mar the composition, by allowing the play-wright to depend upon exquisite dresses and gorgeous scenery.

But this paper is not meant to be controversial, and I therefore conclude it with the hope that classical scholars will weigh candidly the reasons given for my theory, and find in it the solution of a difficulty often raised and not yet, I think, adequately discussed.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

ON THE TRISYLLABIC ENDINGS OF THE PENTAMETER IN PROPERTIUS.

IN reading the works of the Elegiac poets who preceded Ovid, one cannot but be sensible of the differences amongst each other and from Ovid in reference to the ending of the pentameters. The present is an attempt to determine more precisely their differences in reference to one point, viz., *the trisyllabic ending*. So far as I know, not the slightest hint has ever been given by any of the Editors of Propertius, ancient or modern, of the canon established in the following pages, and which I here give by way of introduction, calling it for shortness the

RULE OF THE LIQUID.

“No pentameter (in Propertius) ends in a trisyllable unless the word contain a *liquid* (usually in either the penult or the ultimate syllable).”

Before I proceed to demonstrate this canon in the case of Propertius, it will not be out of place to exhibit also the usage of Catullus and Tibullus, in order to shew the gradual approximation to the later standard of Ovid, as I believe the final result in the Ovidian elimination of the trisyllable to be a perfectly natural and organic development, thoroughly in keeping with the genius and structure of the Latin language, and Ovid's pentameter to be the result of no individual caprice, but the final outcome of Roman thought on the harmonization of the elegiac.

CATULLUS.

The trisyllable occurs about 50 times, the quadrisyllable being rather more frequent. These, together with the polysyllables, form the endings of about half the number of pentameters in the whole of Catullus. In the trisyllables no attention is paid to the euphonic law of the liquid, all sorts of words occurring without a liquid, ex. gr., *obitus* 66.2: *posuit* 66.64: *videat* 67.16: *dubita* 67.18: *sequitur* 68.36: *studium* 68.44: *faciat* 68.50: *docuit* 68.118: *capiti* 68.124: 88.8: *fugiunt* 69.10: *habuit* 73.6: *statua* 81.4: *facias* 81.6: 87.8: *coquitur* 83.6: *avia* 84.6: *fatuis* 98.2: *cupido* 107.4: *pathicus* 112.2: *egeat* 114.6.

On the other hand, the very convenient termination, in *-ibus*, which is so often found in Propertius, Bk. I, *never* occurs in Catullus as the final. Curiously enough also, the *-ibus* ending in quadrisyllables, so common in Tibullus and Propertius, never occurs in Catullus, except in two odes, viz., 65.2 *virginibus*: 66.4, 58, 60, 80 *temporibus*, *litoribus*, *temporibus*, *coniugibus*. In these two poems Catullus seems to have tried the quadrisyllabic ending in *-ibus*, and being dissatisfied with it, to have rejected it. Plainly the poets were groping after some principle of harmony not yet discovered.

TIBULLUS.

The following is a synopsis of all the trisyllabic endings:—

	Ultimate.	Penult.	Antepenult.	-IBUS.	Non-liquid.
Bk. I.	<i>latere</i> 5.62 " 10.14 <i>venere</i> 10.66	<i>Pharia</i> 3.32 <i>Cilicas</i> 7.16	<i>pluvias</i> 1.50 <i>refugit</i> 5.72	<i>foribus</i> 6.34 <i>pedibus</i> 7.36 " 9.4	<i>capite</i> 1.72 <i>sedeat</i> 3.30
Bk. II.	<i>tumulo</i> 4.48 <i>latere</i> 1.66 <i>cinere</i> 6.34 <i>lacrimis</i> 6.32	<i>monuit</i> 5.68 <i>melius</i> 6.20		<i>laribus</i> 1.60 <i>ratibus</i> 3.40 " 5.40 <i>pedibus</i> 5.16	<i>capite</i> 1.8
Bk. III.	<i>venerem</i> 6.48	<i>comitem</i> 6.10			<i>potuit</i> 2.4
Bk. IV.	<i>dominæ</i> 13.22				<i>segetis</i> 2.18

Here it will be seen that the rule of the liquid is distinctly operating, and nearly with the same strictness as we shall find in Propertius. Thus, while in the 320 pentameters of Catullus, we have at least twenty trisyllables without a liquid, we have only four or five in the 920 of Tibullus.

Tibullus has very few instances of the Propertian *-ibus* termination, *pedibus*, *foribus*, *laribus*, and *ratibus* being the only examples, but the non-liquid trisyllables *capite*, *sedeat*, *potuit*, *segetis* are quite in the old fashion of Catullus.

Tibullus, however, has the quadrisyllabic *-ibus* very commonly, but it may be noted that all such words have a preponderance of liquids. The following table shows the polysyllabic endings in the three books.

	POLYSYLL.	QUADRISYLL.		
		<i>Proper.</i>	<i>Common.</i>	<i>in -ibus.</i>
Bk. I.	ministerio 2.42 magisteria 4.84	Elysios 3.58	exuvias 1.54	ficti ^l ibus 1.38
		Pieridas 4.62	militias 3.82	carminibus 2.54
		Armenios 5.36	auxiliis 8.24	liminibus 2.84
		Sanctonici 7.10		arboribus 5.32
				" 7.32 verberibus 8.6
Bk. II.		Indigetem 5.44	exequias 4.44	limitibus 1.18
			virginitas 5.64	cælitibus 1.36
			eripiet 5.92	æquoribus 5.80
Bk. III.	imaginibus 4.56 amabilior 4.94	Assyria 2.24	deciderim 1.20	al ⁱ itibus 6.8
			purpureus 4.30	
			arbitrium 6.14	

PROPERTIUS.

Here the rule of the liquid becomes absolute.

In the table it would have been possible to transfer the category of the *-ibus* to that of the liquids, as it may be observed that all the words (except *pedibus*, precisely as in Tibullus,) contain a liquid, ex. gr., *foribus*, *ratibus*, *gradibus*. For the sake of convenience, however, I have placed them by themselves.

	LIQUID.			-IBUS	NON LIQUID.
	<i>Ult.</i>	<i>Penult.</i>	<i>Antepenult.</i>		
Bk. I.	tabulis 2.22	melius 2.10 chalysbe 16.30 Calais 20.26		pedibus 1.4 manibus 3.8	CUBITUM 3.34 sociis 6.20
	lacrimis 10.2			" 3.24	
	" 12.16			" 6.16	
	" 16.32	patriæ 6.22		" 13.16	
	" 18.16			" 15.36	
	" 21.6			" 16.6	
	thalamo 15.16			" 16.44	
	animo 20.2			gradibus 16.42	
				foribus 3.36	
	dominam 7.6			" 16.18	
				" 18.24	
	pueri 3.10				
	opere 14.2				
	venere 14.16				
	zephyro 16.34				
	umero 20.44				
Bk. II.		folia 3.12			
Bk. III.	Sipylø 13.8	foliis 13.6	laqueis 32.48	pedibus 20.20	
	thalamo 7.14	solea 27.40		manibus 27.18	
	calamo 12.24	calice 31.40			
	dominæ 17.4	maria 11.16			
	Helena 32.88	tunica 27.26			
	memores 5.24				
	numeros 15.16				
Bk. IV.		calathos 12.30			
Bk. V.		tunicis 2.38			

From the table it will be clearly seen that Books II., IV., and V., have the fewest trisyllabic endings, one only (of *any* kind) occurring in each. That they were written, therefore, at about the same period, and, besides, even later than Books I. and III., seems to follow almost as a matter of necessity. I cannot at all agree, therefore, with Mr. Paley, who, in his recent edition, is inclined to invert this order, and ascribes Book V. to the earlier efforts of Propertius. The development is quite appreciable in the four poets. Catullus came earliest, wrote the fewest elegiacs [about 320 pentametric lines], and used all possible endings from one to seven syllables. [His seven-syllabled Amphitryoniades in 68.112 is indeed unique,

as also the enclitic *factaque sunt* in 76.8]; Tibullus and Propertius came later, wrote more [Tibullus 920, Propertius 2010], and were working down to the dissyllable by restrictions, as here shown; Ovid finished the series, wrote the most, and established the rule.

There remain, however, in the table *two* exceptions to the canon. These two I shall take in order.

I.

I. 3.34 :—Sic ait, in *molli fixa toro* CUBITUM.

On this line Mr. Paley remarks: "This verse is faulty, not so much from ending with a word of three syllables, as from having no counterbalancing epithet in the former part." Does Mr. Paley mean to say that every pentameter is faulty which has not in the former part a counterbalancing epithet to *every* noun in the 'hinder' part? Are then the following verses, among scores of similar ones, to be condemned as faulty?

- I. 9.16 Insanus medio flumine quæris aquam.
- 13.6 Certus et in nullo quæris amore moram.
- II. 9.48 Ille vir in medio fiat amore lapis.
- III. 4.6 Aut possim Ismaria ducere valle feras.
- 6.6 Interdum tunica duxit operta moram.

Or, to take an instance of a construction somewhat similar to that of the verse in question, we have :—

- IV. 8.22 Corruit ipse suo saucius ense latus.

Mr. Paley's *feel* for the rhythm of the pentameter has led him to attempt to explain, or account for, this faulty verse, and it says something for his scholarship that he should have felt this precisely in the *only* case where Propertius deviates from his rule; but he has generalized too hastily, and his explanation is quite wide of the mark. The line is faulty, *not* because of the want of counterbalancing epithet, [what would he have, *aduncum*?] but because it does not contain a liquid, and therefore was

too *hard* for the pentameter ending as Propertius heard it.

Of course it is well enough known that in general, and indeed in the great majority of cases, an epithet is found in the former part, as Mr. Paley has it, but it is not to be looked for *always*.

[Having formulated the principle however (of the counterbalancing epithet), it is a pity that Mr. Paley did not adhere to it throughout as a guiding light; at all events, ex. gr., in the two following passages. In the first I. 20.14, his edition in the teeth of all the edd. (except Hertzberg) violates this principle, and *pari passu* does a violence to the structure of the language. His text is as follows:

I. 20.14:—

Ne tibi sit—durum!—montes et frigida saxa,
Galle, neque EXPERTO semper adire lacus,
Quæ miser ignotis error perpessus in oris
Herculis indomito fleverat Ascanio.

Here, according to Mr. Paley, the construction is—

tibi, ... *experto* (*ea*) *qua*, ...

But surely, *experto* *could not* stand thus, separated from *tibi* and without its régime *ea*.

The other texts, of Lachmann, Keil, Müller, &c., have *expertos*, the counterbalancing epithet to *lacus*, which, as Lachmann would say, is no doubt 'unice verum.'

Again, in II. 6. 20, where Lachmann and Müller read—

Nutritus DURÆ, Romule, lacte lupæ,

Mr. Paley has neglected his maxim and given the faulty (?) verse:—

Nutritus DURO, Romule, lacte lupæ.

Hertzberg (as Mr. Paley says) compares V. 4. 52; but there the counterbalancing epithet is right, viz. :—

Nutrit INHUMANÆ dura papilla lupæ.

But the very parallel shews that the reading in II. 6. 20, should be *duræ lupæ*, the "*inhumanæ lupæ*" of V. 4. 52. The *papilla* may be *dura*, but what sense is to be given to *duro*, as applied to *lacte*, one does not see. How will Mr. Paley translate it? (An irreverent friend has suggested *cream-cheese*, which perhaps, under the circumstances, is what the Germans would call *zu gewagt!*). Müller suggests "*crudo*."

The subject is fertile enough, but is beyond my present purpose.]

The verse is a faulty Propertian verse, not for the reason Mr. Paley alleges, but because it is a Propertian *Solecism*, being [if we omit *Sociis* in I. 6. 20, on which vide *infra*] in all the 2000 pentameters of Propertius absolutely the ONLY single case in which a trisyllabic ending has not a liquid.

II.

The other apparent exception to the rule here established is in I. 6. 20, where there seems to be a universal agreement of editors in giving "*sociis*" as the final of a pentameter. The foregoing canon here established is, however, adhered to so strictly by Propertius, that I should be inclined to oppose the admission of the irregular trisyllable on even slighter grounds than I seem to myself to have. The passage is as follows:—

I. 6.20 Tu patrui meritis conare anteire secures
Et vetera oblitis jura refer sociis.

To that ending, as an ending, I demur, in limine. Apart from the principle, however, I do not think the two lines of the elegiac harmonize. Here are two imperatives, '*do thou endeavour to surpass thy uncle, AND do thou bring back old laws to the allies who have forgotten them,*' conare et refer—which the *et* joins very lamely. Besides, those laws are evidently assumed to be laws beneficial to the allies. Was it likely then that the allies *could* have forgotten them? It is hardly probable. On the other hand, the *place* where they were administered might have

forgotten them from disuse, and that is what I think the poet said. Now it will not be denied that the connection between *forum* and *jus* is a very common and a very natural one. Here then is a passage from Propertius himself, which I beg to submit as being a strong argument in favour of the correctness of the reading I adopt. The parallelism at all events is striking.

Compare IV. 9. 24,

Quum tibi Romano dominas in honore SECURES
Et liceat medio *ponere jura* FORO, &c.

with I. 6. 20,

Tu patruī meritas conare anteire *securēs*
Et vetera oblitis jura referre *foris*.

And now the *et* assumes its proper co-ordinate connective force, the two infinitives being dependent on the imperative *conare*: "let it be thy aim to wield (even yet more admirably than thy uncle) the axe of the executive, and to restore to the courts their legislative functions."

Here then I stand by the reading quoted by Barth in loco, and adopted by Weise apparently alone of all the modern editors.

As to the probable worth of the source from whence this reading is taken there is not much certainty, but Lachmann's note on this reading (which he condemns) is as follows:—

"Jura referre foris sic vetus codex Perreji. Vaticanus secundus, Heinsius et Burmanni alter, nescio an e Vallæ libro; de conjectura enim non videtur positum."

This last clause seems intended as a corrective of what Lachmann had said in reference to this vetus codex, &c. in the preface (p. xi, sqq.), viz. :—

"Præter septem hosce nihil mali a correctorum Italorum temeritate passos unus commemoratur B. Vallæ

liber antiquissimus, cujus scripturas, quas a F. Puccio anno 1502 annotatas haberet, si L. Santenius apponere voluisset, haud paullo rectius, ni fallor, de multarum lectionum fonte et origine judicare possemus; quamquam cautione vel in his F. Puccii *excerptis* adhibendis opus erit, quem multa DE CONJECTURA CUM SUA TUM ALIENA REPOSUISSE non suspicor sed certe scio. Nunc cum Puccii opera nobis carendum esset, hic, quæ ex A. Perreji *excerptis* notantur, usi sumus, caute tamen cum præter Puccii librum alios quoque eosque non leviter passim interpolatos adhibuerit, in quibus et Vaticanorum primum ac secundum fuisse existimo."

According to Kuinoel (I. p. 47) *referre foris* was edited by Broukhusius, from an emendation of Heinsius, instead of the *sonis* of some codices.

This *sonis* Heinsius in his notes to Ovid Fast. I. 287, II. 532, altered into *foris*; Kuinoel adds, 'idque invenit confirmatum a cod. Ant. Perreii, Vat. sec. et duobus meis. Adoptata autem Heinsii conjectura *iura referre foris* intelligendum erit de conventibus quos agere solebant magistratus provinciales, idque *forum* vel *conventum* agere, aut *indicare* vocabant.... Hemsterhusius tamen veteram scripturam *iura refer sociis* propugnat, et Vulpius Heinsii correctionem se ideo repudiare notat, quia efficax magis et concinnum *iura refer*, quam *conare referre* tanquam si res esset dubii eventus. Potius Heinsii apponendum erat, *oblitos socios* rectius dici quam *oblitos foris*; quæ si displiceant, forte *obtritis foris* substitui posset in quibus leges et iura iacuerant proculcata, obsoleta et velut situ obducta.... Revocanda est vetus lectio: *referre sociis*. Præcedenti versu cur diceret: *conare anteire*, gravis erat caussa; eleganter enim ad laudem Tulli patris pertinet, cuius imperium tam fuit iustum, at vix sperare possit, alium successorem ad eandem laudem facile perventurum. Verum hic si Tullo dicat, *conare vetera iura referre*, diffidere se amici virtuti ostendet, quod certe absurdum, et ab elegantia Propertii alienum.'

The very fact of Hemsterhuis suggesting *obtritis foris* shews a desire on his part to preserve the *foris*, even at the cost of an altogether unfounded alteration *obtritis*, the Latinity of which in this sense is extremely questionable. He supports 'obterere' by two quotations, viz. :—

Ovid Met. x., 6. '*obtrita* consuetudo,' for *desueta* ;

Cic. Verr. v., 1. '*obterere* laudem imperatorum,' for *carpere*, *imminuere*, neither of which, I submit, justifies Hemsterhuis' version of the proposed substitution '*obtritis foris*.'

As to the last sentence of his argument, viz., that Propertius would not say *conare vetera iura referre*, lest he should seem to be distrusting his friend's *virtus*, it is easy to reply that the task of bringing into actual workable order the law courts of a disorganized country has ever been a task of sufficient magnitude to obviate the possible charge of want of *virtus* in case of failure. So one might retort this æsthetic side of Hemsterhuis' argument by simply emphasizing the '*vetera iura referre*,' "and the Herculean task of re-organizing judicial procedures do thou attempt."

But it is not necessary to retort even ingenuities. If there were an authoritative MS., its statement, of course, would be accepted *quand même* ; failing that, the balance of probability is undeniably in favour of a dissyllable against *such* a trisyllable as *sociis*, unless overwhelming linguistic evidence to the contrary should be forthcoming.

ROBERT ATKINSON.

EURIPIDEA.

Frag. 357 (Nauck). ERECTHEUS.

πολλάκις

ναῦς ἢ μεγίστη κρεῖσσον ἢ μικρὸν σκάφος.

The sentiment of this verse is plainly not satisfactory.
Herwerden suggests—

ναὸς μεγίστης κρεῖσσον ἢν μικρὸν σκάφος.

But would it not be much simpler to read

πολλάκις

ναῦς ἢ μεγίστη κρεῖσσον ἢν μικρὸν σκάφος·

This gives the sense one naturally expects, ‘Often-times has a little barque proved better than a great ship.’

388. THESEUS.

κάρα τε γάρ σου συγγέω κόμαις ὁμοῦ,
βανῶ πέδοι δ’ ἐγκέφαλον, ὁμμάτων δ’ ἄπο
αἵμοσταγεῖς πρηστήρες ρεύσονται κάτω.

Read for the last line—

αἵμοσταγῇ πρηστήρε ρεύσονται κάτω.

The vigour of the passage is thus much improved, while the metre is set right. The “twin streams of blood” call up a picture quite in harmony with the rest of the fragment. The substitution of the plural for the dual is a very common mistake; compare, for instance, frag. 848.

δοῖς δὲ τοὺς φύσαντας μὴ τιμᾶν θέλῃ,

where the obvious correction is τῶ φύσαντε.

406. INO.

νόμοι γυναικῶν οὐ καλῶς κεῖνται πέρι,
χρὴν γὰρ τὸν εὐτυχοῦνθ’ ὅπως πλείστας ἔχειν
γυναῖκας, εἴπερ * τροφή δόμοις παρῇν,

Pflugk conjectures—

εἴπερ ἐν δόμοις τροφή παρῆν.

Nauck—

εἴπερ δώμασιν τροφή παρῆν.

But, if either of these corrections be right, whence arose the corruption? This would be accounted for if for τροφή in v. 3, were read παρατροφή. This word is not found in our dictionaries, but might, of course, stand beside παρατρέφω and παράτροφος. The παρα- in παρατροφή fell out, we may suppose, by reason of its juxtaposition with a syllable so closely resembling it as the last syllable of εἴπερ. The word would exactly express the 'keep' of these additional wives. When Plutarch speaks of concubines *living with* the wives, the word he uses is παρατρέφεισθαι.

584. PALAMEDES.

Ἀγάμεμνον, ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι χρήματα
μορφήν ἔχουσι.

Cf. Juv. XIII. 34,

Quas habeat *veneres* aliena pecunia.

The plural verb shows that χρήματα means the coins in the hand, the "splendid shillings," which the attribution of beauty endows with a sort of personality.

779. PHAETHON.

Ἰεὶ δ' ἐφ' ἑπτα Πλειάδων ἔχων δρόμον.

This use of ἔχων seems to me to defend the reading of the MS. ἔχουσαι in a parallel passage of the Bacchae, 1089, 1090,

ἦξαν πελείας ὠκύτητ' οὐχ ἥσσονες,
ποδῶν ἔχουσαι συντόνοισι δρομήμασι,

where I render ἔχουσαι, *holding their course, pushing on*, and reject Schöne's conjecture, τρέχουσαι.

ἔχων is used in both cases in the same sense as in the common phrase ληρεῖς ἔχων, *you keep on trifling*.

813. PHOENIX.

ὦ φιλόζωοι βροτοί,
οἳ τὴν ἐπιστείχουσιν ἡμέραν ἰδεῖν

ποθείτ' ἔχοντες μυρίων ἄχθος κακῶν
 αὐτως ἔρως βροτοῖσιν ἔγκειται βίου.
 τὸ ζῆν γὰρ ἴσμεν, τοῦ θανεῖν δ' ἀπειρία
 πᾶς τις φοβεῖται φῶς λιπεῖν τόδ' ἡλίου.

Does this bear a merely fortuitous resemblance to the doctrine of Hamlet:

Who would fardels bear
 To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
 But that the dread of something after death,
 puzzles the will,
 And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
 Than fly to others that we know not of?

819. PHRIXUS.

γυνή γὰρ ἐν κακοῖσι καὶ νόσοις πόσει
 ἡδιστόν ἐστι, δώματ' ἦν οἰκῇ καλῶς,
 ὀργὴν τε πραΰνουσα καὶ δυσθυμίας
 ψυχὴν μεθιστᾷ· ἡδὺν κἀπάται φίλων.

This fragment is an instance rare in Euripides of appreciation of the attractive side of the female character, and somewhat recalls in its tone the oft-quoted lines of Scott:

When pain and anguish wring the brow,
 A ministering angel thou.

830. PHRIXUS.

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν,
 τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστὶ ; πλὴν ὅμως βροτῶν
 νοσοῦσιν οἱ βλέποντες, οἱ δ' ὀλωλότες
 οὐδὲν νοσοῦσιν, οὐδὲ κέκτηνται κακά.

v. 2. 'πλὴν ὅμως, verba corrupta,' says Nauck. But πλὴν is quite essential. This fine passage may be set right by reading ὅσον for ὅμως in v. 2, πλὴν ὅσον means 'except in so far as,' that is, perhaps the only difference is one in favour of the dead, namely, that in death

We end

The heartache and the thousand natural shocks
 That flesh is heir to.

957. INCERT.

ὁ βίος γὰρ ὄνομ' ἔχει πόνος γεγώς.

"βίος malim" is Nauck's only comment, but surely the line ran :

βίου γὰρ ὁ βίος ὄνομ' ἔχει πόνος γεγώς,

"For life has but the name of life, though it is in sooth one long labour."

981. INCERT.

ἀλλ' ἔστι κεί τις ἐγγεῖλᾳ λόγῳ,

Ζεὺς καὶ θεοὶ βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθῃ.

Nauck inserts τῶμῳ before λόγῳ, but again I must ask, whence came the corruption in that case? Read :

ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἔστι κεί τις ἐγγεῖλᾳ λόγῳ.

The *most frequent* mistake of copyists, is the omission of two exactly similar words in juxtaposition. Cf. frag. 288, οὐκ εἰσὶν, οὐκ εἶσ'.

1008. INCERT.

δούλοισι γάρ τε ζῶμεν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι.

On this fragment Nauck's comment is "versus non-dum emendatus." But we can easily see what the poet must have said, when we read the whole of the passage in which the fragment is preserved. The passage is as follows: ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ οἰκέται τῶν δεσποτῶν τοὺς πόνους διαλύουσι τῇ θεραπείᾳ, λυσιπόνους αὐτοὺς ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης δούλοισι—ἐλεύθεροι'. Thus, the meaning is "it is by means of slaves that we are enabled to live as gentlemen," and the verse should be read :

δούλοισι γάρ τοι ζῶμεν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι.

1045. INCERT.

δεινὴ μὲν ἀλκὴ κυμάτων θαλασσίων,

δειναὶ δὲ ποταμῶν καὶ πυρὸς δεινοῦ πνοαί,

δεινὸν δὲ πενία, δεινὰ δ' ἄλλα μυρία,

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν οὕτω δεινὸν ὡς γυνὴ κακόν

οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο γράμμα τοιοῦτον γραφῆ,
οὐδ' ἂν λόγος δείξειεν· εἰ δέ του θεῶν
τόδ' ἐστὶ πλάσμα, δημιουργὸς ὦν κακῶν
μέγιστος ἴστω καὶ βροτοῖσι δυσμενής.

The last three lines recall Hamlet's invective against the players that "have so strutted and bellowed, that I have thought some of nature's journeymen had made men and not made them well, they imitated humanity so abominably." A similar expression is used in frag. 978,

τέκτων γὰρ ὦν ἔπρασσεσ οὐ ξυλουργικά.

[I may here remark, that Shakspeare seems to think that *abominable* is connected etymologically with *ab* and *homo*. In *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act v. Scene 1, Holofernes condemns the Euphuist Don Adrião de Armado, for not pronouncing the *b* in *doubt* and *debt*, and the *h* in *abominable*; "I abhor such rackers of orthography as to speak *dout* fine when he should say *doubt*, *det* when he should pronounce *debt*. . . this is *abominable*, which he would call *abbominable*." It seems to me, therefore, that Shakspeare thought that the pronunciation *abominable*, disguised the true origin of the word just as the ordinary pronunciation of *doubt* and *debt* disguises the etymology of those words, and that if pronounced according to its etymology it should be pronounced *abhominable*. Hence, I believe, that in the passage from Hamlet quoted above, *abominably* means *inhumanly*, ἀπανθρώπως, and that when Shakspeare says of the players "they imitated *humanity* so *abominably*," he means, "they imitated *humanity* so *inhumanly*, in a manner so unlike humanity or nature." Indeed, whenever *abominable* occurs in the plays of Shakspeare, it lends itself, more or less, to the signification of *unnatural*, *inhuman*. It is applied once to Caliban, and often to Gloster].

1117. INCERT.

The Choral Ode commencing at the 49th verse of this fragment is written by a scribe utterly unacquainted

with the Greek metres, and furnishes good examples of many of the ordinary sources of depravation in MSS. The verses from 49 to 63 owe their corruption, firstly, to the introduction of copious glosses and marginal notes, such as οὔτος in v. 49, κοιράνου, v. 52, Δανάην, v. 53, ἐν παρθενῶσι, v. 59, Ἀκρίσιον, v. 62; secondly, to the corrections of the scribe, (as for instance μήποτ' ὥφελ' for μήτ' ὥφελεν, v. 55), as well as frequent transposition of words so as to gain an *ordo verborum* closer to the prose usage; and, thirdly, to the pertinacity with which certain of the ancient copyists torture into a *senarius* any verse which seems in any way susceptible of such manipulation.

I give first the verses as they are printed in Nauck's edition:—

τίς ὁ καινοτρόπος οὔτος μῦθος	
κατ' ἐμὴν ἦκεν ἀκουάν;	50
ἐνθ' ἀσπερχές μενεαίνουσα	
τοῖσδε δώμασι κοιράνου ἀμφίδοξος πελάζω	
τίς δεσπότην ἐμὴν Δανάην	
βάξιος ἔχει κατὰ πτόλιν;	
ἦν μήποτ' ὥφελ' εἰς ὧτα φέρειν	
ὁ πρῶτος τάδε φράσαι τολμήσας,	
ὡς ἐγκύμων εἵληπται χρανθεῖς ἄλεκτρος	
ἀνδρός· πατήρ δέ μιν κλήσας	
ἐν παρθενῶσι σφραγῖσι δέμας φυλάσσει.	
ταῦτ' ἐτήτυμα μαθεῖν θέλω.	60
ἀλλ' εἰσορῶ γὰρ τύραννον χθονὸς τῆσδ'	
Ἀργείας Ἀκρίσιον πρὸ δόμων στείχοντα,	
ὀργῇ βαρὺς, ὡς δόξαι, κέαρ.	

The verses may have run thus:

τίς ὁ καινοτρόπος μῦθος κατ' ἐμὴν
 ἦκεν ἀκουάν; ἐνθ' ἀσπερχές
 μαιμῶσα δόμοις τοῖσδε πελάζω.
 δέσποιναν ἐμὴν
 τίς πόλιν ἴσχει κατά βάξιος;
 ἦν μήτ' ὥφελεν εἰς ὧτα φέρειν

ὁ φράσαι πρῶτος τάδε τολμήσας,
 ὡς εἰληπται Δανάη χρανθεῖς
 ἀνδρὸς ἄλεκτρος κλήσας δὲ πατὴρ
 δέμας ἐν σφραγίσσι φυλάσσει.
 ἀλλ', ἐσορῶ γάρ, τῇσδε τύραντος
 χθονὸς Ἀργείας πρὸ δόμων στείχει,
 βαρὺς, ὡς δόξαι, κέαρ ὀργῇ.

I regard *μενεαίνουσα* and *ἀμφίδοξος* as being both rival explanations of *μαιῶσα*; the scribe having inserted *Δανάη* above as an explanation of *δέσποιναν ἐμὴν*, omitted the name here where it is plainly necessary; *ἐγκύμων* is a gloss on *χρανθεῖς*; *ἐν παρθενῶσι* is a gloss on *ἐν σφραγίσσι*; v. 60 is inserted as a sort of recapitulation of the question above, and is quite inappropriate. That *στείχοντα*, v. 62, is wrong, is shown by the case of *βαρὺς* in the following line, though otherwise one would have expected rather

ἀλλ' ἐσορῶ γάρ πρὸ δόμων στείχοντ'.

The following notes are *δεύτεραι φροντίδες* on the *Bacchae*.

v. 36.

καὶ πᾶν τὸ θῆλυ σπέρμα Καδμείων, ὅσαι
 γυναῖκες ἦσαν, ἐξέμηνα δωμάτων.

We know that the Theban women who fled to the hills under the impulse of the Bacchic frenzy included unmarried women, as is shown by v. 694,

νῆαι, παλαιαί, παρθένοι τ' ἔτ' ἄζυγες.

We must choose then between two explanations of *γυναῖκες*. Either it means *adult women*, whether married or not, a sense which I believe the word cannot bear; or it must be taken in a *quasi-pleonastic* sense, "all the female Thebans, every woman of them." The Master of Trinity, Cambridge, among many valuable suggestions, kindly communicated to me since the publication

of my edition of the *Bacchae*, has observed that my view is strengthened by the fact, that ἦσαν is written, not εἶσι.

V. 71.

τὰ νομισθέντα γὰρ αἰὲ Διόνυσον ὑμνήσω.

The corresponding line in the strophe, is

κάματόν τ' εὐκάματον, Βάκχιον εὐαζόμενα,

to which in the Aldine θεόν is added at the end of the verse. As one of the verses, therefore, must be wrong, would it not be more philosophical to suspect the verse which contains such a metrical monster as ὑμνήσω with the first syllable short? I believe with Nauck, that ὑμνήσω is a gloss on some word meaning 'I celebrate,' perhaps κελαδῶ; or κελαδήσω, if the θεόν of the Aldine in the strophic verse be supposed sound. The passages in which our vocal organs are required to perform the gymnastic feat of pronouncing a vowel short before μν, either are not decisive on the point, or admit of easy correction. For instance, in the passage in Pind. *Nem.* IV. 83 (135),

αὐγὰς ἔδειξεν ἀπάσας ὕμνος δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν,

the syllable corresponding to the first syllable of ὕμνος is long elsewhere in the ode as well as short; and can it be supposed, that Pindar, who uses ὕμνος hundreds of times should make it short once and once only?

So the passage in *Æsch. Pers.* 281, where

δυσαιανῇ βοάν

answers to the antistrophic

μεμνήσθαι τοι πάρα,

can hardly be regarded as decisive, unless it be held that an anacrusis cannot be long in strophe and short in antistrophe. This often happens in Sophocles and Euripides, and I do not see why it should not happen in Aeschylus; but I do see why the first syllable of μεμνήσθαι should not be short.

Mr Davies' simple change of ὑμνωδεῖ to μονωδεῖ in *Agam.* 990 disposes of the difficulty there, and few, I think, will with Hermann read πολὺμναστον in *Ag.* 1459,

especially as Mr. Davies has pointed out that the word is most probably a gloss on ἐριμνάστευτος, Heimsoeth's admirable correction of ἐρίδματος. If any part of the beginning or the end of Iph. Aul. be sufficient to prove a metrical usage, then from it can be established the violation of the pause, and the admissibility of the anapaest after the first foot. The εὐύμνος of Epicharmus may be dismissed in the words of Enger's note on ὑμνωδεῖ in the Agam.: "nihil his locis aperte corruptis tribuendum."

V. 200.

ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀπάντων βούλεται τιμὰς ἔχειν
κοινὰς, διαιρῶν δ' οὐδὲν αὖξασθαι θέλει.

I give up διαιρῶν and read διαριθμῶν for the *Vulg.* δι' ἀριθμῶν. In the passive voice διαριθμεῖν is found in Aeschines (83, 32), meaning *to be distinguished*; I therefore do not see why Eur. should not have used διαριθμῶν οὐδὲν in the sense of *making no distinction* (that is, between young and old, as the previous lines show). I allow that, in this sense, the middle is more usual. The *vulg.* I still cannot accept for these reasons: δι' ἀριθμῶν should then stand in antithesis to ἐξ ἀπάντων, and should mean (to use the words of Mr. Jebb, in a very kind notice of my edition in the *Dark Blue* for July, 1871) "in the way of ἀριθμοί"; that is, *by ἀριθμοί*, definite, limited *numbers* or sections of worshippers, separated from the rest of the world by special differences." Now, I crave leave to ask, how can ἀριθμοί mean *numbers*, except in the sense of units 1, 2, 3, &c.; and, if it could, how are we to bridge over the chasm between *numbers* and *sections*. λόγων ἀριθμὸν means a *mere set* of words, and ἀριθμὸς ἄλλως means a *mere lot*, and we have in Heracl. 997,

οὐκ ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλ' ἐτητύμως,
ἀνδρ' ἄντα.

But all these usages are just the same in meaning as the well-known

Non numerus sumus et fruges consumere nati,
and will anyone contend that it would be correct to write

in Latin *ab omnibus non a numeris Deus vult coli?* Yet *numerus* might be explained as meaning a *detachment*, a sense which ἀριθμός does not bear. ἀριθμός may mean *a mere unit* or *a mere collection of units*, but Teiresias does not want to say the god will not be honoured by a mere collection of units; what he says is, "though old I shall join in the revels, for the god has laid down no distinction as to whether the young or the old are to compose his θλασος, no, he wishes to have *all* without any nice distinctions of age for his votaries."

v. 261.

ὅπου βότρυος ἐν δαιτὶ γίγνεται γάνος.

This is not spurious, as is shown by the ἐν in the next line. The meaning is, as pointed out by Mr. Jebb, "there are some ὄργια in which women can bear a part without reproach (*e.g.* the Orphic and the Cabeirian); but when wine comes in *then no longer* is this the case."

vv. 286—306.

Mr. Jebb believes that these verses bracketed by me, as well as 285, 285 bracketed by Dindorf, "are genuine, if anything in Aeschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides, is genuine." Now the sceptical story of the son of Semele is, that the infant was consumed by the thunderbolt which blasted his mother for falsely asserting that she had enjoyed the embrace of Zeus; and this is the version fitly put into the mouth of Pentheus, v. 244. But the story told by believers is that to which the Chorus refer in vv. 520—530, that Zeus rescued the infant from the fire which consumed Semele, placed him in his thigh for concealment (whence they derive Διθύραμβος from Διὸς θύρα, because he entered, as it were, a door in the side of Zeus), and afterwards committed him to the care of Dirke. The difficulty then consists in this:—that if this passage 286—297 is sound, Euripides puts into the mouth of Teiresias (who, as well as the Chorus, is all along an exponent of the views of the believers), a theory explaining away the myth in which the Chorus express

their belief. Mr. Jebb defends the passage, by ascribing to Teiresias "a rationalism, which, holding the substance of faith, seeks to purge it of gross accidents." "The form," says Mr. Jebb, "of the popular story is, he (Teiresias) allows, absurd. But the story itself is essentially true. Dionysius *is* the son of Zeus; Zeus *did* save him from Here; a jumble of *μηρός* and *ὄμηρος* was the source of the grotesque popular legend." All this shows that the verses *might* be sound, that there is a theory on which they might fitly be put into the mouth of Euripides; but is it consistent with the character of Teiresias, the aged believer, who had said above, v. 200,

οὐδὲν σοφίζομεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσι,

that he should propound a theory ignored by the Chorus in the whole of the second antistrophe of the parode, and afterwards in vv. 520—530? Would the believing Chorus, who are continually condemning rationalism, and whose aspiration is

τὸ πλῆθος ὅτι τὸ φαυλότερον

ἐνόμισε χρῆται τε, τόδε τοι λέγοιμ' ἄν,

look on the rationalism of Teiresias with more favour than on the scepticism of Pentheus?

Mr. Jebb, moreover, has addressed himself only to the objections levelled against the passage as interrupting the natural train of thought. The quality of the diction must, in the last resort, be a matter of opinion; but on the diction of vv. 291—295, one would be glad to have the opinion of a scholar so well qualified to form a judgment as Mr. Jebb. To Dindorf it appeared, "*inepta confusa omninoque non Euripidea*;" the etymologising, too, of the whole passage suggests rather the ponderous exegesis of the Alexandrine school than the hasty allusive word-play of Euripides.

v. 243 must, of course, seem unsound to one who disbelieves in the authenticity of vv. 286—297, and is it altogether of no weight as an argument against v. 243, that, unless emended, it interrupts the very grammatical

construction of the sentence of which it is supposed to form a part?

Is no weight, moreover, to be attached to the principle, that a speech in answer to another generally conforms, at least roughly,* to the first speech in its number of lines? Now the speech of Pentheus consists of 47 verses, the answer of Teiresias of 48, as arranged by Dindorf, of 42 as arranged by me, and of 62, if the whole of the suspected passage be pronounced sound.

v. 396.

τό τε μὴ θνατὰ φρονεῖν
βραχὺς αἰών.

βραχὺς αἰών is no doubt the *predicate*, the previous sentence must be taken in close connection. This has been pointed out in an able review by Mr. Sandys, of St. John's College, who compares *Iph. Taur.* 1122,

τὸ δὲ μετ' εὐτυχίαν κακοῦ-
-σθαι θνατοῖς βαρὺς αἰών.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ, *sc.* ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν.

v. 430.

τὸ πλήθος ὃ τι περ φαυλότερον
ἐνόμισε χρήταί τε τόδε τοι λέγοιμ' ἄν.

For *περ* I would read *τὸ*, Brunck's correction of the *τε* of *C a man. sec.* It suits the context better that the Chorus should say, "let me profess those opinions which the common-place public hold, and on which they act," than that they should say, "let me profess the common-place opinions held and acted on by the crowd."

v. 451.

μαίνεσθε· χειρῶν τοῦδ' ἐν ἄρκυσιν γὰρ ὦν
οὔκ ἐστιν οὕτως ὥκὺς ὥστε μ' ἐκφυγεῖν

C has a Scholium ἐμοῦ superscribed over τοῦδ'. This Schol. has been curiously neglected by all the editors of

* For instance, at v. 1202, the answer of Cadmus exceeds the speech of Agave by three verses.

the *Bacchae*. Yet I believe it is all important for the right understanding of the passage. "Ye are mad," says Pentheus, "once caught in the toils of my hands, he (Dionysus) is not so quick as to escape me." In my edition I have defended this interpretation sufficiently, as I think; however, it was not without satisfaction that I learned from my friend Mr. Mahaffy, who personally inspected C last spring, that C has the stop *a prima manu* after the word *μαίνεσθε*. Mr. Mahaffy's examination further goes to prove, that the negligence of De Furia's collation has been hitherto underrated. When I say that C has the stop *a prima manu*, I mean that there is not merely a stop which might have been inserted later, but the regular space for a stop between the words *μαίνεσθε* and *χειρῶν*, and in that space the mark of punctuation.

v. 506.

On this verse I accept Reiske's δ δρᾶς for ὀρᾶς. The line then runs:

οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι ζῆς οὐδ' ὁ δρᾶς οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ.

The argument on which I relied in my view of the verse was the fact that a line in the *Christus Patiens* begins ἀρ' εἰσέτι ζῆς, and that, unless εἰσέτι occurs here, it is not found in the dramas of Euripides from which Pseudo-Gregory composed his *cento*, and it is a word too rare to occur except supported by some passage. It is on this same principle that I read ἀρδὴν in v. 1352.

v. 737.

καὶ τὴν μὲν ἂν προσεῖδες εὐθηλον πόριν
μυκωμένην ἔχουσιν ἐν χειροῖν δίκη.

P. G. have δίχα. Elmsley's conjecture δίκη is objected to chiefly because the *plural*, not the *dual*, χειρῶν not χειροῖν, would be expected. But this objection rests, as it seems to me, on an erroneous interpretation of τὴν μὲν, as "one of the Maenads." If this were the meaning of τὴν μὲν, it would of course be absurd to use the dual, as the picture would then be *ex vi termini* vague. But when τὴν μὲν is

rightly understood as referring to Agave, *her*, the chief agent in the scene, the picture becomes definite and the dual appropriate.

v. 743.

ταῦροι δ' ὑβρισταὶ κὰς κέρας θυμούμενοι.

Does Euripides mean in this line to describe the action of the bull when he puts his head down and appears to look along his horns, or does he mean that the bulls "vented their rage on their horns?" The former seems much more probable, when we compare with this passage Hel. 1558,

κὰς κέρας παραβλέπων,

as well as the ὄμμα ταυρουμένην of the Medea, and the ὀξὺ κέρας δόχμωσεν of Nonnus. If Euripides ever observed at all this peculiar *pose* of the head of an angry bull (and that he did Hel. 1558 is a proof), the only difficulty in the way of supposing him to refer to it here is removed. If this view be correct, not only is this passage misunderstood by Virgil, Georg. III, 232, when he renders it *irasci in cornua discit Arboris obnixus trunco*, but by the unknown poet (perhaps Callimachus) quoted by Cicero ad Att. VIII. 5, 1, when he said, with this passage, no doubt, in his mind,

πολλὰ μάτην κεράεσσιν ἐς ἡέρα θυμήναντα.

v. 864.

δέραν

εἰς αἰθέρα δροσερόν

ρίπτουσ'.

I give up *δορὰν*, the phrase *ρίπτειν δέραν* being defended by Pindar's *ῥιψαύχενι σὸν κλόνω*, as Mr. Sandys has pointed out. I still believe, however, that *ρίπτειν δέραν* can be used with reference to women only by a metaphor, and when their gestures are compared to those of animals.

v. 986.

τίς ὃδε Καδμείων μάλιστα ὀριδρόμων.

The last word was proposed by Kirchhoff and by me

independently for the *ὀριοδρόμων* of P., and the *οὐριοδρόμων* of Ald. But Kirchhoff has not mentioned, and so, I suppose, had not observed (as neither had I myself) that that word, abundantly defensible from analogy, does not, however, rest on mere analogy, but has an actual existence in Nonnus Dion. v. 22. This, I take it, establishes beyond question the correctness of *ὀριδρόμων*, and this must be added to the other passages (*e.g.* vv. 457, 665, 1060) on which the paraphrase of Nonnus is decisive of the sense or reading.

v. 1383.

ἔλθοιμι δ' ὅπου
μήτε Κιθαιρῶν ἔμ' ὄρᾳ μιὰρὸς
μήτε Κιθαιρῶν' ὅσσοισιν ἐγώ,
μήθ' ὅθι θύρσου μνήμ' ἀνάκειται.

In this passage *ἔμ' ὄρᾳ* is, of course, the indicative mood not the subjunctive, as some suppose. This would be shewn by the meaning, even if *ἀνάκειται* did not follow; "let me go where there will be no Cithaeron looking down on me as there is here."

ROBERT YELVERTON TYRRELL.

ON THE KANTIAN THEORY OF EXTERNAL
PERCEPTION, AND OF THE PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY QUALITIES.

SIR William Hamilton, in his famous discussion of Theories of External Perception, classes the Kantian doctrine on this subject with the finer form of representation. The justice of this classification does not appear to have been called in question by subsequent writers. Mill, while vindicating for Brown, on much weaker grounds than exist in the case of Kant, a theory of immediate or presentative perception, seems content to abandon the latter philosopher to the Hamiltonian strictures. Mr. Mahaffy too, to judge from a passage in his volume on the "Deduction and Schematism of the Categories," would appear to take the same view. "We still hold," he says, p. 178, "in opposition to Sir William Hamilton and other Scotchmen, that external objects (in the common sense) are not presented to the mind, but represented by intuitions or modifications of our sensibility."

I propose in the present paper to show some reasons why I think this classification incorrect, and calculated to give a false impression both of Kant's philosophy in general and of his views on the question of External Perception in particular. In fact, his theory on this subject in many respects resembles Hamilton's own doctrine of Natural Realism, while its undoubted contrast to that scheme in others depends on metaphysical not psychological grounds.

In considering this question it may be well to examine in the first place in what sense the Kantian philosophy

as a whole may truly be termed one of representation, and then to endeavour to ascertain the teaching of that philosophy on the special question of the perception of an external world.

With respect now to the first of these questions, we are met at the outset by a verbal ambiguity. The word *Vorstellung*, which is so peculiarly characteristic of the Kantian system, may, as Mansel has observed, be rendered either presentation or representation. He seems, however, to be in the right in deciding for the latter. For in treating of the concept, Kant styles it "*die Vorstellung einer Vorstellung*," where "representation of a representation" seems the only admissible sense.

At the same time it is to be remarked that the word is seldom used by Kant with a genitive of an object, but usually by itself in the same manner as phenomena, a circumstance which is, I think, not without significance as regards the true character of his philosophy.

But, admitting Kant's system to be one of representation, the question arises, in what sense is it so, or, in other words, what is the represented correlate of the representations?

Now, following the analogy of a classification of Hamilton, we may perhaps regard representative theories in general as determined by three causes which are conceived to render direct presentation of objects impossible.

These are (1) the mind inhabiting the body is locally separate from its objects in space; (2) the perceiving mind differs in nature from its objects being spiritual while they are material; (3) the object as thing in itself or noumenon has an existence of its own apart from the mind, whilst that which is presented to the mind exists only relatively to it as phenomenon.

Now I wish to point out that the first two determinants here are physical and psychological, and give rise to representative theories of perception properly so called.

But the third, which is the basis of the Kantian system, is not physical or psychological, but metaphysical, and hence gives rise to a representational theory not of perception but of cognition. The represented correlate of the perception is not an object in space over against a percipient mind in the body, nor again matter as opposed to mind, but the unknown and unknowable Absolute or thing in itself as distinguished from the known and relative phenomenon. Such a theory can with no propriety be termed a representative theory of perception. For, in the first place, the representatum, or noumenon is not, and cannot be perceived at all. And in the second place, which is still more important as marking the true character of the theory as one of cognition not of perception, mental or internal phenomena are unequivocally asserted by Kant to be alike representative with external or spatial. Both are given us only in relation to the knowing subject; both accordingly are phenomena; neither noumena. In both the cognition is immediate as regards the actual perception, mediate only as regards the underlying ground or thing in itself. On the other hand, really representative theories of perception, *e.g.*, the Cartesian, contrast the immediacy of our knowledge of internal with the mediacy of our knowledge of external phenomena. In fact, this is one of the very grounds on which Hamilton maintains Reid's theory to have been one not of representation but presentation (*External Perception*, Note C, p. 823).

It appears, then, that the general scope of Kant's philosophy affords no ground, but rather the reverse, on which to attribute to him a representative theory of Perception, or, to use Hamilton's phrase, Cosmothetic Idealism. It remains to consider whether he has given any countenance to such a theory in those passages where he has more explicitly treated the subject of external perception. These are to be found mainly in the discussion of the Paralogisms of Psychology, in the 1st

edition, and especially in the Refutation of the Paralogism of Ideality and the general remarks which follow.

Now, at the outset of the Refutation of the Paralogism of Ideality, it strikes us as remarkable that, while Hamilton classifies Kant along with Descartes as a Cosmothetic Idealist, Kant states the aim of his discussion to be to controvert Descartes' doctrine on this very point, and to show that the problematical judgment of existence of an external world, which alone is possible in the Cartesian system, may be replaced by an assertoric in his own. With this aim he proceeds to point out that the phenomena of the external sense are attested by consciousness with the same clearness and immediacy as those of the internal. Thus p. 245 of the Appendix to Mr. Mahaffy's third volume we read, "But external objects are mere phenomena, and nothing at all but a species of my representations whose objects only exist through these representations, and apart from them are nothing. External things exist, therefore, just as much as I myself do, and both upon the immediate evidence of my self-consciousness, with this difference, that the representation of myself as a thinking subject is referred only to the internal sense, but the representations which denote extended existence are referred also to the external sense. With regard to the reality of external objects, I have just as little need of inference as with regard to the reality of the object of my internal sense (my thought), for they are both nothing but representations, the immediate perception of which is likewise a sufficient proof of their reality.*

* This passage, I conceive, affords a clue to Kant's meaning when he speaks of phenomena as representations in us. This expression is, I think, to be taken as equivalent to what is stated here, namely, that as phenomena they are relative to the knowing subject, and apart from it have no existence. In other words, it is a metaphysical or

transcendental, not a psychological relativity which Kant here, as elsewhere, has in view. It is, as it seems to me, the introduction of this relativity which markedly distinguishes the Kantian from preceding philosophies, and renders the famous classification of Hamilton, based as that is on merely psychological grounds, inapplicable to him.

But the phenomena of the external and internal senses, while resting alike on the basis of immediate perception, yet differ markedly in kind from each other. Thus, p. 252, "I who am represented through the internal sense as in time, and objects without me, are indeed phenomena totally distinct in kind, but need not therefore be thought as distinct things." And again, p. 258, "These," *i.e.*, the external and internal senses, "though united in one subject are nevertheless different in kind."

Lastly, Kant distinctly asserts that the data of perception are real in the sense of being given to not invented by us. "This material or real something," he writes, "which is to be intuited in space necessarily presupposes perception and cannot be in any way imagined or produced independently of this perception;" and again in the next page, "the real element in intuition cannot at all be obtained by a *priori* thinking."

Kant is thus seen to vindicate for the transcendental Idealist a position, as regards phenomena, closely akin to the Hamiltonian of Natural Realism. The phenomena of the internal and external senses are alike perceived immediately; the reality of the latter, then, is not an inference and, as such, uncertain, but is guaranteed by the immediate testimony of consciousness, as a reality relative indeed to, but not produced by, the perceiving subject.

At the same time these two classes of phenomena present in the field of experience wholly distinct characters; hence, again in striking agreement with Hamilton, the Kantian is not only a Natural Realist but an empirical dualist, though he abandons the problem of noumenal dualism as essentially insoluble.

We have thus in the Kantian system the independence, equipoise and antithesis of external and internal phenomena which Hamilton requires as conditions of a true philosophy of consciousness. Brown, on the other hand, though, as Mill has shewn, his theory may be truly

termed one of immediate perception, yet, failing to draw the distinction of phenomena and noumena, falls into empirical idealism in deducing the form of space from that of time.

But, further, it is remarkable that Kant, in one passage of his discussion seems to have had the representative hypothesis directly in view, and distinctly rejected it. The passage occurs p. 258. Speaking of the confusion which arises from hypostasizing the phenomena of the external sense, he says "The whole difficulty we have conjured up amounts to this: how, and through what cause, the representations of our sensibility are so related, that those which we call external intuitions can be represented as objects without us according to empirical laws. This question by no means contains the supposed difficulty of explaining* *how the representations arise from entirely heterogeneous efficient causes which are found without us*, a difficulty which is caused by our taking the phenomena of an unknown cause for the cause external to us, a procedure which can only occasion confusion. In these latter words Kant, it seems to me, clearly indicates the problem incumbent on Cosmothetic Idealism, while he shows at the same time how, by drawing the metaphysical distinction between phenomena and noumena, that problem ceases to exist for himself. The elaborate subsidiary machinery necessary, as Hamilton

* It will be seen, on referring to the original, that I have adopted in this clause a rendering different from that of Mr. Mahaffy. The words in the original are "den Ursprung der Vorstellungen von ausser uns befindlichen wirkenden Ursachen zu erklären," Mr. Mahaffy taking "Vorstellungen von.... Ursachen" together translates "representations of..... causes." It seems to me, however, that we obtain better sense if taking

Vorstellungen absolutely, which is, as I have remarked, Kant's usual practice, we render von by "from," so that the meaning will be "how the representations (those namely of external perception) originate fromcauses." This rendering has the further advantage of giving an intelligible reference to the word "heterogeneous," viz. to the representations, which we do not obtain in the other.

shews, to the Cartesian system, is seen to be as needless in the Kantian as in his own.*

The true difference between Hamilton and Kant is, as I intimated at the beginning, metaphysical not psychological, arising, not from difference of view respecting the nature of external perception, but from the fundamental difference of the two philosophies as respects the doctrine of Relativity. This doctrine was embraced by Kant in its fullest sense, that in which it stands opposed to Absolute, and forms indeed the very basis of his system. On the other hand, Hamilton, while also insisting strongly on the doctrine of relativity, has, as Mill's well-known chapter shews, left the sense in which he understood it extremely doubtful. At all events with respect to the philosophy of perception, the doctrine, if held at all by him, was held in a sense not excluding absolute knowledge. If we are to judge from the only passage (*Theory of Ext. Perception*, Note D, p. 866), where he has recognized the inconsistency in which his philosophy appears involved on this point, we should gather that by knowing the object relatively to us he meant knowing the relation in which it stands to us (in the case referred to that of a resisting force). Now, relativity in this sense is clearly not inconsistent with absolute knowledge. The thing in itself is really known, but partially only, in so far namely as it comes into contact with the knowing mind. If

* Throughout the whole of this discussion we feel keenly the want of terms clearly marking the distinction between external in the sense of existing in space, and in the sense of existing out of relation to the mind. Kant has indeed put us on our guard against this ambiguity, and has proposed to remedy it by substituting for external in the former sense "things which can be perceived in space." But it cannot be said that he has adhered to this plan, as he continues to use the term "external" of spatial phenomena, and employs the properly spatial term "without" in a transcendental sense. No doubt, and here lies the cause of the ambiguity, the outness or externality of objects in space was that which first suggested the conception of irrelative existence. But, once suggested, the latter conception is seen to be more fundamental and ought, for clearness of thinking, to have a distinct name.

this be the true view of Hamilton's doctrine on this point it would explain the fact noted by Mill, that while admitting all our knowledge to be phenomenal, he hardly ever speaks of things in themselves as contrasted with phenomena. For as so contrasted they would denote those qualities of things which stood in no relation to us, and would not therefore fall within the scope of philosophy at all. With Kant, on the other hand, for whom the thing in itself is not the unknown remainder of an object partially known, but a reality wholly unknown, yet everywhere underlying the known, the antithesis becomes all important. The difference of the two philosophies may partly, I think, be accounted for by the difference of their starting points. Starting from the Reidian controversy respecting External Perception, Hamilton dwells on the psychological distinction of self and not self, the mental and the material. Kant, on the other hand, starting from the problem of Hume, makes the keystone of his system the metaphysical distinction between phenomena and noumena, between objects relative and irrelative to the subject. This distinction Kant was, it seems to me, the first to draw out with clearness, thereby marking a new stage in philosophy. His firm grasp of it enables him both to vindicate the reality of our knowledge within the sphere of experience, and to explain the contradictions which arise when we attempt to transcend that sphere. By its aid he obtains a valid ground, on which to base the doctrine, evidently most vital in his eyes, of human freedom. And it is by its maintenance that he guards himself, an object of hardly less moment to him, on both sides from idealism. The older or empirical idealism of Descartes he combats, as we have seen, by showing that, once we allow the phenomenal character of all our perceptions, we are free to recognize a difference in kind within them; while to the later idealism of his own successors, he stands op-

posed by his refusal to deduce the unknown but existing noumenon from the subject.*

A question closely allied with the preceding is the Kantian view of the famous distinction of the primary and secondary qualities.

Consistently with his classification of Kant as a cosmthetic idealist, Hamilton charges him with not only ignoring but absolutely reversing this distinction, citing in proof of this charge a passage from the *Prolegomena*, p. 55. Postponing for a moment the consideration of this passage, we shall, I think, on turning to the transcendental *Æsthetic*, see reason to believe that the accusation is unfounded; and that Kant, though true to his metaphysical rather than psychological aim, he does not dwell on the distinction, yet fully admitted it.

The subject is referred to by Kant, though not by name, in the transcendental *Æsthetic*, in connexion with his remarks on the true nature of the ideality of space. Thus, p. 27, 2nd edition, he warns us against illustrating this ideality by that of the secondary qualities. These latter "must be contemplated, not as properties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes which may be different in different men. For in such a case, that which is originally a mere phenomenon, the rose for example, is taken by the empirical understanding for a thing in itself, though to every different eye in respect of its colour it may appear different."

Here Kant, while asserting the transcendental relativity of the primary qualities, yet vindicates for them a character physically absolute, as contrasted with the secondary. They are properties of things, the secondary

* I would not be understood as expressing an opinion as to the truth of the Kantian system. But its inner coherence and deep philosophic earnestness cannot, I think, be denied. It is, therefore, the less creditable to English metaphysicians that his doctrine should have been so grossly misrepresented on the two cardinal points, to which he attached not intellectual only, but moral importance, the solution of the Antinomies, especially that relating to the freedom of the will, and the refutation of idealism.

only changes of the subject. But a subsequent passage, occurring in his general remarks, p. 38, is still more decisive. "We call the rainbow a mere appearance or phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the rain the reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough if we understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense, as that which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of sensuous perception, is known in intuition to be so, and so determined and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum generally, and inquire, without reference to *its accordance with all our senses*, whether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object as a thing in itself, the question of the relation of the representations to the object is transcendental, and not only are the rain-drops mere phenomena, but even their circular form, nay the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our own sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us entirely unknown."

We have here, it appears to me, a complete recognition of the primary qualities as physically objective, whilst the secondary are physically subjective only. And we find Kant drawing that very Aristotelian distinction of common and proper sensibles, the identity of which, with the modern of primary and secondary qualities, Hamilton was himself the first to point out.

If now we turn to the passage cited by Hamilton from the *Prolegomena*, and read it in the light of those just quoted from the *Critick*, we shall see that it entirely fails to substantiate his charge. Kant there merely contends that, as the transcendental relativity of the secondary qualities which follows a fortiori from their physical relativity was yet compatible with the noumenal reality of external things, that noumenal reality would be unimpaired by the admission of the equal relativity in a transcendental sense of the primary qualities. But this

is quite compatible, as we have seen in the *Critick*, with a recognition of the difference between the two phenomenally considered. At the same time Kant does not here dwell on this latter distinction, his object being rather to assert the transcendental ideality of space than to guard against its misconception.

The ground of Hamilton's misunderstanding of Kant here is the same as in the theory of external perception, viz. that he fails to appreciate the Kantian distinction of phenomena and noumena. Hence he supposes that Kant, because he confined a *priori* knowledge to the primary qualities, regarded these as more subjective than the secondary, and thus reversed the true distinction. But this is to misconceive the true bearing of Kant's doctrine of space as a form of the mind. If we compare the note appended to the first Antinomy with the discussion of Idealism in the Paralogisms, we shall see that space as a form apart from objects is clearly asserted by Kant to be a mere possibility of intuition, which becomes actual only on the perception of objects. Thus, if objects as phenomena are rendered possible by space as a form of the mind, it is no less true, on the other hand, that space is rendered real and actual only by objects.

Kant might thus have adopted Hamilton's own language, that the primary qualities are at once "conceived as necessary and perceived as actual." Moreover, in his system these two aspects have a coherence which is not found in the Hamiltonian. As dependent on the general form of space lying a *priori* in the mind as a possibility of intuition the primary qualities are conceived as necessary; as special determinations of space thus and thus determined in intuition they are perceived as actual. With Hamilton, on the other hand, the doctrine of the empirical perception of extension, which forms a part of his own scheme of Natural Realism, is somewhat incongruously blended with that of the *a priori* nature of space as a form of the mind which he accepted from Kant.

I have thus endeavoured to shew that Kant's philosophy possesses, besides its idealistic, a marked realistic side. This aspect, on which Mr. Mahaffy was the first strongly to insist, in opposition to Kant's later German expositors, has not yet, I think, received the attention it deserves. It may be that I have in some cases exaggerated this element in the Kantian system, and not given sufficient weight to counter passages. But its existence seems to me unquestionable. Ignoring it, we become wholly unable to understand the earnestness with which Kant repels Idealism, and his views on this point, instead of blending harmoniously, as they do, with the rest of his system, present the appearance of a clumsy after-thought, if not of disingenuous sophistry. Recognising it, on the other hand, we see in Kant not an abstract speculator delighting in revolting paradox, but an earnest-minded philosopher, who, though intrepidly carrying out the doctrine of Relativity, and rejecting Hamilton's appeal to common sense, yet possessed for the deep-seated convictions of mankind a reverence no less genuine than his.

FREDERICK PURSER.

ON AN ATTEMPT TO RESTORE A LOST
UNCIAL MS. OF THE GOSPELS.

AMONGST the cursive MSS. of the Gospels there are a few (about half-a-dozen) which stand apart from the rest, distinguished by their general affinity to the more ancient uncials. Three of these have long attracted the particular attention of critics, in consequence of the peculiarity of some of their readings; these are the MSS. known as 13, 69 and 124, preserved respectively at Paris, Leicester and Vienna. The most superficial study of Tischendorf's *apparatus criticus* is sufficient to show that there is some close connection between these three. To these we must add 346 (in the Ambrosian library at Milan), hitherto imperfectly known, but which an accurate collation has shown to be even more closely related to 13 than either of the others. 69 is of the 14th century, the other three belong to the 12th.

The most striking peculiarity of these MSS. is their placing the narrative of the woman taken in adultery not in its usual place in John viii., but after Luke xxi. In this they as yet stand alone.* This is, however, but one of a great number of coincidences which naturally suggest the question whether they may not be ultimately derived from the same original. This was long ago suggested by Birch, the Danish collator, with regard to 69 and 124 (with which alone he was acquainted), but he rejects the idea. His words are: "Hic codex inter omnes Bibl. Cæs. libros MS. N.T. singularium lectionum copia

* I take this opportunity of correcting an error of Scholz. He mentions cod. 63 among those which contain the *pericopa de adultera*. On the contrary, it omits the passage.

eminet, codici Leicestriensi in multis ita similis, ut ambo ex uno apographo exscriptos crederem, nisi aliis in locis plura in Leicestriensi codice non obvia, in hoc observassem."

Griesbach, in his *Symbolæ Criticæ*, throws out a similar suggestion respecting 13 and 69, but in consequence of many differences which cannot be attributed merely to a copyist, concludes, "dubitari non potest ex diversis, licet propinqua cognatione conjunctis, exemplaribus utriusque libri textum transcriptum esse." These objections, however, both of Birch and Griesbach, only apply to the hypothesis of an immediate derivation from one original. The connection of 346 with 13 is at least equally striking.

The late lamented Professor Ferrar, of Trinity College, Dublin, was the first who undertook to test this hypothesis of a common origin by a careful critical examination of the four MSS. This examination added largely to the number of ascertained coincidences, some being very singular. It will suffice to mention one of these here. In Luke xxi. 25, 26, we find in 13, 69, and 346, ἡχους θαλάσσης καὶ σάλου ἀπὸ ψυχῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων (for ἀποψυχόντων ἀνθρώπων). 124, if from the same original, has corrected this singular blunder. On the whole, if the hypothesis of a common origin of the four MSS. has not been placed by him beyond all doubt, it has certainly been raised to a high degree of probability. The importance of this result, as bearing on textual criticism, may be stated in Mr. Ferrar's own words: "If it can be rendered highly probable that they are derived from an older MS. now lost, then in estimating the support given by them to any reading we can only look at them as equivalent to one witness. In place of this fact diminishing the value of these four MSS., it greatly enhances it, for it removes them from the class of ordinary cursives and elevates their combined testimony to the rank of an uncial of the first or second rank."

I propose to give in the following pages a concise

view of the results of Mr. Ferrar's critical examination of the MSS. For convenience of reference I shall call them by the initials of the places in which they are now preserved: thus, 13 I shall call P; 69, L; 124, V; and 346, M. There can be no danger of their being confounded with the uncials usually designated by these letters. Some account must first be given of the materials available for the enquiry. A moment's reflection will show that for such a purpose it is important to know, not only the bona fide readings of each MS., but its blunders, itacisms, etc. The example just quoted illustrates this. In the case of 69 (or L), Mr. Scrivener's collation (appended to his edition of the Codex Augiensis) left nothing to be desired; but with the others it was not so. Of 124, or V, we possess indeed two valuable collations published almost simultaneously by Birch and Alter. (Birch, *Quatuor Evang. Græce cum variantibus Lect.* Hauniæ, 1788. Alter, *Novum Test. ad cod. Vindob. Græce expr. var. Lect. addidit F. C. Alter*, Viennæ, 1787.)* The former states that he collated this MS. with especial diligence on account of the high estimation in which he held it, and he frequently supplies omissions of Alter or enables us to correct his errors. But he takes no notice of itacisms, etc. Alter's collection is more complete, and extends to the minutest particulars; the

* Alter's preface contains a curiosity of literature which is too instructive and amusing to be left in that obscurity. It is desirable, he says, that some learned man should compare the entire Welsh Bible, printed at London, 1588, and 1620, with the Wallachian. It will probably be found that the only difference is in the Slavonisms of the latter. He illustrates this by giving the Lord's Prayer in parallel columns. The resemblance is so striking that one wonders it did not excite some little doubt in his mind. In fact, his Welsh

is not Welsh at all, but Wallachian. The error originated with A. Müller, but Alter improved on him by the precision of the reference to the Welsh Bible, London, 1588, as if he had it before him. His error does not stop here. He adds, with a charming combination of modesty and confidence, "Comparatio duorum istorum Bibliorum historicis illis usui esse forte posset qui Wallachos Romanos esse asserunt. Populum Wallicum in Anglia, the Wales, dictum, Romanos esse, omnibus compertum est"!

arrangement of his book, however, is the worst that could possibly be devised. It is, doubtless, owing to this that Scholz has followed Birch and Wetstein, without apparently consulting Alter at all; and Scholz has been followed by Tischendorf, whose great labours as a collator have been chiefly devoted to the uncials. There are, however, numerous readings omitted by both Birch and Alter, and a collation of some hundreds of passages made for me by Dr. Hoffmann, of Vienna, has supplied me with many such. I have not yet been able to obtain either a complete copy of the MS. or an opportunity of collating it with the other three.* The materials for the study of the other two MSS. were quite inadequate. Although Griesbach had dwelt on the importance of a complete collation of P, or 13, (which he esteemed very highly, but had only been able to examine hastily), the task was still unaccomplished, Scholz's collation being very imperfect and inaccurate. This MS., therefore, Mr. Ferrar himself collated minutely. Of M or 346, still less was known, but he was prevented by ill-health from collating it himself. However, through the kindness of the Rev. Antonio Ceriani, he obtained a tolerably complete collation of it in St. Matthew's Gospel, and a copy of the remaining three gospels.†

Of the four MSS., V is the most carefully written, and its scribe appears to have consulted several codices. He notes various readings in a few places. Of itacisms and similar blunders I have noted less than 250. The other three abound with such mistakes; there are more than fifteen hundred in P, and a somewhat less number in M;

* Mr. Ferrar had attempted to procure an accurate collation at least of those passages in which Alter and Birch differed. By an error on the part of the Viennese collators he was led to overrate the completeness of Alter's work.

† Mr. Burgon has lately collated a few chapters in this MS., and his results have been kindly communicated to me through Dr. Salmon. They have been of considerable service in verifying and correcting the copy.

L has about half as many. Some of these appear to be errors of the eye, arising from confounding the forms of letters;* but the majority are the usual itacisms; *o* interchanged with *ω*; *η*, *υ*, *ι*, *ει*, *οι* confounded.† It may be observed that such blunders do not occur promiscuously, but much in the same way as the errors of indifferent spellers in our own language, that is to say, that except in the case of unfamiliar words, they are usually such as to substitute one existing form for another, as *τούτο* for *τούτω*, *λέγεται* for *λέγετε*, etc. The last-mentioned misspelling of the second pers. pl. active and passive is frequent.‡ In P. we often find *οὗτος* for *οὗτως* and *υ*, *υ*. and the accent always corresponds with the spelling. From this I am disposed to infer that the accents were not added at the moment of writing the words, but supplied subsequently. This would also account for the fact that prepositions in composition are frequently accentuated as independent words, as *ἐπὶ στασα*, *πρὸς ἐκείνη* (in P for *προσεκύνει*), *κατὰ βολῆς* (M), etc., as well as for several anomalous blunders of the accentuator, e.g. *ἡ ἄθη* (for *ἰάθη*), *ἐ αὐτοὺς*, *ξέστῶν* (in P) *ἡ ῥωδης*, *μὴ κύνεται*, *δι' ὧγμου*, (in M).

The chapters selected by Mr. Ferrar for a detailed comparison are Matt. xix. and xx., and Mark i—ix., the former being chosen because L is deficient up to Matt. xviii. 15. The MSS. with which he compares our group

* e.g. *ασιου* for *αγιου*, *επαυγατο* for *επαυσατο* in L.

† It is to be regretted that collators in general do not, like Mr. Scrivener, specify at least approximately the number of itacisms in their MSS. It is sometimes impossible to estimate correctly the evidence for or against a particular reading without this knowledge; as for instance in Rom. v. 1., where the question is between *ἰχομεν* and *ἰχωμεν*. The authority of a MS. may be very high, but before we accept its evidence in such a case we must

know whether the scribe was in the habit of confounding *ο* and *ω* or not; even if he avoids obvious errors of this kind, he may write *ω* erroneously where its unsuitableness is not strikingly manifest. Thus in 1 Cor. xv. 49, a vast preponderance of MS. and patristic authority supports *φορέσωμεν* against *φορίσωμεν*, while the internal evidence is quite as overpoweringly in favour of the latter.

‡ In P it occurs 76 times.

are, \aleph A B C D Δ and the cursives 1, 28, 33. A is however deficient in the selected chapters of Matt. In these two chapters L M P V agree in 25 variations from Stephens' text. Of these 14 agree with \aleph ; 18 with B; 12 with C; 17 with D; 11 with 1; 15 with 33, and 3 stand alone. This analysis, so far as it goes, would seem to shew that L M P V are most closely related to B and D, and next to \aleph and C. The result of the analysis of Mark i—ix. points to a similar conclusion. We find there that our MSS. agree in 215 variations from Stephens, of which 84 agree with \aleph ; 50 with A; 88 with B; 60 with C (which is imperfect); 90 with D; 73 with 1; 89 with 28; 56 with 33, and 43 stand alone. Our record of the readings of 28 is probably imperfect, so that its relation to our MSS. seems very close. Mr. Ferrar argues that this analysis upsets Griesbach's genealogical table (given in his *Symbolæ Criticæ*), which is as follows:—

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 & & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Origenes} \\ C \\ L \end{array} \right. \\
 \text{Recensio Alex.} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} t \\ u \end{array} \right. & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 33 \\ 106 \text{ et al.} \end{array} \right. \\
 & & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} w \\ x \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} y \\ \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} z \\ 1 \\ D \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 13 \\ 69 \end{array} \right. \\
 \text{Recensio Occid.} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \end{array} \right. & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \\ \text{Itala} \end{array} \right.
 \end{array}$$

In taking into consideration only those readings which differ from Steph. Mr. Ferrar followed the precedent set by former critics (as, for example, Treschow, in his *Tentamen descriptionis Codicum*, etc.) who estimated the affinities of a MS. by the number of unusual readings which it has in common with such and such other MSS.: unusual readings being included (with very few exceptions) under the head of variations from Stephens. This method, however, appears to me to be fallacious. Agreement in a reading which may be that of the genu-

ine original text is no evidence of special affinity between MSS.; and such are in all probability many of those above reckoned by Mr. Ferrar, as well as of those which Treschow notes as very peculiar. Again, the unexamined readings in which our four MSS. agree with Steph. may include so many variations from B and D, as quite to outweigh the coincidences with B and D. If, however, we reckon *coincidences* only, we must adopt some definite rule of selection; else the coincidences might be multiplied *ad infinitum*. The only alternative is, to reckon *differences*. This I find a more tedious task. I have applied the method, however, to Matt. xix., xx.; Mark i.-iv. and xiii.; and John xx. It is important to notice, as furnishing a standard for the reader's guidance, that the number of various readings noted by Tischendorf, from the great uncials \aleph B C D, in Matt. xix., xx., exceeds 170. If we attend only to the three uncials \aleph B D, we find that they differ in 105 readings.

The following table exhibits in a convenient form the number of times that the unanimous reading of our four MSS. differs from the text of any one of the uncials mentioned therein, or from that of Stephens, in the chapters cited:—

	\aleph	A	B	C	D	L (uncial)	Steph	1.	33.
Matt. xix., xx.	58	hiat	55	34	67	25	25	47	38
Mark i.-iv. ..	174	100	174	102*	216	143	126		
Mark xiii. ..	44	30	51	†	62	49	24		
John xx. ..	34	14	26	hiat	33	19	7	23	28

This analysis, it will be seen, leads to a conclusion the very reverse of that previously suggested. It is clear in fact from this table, that the reason A stood low in the list founded on agreements, was simply that it differs less from Steph. than the other uncials. In particular, the hypothesis of a very close relation to D is completely overthrown. It would not be worth while to carry this

* From i. 17.

† Too imperfect to be worth reckoning.

analysis through the entire of the Gospels. I have ascertained, however, that in the last three Gospels, LMPV agree in more than one hundred readings, for which no other MS. authority is adduced. St. Matthew is omitted from this calculation on account of the deficiency of L. Had we taken account of the readings for which only few other authorities can be found, the number would be much larger. Many of these, no doubt, are trifling variations; but the value of a coincidence in attesting community of origin is not proportionate to the importance of the reading. A remarkable reading may have been taken from a MS. occasionally consulted, whereas the more trivial readings, if not derived from the archetype, must have originated with the copyist himself. This remark applies also to itacisms and similar blunders which are not included in the above number.

The following are a few specimens of the peculiarities referred to:—

Mark i. 16: ἀμφιβάλλοντας τὰ δίκτυα (δύκτυα MP) εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν.

Mark vii. 5: κοιναῖς χερσὶν ἀνίπτοις, a combination of two readings, BD reading κοιναῖς while ΑΓΔΠ have ἀνιπτοις. \aleph has κοιναις corrected by \aleph^o to ἀνιπτοις.

Mark xv. 36: καὶ δραμόντες ἐγέμισαν (εγεμησαν MP) σπόγγον ὄξους καὶ περιθέντες καλάμῳ ἐπότιζον αὐτὸν (om. αὐτον L) λέγοντες, where all other MSS. have the singular throughout, beginning καὶ δραμών τις (or εἷς).

Luke vi. 29: στρέψον αὐτῷ for παρέχε.

Luke vii. 6: ἀπέστειλε for ἔπεμψε. A similar variation occurs in John xii. 45., where a few other MSS. agree with ours.

Luke xviii. 25: τρυμαλιᾶς βελώνης (*sic*). Here ΑΓΔΠ read τρυμαλιᾶς ῥαφίδος, while \aleph BD have τρήματος βελώνης. In the parallel passage in Mark x. 25, our MSS. (almost alone) read διὰ τρυπήματος βελώνης instead of διὰ τρυμαλιᾶς ῥαφίδος. It is curious that in the latter passage LMV have πλούσιος for πλούσιον before the infinitive,

and again in the parallel in Matt. xix. 24, LMP have *πλούσιος*.

Luke xi. 37: *καὶ εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ* (om. τοῦ LV) *φαρισαίου ἀνεκλίθη* (*ἀνεκλήθη* MP) for *εἰσελθὼν ἀνέπεσεν*.

Luke viii. 18: our MSS. alone add *καὶ προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν* after *πῶς ἀκούετε*.

Luke i. 66: *χεῖρ κυρίου ἦν μετ' αὐτῶν* for. . . *μετ' αὐτοῦ*.

Luke iii. 23: *ἀρχόμενος εἶναι ὡς* (ὡσεὶ V) *ἐτῶν τριάκοντα*.

Mark x. 12: The reading nearly agrees with D and 28, but has two slight peculiarities. *καὶ γυνὴ ἑάν* (*εαν γυνη* D) *ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ* (add. του D) *ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλον* for *ἑάν ἀπολύσῃ τὸν ἄνδρα*, or the like.

Mark iii. 16: our MSS. alone insert *πρῶτον Σίμωνα*.

John xiii. 5: *λαβὼν ὕδωρ βάλλει* for *βάλλει ὕδωρ*. This agrees with the Armen. version only.

John ix. 16, 17, we find *οἱ δὲ παραλάβοντες αὐτὸν* (add. ἡγαγον καὶ MP) *ἐπέθηκαν αὐτῷ τὸν σταυρὸν καὶ βαστάζων αὐτόν, κ. τ. λ.* The first three words agree with N, and a few other authorities, but the addition *επεθ. αυ. τ. στ.* is found only in Origen and the Harcl. Syr.

John ix. 27: *ἐπιστεύσατε* for *ἠκούσατε*. But Cod. 77 also reads *επιστ.* although not mentioned by Tischendorf.

Add. Matt. xv. 14. Here L is deficient MPV read *τυφλὸς δὲ τυφλὸν ὁδηγόν* (*σεῖς*) *σφαλήσεται καὶ κ. τ. λ.* for *τυφλὸς δὲ τυφλὸν ἑάν ὁδηγῇ κ. τ. λ.* The Armenian version alone supports the reading *ὁδηγῶν* and the addition *σφαλήσεται καί*. The agreement of our MSS. in *ὁδηγόν* is noticeable. It would no doubt have been corrected by the scribe of V had it not been for the *τυφλόν* adjoining, with which he supposed *ὁδηγόν* might be connected. Nor is it unworthy of remark that in the same verse the three MSS. agree in having *εἰσι* before a vowel contrary to their usual practice; and that this is not accidental appears from the fact that V at first had *εἰσιν* which has afterwards been corrected (by the first hand) to *εἰσι*.

In Matt. xxvi. 39 (where P is deficient) LMV insert

the two verses which in most MSS. are found in Luke xxii. 43, 44.* They are found here in C^a marg., and some evangelistaria. Our Cod. M has them in St. Luke also. P has there merely the words ὥφθη δὲ, the rest has been added in the margin by a later hand.*

John vi. 71, for ἰσκαριώτην (after Ἰούδαν Σίμωνος) P has ἀπὸ σκαρνώτου, V ἀπὸ καρώτου and L ἀποκαριώτου (M is deficient). This reading agrees with N alone among Greek Codd., which has it with the spelling of V. The same form occurs in four other places in St. John in D alone, but here D has σκαριωθ.

If these and other peculiar readings were chance coincidences, any three of our MSS. ought to furnish a greater number than four, and two a greater number than three. It is so with itacisms, but with bona fide readings this is so far from being the case that the largest number of peculiar readings found in any group of three is only 30 (in LMP), and no other group of three furnishes more than half-a-dozen, whereas we have seen that LMPV agree in more than 100 peculiar readings. Of readings found in two only of our MSS. there are altogether about ten.

It cannot be expected that many itacisms or other errors should be common to all our MSS., even if they existed in the archetype. There are, however, a few such besides those already quoted; ex. gr. Mark v. 11, πρὸς τὸ ὄρει. Luke viii. 26, καταπλεύσαντες for κατέπλευσαν. Luke i. 29 and iii. 15, εἰ for εἰη. It is hardly worth while to mention συγγενὶς for συγγενής, etc.: but we may fairly notice in this connection such errors as occur in two or three out of the four. LMP furnish the following amongst others: Luke iv. 40, οὐδὲ for ὁ δὲ, (thus reading οὐδὲ, ἔθεράπενσεν αὐτούς); Luke viii. 3, αἰτεραι for ἑτεραι, x. 7; ἐξ οἰκίαν εἰς οἰκίαν; Mark vi. 2, πόθεν τουτο ταῦτα; xiii. 22, ψευδόχρηστοι for ψευδόχριστοι (V omits the

* In Mark xiv. 41, we read in L M MSS., in several Italic codices ('sufficit P V ἀπὶ χει τοῦ τελος' for ἀπὶ χει' finis,' 'adest finis,' etc.), and in the This is also found in five or six other Syriac.

word); xiv. 47, ἔπαισεν for ἔπαισεν; x. 16, τιθων τὰς χεῖρας (=1, 28) for τιθείς τ.χ. V has here curiously ἐνεγκαλίστατος (sic etiam LM) αὐτὰ (sic M) τί θῶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐπ' αὐτὰ κ.τ.λ. This τίθῶ seems to point to an original τίθων where the ν was indicated by a line over the ω, subsequently confounded with the circumflex. In John xviii. 16, εἰσελθὼν for ἐξελθὼν is also to be accounted a clerical error.

Mark xiv. 68, εἰς τὴν ἔξω προαύλιον for ἔξω εἰς τὸ π. (V.) Euseb. has εἰς τὴν ἔξω προαυλιν and D ἔξω εἰς τὴν προσαύλην. We may perhaps reckon as an error (it certainly includes one) the reading of LMP in Mark iv. 30. Here **Σ** B Δ read ἐν τίνι αὐτὴν παραβολῇ θῶμεν; ὡς κόκκῳ σινάπεως κ.τ.λ. ADΠ read ἐν ποίᾳ παραβολῇ παραβάλομεν αὐτήν; ὡς κόκκον (κόκκῳ DΠ) σ. But LMP alone give ἐν τίνι παραβολῇ αὐτὴν θῶμεν παραβάλομεν (*sic*) αὐτὴν ὡς κόκκον σ. Although a tolerable sense might be given to this (reading, of course, παραβάλομεν) by putting a stop after θῶμεν, there can be no doubt that it originated from a mixture of the readings of **Σ** and A. V agrees with DΠ. Mark v. 4, πέδες is read in error for πέδαις in MP; L originally had παιδες, which has been corrected to πέδες.

From the blunders common to MPV, I select the following: Luke viii. 29, an error like the last mentioned, viz.: παιδες for πέδαις; here L reads πέδες. Luke vii. 10, ὑπεμφθέντες for οἱ πεμφθέντες. It is remarkable that V, which alone inserts this whole verse in the parallel passage, Matt. viii. 13, reads ὑπεμφθεντες there also. We cannot, however, give the scribe of L much credit for his correctness in this passage, since in Luke ii. 20, he has written οἰπέστρεψαν for ὑπεστρεψαν, so that possibly he was right in the present case only by mistake. Again, in Matt. ix. 18, MPV have ἐλθὼν ἐπειθες for ἐπιθες, and in the parallel in Mark v. 23, ἐπιθείς χεῖρα αὐτῇ (for ἐπίθες τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῇ). Jno. xix. 28, τετέλεσθαι. Jno. xx. 23, P has κράτηντε (for κεκράτηνται), M κεκράτηντε, and V having at first had κεκράτητε, has been corrected to κεκράτηντε. Jno. xiii. 24, for πύθεσθαι (τίς ἂν εἴη), M reads

by itacism *πειθεσθαι*, P *πειθεσθε*, and V *πειθεσθαι*. The scribe of V probably had the reading either of M, or more likely that of P before him, and made a bad attempt at correcting it. His reading in Jno. xxi. 3, has probably had a like origin. The true reading there is *ἐπίασαν* (*οὐδὲν*), for which M has *ἐποίησαν*, and V *ἐποίησαν*, P is deficient. I may mention that in Matt. xxi. 46, where all other authorities (including L and V) read *κρατῆσαι*, M P have *ποιᾶσαι*, obviously for *πίασαι*. Similar forms of the same verb occur in seven other places (all in Jno.), and in six of them are correctly written by all our MSS. In Luke vi. 1, where the received text has *δευτεροπρώτῳ* (an inexplicable word, which I have little doubt is an interpolation*), M and P read *δευτέρῳ πρώτῳ*. V had originally the same, but above the first *ω* the first hand has written *ο*. L omits the word, but it is added in the margin. In the *pericopa de adultera* (Jno. viii. 4, in Steph.) for *ἐπαντοφώρῳ* (which L has) MP have *ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ φώρῳ*, and V reads *ἐπ' αὐτῷ φώρῳ*. This last, however, is found in other MSS. also. The confusion of *ο* and *ω* is so frequent in L that it may be only accidentally right.

Some grammatical forms may be here mentioned, though not peculiar to these MSS. All four have *θυγατέραν* in Luke xiii. 16; LMP have *νύκταν*, Luke ii. 37; and LMV *μέγαν* as neuter, Luke xiv. 16. This last agrees with D and several others, including B³. (Lachmann and Tischendorf formerly adopted it under the impression that it was the reading of B¹.) All make *ὁφρῦς* masc. in Luke iv. 29 (=D² only). In writing the 2nd aor. of *ἐρχομαι* and its compounds with *α* (as *ἤλθατε* etc.) as

* It is not difficult to conjecture how it may have originated. In ver. 6 we have another relation introduced by *ἐγένετο δὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ σαββάτῳ*. Nothing was more natural than that a marginal note should be put to ver. 1 [*πρώτῳ*], pointing out this as the *first* sabbath in

reference to the *ἕτερον* of ver. 6. Then another reader, observing that ch. iv. 31 already contained an account of a miracle wrought on the Sabbath, corrected this *πρώτῳ* by writing over it *δευτέρῳ*. Hence arose *δευτεροπρώτῳ*.

our MSS. usually do (V always), they agree with the most ancient uncials. They generally write *εἶπον*, but in Matt. xiii. 27, 28 (L being deficient), MPV agree in writing *εἶπαν*. They have *ἔπεσαν* Matt. xvii. 6, and usually read *ἴδον* instead of *εἶδον*.

I proceed now to apply the method above suggested, namely, an analysis of the differences between the MSS. The numerical test is an essential one in every case of this kind. It is desirable, for obvious reasons, to reckon separately the additions, the omissions, and the verbal differences.

First, let us take those readings in which three agree against the fourth. There are 12 instances in which LMV agree against P, most of these being very trifling. The most considerable are: 1° Matt. xxii. 44, where P reads *ὑποπόδιον* (=UΔΠ) instead of *ὑποκάτω*. But *ὑποπόδιον* is read by all in both the parallel passages, so that the substitution was natural to a copyist. 2° Matt. xxii. 29, *ἴδοντες* for *εἰδότες*, obviously a blunder. 3° Luke vi. 11, *ἀνομίας* for *ἀνοίας*, also a blunder. 4° Jno. iv. 51 (where, however, M is defective), *ὁ παῖς σου ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ*, a combination of two, or, rather, three readings. LV (with D etc.) read *υἱὸς σου*, ΓΔ have *παῖς σου*, and ~~Σ~~ABC read *παῖς αὐτοῦ*. And 5° Luke xvii. 2, *λίθος μυλωνικός*, where LM have *λίθος μυλικός*, and V (*e sil.*) *μύλος ὀνικός*. But in Mark ix. 42, LPM agree in reading *μυλωνικός* (*μυλονικός* M) *λίθος*, agreeing therein with only three or four other cursives. V has there *λίθος μυλικός*. As *μυλωνικός* is not found in any other MS. in the passage in Luke, we may conclude that P took it from the parallel in Mark. It follows that P has taken little, if anything, from independent sources. The only apparent exception amongst the readings mentioned, is from a passage where M is defective.

M has a greater number of readings in which it differs from the other three (LPV), viz., about 42. Several of these are clearly blunders, and those which are not so

are all trifling. The majority of these agree with the uncials ΓΔΠ. It has one very peculiar reading in Matt. i. 16, viz., ὃ μνηστευθῆσα παρθένος μαριάμ ἐγέννησεν ἱν τὸν λεγόμενον χν. This reading is found in some Italic codices but not in any other Greek MS. It is to be noted, however, that L and P are both defective in this portion of the Gospel; the reading, therefore, does not properly come under the present head. In Matt. vii. 27, where P V stand alone in reading προσέκρουσαν, M agrees with most MSS. in having προσέκοψαν. L is deficient. In Mark ii. 14 M agrees with most authorities in reading λευιν, but L P V (with D and several Italic codd.) have ἰάκωβον. V has in the margin ἐν ἀλλ. λευιν. The total number of readings in which M differs from P is only 71, not including omissions or additions.

L and V show a greater number of peculiarities than the two former MSS. L differs about 75 times from the united testimony of MPV; and V differs no less than 220 times from LMP combined. But there is an important difference between these two MSS. Most of the readings of V are assimilations to the more common text. From what has been said above it may be seen that LMP agree in a considerable number of readings which have little or no support from other MSS. In a large proportion of these cases V has adopted a more usual reading. It has, however, about 27 unsupported readings. Four of these (2 in Luke and 2 in John) conform to the parallel passages in Matt. or Mark;* about the same number arise from the repetition of a word employed just before, e.g., τρίτον for τοῦτον, Luke xx. 12, θεοῦ for πατρός, John xvi. 28. Of the remainder those which are not obvious slips are four, viz., κατασκευάζοντας for καταρτίζοντας, Mark iv. 21; ἀπαγγείλατε for εἶπατε, Luke xxiii. 32; δούλων for ἐκλεκτῶν, Luke xviii. 7, and the most remarkable of all, γαλιλαίας

* τίκουν for ἀνθρωποι, Luke v. 19; ἐνθύνετε, Jno. i. 23; ἰχθύων for ὀψαρίων ὑμᾶς for αὐτοῦ, xi. 49. ἐτοιμάσατε for (which is peculiar to John), vi. 11.

for *ιτουραιας*, Luke iii. 1. There is here a marginal note by the first hand (according to Alter), *εν αλλ. της ιτουραιας*. If this is really by the first hand, *γαλ.* must have been an error of the MS. copied by V. Another remarkable reading, but not unique, is *ἐπικεφάλαιον* for *κῆνσον*, in Mark xii. 14. This is found besides only in D, and in the cursive 2^{pe} which has much affinity with our group. It was doubtless the original of *capitularium* which is the reading of the Codex Bobbiensis (of the 5th cent.).

In Mark v. 12, most MSS. read *παρεκάλεσαν αὐτὸν πάντες οἱ δαίμονες* (many omit *παντ. οἱ δ.*) *λέγοντες*. Here LMP alone read *παρακαλέσαντες αὐτὸν εἶπον*. But V in attempting to make its reading conform to that of other MSS. betrays its connection with LMP by reading *παρακαλέσαντες αὐτὸν πάντες οἱ δαίμονες λέγοντες*.

The case of L is different. At least two thirds of those readings in it which differ from MPV are wholly unsupported, and the remainder are found in but few other MSS. Yet on the whole it differs from P (apart from omissions &c.) only 117 times. The inference is naturally suggested that its peculiar readings have originated with the scribe himself, whether from error or design. This inference is confirmed by a consideration of the manifest blunders of the copyist. For example, in Mark iii. 5, he writes *ἀπεκτάνθη* (*ἡ χεὶρ αὐτοῦ*) for *ἀπεκατεστάθη*, in Luke xvii. 4, he has *ἀνασστηση* for *ἀμαρτήση*. John vii. 17, *εἰς ἐγὼ* for *ἡ ἐγὼ*. Some similar errors he has corrected; as Luke xi. 51, *ἀπολελυμένου* for *ἀπολομένου*: here two dots over the *υ* indicate that it is erroneous. Luke xv. 6, instead of *πρόβατον* he has *προσωπονβατον*. In Matt. xxvi. 21, for *ἐσθιόντων* he seems to have written first *εστι οντων*, which has been *corrected*! either by the first hand or the second to *ετι οντων*. In Luke xxii. 3, he began to write *ὁ καλουμενος* after *σατανᾶς* and omits *εἰς ἰούδαν*, so that the verse reads: *εἰσῆλθε δὲ σατανᾶς ὁ καλὸν τὸν καλούμενον ἰσκαριώτην*. In Luke xxiii. 8 he has *λέγον* for *λίαν*. Lastly, in John ii. 15, where the received text

has ἀνέστρεψε (τὰς τραπέζας) and MPV κατέστρεψε, L has in the text absurdly κατόρθωσε, for which κατέστρεψε is substituted in the margin. In Mk. xvi. 36, he reads ἄφες ἡλίας σῶσον καὶ καθελεῖν αὐτόν, omitting ἰδωμεν εἰ ἔρχεται and inserting σῶσον (for σῶσον) from Matt. With such instances before us we may readily believe that σαλεύσεται, in Luke xxi. 6 (for καταλυθήσεται), πορευσόμεθα in John xiv. 23, (for ἐλευσόμεθα) and the like, or βάπτισμά μοι for β. ὁ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι, Matt. xx. 23, originated with the scribe himself. There appear to be one or two readings which we can scarcely explain in this way. John v. 7, L adds at the end of the verse ἐγὼ δὲ ἀσθενῶν πορεύομαι. No other authority is mentioned as containing this addition.* But it must be borne in mind that here M is deficient, so that we cannot fairly consider this as an exception. But if this inference respecting L is correct, its authority as an independent witness is weakened, and it does not deserve the place assigned to it in Tregelles' Greek Test., as one of the three cursives thought worthy to stand beside the principal uncials. P or M would better deserve this distinction.†

As an example of readings in which L differs from MPV, and which may, or may not, have been taken from an independent source, I may quote Luke viii. 51. Here BC 33 read οὐκ ἀφῆκεν εἰσελθεῖν τινὰ σὺν αὐτῷ. MPV alone read οὐκ ἀφ. τινὰ συνελθεῖν αὐτῷ, but L has οὐκ ἀφ. τινὰ εἰσελθεῖν σὺν αὐτῷ.

* 64 (a MS. formerly in the library of Trinity College, Dublin, but missing since 1742), has curiously καὶ λαμβανει ιασιν.

† Griesbach arrived at the same conclusion though from more imperfect data.

Tischendorf frequently cites 61 marg. as agreeing with 69 (our L) in readings otherwise unsupported. Now 61 (codex Montfortianus) and 69 were formerly in

the possession of the same William Chark (who is supposed to have lived in the reign of Elizabeth). To him are due some of the later variations in L, according to Mr. Scrivener, and these marginal readings in 61 are beyond doubt from his hand. See Dobbin's *Codex Montfortianus*; *Introd.*, p. 7. Scrivener, *Codex Augiensis*; *Introd.*, p. xli.

Some few instances of omissions or additions have been mentioned, but the statistics of this class of variations have been reserved for separate consideration. They are much more numerous than the verbal differences, but for the most part unimportant. In the following table the first column shows that in 109 instances L adds something to the common reading of MPV, and in 281 instances omits something contained in these three; the other columns are to be read similarly:—

	L against MPV	M against LPV	P against LMV	V against LMP	LM against PV	LV against MP	LP against MV
Adds	109	89	32	186	10	27	7
Omits	281	81	132	203	12	61	56

With few exceptions these omissions and additions are of single words. For instance, if we take Mark xiv. and Luke ix. together, we find on the whole 59 variations of this kind, 8 of which concern only the article, 5 *καί*, 6 *δέ*, and so on, and some are obviously slips. Such variations are of no weight as indications of independence, although they may help to prove a common origin of two MSS., if the coincidences are much beyond what might be expected from chance. L is particularly liable to errors of omission. Mr. Scrivener has counted in this MS. (in the entire N. T.) 74 omissions from homoeoteleuton and the like causes. The scribe has not only omitted words essential to the sense, but even parts of words, writing *απηλ*, *ματι*, etc. P has sometimes committed the same fault, as *ηδν* for *ηδυνήθη*. What Griesbach says of P is still more applicable to L, that "the omissions of other good codd. receive a great accession of weight from its support, but in itself it is of little weight in such variations." Omissions peculiar to either of these MSS. are indeed not entitled to any consideration.

It would be useless to submit these variations to the same analysis as the verbal differences. Indeed, in any given case where an article or particle can be added or

omitted without obvious injury to the sense, the chances are that several MSS. will be found on both sides, so that no inference can be drawn from such possibly accidental coincidences. I have, however, gone through a few chapters, and the result tends to confirm the conclusion drawn from the verbal differences.*

It remains to mention the itacisms or other clerical errors. Of these I number in L 572, of which 125 are common to it and P, and 45 of these also occur in M. M itself has 1320† itacisms, and of these no less than 340 are common to it with P; P itself has 1523,† and V 243. It will be observed that V is much the most carefully written. But of this moderate number 100 are common to it and P, and half of these are also found in M. There are few, if any, errors common to M and V which are not found also in P.

The foregoing analysis on the whole puts the hypothesis of the common origin of L, M, and P, beyond all reasonable doubt. The case of V appears at first sight more open to question. It is, however, much easier to account for its deviations from LMP on the hypothesis of a common origin, than to account for its singular agreement with them if this hypothesis be rejected. The statistics of its itacism just given add force to this consideration, for the reason given above. It is not to be supposed indeed that the four MSS. directly copied one and the same original; there must have been at least one step between each and the archetype. Mr. Ferrar at first conjectured that L

* Including every variation (except itacisms), the total number of differences between V and M is 756, and between P and M is 491. In order to fix the reader's ideas it may be mentioned that Alter's collation of V with cod. 218 (which is his standard and closely resembles Steph.) includes about 2500. The number of differences between 218 and M is considerably greater. L differs from V 1131 times and from P 731 times.

† About half the itacisms of M and P occur in St. Luke. V has fewest in Luke. The confusion of *ὑμῶν* and *ἡμῶν* occurs in St. Luke, 12 times in P, 11 times in M, and of these 8 are common to both. Two of these instances are in the institution of the Eucharist, ch. xxii., 19, 20, where M P have both times *ἡμῶν*. M P always will write *ἐὺ-σπλαγχνίσθη* for *εἰπ*.

copied P. To this conjecture he was led by observing that in some instances the words omitted by L formed one or two complete lines in P. Sometimes, too, a single letter which stands outside the column in P is omitted in L. In the case of *ἰματι* for *ἰματια* above mentioned, he found that in P *ἰματι* ends a line and *a* begins the next. The same thing happens in another instance where the *ἰδον* of *ἰδοντες* ends a line in P and appears in L without the *τες*. But on finding that sometimes when a line is omitted in P it is supplied in L, he suggested that perhaps L was a free copy of a MS. from which P was copied line for line. However, we need not here discuss further the special relations of the four MSS. to their archetypes; enough has been said to show that the attempt to recover the original text is not a chimerical one. This was the task that Professor Ferrar undertook, and although he did not live to complete it, he was able to prepare a great part of his work for the press and he left the materials for its completion. The value to be assigned to the text so restored may be estimated from the consideration that the high commendation which Griesbach and others bestow on 13 and 69 may be applied to this text without the qualifications which the peculiar errors of both these MSS. made necessary. The comparison with the other MSS. supplies a criterion by which we can distinguish the genuine ancient readings of 13 and 69 from their own errors and accidental omissions. The resulting text may fairly stand not lower than D in the class of uncials: it has some affinity to D, but as Griesbach remarks of 13, it is much purer. At the same time it is more independent than any of the other uncials, often standing alone amongst Greek MSS. or nearly so; whilst in many such cases it has the support of the Armenian version, to which a high authority is conceded, or of ancient Italic Codices, or of some of the Syriac Versions.

THOMAS KINGSMILL ABBOTT.

VIRGIL AENEID VIII. 102—109.

FORTE die sollemnem illo rex Arcas honorem
 Amphitryoniadae magno divisque ferebat
 Ante urbem in luco. Pallas huic filius una
 Una omnes iuvenum primi, pauperque senatus
 Tura dabant, tepidusque cruor fumabat ad aras.
 Ut celsas videre rates atque inter opacum
 Allabi nemus et tacitis incumbere remis,
 Terrentur visu subito—

Evander and his son Pallas, together with the chief nobles and senators, are sacrificing to Hercules in a grove before their city Pallanteum (on the site of future Rome), when they suddenly descry two strange vessels coming up the Tiber,

atque inter opacum,
 Allabi nemus et tacitis incumbere remis.

In this passage the meaning of the words "tacitis remis" has not as yet, I think, been satisfactorily explained. A variant "tacitos" is found in many MSS., but there is little doubt that it is merely an attempt to simplify the construction, the very complexity of which (*i.e.* incumbere being said of the ships when it really refers to the rowers) is, as Conington well remarks, characteristic of Virgil. "Tacitis," moreover, has the authority of Servius, whose explanation, however, is very questionable:—"tacitis incumbere remis" pro ipsi taciti, *i.e.* sine celeusmate." But it may well be doubted whether the ancient rowers could have dispensed with the services of the celeustes, if this be what Servius means by "sine celeusmate;" while, if he means

that the crews abstained from all the shouting, singing, &c., by which the rowers were accustomed to encourage one another and lighten their toil, then his interpretation appears to contradict line 90 *supra*, where, describing these same ships on their voyage, Virgil says—

Ergo iter inceptum celerant *rumore secundo*,*
which is rightly explained of the shouting of the crews (Vid. Conington ad loc.)

Conington, who reads "tacitis" in his text, explains: "whichever reading (tacitis or tacitos) we adopt, the silence seems to mean not what Servius supposes, but the absence of any intimation from the Trojans who they were, which would itself alarm the Arcadians; probably, too, we are meant to think also of the calm of the river. Strictly, of course, the oars cannot have been noiseless."

* I have quoted line 90 with the reading "rumore secundo," as it seems difficult to believe that the variant 'RUMONE,' though found in the Medicean a *prima manu*, and mentioned with approval by Servius, can be anything but an early copyist's mistake for 'RUMORE.' Dr. Henry, the veteran Virgilian critic and commentator, who has himself examined the Medicean MS., has courteously supplied me with the following interesting extract from his memoranda: "According to my memoranda the reading of the Medicean MS. is RUMONE with a line drawn through the N, and R superscribed. Foggini testifies to the same effect, and adds, in a note at the end of volume: 'linea expungens N est recentioris manus, non secus ac superimposita R.' Rumore is also the reading both of the Roman and Palatine MSS., the latter MS. being of no less authority than the Medicean, also of eight MSS. of the second class, consulted by me with special reference to this word. I have

not met the reading Rumone except in the Medicean alone, in which MS. the error has been corrected a *pr. m.*" Servius (and, I believe, Servius alone) says that Rumo was an old name for the Tiber; but Virgil himself (VIII. 332) mentions the old name, *i.e.* Albula,

"immani corpore Thybris

A quo post Itali fluvium cognomine
Thybrim

Diximus; amisit verum vetus Albula
nomen.

It appears incredible that Virgil, recognising Albula as the old name of the Tiber, should, without any particular reason or explanation, use on one occasion, and one only, the strange name Rumo for the river. It may be added, in confirmation of rumore, that the phrases *rumore secundo* and *rumore adverso* are by no means uncommon in the Latin writers. Horace has *rumore secundo* (*Epist.* 1, 10, 9); also *Tacitus Ann.* 3, 29, perhaps one of the many reminiscences of Virgil to be found in that writer.

This (rather hesitating) explanation will scarcely be deemed satisfactory. What alarms the Arcadians is the sudden appearance of the strange craft, "terrentur visu subito;" moreover, the Trojans have not had time and are as yet too distant to be able to convey to the Arcadians any intimation as to who they are.

A different interpretation of "tacitis remis" suggests itself from the following passage of Martial (IV. 64, 18-24), which seems to have been overlooked by the Commentators.

Illinc Flaminiae Salariaeque
 Gestator patet *essedo tacente*,
 Ne blando rota sit molesta somno,
 Quem nec rumpere nauticum celeusma
 Nec clamor valet helciariorum
 Cum sit tam prope Mulvius sacrumque
 Lapsae per Tiberim volent carinae.

Martial is describing the villa suburbana of Julius Martialis on the Janiculum, and remarks that from the top of that hill one can see the people riding in their carriages along the Flaminian and Salarian roads, and watch the boats flitting up and down the Tiber, while the distance prevents one's repose being disturbed either by the rumbling of wheels or the shouts of the boatswains and rowers. Now, I submit that the "tacitis remis" of the Virgilian passage is to be explained by the "essedo tacente" of Martial. Evander and his followers can see the ships approaching, but, owing to the distance, the splash of the oars is unheard, and thus the crew may be said to lean on noiseless oars. We might even extend the meaning of "tacitis remis," and say that it implies not only the splash of the oars, but also the celeusma and all the nauticus clamor was unheard, owing to the distance by which the Trojans were as yet separated from the Arcadians. That they were at some considerable distance is clear from the lines immediately succeeding (V. 111),

raptoque volat telo obuius ipse (Pallas)
Et *procul* a tumulo.

The following might be suggested as the origin of Rumo—an ancient name for the Tiber. Servius lived about four hundred years after the publication of the Aeneid; in that long period many corruptions, no doubt, crept into the manuscripts. Among these was the blunder of RUMONE for RUMORE. Some Virgilian critic of philological tendencies (perhaps Servius himself), finding this curious word RUMONE in his copy, and not knowing what to make of it, conceived the idea of connecting it etymologically with ROMA, ROMULUS, RUMINALIS (for these words *vide* Seeley, *Introduction to Livy*, p. 32); and thus, associating the word with the most ancient history of the city, conjectured that RUMO was the river of ROMA, or ROMA the city on the RUMO. Subsequently the conjecture was received as an historical fact. Whether there was or was not an ancient name RUMO for the Tiber must, of course, remain a matter of doubt, but it is pretty clear that Virgil thought the ancient name was Albula.

T. J. B. BRADY.

PROFESSOR CAMPBELL'S SOPHOCLES, VOL. I.

SOME words of preface seem to be needed before I proceed to the task of following Professor Campbell through a few of the darker passages of these three plays. Our editor professes 'Conservatism' in criticism, stricter conservatism than that of any editor since Hermann. This profession is rather perplexing, because Hermann was an ultra-Liberal. But what *is* Conservatism in criticism?

He who first called himself a Conservative in criticism used the metaphor, no doubt, in a careless way and without much consideration of what he was saying. The phrase has been taken up by later editors and put forward as one of favorable import and good signification. Most English editors seem to regard Conservatism as a thing to be proud of, and the profession of it as something which is likely to conciliate the reader. I will try to show that the metaphor is a wrong one, that 'Conservatism in criticism' is a thing to be disavowed, and that the phrase is a form of words which careful writers would do well to avoid.

One is a Conservative in politics either from some principle which one thinks is right, or from private interest, or from prejudice and unreasoning obstinacy in clinging to the old state of things whether better or worse than the new. The last class would be represented in criticism by those who say, not without applause, that "they prefer the old mumpsimus to any one's new sumpsimus." Of this confessedly stupid and uncritical class of Conservatives, I need only say that I think no Conserva-

tive editor would like to be called 'a mumpsimus editor,' nor to have his book called 'a mumpsimus edition.' Secondly, I cannot see that interest has anything to do with Conservatism in criticism. Fellowships are fairly won by young scholars before they have reached the critical age, and professorships and preferments are nearly always given to Fellows because they possess the best certificates of eminent scholarship. There remains that class of political Conservatives who are such from some right principle. In its ultimate and most general form I suppose this right principle would be, that old institutions are good because they are old; not at all a bad reason if used in moderation. There are many old institutions which no Liberal would impugn. There are laws and customs about which all would agree, as that parents ought to feed and protect their young children, and that, between man and man, unprovoked violence is wrong. There are also those laws of which Sophocles says that they were bred beyond the sky, that man's mortal nature did not beget them, and that no oblivion will ever put them asleep.

There is nothing of this kind in criticism. The manuscripts from which our texts of Sophocles are copied, with more or less accuracy, have suffered so much from frequent copying through a space of some centuries over two thousand years; from copying both by sight and ear; from the blunders of copyists who wrote badly and knew a little Greek, and the blunders of others who wrote well and knew no Greek at all; from the insertion in a subsequent copy of glosses written over the text; from the gags and interpolations of ignorant actors; from the actors' correction, misordering, and omission of lines; from what in the *Rhesus*, at least, comes very near the *Cibberising* of a play; and from twenty other causes of corruption and deterioration, that not one of them can be regarded as good. There is no one word in any author which you might not be obliged to acknowledge to be

wrong on the appearance of another manuscript. There is no text to the consideration of which your critic, that is, your careful reader, is justified in addressing himself for the first time with a predilection in its favour. Your critic, that is, your careful reader, must always say to himself when he proceeds to the consideration of a text which is new to him: 'every word, point, accent, and arrangement and consecution of lines in this text is likely enough to be wrong; very many of them are certain to be wrong; and I shall have to examine everything. It will not much surprise me if I find reason to believe that the whole work is spurious, and ought to be assigned to a quite different age and author, for there have been many examples of this.' That is the only right and sound standpoint for a critic, and it appears to me that there is nothing like political Conservatism about it.

'Conservatism in criticism' is not even a convenient wrong phrase. If it means that you receive proposed emendations in a spirit of dislike, then you are, to that extent, no critic. An emendator presents his emendation as being, in his opinion, the true reading of the original text. You have to consider, if you please, whether it is likely to be so or not; but you must do so without any prejudice whatsoever, either for the old or against the new.

The most useful and instructive edition of Sophocles which has yet appeared is, I think, that of the Rev. F. H. M. Blaydes, M.A., in which there is a greater abundance of wrong emendations than in all other editions put together. The wrong emendations or, rather, suggestions, do not hurt you: they are really useful; they give you a keener sense of what is wrong. It is true that a critic who had a quick sense of what is right would not propose many things that must all, or all but one, be wrong. And yet one learns from all, and Mr. Blaydes' is that edition from which you can learn most about the true Sophocles. So the Germans

printed our Bentley's Horace over again a few years ago, although *all* Bentley's emendations, except some punctuations, are wrong. They did so because it is from Bentley that you can best imbibe the true spirit of criticism.

Professor Campbell reserves the reasons for his greater Conservatism than that of any editor since Hermann until his second volume. He follows the fashion set by Mr. Shilleto, who deferred for an indefinite period his treatment of the exact point which I had chosen as a test whether he was a clear-sighted editor of Thucydides. This tantalising way is, perhaps, rather too much in the style of the halfpenny numbers of sensational novels, where the hero and the villain of the story are left to wrestle together on the edge of a precipice until "our next number." The preface of the first volume was the right place for Mr. Campbell's statement of reasons for Conservatism, and Mr. Shilleto's first number might well have settled so easy a point as that *é*s.

This edition of Professor Campbell's is of a non-descript character. It is too big for a school book, and the critical part is not full enough for the advanced student. There was, indeed, abundance of room in the five hundred and odd pages, of which the first volume is composed, to include all that the advanced student could reasonably ask for in the first volume of a single edition; but the editor has used up very nearly one-fifth of his space with a treatise on the language of Sophocles, which treatise I should think that no one, whether schoolboy or advanced student, will have patience either to read or refer to till the crack of doom. It is Sophocles that one wants to read, and not any dry and dreary analysis of his forms of speech. All of this matter, so far as it is of value, might easily have been incorporated in the foot-notes, where, again, much room is lost in useless talk, and idle remark that is good for nothing.

It was, on the other hand, quite clear for whom

Mr. Blaydes' edition was intended. It presupposed a good knowledge of the Greek language and of such editions of the plays as are read in schools—travesties of the text which go by the name of 'the text of Dindorf'—and it proceeded to give to the University student, eager to know all that can be known about the text of Sophocles and its meaning, that full exposition of them which could only come from a scholar so devoted and painstaking as Mr. Blaydes. Perhaps Mr. Blaydes makes you think too much; in other words, makes you take more trouble than you like. But that is precisely what a good edition ought to make you do; it ought to make you take trouble to know what is right. That is not only the proper duty of an edition of Sophocles, it is also the duty of great Universities. What is the use of any University if it will not make men think and take trouble in the exercise of their thoughts? No University is justified in forsaking the path of advanced inquiry, and wasting its time and energy in the compilation of 'popular' or 'middle-class' editions. The public has no right to dictate to men of science and learning. Every step in the direction of the popular voice is a step backward. There will always be popularisers enough, and good enough, without any scholar's turning his back on his work. But it may be questioned whether any real scholar ever did write a popular edition, or ever will.

The preceding remarks are not impertinent to this production of the Clarendon Press series, because this edition of Sophocles has all the air and ways of a popular edition. It affirms, and denies, and lays down the law (for the most part erroneously), as if it were written for the behoof of a shoal of gudgeons, greedy to know all the things that the Clarendon Press Editors would let Professor Campbell say about Sophocles. It is such a comfortable and satisfactory thing to have your Sophoclean creed made out definitely, and sanctioned

and sealed by the highest authority. But in good truth it matters little who writes a book; the book is not valuable to anyone (I omit some students who have to be examined), except so far as it helps you to identify and understand your text. It is not valuable as indicating what I, or Professor Campbell, or the Clarendon Press Editors, think about Sophocles. No Hermann or Bentley that ever breathed, much less any Conservative editor, ought to be taken as an 'authority.' If you begin to talk about 'authorities,' then you begin to save yourself the trouble of using your own brains. No matter where the book comes from, you must watch, weigh, ponder, suspect, distrust, and deny with unremitting persistence. If your Editor's words bring conviction, you will not, indeed, set him up for an authority, but you will heartily thank and honour him as long as you live.

You will heartily thank and honour him as long as you live if you care much for the Sophocles or Homer in question. But Professor Campbell has found very few indeed of the time-honoured editors of Sophocles whom he could heartily thank and honour. He is very far from being liberal in his awards of honourable mention to his predecessors, those predecessors through whose genius and devoted study alone Professor Campbell has been able to learn what he knows about Sophocles. Look at the stars, medals, and honourable decorations that Hermann wears in the picture. There is nothing of that kind conferred in this country of England, nor is it desired. But if a scholar's work and contributions are superciliously overlooked by editors like Professor Campbell, then, surely, there is no hope for the scholar of any reward at all. I fear that many a Brunck's and Musgrave's shade will look in vain into this edition for its little *γέρας* and guiderdone of everlasting remembrance. Professor Campbell has omitted almost entirely that part of the duty of an editor and

ἐξηγητής which consists in the care of a departed Grecian hero's prize and ἀνάθημα of his garland of leaves. Elmsley and Hermann have, with characteristic energy, squeezed their way into this limited Valhalla, but one misses the face of many a noble old Viking, and one sees a great deal too much of the self-elected Thaliarchus.

Upon the whole it almost seems as if this edition is intended for those who are about to be examined by the editors of the Clarendon Press series; and I should certainly not have turned aside from the congenial task of proposing new meanings for Homeric words, where there was no one to find fault with, to write this notice of a book whose purpose is so limited, if I were not afraid that the text and interpretation of Sophocles may suffer from this new form of prestige and authority. It is for Sophocles' sake alone that I beg to be allowed to call attention to some of the difficult points in these plays.

The Oedipus Tyrannus, like the Ajax, is a play in which all the ground has been so well hunted and shot over, that very little of the more exciting kinds of critical game can be expected to turn up. Not that the Oedipus Tyrannus is wanting in corrupt passages, and in places where it is possible for professors to blunder, but the corrupt passages, which remain unrestored, are of that sort where the best suggestion can only be regarded as the best, and not as certain. You have to find out what Schneidewin, Arndt, and some others have said about them, which you can best do with the help of Mr. Blaydes' edition, and after that there is little more that can be done. There are, apparently, few of those passages where the exigencies of the context point to some one restoration and reject every other; there are few, apparently, of those which are like a good riddle, in admitting of only one solution, and that, such a solution as may be discovered. Conservative editors will be surprised at so great a con-

cession, and indeed it is humiliating. I have always held with the Greek gnome—

πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐξευρεῖν ἐὰν μὴ τὸν πόνον
φεύγῃ τις, ὃς πρόσεστι τοῖς ζητουμένοις.

But Philemon forgot that not only trouble is needed but time; he forgot for the moment what his countryman, Hippocrates, had said ὡς ἄρα βραχὺς μὲν ὁ βίος, μακρὴ δὲ ἡ τέχνη. "You can find out anything, if you take trouble enough," requires to be modified by "Life is short and art is long." The true meaning of words, however, is very nearly as interesting and important a study as the right reading of a passage, and Professor Kennedy has done well to call attention to Soph. O. T. 44—

ὡς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς
ζώσας ὁρῶ μάλιστα τῶν βουλευμάτων,

where the old rendering, and Professor Campbell's, is of a very loose and objectionable character. There is a fatal objection to Professor Kennedy's interpretation; *συμφορὰ*, a word which occurs *μυριάκις*, never came near the meaning, 'conference in counsel.' The *καὶ* also remains without satisfactory explanation; nor has the priest proposed that Oedipus should confer with any one. *Συμφορὰ* has its ordinary meaning of 'misfortune' and 'failure.' This, I find, may be almost made out from the confused note of Triclinius. I take the meaning to be, "since I observe that even the failures of the counsels of experienced men are in the highest degree endowed with life." Their counsel dies harder than any other counsel, and the bad results are not so bad as those of an inexperienced man's counsel, because the man of experience has also taken into account the possible modes of failure.

Professor Kennedy makes a very good and much wanted comment at v. 228, where Professor Campbell's note is, at best, confused, vacillating, and prolix:

κεῖ μὲν φοβεῖται, τοῦ πικλῆμ' ὑπεξελὼν
αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ πείσεται γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν
ἄστεργές οὐδέν.

"and if he fears the consequence when he has removed the offence from us and charged it against himself, let him, nevertheless, not keep silence, for he shall suffer nothing else unpleasant, &c." There is the omission of μὴ σιωπάτω (see v. 231) after αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ, or, if you like it better, of οὐ καλῶς ταρβεῖ, which is expressed in a similarly formed sentence, Trach. 457,

κεῖ μὲν δέδοικας, οὐ καλῶς ταρβεῖς, ἐπεὶ
τὸ μὴ πυθέσθαι, τοῦτό μ' ἀλγύνειεν ἄν.

With reference to the elision at the end of v. 29, where the editor says nothing, and of ταῦτ' at the end of v. 332, where an imperfect account of the elision is given, and a reference to O.C. 114, which ought to be O.C. 1164, the law seems to be that the elision was sparingly tolerated when there was a colon or comma in the latter half of the senarius, to give the actor time to take breath, and the nearer the end the better. Sophocles has used this elision frequently enough, I think, to justify its admission under those circumstances, and with a long syllable at the elision, into our own Greek iambics. O.C. 1164, one of the elided lines, is so clumsily expressed that I have no doubt at all that ἐλθεῖν μολόντ' is corrupt. μόνον has been proposed for μολόντ'. The corruption lies deeper. Is it possible that there was a word χρῆν equal to χρῆζειν, and that αἰτεῖν is a gloss? We know that Sophocles used χρῆς and χρῆ. I almost suspect that he also used χρῆν, and would suggest, by way of hint and indication, the following form of the lines:

σοὶ φασὶν αὐτὸν ἐς λόγους μολόντα χρῆν
ἐλθεῖν ἀπελθεῖν τ' ἀσφαλῶς τῆς δεῦρ' ὁδοῦ,

instead of the vulgate σ. φ. α. ε. λ. ἐλθεῖν μολόντ' αἰτεῖν
κ τ. λ., two verses that could not pass muster anywhere.

Professor Campbell, whom I will in future call 'the Editor,' sadly misinterprets *ἐκτριβήσεται*, 'shall be extirpated,' v. 428. The nautical allusions in the context are so numerous, that even a very careless reader could hardly miss seeing that the word means "suffer utter shipwreck." The 'utter shipwreck' of Oedipus after his fair voyage is a proper climax to a fearfully fine passage.

This edition is one of those which represent to us the smooth chinned Apollo, the god of youth and gladness, as a well bearded father of any number of grown up daughters who have become mothers. The editor puts into his text, v. 1101, the MSS. reading,

ἦ σέ γέ τις θυγάτηρ Λοξίου.

Here, I think, the editor resembles too much that official to whom I pointed out a bearded statue marked "Apollo," in the British Museum, and asked whether that could possibly be right. I had heard of a bearded Venus, but a bearded Greek Apollo was quite new. The official calmly replied that he had no doubt it was all right. He was evidently a conservative official. So here we have a grandfather Phoebus Apollo; grandfather of Oedipus Tyrannus, and great grandpapa of the interesting family of four. He looks wonderfully like a great grandpapa (does he not?) as he stands there on the Belvedere of the Vatican Museum, with those maiden locks, that youthful face, and those dainty arms, but as hard as nails, that have just sent whizzing forth from silver bow some well-aimed shaft of high emprise. I hardly think that a Greek would have suffered this notion of grandpapahood to come so near the young Apollo. It was quite bold enough to suggest that Oedipus was a love-child of Apollo, but no Greek could endure the idea of his being his grandfather. Nor did Winckelmann even once think of him as a grandpapa when he saw and celebrated all those fine things which are to be found in his Hymn to the Apollo of the Belvedere. Surely, after Dr. Arndt

had corrected the passage in so masterly a way, and Mr. Blaydes had put the correction clearly, in the text, before the English reader, that notion of 'some one of Apollo's daughters who has become a mother' ought to have been omitted from this edition. No editor has the right to father upon the poet any such absurdity. But the Editor makes the offence still more offensive by talking about 'a quasi epic quantity *θυγάτηρ*,' and about 'cyclic choriambuses,' and how 'the cheerful steadiness of the prevailing ditrochaic rhythm is relieved, but not broken, by the cyclic dactyl.' This jargon is without excuse. The chorus is really an ordinary logaoedic one, of a very steady and well-conducted character, in which there are only three flaws. There is the omission of *που** after *ὄρεσσιβάτα*, the corruption of *ἡ σέ γ' εὐνάτειρά τις* into *ἡ σέ γέ τις θυγάτηρ*, and that of the endings of the last lines of the strophe and antistrophe. I think they originally ran thus;

ἰήϊε Φοῖβε, σοὶ δὲ | τοῦτ' ἄρεστὸν εἶη, and

Νυμφᾶν Ἑλικωνίδων σὺν | αἷς γε πλείστα παῖζει,

anacrusis, dactyl, trochaic dipodia, and ithyphallic. As the endings stood before, they had no rhythm at all. The little changes which I propose are just of the character which I have alluded to above. They are the easiest conceivable correction of the broken lines; but you could not say that they are certain restorations, because the passages do not afford an absolutely certain clue.

Lines 1347,8 have not been well treated by editors and translators:

δείλαιε τοῦ νοῦ τῆς τε συμφορᾶς ἴσον,

ὥς σ' ἠθέλησα μηδ' ἀναγνῶναί ποτ' ἄν.

The Editor, a little better than the rest, says, "How I could wish that I had never known thee, who thou art." An awkward and silly remark put in uncivil form. The lines mean, "How I could have wished that you had never found out who you are;" a remark that clearly

contains one of the important moral reflections which this drama illustrates. Oedipus was wrong in the persistent investigation of his birth and origin. It is well to be ignorant of those things which the Deity does not choose to reveal. *πολλὰ καὶ λαθεῖν καλόν.*

There is a troublesome passage just below, v. 1349, which is also ill-managed :

*ὄλοιθ' ὅστις ἦν ὃς ἀπ' ἀγρίας πέδας
νομάδος ἐπιποδίας ἔλαβέ μ' ἀπό τε φόνου.*

The Editor says, "Who took me from the cruel gnawing fetter on my foot," which is only a glossing over of the queer old notion that the fetter pastured on the foot of Oedipus. Ridiculous enough! But it is surpassed in absurdity by the Editor's very unconservative suggestion that the reading ought perhaps to be, *νομάδος ἐπὶ πόας*, "the fetter that grazed upon the grass." In this suggestion we have an example of a truth which I have long ago remarked, that conservative editors, who will not tolerate any correction coming from a critic or careful reader, are certain, sooner or later, under the instigation, I suppose, of some kind of Nemesis, to make an emendation of their own, and then, indeed, there is a sight for angels and men to contemplate. In point of fact, the fetter did not graze either on the foot or on the grass; nobody and nothing grazed on anything. But little Oedipus is compared to a grazing animal secured with spancels, as he lies there on the ground with his feet tied. If *νομάδος* were the reading which *must* be read, the meaning would be, "Accursed be the man, whoever he was, who took me from the cruel fetter of the grazing foot-clog," where "grazing" only means "such as is put upon the feet of grazing cattle." But both *νομάδος* and *ἐπιποδίας* (of course) are corrupt. The metre guides to the following form of the two lines :

*ὄλοιθ' ὅστις ἦν, ἀπ' ἀγρίας πέδας
νομάδ' ὃς ἐπιποδίου ἔλαβέ μ' ἀπό τε φόνου.*

"Who, when I lay there like a spancelled lamb, took me from the cruel fetter on my foot." I suppose that both ἐπιποδίου and φόνου have the last syllable short by hiatus.

The too common misfortune of being unable to see a plain thing when it is put clearly before you is very manifestly remarkable at v. 1463, where the Editor does not mention the certain restoration of Dr. Arndt. Even if he could not appreciate the restoration himself, it has at least so much undeniable verisimilitude that he was bound to put it before the reader. The passage runs:

αἶν οὐποθ' ἡμῇ χωρὶς ἐστάθη βορᾶς
τράπεζ' ἀνευ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός.

If you read ἡμῇ with the Editor, you must translate "For whom my meal-table was never set apart without me," a sentence so clumsy and obscure that no man could write it who knew what he wanted to say. It reads, too, as if Oedipus was himself to be one of the dishes, and part of the food for the girls to feed upon. Dr. Arndt said that ἡμῇ is a corruption of ἀμῇ 'our,' and that AMH was a corruption of ΑΛΛΗ, and the meaning "For whom a separate meal-table was never set, apart from me." This will be an ordinary instance of what the good and laborious Mr. Riddle was the first to call "Binary Structure."

Passing on to the Oedipus at Colonus, one observes the absence from this edition of the extremely valuable and interesting Greek Argument. It is very hard to imagine what could be the reason for leaving it out. Surely there is no student of Sophocles, either at Oxford or St. Andrew's, who does not care for these epitomes of ancient tradition. This omission of the Greek Arguments is really a high crime and misdemeanour, which, I think, this Editor is the very first to commit. To the best of my knowledge, no one has presumed to omit them before, in any edition, great or small. Did the

Editor think he was able to write anything more interesting to the student than these Arguments? It might very well be suggested that the remainder of this edition should be called in, like the old florins of the year 1849, that were so improperly issued without the *Dei Gratia* inscribed and the *Fidei Defensor*.

At v. 15, O. C. we have the words (πύργοι) πόλιν στέγουσιν where Prof. Palmer and the Editor retain στέγουσιν and reject Wakefield's στέφουσιν. It is a very nice point whether a conservative editor deserves credit for retaining the true reading although he does not know what it means. An emendator would put the word which he thought to be the word of Sophocles into the text, and would very carefully record the reading which he failed to understand in the foot notes. I shall show as I go on that you must not look to conservatives for the conservation of the MSS. readings. They only conserve the popular text. Prof. Palmer says that στέγουσιν is right because it means "to cover like a helmet." Our Editor says "protect," and that στέφουσιν "is an unnecessary conjecture." It was such a conjecture (of a Latin and Greek scholar such as we could not find a match for now, look where we would) as the Editor was bound to put into the text, if he knew no more about στέγουσιν than "protect." The difficulty was really not great. Στέγειν means "to be stanch," or keep out wet. A ναῦς στεγανή saves the passengers by keeping out the sea, the "inimicum imbrem," or the ἄντλον of Aesch. Sept. 796 :

πόλις δ' ἐν εὐδία τε καὶ κλυδωνίου
πολλαῖσι πληγαῖς ἄντλον οὐκ ἐδέξατο
στέγει δὲ πύργος.

"The ship of our country is now in fair weather; from the many strokes of the surge it took in no water, and our bulwarks are stanch." Aesch. has also δίκτυον στεγανόν, the net which is stanch, and will not let out the birds or fish which are caught in it. The word is also used of a

roof that will not let the rain through. The Latins had their *tego* for *στέγω*, but seem to have been contented with their "tectus" in place of *στεγανός*, *στεγνός*, as in the phrase "sarta tecta." Their medical men, however, had the word "stagnus" "stagnae" as an epithet for fevers which are characterised by a tightness of the patient's skin, and an imperviousness to perspiration and exhalation; Plin. H. N. 23, 7, 23, "febris constrictis quas stagnas vocant," where Dalchampsius "hae fiunt adstricta cute, praeclusis ejus spiraculis, impeditoque humorum et vaporum transpiratu." The transition from the intransitive *στέγειν* "to be stanch" to the transitive "to stanch" was easy. So we find in Italian "stangere l'uscio" and the word "stagno" for *στεγανός*; in Spanish, "estanco" with the same meaning "stanch," and the French *étanché*. Ships which are not stanch are *νῆες οὐδὲν στέγουσαι*, Thuc. II. 94. "Stanch," applied to the walls of a city, means that they are able to keep out what is hostile or dangerous.

At v. 30. *ἡ δεῦρο προστείχοντα κάξορμώμενον* the Editor talks of an inverted order. This would be right if he had corrected the last word to *κάξωρμημένον*. The present tense is schoolboy's Greek.

The Editor seems also to share Prof. Palmer's peculiar views about the particle *ἄν*. They seem to think that the vagaries and eccentricities of this little creature are so incorrigible and irrepressible that no passage can be safely touched in which any of its contortions are at stake. And they mix up passages in proof which are quite irrelevant, in a way that is very irritating. It is really a fortunate thing that there are scholars of a more Epicurean temperament,

non ignari quid queat esse
quid nequeat,

who have some distinct notion of what can happen in a Greek sentence, and what can not. On O. C. v. 42,

ὃ γ' ἐνθάδ' ἄν
εἴποι λεώς νιν,

the Editor cites two passages which have no pertinence whatever. In *Ar. Av.* 180, ὥσπερ εἶποι τις τόπος, it seems pretty clear that we ought to read ὥσπερ εἶπέ τις τόπος, and translate "just as one says (at any time) τόπος." This will be a species of the gnomic aorist, for φησὶ and φήσει would be quite as true as εἶπε. So in *Theocr.* 15. 76, ὁ τὰν νύον εἶπ' ἀποκλάξας, it might be more correct to translate "as the man says when he has locked out the bride," because the joke was of frequent occurrence, or because, as before, either φησὶ or φήσει would be equally true. Creon's εἶπον at *Eur. Med.* 272 is different, but it shows how readily the aorist slipped in where we use the present. The other passage put forward by the Editor is *Aesch. Ag.* 335, τοιαῦτά τοι γυναικὸς ἐξ ἐμοῦ κλύοις. Here the latest and most careful editors have substituted κλύεις. But even if you read κλύοις the citation has no pertinence, because κλύοις would be opt. optans, "I would have you hear," and then, too, we want no ἄν. In this passage of *Soph.*, ὃ γ' ἐνθάδ' ὦν is simply the blunder of a copyist who, like some editors, had cloudy ideas about Greek syntax. The εἶποι cannot be construed at all without an ἄν. There are some blunders which are sufficiently refuted by a flat contradiction. (I remark, in passing, that the *κεν* and *μὲν* have changed places in *Hom. Il.* 19. 321, 2,

οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι·
οὐδ' εἴ κεν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποφθιμένοιο πυθοίμην.

'Hè τὸν, κ. τ. λ., in v. 326 is the clause of which οὐδ' εἴ μὲν, κ. τ. λ. gives notice beforehand.)

This is the way nearly all through the edition. The Editor breaks down at nearly every rough place in his editorial path. But I have little liking for this constant fault-finding, and will continue my remarks on the text of *Sophocles* without any reference to this edition except in places where I can praise, or where the provocatives to censure are irresistible.

In v. 44. ἀλλ' ἴλεω μὲν τόνδ' ἰκέτην δεξαίατο, it is satis-

factory to find Prof. Palmer sanctioning the correction τὸ^v because "it seems to be quite necessary for the sake of the metre."

In v. 120, ὁ πάντων ἀκορέστατος is "most insatiable" because he is not satisfied with all the profane ground at his disposal.

V. 167. I would read νομός, "where there is range for all."

V. 172. The true reading seems to be:

καῶντας, ἃ δεῖ, κοῦκ ἄκοντας,

that is, "conform our practice, where it is necessary, to that of the people of the country, both when we are unwilling and when we are not unwilling."

Vv. 250—254 are very unmetrical, corrupt, and absurd. I would read:

πρὸς σ' ὃ τι σοι φίλον ἐκ φρενὸς ἄντομαι,
ἢ τέκνον ἢ ἄλοχος, ἢ κλέος, ἢ θεός·
οὐ γὰρ ἴδοις ἂν ἀθρῶν βροτὸν οὐδένα
ὅστις ἄν, εἰ θεὸς ἄγχι, ἔκφυγεῖν δύναιτο—

that is: ἐκ φρενὸς for ἐκ σέθεν, ἄλοχος for λόγος, κλέος for χρέος, βροτὸν οὐδένα for βροτῶν, and ἔκφυγεῖν for ἐκφυγεῖν. Θεός is one short. The ithyphallic is a fit clausula for a dactylic rhythm.

There is a desperate corruption at v. 278, εἶτα τοὺς θεοὺς μοίρας ποιείσθε, for which no rational explanation has yet been given, and which seems to defy emendation. The only suggestion which I can make is that a verse has been omitted before μοίρας.

In v. 300 I think, with Triclinius, that κάπόνως might be kept; and that βραδὺς, at v. 306, is a corruption of βαθὺς. The latter word was changed, by the corrector, to βραδύς, for the sake of the antithesis to ταχύς, the word below it. Even though Theseus is fast asleep the sound of the name Oedipus will startle him and he will come quickly. So in Hom. Il. 10. 162:

ὧς φάθ', ὃ δ' ἐξ ὕπνοιο μάλα κραιπνῶς ἀνόρουσεν;

in ib. 135 there is a still closer parallel,

πρῶτον ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆα, Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντον,
ἐξ ὕπνου ἀνέγειρε Γερήνιος ἱππότα Νέστωρ
φθεγξάμενος· τὸν δ' αἶψα περὶ φρένας ἤλυθ' ἰωή.

Palmer and the Editor would have you keep *βραδὺς* in the sense "though he sleeps so as to be slow," a truly conservative idea. Much more sensibly would Sophocles have said "though he sleeps so as to be dreaming, or snoring."

Next we note the appearance on the stage of Ismene, sitting on her Aetnean palfrey, with a long *χιτὼν*, I presume, as well as the sunshade hat of Thessaly, where "Thessaly" seems to be *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* for "Paris."

V. 328. Οἱ ὦ σπέρμ' ὅμαιμον. Ἰσ. ὦ δυσάθλιοι τροφαί, means: Oed. "My child and sister!" Is. "Alas, the two unhappy nursings!" Nursings, by Jocasta, of Oedipus first and then of Ismene.

At v. 336 change *δεινὰ δ' ἐν κείνοις τὰ νῦν* to *κείνα δ' ἐν δεινοῖς τὰ νῦν*. *Ἐν δεινῷ* is readily remembered from the Antigone.

There is a peculiar mistake made by, I believe, all editors at v. 479 foll. To pass over the mistake, the Chorus tell Oedipus to take the two jugs or crocks, *κρωσσοί*, which stand by the fountain, and with one of them pour two libations of water, and with the other a *κρωσσὸν ὅλον ὕδατος μελίσσης*, i.e., a jug full of the liquor of the bee: two of pure water and one of pure honey. There should be a dash at the end of line 479, so that the construction may run on, *τὸν τελευταῖον δ' ὅλον ὕδατος μελίσσης*. *Ὑδατος μελίσσης* is a close imitation of Æsch. Pers., *τῆς τ' ἀνθεμουργοῦ στάγμα, παμφαῆς μέλι*.

Instead of *ὥς σφας καλοῦμεν*, v. 486, I would read *καλούμενός σφας*. The *ὥς*, that is, *ος*, has got out of place. Not that the vulgate is incapable of translation; its being capable of a translation is much the same thing as being capable of *none*.

Ἐπιστροφὰι, v. 536,

μυρίων γ' ἐπιστροφὰι κακῶν,

is a very interesting word generally regarded as obscure and doubtful. Still I think that its meaning is consistent in all the principal passages. Here it means "objects towards whom numberless woes turn," or who are visited by numberless woes. In Aesch. Eum. 547, ξενοτίμους δωμάτων ἐπιστροφὰς is "the visits paid to your house by guests who must be honoured." In the Agam. 397, τὸν ἐπίστροφον is "the man who turns to the gods in prayer." In Soph. O. C., 1045, ἐπιστροφὰι seems to occur with the ἐπὶ in its reciprocal meaning, "the mutual turnings-upon-one-another, that is, charges and conflicts of contending troops." δωμάτων ἐπιστροφὰς, in Aesch. Sept. 648, is turnings to, or visitations of, one's home.

In vv. 540, 1,

δῶρον δ' μήποτ' ἐγὼ ταλακάρδιος
ἐπωφέλησα πόλεως ἐξελέσθαι,

and the corresponding lines 547, 8,

καὶ γὰρ ἄλουν (Ms. ἄλλουν) ἐφόνευσα καὶ ὤλεσα,
νόμῳ δὲ καθαρὸς, αἰδρις ἐς τόδ' ἦλθον,

there is a great deal of work cut out for the critic. I have no room for anything but results. There is not room in a short article, like the present, to give reasons or discuss the various readings proposed. I read

δῶρον δ' μήποτ' ἐγὼ ταλακάρδιος
ἀνωφελὲς ὄφελον πόλεως ἐλέσθαι,

and

καὶ γὰρ ἐμὸν φονέας καὶ ἀπώλεσα
νόμῳ δὲ καθαρὸς, αἰδρις ἐς τόδ' ἦλθον.

Everyone can see that the ἐξ in ἐξελέσθαι is wrong, and that the ὄφελον ought to be there. Translate: "the bootless gift which would that I of the grief enduring heart had never received from my country," and "(I

killed him justly) for him who slew me I also slew; and I am legally clean, for I came to this act (of just retaliation) without knowing it." Oedipus says that he slew Laius, who had virtually slain him; therefore there was no guilt, but perfectly even scales. The father slew the son; the son slew the father. Besides, he killed his father unwittingly. 'Εμὸς corrupted to ἄλλος is like that corruption already noticed in O.T. of ἄλλη into ἡμή.

In v. 709 I believe the lost word to be ἐνὸν "I have to tell of another glory, the best of all, existing in this motherland."

There is a small point at v. 821 which seems worthy of a note. Palmer and the Editor persist in retaining the γ' in

ΟΙ. τὴν παῖδ' ἔχεις μου; ΚΡ. τήνδε γ' οὐ μακροῦ χρόνου,
rather than adopt the τ' which emendators propose. The τ' is much better than the γ' which no one could explain, but neither appears to me to be right. The full answer of Creon would be ἔχω μὲν ἐκείνην τὴν παῖδα (Ismene), ἔξω δὲ τήνδε (Antigone) οὐ μακροῦ χρόνου. "I have that absent daughter, and will have this one who is present, within the limits of a not long time," so that the reading ought to be τήνδε δ' οὐ μακροῦ χρόνου. Editors have seemed to be too fearful of restoring δὲ after ὅδε also at S. Trach. 652, ἃ δέ οἱ φίλα δάμαρ. The corresponding line is νασιῶτιν ἐστὶαν. Insert the δ' so that the line may be ἃδε δ' οἱ φίλα δάμαρ, and the lines correspond without hiatus. There is τᾶδε δὲ at Trach. 953 and elsewhere.

In the difficult and still uncorrected passage O. C. 1084, 5, all that we can be certain of is that the former of the two lines should be αἰθερίας νεφέλας κύρσαιμι τῶν δ' ἀγώνων (not τῶνδ' as the Editor reads), and that θεωρήσασα is corrupt. Wunder's ἐωρήσασα, a vox nihili, could not be right here if it was an ever so well authenticated Greek word. The Editor does wisely in saying nothing about this ἐωρήσασα, but his note has no other merit. There

is the same desperate confusion of quite different things, which I have complained of before.

The treatment of line 1118 by conservative Editors is a good sample of their critical vigilance. Hermann found the line in the following state :

καί σοί γε τοῦργον τοῦμὸν ἔσται δὴ βραχύ,

where the girl Antigone says to her father "and, as you suggest, the affair, my part of it, shall be really brief." This suits the context on both sides, and it is very hard to see what fault Hermann could find with it. The old MSS. text is sound; but the arch-conservative Palmer does not deem it even worthy of record. He puts Hermann's line before you without any notice that it is not the line attributed to Sophocles. The Editor's way is a little less uncritical. He puts Hermann's line into the text, and the true old form of the line into the limbo of MSS. readings with the postilla "Herm. corr." All we can say is that it is *a little* safer for the student to read Sophocles from the Editor's book than from Prof. Palmer's. There are many examples of this sort of editorship by conservatives. Another occurs cruelly soon in the play which I have in hand, v. 1148,

χῶπῳ ἀγὼν μὲν οὗτος ἤρέθη, τί δεῖ
κομπεῖν;

"and how this contest was won, why need we vaunt?" There was no sound reason (I must be brief) for Reisig's rewriting of the line:

χῶπῳ μὲν ἀγὼν ἤρέθη τί δεῖ μάτην
κομπεῖν;

Prof. Palmer gives you Reisig's line and says nothing about that of Sophocles. The Editor does as he did before.

Not in emulation of Professor Webb's exquisite verse rendering of the next chorus vv. 1210—1248, which appeared in the second number of Kottabos, but as the

scrupulously correct form in which a mere grammarian would give the meaning, I will here insert my translation. Mr. Webb's verses appear to me to be a splendid example of how a highly gifted poet and scholar may sometimes—and yet, even the most gifted, how rarely!—so truly catch and express the beauty of an original piece, that if you put the original and the translation side by side you can hardly say which is the premier form: that praise supreme which Don Miguel de Cervantes gave to Don Giovanni de Jauregui's translation of Torquato Tasso's *Aminta*. Some critical remarks must precede my literal rendering.

Παρεῖς, unless you would prefer *πάρος* (which I suspect to be the true reading), must have for its object the notion of 'desire' taken out of *χρῆζειν*. *κατάδηλος* means "manifest in many ways," like *κατάμεμπτον*, lower down, "faulty all over," *κατὰ* having its distributive meaning, as in *κατάδενδρος*, *κατάχαλκος*. *Κατέθεντο* is gnomic aorist. *Τοῦ θέλοντος* is an allusion to the truth that that favour is most delightful which comes from a willing giver. Horace has the idea in "vos lene consilium et datis et dato gaudetis, almae." It originated in the sense of greater delight which the Greeks found in the favours willingly conceded by some one well beloved. The lengthened days cannot come from a willing giver because they bring no joy. The *τοῦ* in *τοῦ θέλοντος* expressly recalls the proverb. Hermann's reading: *ὁ δ' ἐπίκουρος* is not only required by the metre, but yields a sense so well mated with the genius of the passage that a man must be stone-blind indeed if he does not adopt it. *ἰσοτέλεστος* is "initiated in the same mysteries." *Θάνατος* is personified; so Schol. Next there is a more grievous corruption; but guided by the spirit of the poem and by the metre of a clearly correct antistrophic line, I say that v. 1221 ought to be

Ἄϊδος ὄμορος ἀνυμέναιος,

instead of the quite untranslatable, unmetrical, and incomprehensible

Ἄϊδος ὅτε μοῖρ' ἀνυμέναιος.

In *τίς πλάγχθη πολύμοχθος ἔξω*, the metaphor is indicated by *κούφας ἀφροσύνας φέρον* to be that of birds and fish in a net. *Κουφονόων* is easily remembered as an epithet of birds in Soph., and Hor. has "vagas aves" and "vagos pisces." *κακὰ κακῶν* is "such ills as are ills to one who is ill already." At "not I alone" we remember that Sophocles himself is 90 years old. *ἐννυχίων* must be read, of course, in the last line. Parallel forms of speech are very observable; and in the peculiar manner of the Greeks *πάντοθεν κλονεῖται* is insisted on by the poet in the repetition of the statement, *κατάκρας κλονέουσιν*. The last four lines of the ode mean that the troubles of old age are present every hour of the day and night, evening, morning, midday, and midnight.

"Whoever craves the fuller portion of *time* to live in, putting aside desire for the moderate one, will be clearly convicted, in my judgment, of harbouring folly. For lengthened days store up many things which are nearer to sorrow *than to joy*; and as for the things that please, you will not see where they are, whenever any one of you falls in for more than comes from the willing giver. And then Death, the ally, co-mystic, and next neighbour of Aïs, with no nuptial hymn, no lyre, no chorus, appears, to make an end."

"Not to be born at all beats the whole argument; and that which is by far the next best thing is, when one has appeared in the world, to go as soon as possible to the place from which he has come. For when youth is with us, bringing its light-hearted follies, who in the midst of many troubles wanders free of them? what distress is there not contained in it? There are blood-sheddings, faction, strife, battles, and envy! And then

the all-faulty old age takes by lot the last place, with no strength, no companion, no friend; in which all the pains which to pain are painful dwell together."

"In which old age this poor sufferer, and not I alone, like some northern strand wave-buffed and weather-beaten, is every way confounded. Even so do dire calamities like dashing waves utterly confound and always beset him; these coming from the sunset, these from the rising sun, these from its mid-day beams, and these from the glimmers of night."

In v. 1341, *βραχεῖ σὺν ὄγκῳ καὶ χρόνῳ διασκεδῶ*

we should read *ὄγκῳ* "whom I with brief delay, and in brief time, will utterly demolish." You can hardly make much out of "with brief size." *ὄγκος* has none of the *ἐνέργεια* of 'moles,' and Polynices has just been expatiating upon the magnificent array of warriors which he will lead to Thebes.

The Editor makes two blunders at v. 1370, in reading *που* instead of *πω*, and in mistranslating *αὐτίκα*. Here is his translation of the passage:

*τοίγαρ σ' ὁ δαίμων εἰσορᾷ μὲν οὐ τί πω
ὥς αὐτίκ'*

'for this the god regards thee, not indeed immediately as yet.' So the Editor. The true translation is "and so the deity does not yet look upon thee as he will presently," that is "not yet with such fierce displeasure as he will show after you have marched to Thebes." The Editor is ignorant of that meaning of *αὐτίκα*.

"It is surprising that any critic should deny," as the Editor does, that the meaning of *τὸ σὸν θάκημα καὶ τοὺς σοὺς θρόνους*, v. 1380, is "thy seat, even thy kingly throne," when Polynices lower down, v. 1380, appeals to his sisters and says "do not *you*, in the gods' name, if these prayers of our father are answered, and there is a return home for you, do not *you* treat me with contumely." Nor could

anything be more plainly true than Elmsley's correction of σφῶν γ' ἂν, v. 1407, into σφῶν ἐάν γ? Besides, there is no meaning in "they win thy suppliant seat," not a particle.

Next I come to one of these passages where the provocation is intolerable. Professor Campbell says on v. 1491: "The restoration of the text is due to Professor Edmund L. Lushington, of the University of Glasgow. The meaning is, 'Ho! my son, come on thy way (from Athens), or if thou chancest to be consecrating to Poseidon, God of Sea, the altar with its hollow surface that crowns the height, come hither!' τυγχάνεις is not unsuited to express the uncertainty where Theseus is. ἐπιγύαλος follows the analogy of ἐπίσημος, etc. ἄκραν partly indicates the surface of the altar, where the victim was placed over the hollow (γύαλον) that received the blood, and partly its position on the top of the hill."

The above is exactly copied from p. 365 of Professor Campbell's book. The astounding audacity of the note, so carefully transcribed, is manifest in many ways. Thus: γύαλον did not mean 'the hollow of an altar.' There is no word ἐπιγύαλον, never was, and never could be. Can any one suppose that Sophocles would talk of "the hollow on the top of an altar on the top of a hill," and put it forward as a thing well said? Nor would the poet represent Theseus as consecrating the altar just then, consecrating it, too, with a hollow in it. I find that on my first reading of this note I did what I suppose every other scholar did who had any ideas about altars: I drew a red ink line through the whole of it. I have since looked out all the points in a sufficient number of reference books, ancient and modern, and I declare that there is no excuse for Professor Campbell's advancing any one of the points involved. Go where you will there is nothing to support our two Scottish friends except some hollows in the incense altars represented in Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities. But

this, Soph. O. C. 1491 is a *βούθυτος ἐστία*, and neither Pausanias, in his particular description of the great altar of Zeus at Olympia, and of other altars, says anything about any *γύαλον*, nor Julius Pollux where he talks about altars, nor L. and S., nor Suidas, nor E. M., nor, I believe, anyone else. You have only to read the article on *θέναρ* in L. and S. to see that it means the flat part of anything, and not a hollow. One strikes, *θείνει*, with the flat of the hand. You say the flat, rather than the hollow, of the foot. Hercules was not a diver and explorer of the hollow of the sea in the words *ἀλός ἐξευρών θέναρ*. So that it is undeniable that Boeckh and the Scholl. are mistaken at Pindar Pyth. 4.206, where I have always translated *βωμοῖο θέναρ*, "the flat top of the altar." If Professors Lushington and Campbell have any basis of authority, or record of antiquity, to support their view, why did they not proclaim it, with chapter and verse cited, for the benefit of myself and others who are not so well informed? What right have they to give one six hours' work in proving that to be a craze which one knew right well to be a craze?

Translate, good reader, as you did before: "Come, come, my son, even if (εἰ τ', not εἴτ' with the Editor) at the end of the vale you chance to be offering victims to the sea-god Poseidon on the altar where oxen are slain, still come!" Every Athenian knew what 'at the end of the vale' meant.

'Ὡδ' 'hither,' has slipped out of v. 1497, which should be written:

δικαίαν χάριν παρασχεῖν παθών. αἴισσ' ὦδ', ἄναξ.

The corruption of *ὦδ' ἀναξ* into *ὦναξ* and *ὠναξ* of the Codd. arose out of the greater rarity of that meaning of *ὦδε*, 'hither,' and from the supposition that Sophocles would say *ὦναξ*.

An easy correction may also be made at v. 1514. The iambic trimeter begins in the Codd. with *πολλὰ βρονταί*,

or, *πολλὰ βρονταί*, or, *πολλα (ι) βρονταί*. From this it is quite clear that the copyists found *πολλαί* and felt bound to write it; and that the corrections *τὰ πολλὰ* and *αἱ πολλὰ βρονταί* (Dindorf, 5th Ed., which is bad Greek), are wrong. The article is indispensable with *βρονταί*, because *βέλη* has it. The context is:

ΘΗ. πῶς εἶπας, ὦ γεραιέ, δηλοῦσθαι τάδε;

ΟΙ. *πολλαί βρονταί διατελεῖς, τὰ πολλὰ τε
στράψαντα χειρὸς τῆς ἀνικῆτου βέλη.*

Here *διατελεῖς* is the epithet for *βρονταί*, corresponding to the *πολλὰ* which goes with *βέλη*. Correct thus:

πολλ' αἷ τε βρονταί διατελεῖς, τὰ πολλὰ τε

and you have a sentence perfectly formed in Sophocles' way, with the meaning,

"Th. How say you, old man, that this is made plain?

Oed. In many ways do both the continuous thunders make it plain,

And the many bolts that flashed from the hand invincible."

Dindorf's *αἱ πολλὰ βρονταί* is a fair example of the sort of readings which one finds in the text of his edition. He takes up with the first smart thing or easy way that comes to hand. He puts in a good thing once or twice like Choerilus; but if he were visited with condign punishment for each of the bad ones, I fear that he would share the fate of that unfortunate poetaster. Of course you could not expect an Editor of forty-four Greek plays, and of fragments enough to make up the half-hundred, to present you with the result of any very careful thought and reflection. It is this thrice execrable railway speed with which he works that makes his work worthless. As if any process of thought that was hurried could be genuinely good! If his book did not give you a MS. reading at each correction, it would be about the worst book to read Sophocles from that has appeared.

There are many other passages in the *Œdipus at*

Colonus on which I could offer suggestions and help. I have confined myself to such as seemed to present some doubt the solution of which was indisputable. To do more would be to trench upon ground which properly belongs to an Editor, and would take up too much space. It remains to do the same for the Antigone.

The text of the Antigone appears to me to be in a more unsatisfactory state than that of any other Greek play. Although most of the very best scholars have done their utmost for it, and not without much success, it is impossible for a frequent reader of the other plays of Sophocles not to see that there are in the Antigone forms of speech, and things said, which could not proceed from Sophocles. On this account I have, with many other readers of Sophocles, accepted the tradition that ours is not the original edition of 440 B.C., but is that form of the play which was brought out by Ἰοφῶν ὁ ψυχρός. This accounts for a good deal, but the explanation is troublesome in another way: it makes the critical examination of the text very trying and difficult. The text appears to have been so much tampered with by its insipid Editor, I mean Iophon, that no mortal ingenuity could ever see its way to the disentangling of the flimsy mess. Look at the first five lines. How much acuteness and learning have been brought to bear upon them, and yet nothing achieved that is convincing. My own eclectic way is to read *ὅτι* with Hermann; to take *ἄτης ἄτερ*, with Boeckh, as meaning "apart from the doom which follows horrid sin;" and to relieve the anaphora of which Schneidewin complains (*οὐτ'—οὐτ' αἰσχρὸν*), by reading *οὐδ', ἄτης ἄτερ, οὐτ' αἰσχρὸν οὐτ' ἄτιμον*. I am disposed to think that *ἄτης ἄτερ* must be right, because *ἄλγος*, *αἰσχος*, and *ἀτιμία* are not sufficiently grievous and unpleasant things to be put by the side of *ἄτη*. It is proper, therefore, that Antigone should except *ἄτη* from the count of sufferings which she says had befallen herself and Ismene.

Such being the state of the text, how admirable must be the design of the play, and how absorbing the interest of the moral actions discussed, to have obtained so much attention and roused so much enthusiasm! In spite of the critical perplexities and desperate improprieties of the language, there is still so much absolute beauty and force of thought floating about the mangled lines that one remembers the *Antigone*, and thinks about it in maturer years almost as much as about the *Agamemnon*, the *Prometheus Vinctus*, and, to go down several steps, the *Epistles of Horace*. The careful reading of the *Antigone*, with its 1300 odd lines, is in itself an education. If read faithfully, this play will make the reader a good citizen; and one does not in the least wonder that the Athenian people, who could see its educational worth, made the writer one of their ten *στρατηγοί*, *honoris causa*. The impulse was good, whether Sophocles was a good general or not; and was certainly quite as judicious as that impulse of English and Irish Universities which has made generals and medical men Doctors of Laws, *honoris causa*. The corresponding phenomenon has not yet occurred: Mr. F. A. Paley has not yet been made a General for his forty years' distinguished service in the field of advanced literature.

But I must, as before, confine my remarks to things which appear capable of satisfactory explanation and correction. In the first antistrophe of the *parodos* of the *Antigone* I wish to protest against the universal translation of *ἔβα*, v. 120. There is nothing said as yet about the defeat of the Argives. There is no intimation of it until we come to *δυσχέρωμα*, v. 126, which word introduces *Ζεὺς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, "but conquered he was, for Zeus hateth exceedingly, &c." It is not easy to give a translation of this passage which shall at the same time keep up the imagery of the eagle and of the Argive army; but, as nearly as I find possible, the translation would be: "And after alighting on the hill which overlooks our

homes, with gaping bill and spears hankering for blood, *he went* reconnoitring the entrance of our seven gates, previous to being filled (*as he thought*) in his jaws with our blood, and before the fire of pinewood had caught our coronet of towers. Such was the flapping din of war that raised itself upon his back, a hard conquest for the Theban snake which had to cope with him. But conquered he was. For Zeus hateth exceedingly the rantings of an arrogant tongue, &c." Ἐβα ἀμφιχανὼν is "he went with gaping bill to reconnoitre" and not 'he fled,' which makes him fly a great deal too soon.

In ἄλλα δ' ἐπ' ἄλλοις, v. 139, there is an allusion to the Homeric epithet ἄλλοπρόσαλλε. Rude Ares dispenses a different lot to each of the warriors. Amphiaraus, *e.gr.*, was swallowed up by the earth in his flight from the spear of Periclymenus. Capaneus was struck by a thunderbolt, from the top of the battlements into the air, and *πανταλωθείς*, that is, "turned into a Tantalus" in being suspended, for a few seconds, between earth and heaven. Then he dashes upon the earth which, ἀντιτύπῳ, reverberates with the crash of his fall. In this interpretation of ἀντίτυπῳ I follow Mr. Blaydes, who compares Philoct. 1460, ἀντίτυπον στόνον.

There is rather a neat point to be made at v. 234,

κεῖ τὸ μηδὲν ἐξερῶ, φράσω δ' ὅμως,

where we have an ellipsis like that pointed out by Professor Kennedy on O. T. 228. The φύλαξ shrugged his shoulders and twitched his eyebrows at ἐξερῶ, gestures significant of οὐχ ἥδομαι, which is expressed in a similarly formed but more tranquil passage, Trach. 377, where a messenger says:

εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγω φίλα,

οὐχ ἥδομαι· τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ἐξείρηχ' ὅμως.

Here the watchman says "If I say what you do not like, *I am sorry for it*, but will say it all the same." If the reader would like to see what a stir this little difficulty

has caused, he should look at Mr. Blaydes' note, and, for something which passes all human comprehension, at Professor Campbell's.

This use of $\delta\epsilon$ when the clause in which the $\mu\epsilon\nu$ occurs has been expressed by a gesture is the same in principle as that $\delta\epsilon$ which occurs in Attic prose, introducing the apodosis after a long protasis, and which might be conveniently called the *apodotic* $\delta\epsilon$. You will always find that it refers to an $\omicron\iota\ \mu\epsilon\nu$, or the like, understood; that is, it gathers up in effect the whole gist of the long protasis and puts it before you again immediately in front of the apodosis. Such a triumph of ingenuity do we possess in the Greek language!

Leaving out many points on which I could advance what is sufficiently convincing to myself, and stopping only at those where I think I can convince the reader, I come to v. 350, where the MSS. reads $\acute{\iota}\pi\pi\omicron\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$. The metre shows this to be wrong. I take it that the preposition in composition with $\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ has been omitted by the copyists, exactly as in that evident example, v. 380, where the MSS. give $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\nu\sigma\iota$, and where Boeckh's $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\nu\sigma\iota$ is required both by sense and metre. I adopt Brunck's correction, $\acute{\iota}\pi\pi\omicron\nu\ \acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$. The phrase is right, as Mr. Blaydes' citations clearly show, and these citations might be easily multiplied. Nor is there anything very strange in the change of tense. You have the same change a little lower down, in the very next system, $\phi\epsilon\upsilon\acute{\xi}\iota\nu\ \omicron\nu\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$. Read then:

$\acute{\iota}\pi\pi\omicron\nu\ \acute{\upsilon}\pi\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\iota}\phi\lambda\omicron\phi\omicron\nu\ \zeta\upsilon\gamma\acute{\omicron}\nu,$

"he will lead the horse under the neck-encircling yoke."

A few words must be said with a view to save the text, v. 365 foll., from any further marring and misinterpretation by modern Iophonists. $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\omega\nu$ the MSS. reading of v. 368 is right, and this is a place where Professor Campbell deserves praise. He rightly reads $\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\omega\nu$, although his note is not sufficiently clear and

simple. Let me add another place where he has deserved well of Sophocles: he has retained *κόνις* at v. 602. There was, in both cases, much temptation to go astray, if Professor Campbell had not more or less clearly seen the drift of Sophocles' meaning in *κόνις* and *παρείρων*.

The passage which I am discussing appears in the MSS. as follows; I only append the proper punctuation, which is quite different from that of Dindorf. Dindorf has utterly failed to see the meaning of the passage:

σαφόν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνη—
 ας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων,
 τότε μὲν κακὸν ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει.
 νόμους παρείρων χθονός,
 θεῶν δ' ἔνορκον δίκαν,
 ὑψίπολις ἀπολις, ὅτ' τὸ μὴ καλὸν
 ξύνεστι, τόλμας χάριν.

The good man, with the Greeks, was one who went wrong in less important things, but carefully observed the main duties of a citizen, particularly those which he swore to observe in the oath taken when he first became a citizen, the oath of the Athenian *ἔφηβοι*. I will give a translation of that oath lower down, where it seems to be more appropriately placed. The Greeks had no perfect man, not even Ulysses. This is seen again, from the line of Theognis (?) quoted by Xenophon Mem., 1. 2. 19.,

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς τότε μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός,

'a good man is sometimes bad, at other times good,'
 "subject aulcunefoys de vice and aulcunefoys de vertu"
 as Dame Helisenne de Crenne puts it. (Her book is without any mark of date (probably about 1500, A.D.), or printer's name, or place, or pagination. She seems to have read Sophocles carefully. The citation given above is her translation of this line of Sophocles, and she gives the following translation of Soph. O. C. 1236: "descordables contentions, emulations, enuies, detractions,

exilz, homicides, destruction de corps et damnation de lame.") In this light we can interpret the passage quoted above, Antig. 363 foll., "having a measure of cleverness, σοφόν τι, beyond what could be looked for, in the ingenuity of his art, man inclines sometimes to the bad and at others to the good. If he connects with his cleverness the observance of the laws of his country, and the due worship of the gods to which he is bound by oath, then is he of high standing in his country; but no citizen is he with whom that which is dishonourable abides, through his recklessness."

At v. 414, εἴ τις τοῦδ' ἀφειδήσοι πόνου, so MSS., W. Dindorf has happened to make a right selection from the various corrections proposed. He reads ἀκηδήσοι, proposed by Bonitz. I may, perhaps, help to confirm this emendation of Bonitz, by stating a fact which my pupils are able to confirm, that I had conjectured ἀκηδήσοι several years before Dindorf's 5th Ed. was published. I had shown how easily κη in uncial letters a little carelessly written might have been read as φει; and that there was, besides, this argument, that the meaning of κηδενεῖν "to see to a corpse," of κηδεία, κηδεῖος, and the Homeric, οἷσι κηδεός ἐστι νέκυς, Il. 23. 160, made ἀκηδεῖν a peculiarly apt word to be used here. Still, I should probably have refrained from saying anything about it, unless I had just now found that Dindorf had put it into the text, because so many other conjectures would suit the text well enough; and it is, of course, quite possible that ἀκηδήσοι, the *most* suitable word did not occur to Sophocles. So careful do I wish to be not to advance anything which I do not myself hold to be certain.

I now come to a chorus in which I have already made and published three corrections which I regard as certain. In my Agam., page ix., I thought I was saying a plain thing clearly when I wrote: "In Soph. Antig. 585, γερεᾶς must be changed to γερεᾶν. At v. 596, γερεᾶν must be changed to γερεά." Professor Campbell replies,

p. 445, "γενεὰν γένος. There is no distinction of meaning (such as, 'One generation,' 'the whole race'.) Cp. O. C. 27. 28." There is nothing about the point in question either at O. C. 27. 28., or O. T. 27. 28., in Professor Campbell's edition, so that his argument is unknown to me. But whatever the reference ought to be, the following is a statement which I dare to make in the face of it and of all Professor Campbell's readers, that the meanings of γένος and γενεὰ, "race" and "generation," are quite distinct in all even tolerably correct Greek writers, whether prose-writers or verse-writers; and that it is impossible that Sophocles made so astounding a mistake as to confound them. This confounding of things, as different as light and darkness, is the most irritating thing in the world. I cannot even forgive Mr. Shilleto for failing to perceive a difference between αἰδῶς and αἰσχύνη. Αἰσχύνη is the sense of baseness which we feel at the commission of, or at the idea of committing, a base action: αἰδῶς is the feeling which prompts us to do that which our fellows will approve. Suppose that the two ideas do, in some remote end, come round to that which is much the same in practice; yet the words contemplate that end in quite different ways, and are themselves quite different. Mr. Shilleto knows, as well as I do, that he could not use the two words indiscriminately in his verses; those verses that every one rightly extols to the skies. Then why tell young students, who as yet do not know the real meaning of any words at all, that these two words mean about the same thing?

But in Professor Campbell's blunder about γένος and γενεὰ there was not the least mystery in the distinction. The γένος of the name and ilk of Campbell is all the Campbells who ever lived from the time of the first Scot who got the name and founded the race. A γενεὰ of the Campbells is all those Campbells who are living at the moment when I write these lines. Surely no Campbell can confound them now. As, however, it may seem

a bold thing to say that all prose writers of Greek observe this distinction of meaning between *γένος* and *γενεά*, I will quote a prose passage to the greater glory of the original Campbell who founded that illustrious *γένος*. The passage which I select from many others for this particular purpose is a fragment of Aristotle's treatise, *περὶ εὐγενείας*, Stob. vol. iii. p. 168, C. Tauchnitz: "*ὅταν οὖν ἐγγένηται τοιοῦτος εἰς τις ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ οὕτω σπουδαῖος, ὥστ' ἔχειν τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἀγαθὸν πολλὰς γενεάς, τοῦτο σπουδαῖον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ γένος.*" Of course the absolute and complete *γένος* of any one would be the whole series of *γενεαί* from his own to his father's, and so on, all the way back to Adam, or to the original indifferent man who developed himself out of a good monkey, or to some one of those infants who raised their Epicurean heads out of a womb of loam, and stretched forth tiny hands to the nice food and drink which lay within easy reach. But the ordinary usage of the word is to signify a race called by a particular name, and all the generations back to the person who first took the name. So the passage from Aristotle means: "Whenever in the series of generations there is some one person, such as I have described, and so eminent that many generations of his posterity derive advantage from him, this must be an eminent race or family."

That is but one passage: the Indices will supply the rest. It is not a light thing to say that two words mean the same thing in the same way. There are really no synonyms in any one language, much less in the language of the clear-headed "glorious Greeks of old." One of the best things said in Plato's *Phaedo* is, that he who uses words wrongly not only incurs the guilt of that sin but does harm to his own soul. He not only becomes guilty of a new sin, but is, besides, a worse man than he was before. Thackeray puts this solemn truth in rather an exaggerated form, when he suggests that many a desperado's career of wickedness may have had for its first step some reckless rendering of the particle *δέ*. If

we are careless about the use and meaning of words, the mischief widens rapidly, until we come to write deceptive prospectuses of new Companies, to draw up untrue Reports of the half-year's Banking business, to the fraudulent manipulation of figures, and the imitation of other people's signatures.

This long episode, for which Professor Campbell is responsible, has put out of sight the passages which I am discussing. The first is Ant. v. 581, 2,

οἷς γὰρ ἂν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας
οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει, γενεᾶν ἐπὶ πλῆθος ἔρπον.

Here I have changed *γενεᾶς* of the MSS. to *γενεᾶν*. Translate—"since for those whose house is earthquake-shaken by the gods there is no lack of deadly ruin, which (no lack) marches on through a multitude of that race's generations."

The second passage is :

οὐδ' ἀπαλλάσσει γενεὰ γένος, ἄλλ' ἐρείπει
θεῶν τις, οὐδ' ἔχει λύσιν.

Here I have changed *γενεᾶν* of the MSS. to *γενεά*. Translate: "nor does one generation rid the race of the *ἄτη*, but some god dashes it (the *γένος*) down, and it (the *γένος*) has no ransoming." Pindar and Euripides think that the *ἄτη* is at length lulled to peace by oblivion. Aeschylus, too, has hope expressed in one of

"those jewels five words long,
that on the stretched fore-finger of all time,
sparkle for ever:"

χρόνος καθαίρει πάντα γηράσκων ὁμοῦ,

but it does not suit the present strain of Sophoclean reflection to speak in this dark passage of any remission of sin.

Before I treat of the third passage in this chorus, for which I have proposed a correction, I should like to

supply a deficiency which occurs in all the additions of the Antigone, so many! which it has been my lot to read. They will none of them tell you the meaning of strophe β'. Here is a brief analysis of the chorus so far as is required for my purpose.

στρ. α., "when ἄτη gets into a race of men she repeats herself in succeeding generations in the way that one dark roaring wave succeeds another in a stormy sea."

ἀντιστρ. α., "so the bloodstained dust (κόνις), due to the nether gods, which Antigone has scattered over her brother's corse, and her wild words to Creon, and the Fury-like disorder of her brain, are smothering the last spark of hope which remained for the woful race of Labdacus."

στρ. β., "O Zeus! what transgression such as men commit can curb thy sway? neither ἄτη, nor sleep, nor time, can curb it; but poor man is ever assailable by ἄτη and too weak to shun it."

ἀντιστρ. β., "yes, man is ever liable to ἄτη, and yet he hopes: hopes that in the midst of many fancied pleasures he may escape it. But Hope is a coquette and a jilt; a few she favours; the rest she leaves to their baffled wishes and their hopeless pain."

Therefore I would substitute παύροις for πολλοῖς, MSS., in the second line of the third passage which I cite from this chorus:

ἃ γὰρ δὴ πολὺπλαγκτος ἐλπὶς
παύροις μὲν ὄνασις ἀνδρῶν,
πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων,

"for Hope with her many vagaries is for few men the fruition of love, for many she is a mockery of gay-hearted desires." The vulgate πολλοῖς is simply untrue, and Sophocles could not say it.

The oath of the Athenian ἔφηβοι which they took at the time when they were first recognised as citizens is definitely alluded to more than once in Creon's address

to Haemon, v. 639—680. As I have seen no English translation of it, I will here insert one, taken from the Greek of Stobaeus, vol. II., p. 88, C. Tauchnitz. "I will not disgrace the sacred armour, nor forsake the man who stands by me in battle array, whoever he be that I am posted next to. I will defend the things held sacred and holy, both singly, and in company with many. I will hand down my country to those who come after me, not less than she was, but greater and better than when I received her. I will yield a cheerful obedience (read *εὐφρόνως* for *ἐμφρόνως*) to the judges appointed from time to time. I will obey the established laws, and all other laws which the majority of the people agrees to establish. If any one tries to subvert the laws, or does not obey them, I will not suffer it, but will defend the laws, both myself singly, and in company with all. I will respect the religion of my fathers. The gods are witnesses of these promises on oath."

In support of Bothe's conjecture, v. 674,

*ἦδε συμμάχου δορὸς
τροπὰς καταρρήγνυσι,*

where the MSS. have *σύν* and *συμμάχη*, I may add to Bothe's very apt citation of Eur. Andr. 509, the following passage taken from Xen. de Venat. 12. 1., *καὶ ἤδη τινὲς τῶν τοιούτων, πολλοῦ ὄχλου συμμάχων τρεφθέντος, τῇ αὐτῶν εὐταξίᾳ καὶ θάρσει νενικηκότας ἀναμαχόμενοι ἐτρέψαντο*. This reads as if it was written with this passage of Sophocles before the writer's mind: "before now, when a great host of their comrades (*συμμάχων*) had been routed, men of this temper, by their own discipline and intrepidity, have renewed the fight and routed conquerors." *Σύμμαχοι*, both in Bothe's passage and in mine, means simply those who are fighting along with you, on your side; not at all 'confederates,' 'auxiliar,' or 'leagued,' as Professor Campbell has wrongly translated, with the old wrong reading. That meaning also occurs in Xen. Mem. 4. 4., and Demosth. Meid., 558.

There is a misplacement of lines in the passage 688—691. They ought to be arranged thus:

σοῦ δ' οὖν πέφυκα πάντα προσκοπεῖν ὅσα
λέγει τις, ἢ πράσσει τις, ἢ ψέγειν ἔχει,
λόγοις τοιούτοις οἷς σὺ μὴ τέρψεις κλύων·
τὸ γὰρ σὸν ὄμμα δεινὸν ἀνδρὶ δημότῃ,

that is, v. 691 should come before v. 690: "I am able, from the nature of the case, to perceive before you all the things that anyone says, or does, or finds to censure in such words as you would not be pleased to hear; for your glance intimidates the townsman."

At v. 730 put a period at the end of the line in place of the note of interrogation:

KP. ἔργον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας σέβειν.

"'Deeds,' indeed! your deed is to honour rebels." A similar correction is also quite necessary at v. 1062,

KP. κίνει, μόνον δὲ μὴ 'πὶ κέρδεσιν λέγων.
TE. οὕτω γὰρ ἤδη καὶ δοκῶ τὸ σὸν μέρος,

where the vulgate note of interrogation makes the reply painfully awkward and obscure, if not worse. The seer says: "So I have already seemed to do so far as you are concerned," that is, "without any profit to you, who are rejecting my counsels to your frightful cost." On that same page, 477, observe that the Editor does not adopt the right interpretation of τροχῶν ἀμικλητήρας ἡλίου, v. 1065, which can only mean "many revolutions of the sun's racing wheels," that is 'moments.' Sure enough the tragic events took place almost directly. It is ridiculous to talk of days intervening, when the action goes on from moment to moment as fast as it possibly could.

There is a confused and vacillating note by the Editor at v. 736,

ἄλλω γὰρ ἢ μοι χρεὶ με τῆςδ' ἄρχειν χεθονός;

με is Dobree's correction of the γε which led Thomas Magister astray. For when there are absolutely no genuine examples of χρή taking any case but the accusative, no one can doubt that T. M. has blundered. His words are χρή με ποιῆσαι πάντοτε λέγε, οὐ χρή μοι, εἰ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἄπαξ. (Master Thomas broke Priscian's head, by the by, when he said οὐ χρή μοι he should have said μὴ χρή μοι); that is, "always say χρή με, not χρή μοι, even though Sophocles has said it once." I shall not take his authority about the μοι when I could not take it about the οὐ. But indeed the point is past arguing: χρή never takes the dative, and lexicographers must drop that notion altogether.

The passages which they quote in support of this dative, so peremptorily forbidden by Thomas Magister, are, first, the one just cited, Ant. v. 736, where the μοι is dative after ἄρχειν, thus: "must I then rule this land to please any one except myself?" The next is Eur. Ion. 1316, where no one could suppose or believe that when Euripides had just said, v. 1314, τοὺς ἀδίκους ἵζειν ἐχρήν, he would say τοῖσι δ' ἐνδίκους ἐχρήν, in the next line but one! Here Mr. Badham reads τοὺς δέ γ' ἐνδίκους, and one really almost admires his contemptuous silence, utter silence, about that dative of the MSS. The third, and last, passage is Lucian Hermotimus 12, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλως ἐχρήν πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας εἶκειν τοῖς κρείττοσι. Erfurdt, the citator, simply construes wrongly. τοῖς κρείττοσι is dative after εἶκειν, of course, thus: "for that is the only way to go to work with men who will not yield to the better arguers," namely, to knock them on the head with a big silver goblet like Nestor's, σκύφῳ τινὶ Νεστορείῳ, l. c. Dixerunt.

The next passage which I will discuss is Ant. 772, 3,

*Ερως, ἀνίκατε μάχαν,

*Ερως, ὅς ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις,

where κτήμασι is sound. But how show that it is sound?

Just as Colombus showed that an egg could be made to stand bolt upright on a dinner table. And yet, if you read all the notes that have been written about that κτήμασι you would swear that it never could be known what the word meant. The text has been deemed so bad that the whole vocabulary of Greek words has been ransacked to find the right substitute. W. Dindorf enjoys the pre-eminence of having adopted into his last text the very worst (ἀνδράσι) that could be thought of. He chose it out of six words suggested by Mr. Blaydes alone, besides a legion of others proposed by a host of Germans. 'Love' is a Low German and not a Romance word, and the Germans were bound to go wrong, just as Donaldson and other Englishmen have done. It was this Low German word "Love" that sent us all wrong. Ἔρως does not mean "love," it means "strong desire," and, if the truth must out, the Greeks desired money quite as much as they desired ἀφροδίτη. Ἔρως is everywhere the representative of strong desire, ὁ δεινὸς ἕμερος, Trach. 476, for anything that is most desirable. 'Love' is entirely a modern notion, which has to do with such things as "sympathy of spirit," and all the other tendernesses, and worship of women, which we inherit from the paladins of chivalry. 'Love' came in with the Orlandos or Rolands, the Olivers, Rinaldos, Rogers, and Brandimarts; with their enchanted Bayards, Rabicans, Brigliadoras, Durindanas, Flamberges, and Balisardes; with their beauteous damigellas, the Angelicas, Polinardas, Fiordilgis, Marphisas, and Mira Guardas.

The Greeks had very little notion of this slavery to women. Ἠράσθη τῆς γυναικὸς is spoken of as a rather remarkable thing in a husband. The Greek ἔρως is a rampant desire for fame, money, and ἀφροδίτη. Their Ἔρως is a wicked elf, and not a pretty little boy with wings, like your Cupid portrayed on a valentine. If you keep the valentines and modern novels in mind you will never know what ἔρως was. Homer made some approach

to this modern, or Low German, notion of "love" when he imagined a man and wife living together *ὁμοφρονέοντες νοήμασι*. But the traces are so few that they had better be left out of the account.

Nor is Aphrodite the goddess either of Beauty or Love, any more than *Ἔρως* is the god of Love. *Ἔρως* is the god of desire, and *Ἀφροδίτη* is the goddess of sexual desire gratified,

ἥ θέμις ἀνθρώπων πέλει, ἀνδρῶν ἡδὲ γυναικῶν.

She must be beautiful, because the desire attaches itself, for the most part, to the beautiful, or to that which seems beautiful: but when the Greeks thought of the beautiful without the desire, they thought of the Graces, *Χάριτες*, who are called in by Greek fable to attire and make *Ἀφροδίτη* seem beautiful. Else she might have been taken for a "filthy cheat," as the greatest of this century's poets has called her. The Aphrodite of the Greeks is the Venus of the Romans, Plaut. Truc. I. 1,

Venus quam penes amantum summa summarum redit.

Not a little praise is due to Sir Philip Sydney for having been able, in spite of the confusing influence of this Low German word 'love,' to express so much of the Greek notion of *Eros*, and of the Latin notion of *Amor* and *Cupido*, as may be found in the following lines, taken from his True Picture of Love:

To narrow breasts he comes all wrapt in *Gaine* :
To swelling hearts he shines in *Honour's* Fire :
To open Eyes all Beauties he doth raine ;
Creeping to each with flattering of *Desire*.

The English poet is quite right in specifying the objects of strong desire as *Gaine*, *Fame*, and *ἀφροδίτη* : for strong desire is not excited except by those things which are in the highest degree desirable. In this apostrophe to *Eros*, I maintain that Sophocles could not possibly leave out the desire for wealth. That would have contracted the

Greek idea of ἔρως far too much. But he might leave out any reference to the desire for Fame and Power, in a short ode in which the lovely face of a maiden εὐλέκτρον has moved in Haemon such an ἕμερος that he will even break the law that bids him obey his father. So Sophocles was bound to say ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις, by the Greek acceptation of the meaning of ἔρως; and the desire for ἀφροδίτη and the παρθένος εὐλεκτρος is also, of course, the main subject of the ode, from the nature of the case. Forget, then, all about this Low German word "love," and translate:

Irresistible Desire!

Desire, who dost fall upon wealth!

Who also dost lodge in a maiden's soft cheek.

As the Editors make so much difficulty about ἐσχάραι τε παντελεῖς, v. 1016, I may as well say that it seems to mean "public altars;" those at which πάντες τελοῦσι τὰ ἱερά, Eur. Bacch. 485.

There is, of course, much room for multitudinous remark in the remainder of this corrupt play, as well as in the parts passed over; but my plan excludes speculations and everything which does not profess to explain some definite point. There is one more, a very little and yet important one, and then I have done.

The Editors persist in writing αὐτη at v. 990. I have said, Agam. p. ix., that it ought to be αὐτή. The model prose form would be in each case αὐτη ἢ κέλευθος, and αὐτή ἢ κέλευθος, as all know; but in iambic trimeters no one misses the article in either phrase. Now for the sense. If you read αὐτη with the Editor and all the Editors, your meaning will be "for that road from my house to Creon's palace is so intricate and perplexing, it has so many quagmires and precipices in and on each side of it, to say nothing of stones and mud, that, being blind, I must have a guide in order to travel it." If you read the αὐτή which I proposed long before Professor

Campbell's edition appeared, you have the following meaning: "for to the blind the road itself becomes a guide by means of a guide." That which is a sufficient guide to those who see, as in "*qua via ducit*," is only at second hand a guide to blind men. This is an ingenious reflection and remark; the other reading gives a ridiculous meaning. We may add our '*chemin guydant*' to the '*chemins cheminans, errans, passans croisans et traversans*,' which were discovered by our worthy old friend Pantagruel. They must not be confounded with the '*chemins qui marchent*' of Pascal.

The harmlessness of criticism in these days is not one of the least noteworthy features of our generation. Even if I had succeeded in proving that Professor Campbell's first volume of his Sophocles is a bad book to read Sophocles from, and that it is written by an incompetent person, I am still far from thinking that it will be any the less read on that account. For some reason which I can only guess at, no one cares for anything that any Review says about any book, classical or not classical. No one is inexperienced enough to buy a book because a reviewer has praised it; no one is withheld from buying a book because a reviewer has maligned it. My guess at the reason of this is, that reviews are no longer written, as we say, "*bona fide*," but, by the piece, or, all in the day's work, or by command; for writing's sake, or the publisher's sake, or the friend's, or even the reviewer's own book's sake. Many reviews, too, which I used to read, in the days of my ignorance and simplicity, also seemed to be written only with some fair-seeming, and no real knowledge of the subject. The good publisher makes the book good and the critiques good. The rival publisher makes the book bad and the critiques bad. The book is really what it happens to be. The Royal imprimatur, and lustre given by permitted dedication to some noble patron are now merged into the commonplace form "Published by Blank and Co." Perhaps this fair-

seeming kind of review is not unsuited for the eyes and understandings of a public which is singularly careless of every kind of literature but that which is properly called "light;" for a public for whom the detestable word "popular" has actually become a word of good signification; for a public which, in its abhorrence of everything really solid and thoughtful, insists upon having its little dose of information syringed into it in some flashy "popular" form; for a public which delights in being mystified and excited rather than taught; which is like Aeneas gazing on the shield which bore emblazoned the fame and fates of his descendants, "*rerum ignarus imagine gaudet*," knowing nothing of the things themselves, it delights in their glittering show.

J. F. D.

CONIECTANEA.

AESCHYLUS FRAG. 238.

Ἄδων ταῖς ἀγναῖς παρθένοις γαμηλίων
λέκτρων ἐν ᾧσται μὴ βλεμμάτων ῥέπει βολή.

ἐτοίμη is Hermann's certain correction for ᾧσται μή. The lines should, I think, run thus :

ἄδόντα κειναῖς παρθένοις γαμηλία
λέκτρ', ὧν ἐτοίμη βλεμμάτων ῥέπει βολή.

The construction is simple, and the sense perspicuous : ' *Illis virginibus volentibus est connubium, quarum ab oculis promptum jacitur missile.*' Γαμηλίων was induced by the corruption λέκτρων, and ἀγναῖς, in this passage quite unsuitable, was taken out of κειναῖς. We find κοίτας γαμηλίου in Supp. 805.

SOPHOCLES OED. COL. 367.

πρὶν μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦν ἔρως Κρέοντί τε
θρόνους εἶσθαι μηδὲ χραίνεσθαι πόλιν.

Ἐρως, though a very unsuitable word here, and only a conjecture of Tyrwhitt's has been universally adopted. The MSS. have ἔρις. Ἐρως denotes a strong, passionate desire ; and how is it sense to talk of a strong, passionate desire of—doing nothing ? The only parrallel I can adduce to such an expression is Juvenal's forcibly comical ' *magna libido tacendi.*' I believe the true reading may possibly be ἄλις. Cf. Oed. Tyr. 685 :

ἄλις ἔμοιγ' ἄλις, γὰρ προπονουμένας
φαίνεται ἔνθ' ἔληξεν αὐτοῦ μένειν.

The idea in both passages is the same, viz., that it was better to leave matters as they were. Ἄλις is a sort of *μείωσις* in both cases, denoting moderate preference for a certain course. Ἔρις was, of course, dragged in by the copyist who thought the line *must* refer to the strife between the brothers. The sense of the passage is excellent with ἄλις: 'At first they and Creon preferred that the monarchy should fall into désuetude.'

SOPH. FRAG. 58.

βοᾷ τις ὃ ἀκούετ' ἢ μάτην ὕλακτῶ;
ἅπαντα γάρ τοι τῷ φοβουμένῳ ψοφεῖ.

Hermann gave ὕλῳ for the corruption, Dindorf λάκῳ. Read:

βοᾷ τις οὐκ ἀκούετ'; ἢ μάτην κλύω;

i.e., 'do my ears deceive me?' μάτην often = 'falsely' in Sophocles. The second line demands the sense given by me to the first.

SOPH. FRAG. 687.

τῷ γὰρ κακῶς πράσσοντι μυρία μία
νύξ ἐστίν· εὖ παθόντα εἴθ' ἑτέρα θανεῖν.

Brunck gives *θήτερα* corrected to *θατέρα* by Dindorf. Mr. Ellis reads *θ' ἡτέρα* and explains the meaning to be, though a man be prosperous, yet the desirability of death is only removed by a single day. I confess I am unable to understand the construction, and I think it not improbable that the poet wrote

εὖ παθὼν τίς εἴτ' ἐρᾷ θανεῖν;

'The unhappy find a single night an eternity; [but] who, after experiencing fortune's favours, desires death?' The omission of *δέ*, which seems required, would probably be explained, if we possessed the context. *εἴτ' ἐρᾷ* = *ἐτέρα* = *εἴθ'* *έτέρα*.

EUR. FRAG. 324.

Ἔρως γὰρ ἀργὸν κἀπὶ τοῖς ἀργοῖς ἔφν.
 φιλεῖ κάτοπτρα καὶ κόμης ξανθίσματα
 φεύγει δὲ μόχθους. ἐν δέ μοι τεκμήριον
 οὐδεὶς προσαιτῶν βίοντον ἡράσθη βροτῶν
 ἐν τοῖς δ' ἔχουσιν ἡβητῆς πέφυχ' ὅδε·

For the corruption in the last line I would read ἀβρότης. The meaning of the last two lines is: "No beggar ever was in love; he [i.e. Ἔρως] is a luxury which exists only in the case of the rich;" a luxury which only the rich can afford. ἀβρότης exactly suits the tenor of the passage.

EUR. FRAG. 347.

πολλοῖς πάρεστι κἀφθόνησα δὴ βροτῶν
 ὅστις κακοῖσιν ἐσθλὸς ὦν ὅμοιος ἦ.

Read:

πολλοῖς παρέστην κἀφρένωσα δὴ βροτῶν.

παρέστην is Dindorf's. "I have stood by and reproved many." The commoner word ἐφθόνησα was very likely to be substituted for the more uncommon ἐφρένωσα.

EUR. FRAG. 367.

αἰδοῦς δὲ καὐτὸς δυσκρίτως ἔχω πέρι·
 καὶ δεῖ γὰρ αὐτῆς κᾶστιν αὖ κακὸν μέγα·

Reading this in Nauck, I at once changed αὖ to οὖ, and on referring to Dindorf I found, to my surprise, that the MSS. have οὐ or οὔ, and that αὖ is an emendation of Mr. Badham's. Surely a needless one. Slight as the difference is, the ear tells one that Euripides said "*there are occasions on which* shame is a great evil."

EUR. FRAG. 376.

πιστὸν μὲν οὖν εἶναι χρὴ τὸν διάκονον
 τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ στέγειν τὰ δεσποτῶν.

τὸν not being wanted here, *χρῆ* τὸν points to *χρηστόν*.
Read:

πιστὸν μὲν οὖν χρηστόν τε χρῆ διάκονον
τοιούτου εἶναι.

EUR. FRAG. 415.

ἴστω δὲ μηδεὶς ταῦθ' ἃ σιγᾶσθαι χρεών·
μικροῦ γὰρ ἐκ λαμπτήρος Ἰδαῖον λέπας
πρήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρ' εἰπὼν ἕνα
πύθουιντ' ἂν ἄστοι πάντες [ἃ κρύπτειν χρεών.]

For *ἕνα* read *ἀνὴρ*. "Beginning with a small spark one might burn Mount Ida, and so the whole body of citizens, conversing in couples, might come in the end to know [things that should be kept secret.]" I agree with Herwerden that *ἃ κρύπτειν χρεών* is spurious.

EUR. FRAG. 436.

ἔγωγε φημὶ καὶ νόμον γε μὴ σέβειν
ἐν τοῖσι δεινοῖς τῶν ἀναγκαίων πλέον.

I read—

ἔγωγε φημὶ, κᾶνομόν γε, μὴ σέβειν.

'I bid you, aye, not to be over-religious in a time of danger, aye, and it were illegal so to be.' That this is the sense is clear from the next fragment, which is evidently a continuation of this:

οὐ γὰρ κατ' εὐσέβειαν αἱ θνητῶν τύχαι.

EUR. FRAG. 567.

σχολὴ μὲν οὐχὶ τῷ δὲ δυστυχοῦντί πως
τερπνὸν τὸ λέξαι κάποκλαύσασθαι πάλιν.

Perhaps *πλάνην*.

EUR. FRAG. 932.

νῦν οὖν ἕκατι ῥημάτων κτενεῖτέ με;

But *ἕκατι* should follow its case. Read:

κένων ἕκατι ῥημάτων κτενεῖτε με;

EUR. FRAG. 1002.

τὸ μὲν τέθνηκε σῶμα· τοῦτο δ' ἀναβλέπει.

The lemma shows that ἀναβλέπει is corrupt, as it quotes the passage to show that Euripides used βλέπειν for ζῆν. Read:

τὸ μὲν τέθνηκε σῶμα· τῷ δὲ νῶ βλέπει.

'His body is dead: but with his mind he still lives.'

PROPERTIUS I. vii. 16.

Propertius says, addressing Ponticus, then engaged on the composition of a Thebaid:

Te quoque si certo puer hic concusserit arcu,
 Quod nolim nostros *eviolasse* deos,
 Longe castra libi longe miser agmina septem
 Flebis in aeterno surda iacere situ.

For the corrupt *eviolasse* Mr. Paley gives *evoluisse*, with previous editors, so that the meaning of the first two lines would be: "If you too are smitten by the shafts of love, which I would be sorry that the gods who will our destinies had designed for you;" the metaphor in *evolvo* being taken, as Mr. Paley says, from the thread spun by the fates. I object to this reading, as it makes Propertius waste too many words on a simple idea, and I cannot but think there is force in Lucian Müller's remark that Propertius does not say *voluisse*, *soluisse*, for *voluisse*, *soluisse*. Müller's reading *quo nolim nostros te violasse deos* is better than the received one. But the reading of the MSS., *eviolasse*, is very nearly sound. *Eviolasse* is *euiolasse* = *eu uiolasse* = *heu violasse*, and I would thus constitute the passage:

Te quoque si certo puer hic concusserit arcu,
 Quod nolim, nostros HEU! VIOLASSE deos,
 Longe castra tibi, longe miser agmina septem
 Flebis in aeterna surda iacere situ.

Nostros deos means obviously, Venus and Cupid, as in III. xxvi. 26, 'Solum te nostros laetor adire deos:' *flebis* is to be supplied with *violasse* out of what follows. 'You will then, alas, repent of having slighted Love, you will weep for your uncared for Epic poems.' It is possible, however, that the poet wrote 'Quam nolles nostros heu! violasse deos!'

PROPERTIUS I. xv. 29.

Multa prius vasto labentur flumina ponto.

This is correctly explained by Mr. Paley: 'Many rivers shall flow backwards,' but is not *multa* a curious word here? *Multa flumina* is not Latin for 'the rivers which are so numerous,' and 'many rivers' is nonsense. For why should not *all* rivers flow backwards, if any? It may be noticed that the archetype of Propertian MSS. seems to have suffered mutilation more frequently at the beginning of the line than elsewhere. How else came in the vox nihili *ardidus* for *candidus* in II. iii. 68? I think *alta* is more than likely, comparing Ovid's imitation, Trist. I. viii. 1, 'In caput *alta* suum labentur ab aequore retro Flumina.' [So, perhaps, *bellicus* for *Gallicus* in III. iv. 48.]

PROPERTIUS III. xxi. 41.

The poet has had a quarrel with Cynthia, in which she has avowed her constancy, but, offended by his acting the spy on her, has broken off her friendship with him.

Dixit et opposita propellens savia dextra
 Prosilit in laxa nixa pedem solea
 Sic ego tam sancti custode reludor amoris.
 Ex illo felix nox mihi nulla fuit.

So the Naples MS.: the Groningen has *custode recludor*. Mr. Paley, gives *custos excludor*, at the same time marking the passage as corrupt. No one has surmised that *custode*

may perhaps be a corruption of *casto de*, the latter word being the first syllable of the verb, perhaps *deludor*. I read:—

Sic ego tam sanctae CASTO DELUDOR amore.

Custode having been substituted for *casto de*, the syllable *re* was prefixed to *ludor* in order to complete the verse. This gives exactly the sense demanded by the context: 'Thus I am baffled by the constant love of such a virtuous woman.' I do not say that *sancta* and *casta* generally suit Cynthia: they do suit *this* passage, where the strict fidelity to Propertius is enlarged on.

PROPERTIUS III. vii. 23, seqq.

This passage has no meaning as at present arranged ;

Atque utinam Romae nemo esset dives, et ipse

Straminea posset dux habitare casa.

Nunquam venales essent ad munus amicae,

Atque una fieret cana puella domo.

Non quia septenas noctes seiuncta cubaris

Candida tam foedo brachia fusa viro.

Non quia peccaris testor te, sed quia vulgo

Formosis levitas semper amica fuit.

For *peccaris* all the copies give *peccarim*, which, as Madvig has pointed out, is right, and *peccaris* nonsense: 'non ideo cum foedo homine cubuisti quod peccaris!' But the fifth line should undoubtedly be read:

Nunquam septenas noctes seiuncta cubares,

corresponding to

Nunquam venales essent ad munus amicae.

It is in favour of this emendation that the perfect form *cubavi* is rare. *Non quia* was borrowed from the beginning of the next hexameter.

Against the ordinary reading, it may be urged that no one, however imperfectly acquainted with style,

would use *non quia* twice, the second *non quia* not co-ordinate with but subordinate to the first *non quia*, the desire to avoid which was, I suppose, the reason why *peccarim* was stupidly changed to *peccaris*.

In concluding these emendations on Propertius, I cannot but offer a word of congratulation to admirers of that poet, on the amount of work that has been done towards restoring him during the past year. I refer to the emendations of Mr. Ellis* and Professor Madvig.† Two of the conjectures of the former appear to me to be specially good.

IV. vii. 22.

Qua notat Argynni poena minantis aquae.

So the MSS. Most editions read *natantis* for *minantis*, and *aquas* for *aquae*. Hertzberg, a most unfortunate emendator, though a learned and zealous editor, reads his own suggestion *Athamantiadae*. Mr. Ellis' able restoration *Mimantis aquas* will be read in most future editions. He should not hesitate about reading *aquas* for *aquae*, the latter word having, as a matter of course, been substituted for the former the moment *minantis* took the place of *Mimantis*.

III. xviii. 39.

Et qui movistis duo litora cum ratis Argo
Dux erat ignoto missa columba mari.

Here Mr. Ellis defends the MS. reading *ratis Argo* against the early change *rudis Argus*, by shewing that *Argo* is the dative of the masculine proper name. In this case, too, I think he will meet with universal assent.

Madvig's emendations are as pointed and happy as usual, generally establishing a good sense with very little

* See *Professorial Dissertations of the University of London*, 1873.

† *Adversaria Critica*, vol. ii., 1873.

verbal change. Thus what a little alteration, and what a felicitous substitution of sense for obscurity is there in the following :

V. iv. 59.

Commissas acies ego possum solvere : nuptae
Vos medium palla foedus inite mea.

‘Non nuptas alloquitur Tarpeia sed viros, Sabinos Romanosque, inter quos foedus confici suis et Tatii nuptiis vult, ut et res ipsa et proximi versus declarant.’
Scripserat Propertius :

Commissas acies ego possum solvere *nupta* ;
Vos medium cet.

Four lines previously Madvig proposes to read, treading closely on the MS. reading *Sic hospes pariamne*,

Si hoc spectas par eamne tuam regina sub aulam
Dos tibi non humilis prodita Roma venit.

This gives excellent sense, but the metrical laws are doubly violated in the first line. It is not likely that ‘*Si hoc*’ could begin a line. And Madvig says nothing about synizesis in *eam*. This is, however, Madvig’s weak point, as is well known. It is more than astonishing, it is a matter for real sorrow, that a critic of Madvig’s reputation, in a work which contains probably as many certain emendations as any other single volume in existence, should propose to replace *mulasse* in Met. iv. 46, by *natasse*, and thus write of Trist. iii. 21 : “*Scriptis sine dubio Ovidius* :

Si iam deficiam suppressaque vena PALETUR.

This is a casting down of the foundations with a vengeance. When in a late number of *Mnemosyne* Herwerden

propose to read *videus* for *vidit* and *teratologus* for *areta-logus*, people only laughed; but it is a matter to be seriously deplored when the most trusted critics commit errors which would shame an English schoolboy.

OVID MET. xi. 496.

Quippe sonant clamore viri, stridore rudentes,
Undarum incursu gravis unda, tonitribus aether.

Read :

Undarum incursu RATIS UDA, tonitribus aether.

'The drenched ship resounds with the waves breaking over it.' *Uda* and *unda* are often confounded, and the latter here having taken the place of the former, *ratis* was changed into an adjective to agree with it.

OVID MET. xi. 714.

—————egreditur tectis ad litus et illum
Maesta locum repetit de quo spectarat euntem.
Dumque 'moratus ibi' dumque 'hic retinacula solvit
Hoc mihi discedens dedit oscula litore' dicit
Dumque notata oculis reminiscitur acta, cet.

Notata in the last line should certainly be changed to *novata*. Alcyone recalls to mind all the incidents of her husband's departure, which are *renewed, recalled afresh*, by her *seeing* the places where they happened (*oculis*).

JUVENAL v. 146, seqq.

Vilibus ancipites fungi ponentur amicis,
Boletus domino; sed quales Claudius edit
Ante illum uxoris post quem nil amplius edit.

When in a critical magazine of the mark of *Mnemosyne*, appears an article (no matter how otherwise contemptible) in which this passage is pronounced corrupt, and when a

scholar like Ribbeck has proposed to hash up the lines in this fashion :

Boletus domino fungi porgentur amicis
Vilibus ancipites, nec quales Claudius edit ;

and when in Maclean's excellent edition of Juvenal, not a word is said on the construction, and Ribbeck's conjecture is quoted without condemnation, and when Mr. Mayor, though understanding the lines, and giving a valuable list of passages, where *sed* is used as it is here, does not deign to translate the line, it seems necessary to give a correct explanation : 'Poor fungi will be served up to unvalued guests, mushrooms to the master : *aye, mushrooms fit for an emperor,*' literally : 'aye, such as Claudius ate, before he ate that mushroom served up to him by his wife, after which he ate no more.' The third line is not spurious : it is absolutely necessary. For if Juvenal had stopped at the second line, 'quales Claudius edit' would inevitably seem to refer to the very mushrooms with which Claudius was poisoned. To avoid this confusion Juvenal adds 'ante illum uxoris,' cet. 'Quales Claudius edit' may either mean such mushrooms as Claudius was in the habit of eating, the perfect being poetically used for imperfect, or it means the excellent mushrooms he ate on the occasion of his death before he came to the poisoned mushroom, or plate of mushrooms. The intensive force of *sed* which occurs again in Sat. iv., 'provincia tanti Vendit agros : sed maiores Apulia vendit' was in the time of Juvenal and Martial a regular usage of the language. I refer the reader to the list of passages given by Mr. Mayor, and will here only add two from an earlier author, which may have escaped his notice. One is Ovid Met. viii. 283 :

Inquit et Oeneos ultorem spreta per agros
Misit aprum : quanto maiores herbida tauros
Non habet Epiros : *sed* habent Siculo arva minores.

i.e. 'The bulls of Epirus are no larger: the bulls of Sicily are even smaller.'

The other is Ovid Met. x. 38, v. 1:

 ille pharetram
Solvit et arbitrio matris de mille sagittis
Unam seposuit, *sed* qua nec acutior ulla:

'He chose out one arrow, and that the sharpest in the quiver.'

ARTHUR PALMER.

VIRG. AEN. 2, 1.

CONTICUERE OMNES INTENTIQUE ORA TENEBANT
INDE.

COMMENTATORS and translators alike understand this verse to express by its first clause the silence, by its second the attention—manifested by the fixed countenances of the audience—with which Aeneas was heard: “Et tacuerant et desiderio ducebantur audiendi.” Donatus; “Aut ora intuebantur loquentis, aut immobiles vultus habebant, ut Georg. 4, 483: ‘Tenuitque inhians tria Cerberus ora,’ i.e., immobilia habuit; aut intenti tenebant, habebant, ut sit figura, et intelligamus ora intenta habebant.” Serv. (ed. Lion); “Intenti ora tenebant. ornate. erant intenti, habebant vultus et oculos intentos et conversos in Aeneam.” Heyne; ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σχῆμα προσώπου μάλιστα προσοχῆς ἔμφασιν ἔχει, οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνο παρέλιπε, τοῦ μὴ καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅσα καὶ ὥσιν, χρησαμένους, μονονουχὶ τῶν χεῖλεων ἐξαρτῆσαι τοῦ λέγοντος τοὺς ἀκούοντας, προσθεῖς ὅτι καὶ ἐνητένιζον· τοῦτεστιν ἀπενῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν ταῖς ὄψεσιν εἶχον. Eugen. de Bulgaris; “Intenti ora tenebant, ut 8, 520: ‘defixi ora tenebant,’ explicata: sie richteten aufmerksam den blick.” Gossrau; “Intenti ora tenebant. ergo ut solent intenti, in ipso ore apparebat intentio.” Wagner (1861). “Ora tenere is not, as in G. 4, 483, equivalent to ‘linguam continere,’ but means to hold the countenance in attention, as in 7, 250 (where observe the epithet ‘defixa,’ and compare 6, 156), 8, 520,” Conington; “Intenti

ora tenebant, habebant vultus et oculos intentos et conversos in Aeneam," Forbiger (1873):

"They ceissit all attanis incontinent
With mouthis clois and vissage taking tent."
Douglas.

"They whisted all, with fixed face attent."
Surrey.

"They whusted all and fixt with eies ententive did behold."
Phaer.

"Stavan taciti, attenti, e disiosi
D'udir già tutti."
Caro.

"Taciti tutti, e con volti bramosi
D'udire, immoti stavansi."
Alfieri.

"Still war's und jedes ohr hing an Aeneens munde."
Schiller.

"Rings war alles verstummt, und gespannt hielt jeder das
antlitz."
J. H. Voss.

"Each eye was fixed, each lip compressed,
When thus began the heroic guest."
Conington.

The interpretation is false, and there is not one of all this brilliant field of philologist truth-hunters whose horse has not shied and thrown him on the kerb of the deep, dark well in which his vixen game so loves to lurk, and down into which, audax not in iuventa but in senecta, and cheerily harking-in with Hermes' and Athena's whoop, whoop, halloo! I propose now at all risks to pursue her. Let him, who has a taste for such adventure, draw on his spatterdashes and accompany me. I promise him sport, if nothing more. Allons! Vive la chasse de la verité!

ORA is here neither *the face*, nor *the mouth* literally, but *the mouth* figuratively, i.e., *the speech, voice, or utterance*, exactly as (verse 423) "*ora sono discordia*," *sound of voice*

or speech, disagreeing with assumed appearance. Ovid. Met. 6, 583 (of Procne):

"Dolor ora repressit,
verbaque quaerenti satis indignántia linguae
defuerunt."

grief repressed her utterance; and ORA TENEBANT is neither *were holding their mouths closed* literally, nor *were holding their faces fixed*, but *were holding their mouths closed* figuratively, i.e., *were holding-in (withholding) their voice, speech or utterance*; in other words, *were remaining silent*; exactly as "dolor ora repressit" (just quoted). *grief repressed her mouth*, i.e., *her utterance*, and as, still more exactly, "pudor ora tenebit," Ovid. Met., 9, 513:

"Poterisne loqui? poterisne fateri?
coget amor, potero; vel si pudor ora tenebit,
littera celatos arcana fatebitur ignes."

shame will hold my mouth (voice); i.e., *will keep me silent*. and more exactly still, and even word for word, Lucan. 4, 172:

"Tenuere parumper
ora metu; tantum nutu motoque salutant
ense suos. Mox ut stimulis maioribus ardens
rupit amor leges, audet transcendere vallum
miles, in amplexus effusas tendere palmas.
Hospitis ille ciet nomen, vocat ille propinquum."

They held their mouths, i.e., *their voice, speech, utterance*, and, however differently expressed (being prose), still precisely the same thought: Seneca, *de vita beata*, 27: "Ut quotiens aliquid ex illo proferetur oraculo, intenti et compressa voce, audiatís;" where we have the very INTENTI of our text, and where 'compressa voce' is our text's ORA TENEBANT.

How truly this is the meaning of the ORA TENEBANT of our text is further shown, and scarcely less strikingly, on the one hand by Servius's own quotation, Georg. 4, 483:

"tenuitque inhians tria Cerberus ora,"

neither surely, with Servius, kept his three faces fixed, "immobilia habuit" (a picture bordering on the ridiculous), nor kept his three mouths closed (literally), for he has them partially open ('inhians'),

as it is right he should have them, the mouth being always partially open whether in the passions of wonder and admiration or in the expectation inseparable from attentive listening, Valer. Flacc. 5, 469:

"Postquam primis inhiantia dictis
agmina, suppressumque videt jam murmur Iason,
talìa miranti propius tulit orsa tyranno."

Shakesp., *King John*, 4, 4:

"I saw a smith stand with his hammer, thus,
the whilst his iron did on the anvil cool,
with open mouth swallowing a tailor's news,
who, with his shears and measure in his hand,
standing on slippers, which his nimble haste
had falsely thrust upon contrary feet,
told of a many thousand warlike French
that were embattled and rank'd in Kent."

Milton, *Par. Lost*, 5, 353:

"In himself was all his state,
more solemn than the tedious pomp that waits
on princes, when their rich retinue long
of horses led and grooms besmeared with gold
dazzles the crowd and sets them all agape."

Sir W. Scott, *Lady of the Lake*, 1, 17:

"The maiden paused, as if again
she thought to catch the distant strain;
with head upraised and look intent,
and eye and ear attentive bent,
and locks flung back and lips apart,
like monument of Grecian art,
in listening mood she seemed to stand
the guardian naiad of the strand."

and Mr. Conington's "lip compressed" being a mistake not merely with respect to Virgil's meaning, but with respect to the natural phenomenon, and descriptive of the habitus, not of a pleased and attentive listener, but of a pugilist, or the Coryphaeus of a party—some Cromwell or some Gladstone—who throws down his bill on the table and defies you to reject it.

and on the other hand by the general use of *solvere ora*, *resolvere ora*, *movere ora*, *aperire ora*—all plainly opposites of *tenere ora*—to express the breaking of silence, the beginning to speak.

Nor is direct testimony to the same effect altogether wanting, the passage having been thus paraphrased by Sulpicius, *Anthol. Latina*, Burm. (ed. Meyer) 223, 7:

“Conticuere omnes intentique ore loquentis
ora tenent”

where ‘*intenti ore loquentis*’ expressing fully and unmistakably the intentness with which the hearers look the speaker in the face, the remaining words, viz., *ora tenent*, can hardly by possibility be anything else than *keep their mouths quiet*, i.e., *say nothing*.

Ora tenere is thus the Latin representative of the Greek *στόμα ἔχειν* equally figurative, and equally signifying to keep silence, as the two following examples sufficiently testify: Eurip. *Suppl.* 513:

σῖγ', Ἄδραστ', ἔχε στόμα,
καὶ μὴ 'πίπροσθε τῶν ἐμῶν τοὺς σοὺς λόγους
θῆς.

Soph. *Trachin.* 976 (Senex to Hyllus):

σίγα, τέκνον, μὴ κινήσης
ἀγρίαν ὀδύνην πατρὸς ὠμόφρονος.
ζῆ γὰρ προπετής. ἀλλ' ἴσχε δακῶν
στόμα σόν.

and the *ORA TENEBANT* of our text is our author's usual modified repetition in the latter part of his verse, whether for the sake of the greater impressiveness, or the greater ease and fluency of versification, or the less difficult introduction of an additional thought (on this occasion, *INTENTI*) or whether for all three purposes at once, of the thought just expressed in the former part (on this occasion, *CONTICUERE*). Compare Soph. *Trachin.* 976 (just quoted), where the thought *σίγα* is repeated in the same figurative

form in which the thought CONTICUERE is repeated in our text: *σίγα—ἔσχε στόμα*. CONTICUERE—ORA TENEBANT, the thought *δακῶν* being added to the repetition in the Greek, in the same manner as the thought INTENTI is added to the repetition in the Latin. Also Eurip. *Suppl.* 513 (just quoted), where the thought *σίγα* is not only repeated in the same figurative form in which the thought CONTICUERE is repeated in our text: *σίγ'—ἔχε στόμα*. CONTICUERE—ORA TENEBANT, but re-repeated, and enlarged-upon throughout the whole of the next verse. Also Eurip. *Androm.* 250:

ἰδοῦ, σιωπῶ, κάπιλάζυμαι στόμα,

where the thought *σιωπῶ* is repeated in the same figurative form in which the thought CONTICUERE is repeated in our text: *σιωπῶ—ἐπιλάζυμαι στόμα*. CONTICUERE—ORA TENEBANT. Also Plochiri Poematium dramaticum:

σίγα, σιώπα, σφίγγε τόδε λαῦρον στόμα,

where the thought *σίγα*, already repeated in *σιώπα*, is re-repeated in the same figurative form in which the thought CONTICUERE is repeated in our text: *σίγα, σιώπα—σφίγγε τόδε λαῦρον στόμα*, CONTICUERE—ORA TENEBANT;—the thought *λαῦρον* being added to the re-repetition in the Greek, as the thought INTENTI is added to the repetition in the Latin. That the repetition, so manifest and unmistakable in these examples, has so long escaped detection in our text, is owing to two causes: first, to the ambiguity of ORA, a word equally significant of face and of mouth, and, secondly, to the modification of the repetition, by the change of time: CONTICUERE—TENEBANT. They *have* become silent and *were* holding, a change of time necessary to the full expression of the thought:

They ceased to speak and were continuing silent.

Nor is a right interpretation of our text the sole fruit of a right understanding of the expression *tenere ora*. The interpretation of other passages, not only of Virgil

but of other authors also, is rectified at the same moment, ex. gr. Aen. 11, 120 :

"Illi obstupere silentes
conversique oculos inter se, atque ora tenebant ;"

not *they stood in silent astonishment looking at each other, and held their faces (fixed)*, but *they stood in silent astonishment looking at each other and held their mouths (quiet)*, i.e., *withheld their utterance, or speech = said nothing*, ORA TENEBANT being a modified repetition (variation) of the theme obstupere silentes, as ORA TENEBANT in our text is a modified repetition (variation) of the theme CONTICUERE, and conversi oculos inter se, a third thought thrown in between theme and variation and attached to the former (silentes et conversi oculos inter se obstupere), as INTENTI in our text is a third thought thrown in between theme and variation, and attached to the latter (ORA TENEBANT INTENTI). 8, 520 :

"defixique ora tenebant
Aeneas Anchisiades et fidus Achates,
multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant ;"

where the meaning is: *standing fixed in one position, kept their mouths (quiet)*, i.e., *said nothing, and revolved many hardships with their minds*, and where the silence referred back to in the words

"multaque dura suo tristi cum corde putabant"

has not been mentioned at all, if the words defixi ora tenebant be rightly interpreted *kept their faces fixed*. Ennius ap. Cicer. de Divinatione, 1, 48 ; ed. Orell. :

"Sic expectabat populus atque ora tenebat
rebus, utri magni victoria sit data regni ;"

not *the people expected and held their faces fixed*, but *the people expected in silence*. Valer. Flacc. 4, 322 :

"Qua mole iacentis (Amyci)
ipse etiam expleri victor nequit, oraque longo
comminus obtutu mirans tenet ;"

where, far more than either in our text or in any of the just-cited examples, ora tenere might (on account of the superadded obtutu) be suspected of meaning *to hold the face fixed* (*admiring, holds his face fixed in a long gaze*), but where, nevertheless, the "obtutu ora premit" of Statius, Theb. 1, 490:

"Stupet omīne tanto

defixus senior, divina oracula Phoebi

agnoscens, monitusque datos vocalibus antris.

Obtutu gelida ora premit, laetusque per artus

horror iit;"

plainly incapable of being understood of the face at all, and equally plainly nothing more than an emphatic obtutu ora tenet, forbids us to find other meaning than *keeps silence in a long gaze of admiration—gazes long in silent admiration*. And so, precisely, "obtutu tenet ora," Aen. 7, 249:

"Talibus Ilionei dictis defixa Latinus

obtutu tenet ora, soloque immobilis haeret,

intentos volvens oculos;"

the very passage which has been put forward as demonstrative that the expression ora tenere signifies *to hold the face fixed*, is not *holds his face fixed in a gaze, rolling his eyes intently*, but, as sufficiently shown by the examples just now commented upon, viz., Valer. Flacc. 4, 322, and Stat. Theb. 1, 490, *holds his mouth fixed in a gaze, rolling his eyes intently*, i.e., *gazes with fixed and silent mouth and rolling eyes intent*, or if to any one those examples be unsatisfactory, is sufficiently shown by Stat. Theb. 11, 49:

"Stabat in Argolicae ferrato margine turris

egregius lituo dextri Mavortis Enipeus

hortator; sed nunc miseris dabat utile signum,

suadebatque fugam, et tutos in castra receptus;

cum subitum obliquo descendit ab aere vulnus,

urgentisque sonum laeva manus aure retenta est

sicut erat; fugit in vacuas iam spiritus auras,

iam gelida ora tacent, carmen tuba sola peregit;"

where there is no ambiguity, and no matter in which of its three senses—*mouth, face, head*—*ora* be understood, not *fixedness of feature*, but only *silence* can by any possibility be meant, just as not *fixedness of feature*, but only *silence, profound silence* can by any possibility be meant in the exact Ovidian parallel, I might almost say repetition, of our text, ex Ponto, 2, 5, 47 :

“Cum tu desisti, mortaliaque ora quierunt,
clausaque non longa conticuere mora;”

where *conticuere* is the modified repetition (variation) of the theme *ora quierunt*, as the *ORA TENEBANT* of our text is the modified repetition (variation) of the theme *CONTICUERE*, and where to the variation are added the thoughts *CLAUSA* and *non longa mora* in the same way as to the variation in our text is added the thought *INTENTI*.

With the active *tenere ora, premere ora*, compare the passive *ora quiescere, ora requiescere* :

Ovid. ex Ponto, 2, 5, 47 (just quoted) :

“Cum tu desisti, mortaliaque ora quierunt.”

Aen. 6, 102 :

“Ut primum cessit furor, et rabida ora quierunt.”

Aen. 6, 300 :

“Ut primum placati animi et trepida ora quierunt.”

Propert. 3, 10, 9 :

“Alcyonum positis requiescant ora querelis,
increpet absumptum nec sua mater Ityn;”

in which passages *quierunt* and *requiescant* express *quiet, rest from action*, exactly as *quievit*, last word of the third Book, expresses *quiet, rest from action*, with this only difference, that the subject of *quierunt*, and *requiescant* being *ora*, quiet of the mouth only is meant, whereas in the third Book, the subject of *quievit* being Aeneas, quiet both of mouth and limbs is meant: *Aeneas not only ceased to speak, but ceased to gesticulate*; and the thought which so appropriately and impressively closes the third Book, is

neither, with Burmann and Wunderlich "somno se tradidit," nor with Wagner in his edition of Heyne (1832) "narrare desiit," but with Wagner (1861), studiedly, however imperfectly, translating (as is his wont) from my Twelve Years' Voyage (part 2, p. 53), and my paper in the Goettingen Philologus (vol. 11, p. 480), "Non cubitum ivit, sed finita narratione rediit ad habitum compositum et quietum." How much more in ancient times than at present the notion of motion was contained in the notion of speech, appears less, perhaps, from the so frequent expressions: tenere ora, premere ora, ἔχειν στόμα, and their opposites: solvere ora, resolvere ora, movere ora, aperire ora, διαιρεῖν τὸ στόμα, λύειν τὸ στόμα, ἀνοίγειν τὸ στόμα (for similar expressions are not uncommon either in our own or other modern languages), than from the strong pictures of immobility of mouth, face, and even of the whole person, so often presented to us by ancient writers along with the picture of silence. Some of these pictures, viz., Aen. 11, 120; 8, 520; 7, 249, will be found cited above; another is Aen. 6, 469:

"Illa solo fixos oculos aversa tenebat,
nec magis incepto vultum sermone movetur
quam si dura silex aut stet Marpesia cautes."

Ovid. Met. 13, 538, affords another:

"Obmutuit illa dolore,
et pariter vocem lacrymasque introrsus obortas
devorat ipse dolor, duroque simillima saxo
torpet."

Ovid. Met. 6, 301, another:

"Orba resedit
exanimes inter natos natasque virumque,
diriguitque malis. nullos movet aura capillos.
in vultu color est sine sanguine. lumina moestis
stant immota genis. nihil est in imagine vivi.
ipsa quoque interius cum duro lingua palato
congelat, et venae desistunt posse moveri.
nec flecti cervix, nec brachia reddere gestus,
nec pes ire potest; intra quoque viscera saxum est."

Philemon. Fragn. 16 (Anthol. Palat.) another :

ἐγὼ λίθον μὲν τὴν Νιόβην, μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς,
οὐδέποτε' ἐπείσθην, οὐδέ νῦν πεισθήσομαι
ὥς τοῦτ' ἐγένετ' ἄνθρωπος· ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν
τῶν συμπεσόντων τοῦ τε συμβάντος πάθους
οὐδὲν λαλῆσαι δυναμένη πρὸς οὐδένα
προσηγορεύθη διὰ τὸ μὴ φωνεῖν λίθος.

and Paul. Silentiar. Anthol. Palat. 7, 588, another :

Δαμόχαρις μοίρης πυμάτην ὑπεδύσατο σιγὴν.
Φεῦ τὸ καλὸν μούσης βάρβιτον ἡρεμέει.

in which last however the quiet, rest, or stirring no more, which accompanies and completes the silence of the musician, is not the musician's own, but his instrument's.

CONTICUERE. "Conticuerunt, non tacuerunt, quia omnes." La Cerda. That CONTICUERE expresses not *that they were all silent together*, but *that the silence of one and all* (of the "omnes") *was deep and perfect*, appears first from conticuit being the very word used in the last verse of the third Book to express the silence of Aeneas—of Aeneas singly and alone :

"Conticuit tandem factoque hic fine quievit ;"

and, in verse 54 of the sixth Book, to express the silence of the Sibyl singly and alone, "talìa fata Conticuit," as well as the very word used by Apuleius to express the similar silence, or ceasing to speak, of Psyche: Met. 4, 87: "Sic profata virgo conticuit," not to insist on its being the very word by which Statius, Theb. 8, 267, expresses the silence on board a ship at sea in the dead of night :

"Sic ubi per fluctus uno ratis obruta somno
conticuit, tantique maris secura iuventus
mandavere animas, solus stat puppe magister
pervigil, inscriptaque deus qui navigat alno ;"

and the very word by which Severus (see below) sets before us the deep silence observed by Latin Eloquence

mourning the death of Cicero; secondly, from the well-known general use of the particle *con* to intensify the action of an individual; thirdly, from the little occasion there was that the idea expressed by the very next word should be anticipated, and, more than all, from *conticuere* being the precise word used by Ovid (*ex Ponto* 2, 5, 47) to express the complete silence of his friend Salanus's one only mouth:

"Cum tu desisti, mortaliaque ora quierunt,
clausaque non longa conticuere mora."

But *CONTICUERE* is not merely *they were entirely silent*, it is something more; it expresses the passage from the state of speaking to the state of silence: *They have become entirely silent*, or, which is the same thing, *they have entirely ceased to speak*, exactly as 3, 718, "*conticuit tandem*," *at length he has become entirely silent*, or, which is the same thing, *has entirely ceased to speak*. *Eleg. in obit. Maecen.* 52:

* "Postquam victrices conticuere tubae."

After the trumpets have entirely ceased to sound.

Severi de morte Ciceronis *Fragm. Anthol. Latin.* *Burm* (ed. Meyer) 124, 10:

"Abstulit una dies aevi decus, ictaque luctu
conticuit Latiae tristis Facundia linguae."

Latin Eloquence, sad and mourning, has entirely ceased to speak. Strong, in itself, and no matter where placed, *CONTICUERE* is doubly strong owing to its position before, not after, its nominative, still stronger owing to its position, first word in the verse, and stronger still, owing to the verse, in which it is first word, being first verse of the Book.

INTENTI.—Not, with Conington and the commentators generally, "to be taken adverbially and as part of the predicate," but to be taken adjectively and as equivalent

to a predicate: *intent*, i.e. *being intent*. The whole company ceased talking and *being intent* was *silent*, exactly equivalent to *was intent and silent*, *intenti* being as thoroughly in form, and more thoroughly in sense, an adjective, than was ever any one of Horace's four unquestioned and unquestionable adjectives, *invidus*, *iracundus*, *iners* and *vinosus*. Settled the grammar, what is the meaning of the term? Of course, *intent*, Germ. *gespannt*; both of them, terms expressive of a state intermediate between the state expressed by *lentus* and that expressed by *gnavus* or *sedulus*, that intermediate state between *slack* and *full-drawn*, which a harper, speaking of his harp, might designate by the term *strung*; that intermediate state between *remiss* and *excited*, in which, according to Roman historians, Roman soldiers, *prepared and on the qui vive*, used to await the enemy; Liv. 30, 10, "Parati atque intenti hostium adventum opperiebantur." Except for this word, it might have been supposed that Aeneas took advantage of a hush or lull in the conversation—a moment of accidental silence—to begin his story. This word, informing us that when Aeneas began, the minds of the company were already in a fitting state to hear, prevents the mistake. All present had heard the queen's command, and perceiving it was about to be obeyed, had become silent and—not *attenti*, for, no word having yet been spoken, there was as yet nothing to attend to, nothing to justify an *ad*, but *intenti*, intent—*strung*, if I may so say—not to *make*, but to *hear*, the music.

INDE.—This word, and the change from perfect to imperfect in the preceding verse, point out the precise time when Aeneas began to speak, viz. *after* the company had ceased talking, and *while* they were silent and on the *qui vive*. Had *cum* been used, as it might have been used by an inferior writer endeavouring to express the thought which Virgil has expressed by INDE, the meaning might have been supposed to be that it was only *when*

Aeneas began his narrative the company ceased to talk and became silent and intent. INDE makes—

say rather *should make*, for have we not

“All were attentive to the godlike man,
when from his lofty couch he thus began,”

and

“Each eye was fixed, each lip compressed,
when thus began the heroic guest.

—such misapprehension impossible. *All have entirely ceased to talk, and were continuing silent and intent.* INDE (*then—thereafter—next*) TORO PATER AENEAS SIC ORSUS AB ALTO.

JAMES HENRY.

Dalkey Lodge, Dalkey, Ireland,
January 16, 1874.

GREEK AND LATIN ETYMOLOGY IN ENGLAND.

WHEN the foundations of Comparative Grammar had been definitively laid in the great work of Bopp, it was easy to foresee that the doctrines of the new science could not fail to affect powerfully the study of the individual languages of the Indo-European family. This influence, however, could only very gradually be exercised, especially in relation to Greek and Latin Philology, which, nevertheless, stood in urgent want of being thus renovated and rationalised. The old modes of dealing with linguistic questions had such a weight of authority and prescription on their side, and the new views had to encounter such a force of prejudice, that much time had to elapse before the needful and—in the long run—inevitable reform could be achieved. Still, Comparative Grammar has steadily, though slowly, made its way, and the received methods of treating the Classical languages have, concurrently, been more and more modified. Those who have done most, in England and in this country, to naturalize the new science amongst us, and to apply it to the reform of Greek and Latin studies, are Professor Max Müller, and, of native scholars, Mr. Peile and the late Professor Ferrar.*

In England, the influence of Dr. Donaldson, justly respected for his attainments and services in the field of Classical learning, strictly so called, operated for some time disastrously on the fortunes of Comparative Grammar. He had unfortunately the ambition of pursuing an independent path, and making himself an original authority in the science; whilst he wanted the caution and

* I do not overlook the valuable labours of Mr. Roby; but I am here speaking of works of a more general kind than his.

habit of severe method, which are necessary in this, at least as much as in any other, department of research. He had the weak desire, and the still weaker pretension, to explain everything. Hence he launched forth at random all sorts of chimerical or inadequately supported theories, linguistic and ethnological. His rash and arbitrary modes of proceeding, whilst they led many astray, repelled from the science the very minds it would have been most desirable to attract. The evil that he did lives after him, though his books on these subjects are happily, with the advance of just views, becoming more and more discredited. Every student of the higher Greek and Latin Grammar must be warned, so long as he is still a tiro in this field, as he values the maintenance of his etymological sanity, to keep clear of the 'New Cratylus' and the 'Varronianus.'

The publication of Mr. Peile's 'Introduction to Greek and Latin Etymology' marks a real epoch in the teaching of this subject in England. Professor Max Müller's Lectures had previously awakened a general interest in the new science, and placed the public mind at the right point of view with respect to language. But no one could derive from these Lectures much definite or detailed knowledge of the doctrines of Comparative Grammar. The want of an adequate and trustworthy handling of the subject in English, for the use of classical students, was first supplied by the work of Mr. Peile, who has thus established a lasting claim to our gratitude. He has, with great skill, worked into a sufficiently harmonious and very attractive whole a selection of the most essential portions of the *Grundzüge* of Curtius, combined with some of the most valuable results of the labours of Schleicher and Corssen, so far as they were available for his purpose. This book, while it cannot, of course, enable us to dispense with Curtius, while it must, indeed, rather stimulate the demand for the forthcoming Translation of that writer's great work, will probably

remain for a considerable time the best elementary manual that can be placed in the hands of Students in our Universities.

Mr. Ferrar's interest in Comparative Grammar was first awakened, and his early studies directed, by the lamented Professor R. Siegfried, a man of rare powers, great learning, and noble character, whose admirable promise was cut short by a too early death. Catching the enthusiasm of this able instructor for his favourite science, my late colleague proposed to himself the enterprise of preparing, on the basis of Schleicher's *Compendium*, a systematic resumé of the laws and facts of the science, in relation to the Greek and Latin languages in particular. His work was, perhaps, too condensed and dry for an introductory book; and was, as Professor Whitney objected to it, somewhat imperfectly fused into unity and consistency; but these defects would doubtless, had his life been spared, have appeared to a much less extent in the second volume and in new editions of the first. Be this as it may, the work was a vigorous effort in the right direction, and has rendered real service; and Mr. Ferrar has this permanent claim to our remembrance and gratitude, that he was the first member of the University of Dublin who devoted himself seriously to the study of Comparative Grammar, and did anything effectual toward impressing upon our students a sense of its interest and importance.

It is a duty incumbent on the present and rising generation of scholars to continue the work of bringing the principles of this science systematically to bear on the cultivation of the ancient languages. A Professor of Greek or Latin can propose to himself no task more important or more opportune than that of thoroughly working into his teaching (so far as it has to do with the language, as distinct from the literature) the spirit and the doctrines of Comparative Grammar. Whilst it would be a great mistake to introduce into the early stages of Greek or Latin studies direct instruction in this higher

grammar, which the immature mind could not either appreciate or appropriate, our whole teaching should yet be guided and controlled by it. Above all, the student should be taught nothing which is opposed to it, and which his later study of it would have to correct. Every book which is placed in his hands should be subjected to severe scrutiny, and required to conform to this condition. We cannot afford to have implanted in the minds of our youth notions which they must afterwards laboriously unlearn.

It is with the view of doing some small service in this direction that I propose to examine certain books with which classical students in our Universities and higher schools are almost certain to be brought into contact, and to inquire how far they satisfy the condition I have mentioned—how far they are in harmony with the soundest and most scientific notions which have been arrived at in the domain of Comparative Grammar. I confine myself at present to the department of Phonology (*Lautlehre*), deferring the consideration of books in which grammatical forms and word-building are brought under treatment. And I select two well-known and familiar works, the Greek Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, and the Latin Dictionary of Dr. Smith; and another book, which for special reasons has attracted a good deal of notice, and is now in the hands of many students, Mr. Paley's edition of the *Iliad*.

I. The Lexicon of Liddell and Scott is, on the whole, a work of which English scholarship may well be proud. For general accuracy and completeness of information (within the just limits of a working Dictionary, as distinct from a Thesaurus) on the meanings, uses, and inflexions of words, it leaves little to be desired, and, supplemented by Veitch's excellent book on Greek Verbs, suffices for all the ordinary needs of a student. At first it was very weak in the department of Etymology, and a good deal of time elapsed before any decided amendment was made in

this branch. But in the fifth and sixth editions a thorough reform has been introduced, the results of the labours of Curtius have been incorporated, and now, in this as in other respects—though, as I shall presently show, there is still room for considerable improvement—the Lexicon fairly represents the existing state of knowledge.

If I here refer to some “monstra horrenda” which disfigured the early editions, it is only to mark the advance which is shown in the last. The errors I am about to mention are of such a kind that they cannot, like minor blemishes, be excused by the imperfect state of knowledge when those early editions appeared, or by the want of a guide so learned, sane, and truly scientific as the author of the “Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie.”

Formerly (I refer throughout to the *second* edition), under the word *πῦρ*, not only were the German *feuer* and English *fire* rightly compared, but the French *foyer* was treated as cognate, though it has, of course, nothing to do with the Greek word, but comes from *focus* through the low-Latin *focarium*. Of *βίος*, a bow, it was said that it was perhaps originally the same with *βλος*, life, “since the first Greeks, like all rude tribes, lived by the chase,” which is as *bizarre* as anything in Plato's *Cratylus*. The English *plunge* was stated to be connected with *πλέω*, though it really comes, through the French *plonger*, from the low-Latin *plumbicare*, and, therefore, from *plumbum*, lead. In the article on *νίος*, it was said that the Skt. *su*, *generare*, is the same with the Greek *φύω*, the latter being, of course, really = Skt. *bhū*. In general, phonetic laws were treated with little regard, as when *πήγνυμι* was said to contain the same root as the Latin *figo*, or, as when our *bake*, in defiance of Grimm's law, was compared with *πέσσω*, *πέπτω* (root *pak*), with which it has nothing whatever to do, being really akin to *φάγω*. Most errors of this gross kind have now disappeared from the work. A few,

however, still remain. Thus, πόλεμος is not only connected with πελεμίζω, which is right, but with *bellum*, which is, of course, quite wrong, this latter word, as surely no one ought to doubt, having been originally *duellum*. Ἔρα is said to be radically the same, not only with the German *Erde*, which it is, but with the Latin *terra*, which it as certainly is not, a prefixed *t* being an impossibility, and *terra* most probably meaning "dry land," and being akin to τέρσομαι and *torreo*. Under χάρμα the French *charme*, *charmer*, are given as cognates, though "every schoolboy ought to know" that the latter words have nothing to do with χάρμα or χαίρω, but come from the Latin *carmen*. The English *pail* is compared with the Greek πέλλα and the Latin *pelvis*, apparently as a Germanic equivalent of these, in which case the initial mute would be wrong; the word has really no connection with either, but is the same with the French *poêle*, old-French *paele*, and comes from the Latin *patella*. With ἔλμυς "our vermin" is compared, as if it, no less than *worm*, were a Germanic word, instead of coming, as it does, from the Latin through the French. And, just in the same way, *fell* and *peltry* are quoted together under πέλλα, a hide, though the former is Germanic, with the due *Lautverschiebung*, whilst the latter is the French *pelleterie*.

But more important to be noticed than particular errors of this kind is the too frequent neglect of the following general considerations which a lexicographer should constantly keep before him in dealing with Etymology. The one thing needful is to maintain the reign of law in this branch of inquiry, and to save the student from loose and floating notions of the relations of sounds. Whatever information on individual points may be communicated, if the impression is left on the mind that in letter-change everything, or almost everything, is permissible, more harm than good is done. A Dictionary has in the main to deal with established truths, only in a small

degree with questions still *sub judice*. Etymologies generally accepted by the best judges, and falling in with phonetic laws, should be stated without qualification. Other cases there are, where a connexion between words will appear highly probable, though the normal rules of phonology would separate them,—instances of what Curtius calls *unregelmässige Lautvertretung*. Cases of this kind should be admitted with extreme caution; but they may be admitted, and even strongly asserted, provided it be indicated that they are not normal, but exceptional. But if they are placed on exactly the same basis with cases of regular letter-change, if connexions be simply affirmed which are at variance with the common rule, without notice of the anomaly, the student's mind will be hopelessly confused.

The adoption, in the last editions, of Curtius as the leading Etymological authority implies an adhesion to the stricter school of Comparative Grammar. But we still find the considerations stated above, which are in harmony with the doctrines of that school, too frequently overlooked. To mention a few examples out of many, *καλέω* is still connected with the English *call*, *ἀγαθός* with the English *good*, *πλέω* with the Latin *fluo* and *fleo*, *θάλασσα* with *ἄλς*; *ζάλη* is identified with Greek *σάλος* and Latin *salum*; *φοξός* is made to be the same with *ὄξύς*, and *φοῖτος* is represented as akin to *οἶτος*; *τέρσομαι* is said to be related to *θέρος*, *θερμός*; *θιγγάνω* is compared with *te-tig-i*; etymologies which Curtius not merely does not give, or rejects, but which, it is more important to observe, *must*, on his principles, be repudiated.

Among the articles most open to objection on grounds of this kind are those on the several letters of the Greek Alphabet, in almost all of which there are incorrect or highly questionable statements, and even what is true is sometimes given in a misleading way. Thus, under B, that letter is said to be interchanged with κ, "as Latin *tabeo* compared with *τήκω*." But

(besides that interchange within the Greek language should alone have been here mentioned) this is really not a case of interchange at all; the κ is a determinative* addition (Weiterbildung) to the root $\tau\alpha$, and the *-bes* in Latin is the same suffix as in *plebes*, *pubes*. Under Γ , $\gamma\eta\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ and $\lambda\eta\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ are said to be the same, which is altogether incredible; and $\nu\omicron\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, $\gamma\nu\omega\acute{\nu}\alpha\iota$, is given as an instance of prefixed γ , which exactly reverses the true relation. Under Δ , $\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\delta\omega$ is strangely said to be Doric for $\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omega$; $\delta\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega$, to kindle, is said to be the same with both $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega$ and $\alpha\upsilon\omega$, though it has nothing to do with either; and $\eta\delta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ (which is really $\sigma\Gamma\alpha\delta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$) is made the same with $\gamma\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega$, though the two words are quite unconnected. Under \Kappa , $\kappa\epsilon\lambda\alpha\iota\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ and $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\varsigma$ are identified, though Buttmann's $\kappa\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\alpha\varsigma$ cannot be maintained, and the possibility of the substitution of μ for κ , or κ for μ , must be absolutely denied. (Curtius connects the former of these words with Latin *squaleo*, and the latter with Latin *malus*.) Under \M , amongst several questionable assertions, is found not merely the identification of $\text{\AA}\rho\eta\varsigma$ with the Roman *Mars*, (which was really *Mavor(t)s*, and which, notwithstanding what has been said by Max Müller and others as to the possible disappearance of initial μ , it is better to separate, as Curtius does, from the Greek name), but also the monstrous assertion that the Greek $\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\rho$ is related to the English *man*. Under \N , $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\gamma\eta$ and $\nu\acute{\upsilon}\xi$ are said to be related, and under the former word the "interchange" of ν and λ is spoken of as "frequent," which it would be difficult to prove: the truth is, ν hardly stands for λ , except in Doric words before τ or θ , and in $\pi\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omega\nu$ for $\pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\omega\nu$, and there is apparently but one certain case of the change of ν to λ , viz., in $\lambda\acute{\iota}\tau\rho\nu$ for $\nu\acute{\iota}\tau\rho\nu$, which belongs to the class of borrowed words (being Semitic in origin), which are known not to conform strictly to phonetic laws. Under Π , $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$ and $\pi\epsilon\delta\acute{\alpha}$ are identified in

* Mr. Peile (page 44) seems to suppose that Mr. Ferrar first used this term; but it is really due to Curtius. See *Grundzüge*, I. 8.

spite of Curtius and Ahrens, and πάλλω and βάλλω are made the same. Under Σ, the σ in ἐπεσβόλος, ἐγγέσπαλος, and the like, is said to be inserted "merely for euphony," than which nothing could be more misleading. Under Χ, ὄφης and ἔχης are made the same, a *rapprochement* which, on phonetic grounds, cannot be accepted; the latter is the Latin *anguis*, and the former seems to be (as Curtius suggests) from ὀπι, on the analogy of δράκων. These examples are all taken from the articles on the consonants; others might be cited from those on the vowels. And here it may be mentioned that under Ε and Υ, very nebulous and unsatisfactory accounts are given of the names εἰ ψιλόν and υἱ ψιλόν, for which in future editions might well be substituted that which will be found in Curtius' *Elucidations of his Greek Grammar*, Eng. Tr. p. 25. Dialectic varieties are in many places mentioned in the old and misleading phraseology; thus σ is said to *change into* δ in ὁδμή for ὁσμή, and σ into τ in φατί for φησί, and under Ν and Ρ the relation of the forms κτείνω, φθείρω, to κτέννω, φθέρρω is incorrectly described.

What all this indicates is the necessity of a complete and uniform revision of the Etymological part of this work. And that such a revision is wanted is further shown by the inconsistencies which appear in a good many places. Thus, though the identity of θεός and *deus*, which was affirmed in the early editions, is now practically given up in the articles on θεός and δῖος, it is still asserted without qualification under Δ. Though, as we have seen, in one place ἀνὴρ is compared with the English *man*, in the article on the word it is rightly referred to the same root with the Skt. *nri*, and the Latin (or Sabine) *Nero*. Ἄρης, in one place, as we have seen, identified with *Mars*, is *s.v.* associated with ἀρείων, ἄριστος, of which under ἄρω a different account is given. Under Ζ, the derivation of ζυγόν given in Plato's *Cratylus* (*quasi* δυογόν) appears to be seriously accepted, but under ζεύγνυμι the correct account of the word is to be found. Ὀδάξ is compared *both* with

δοῦς and with δάκνω. Whilst ἀκροάομαι is *s.v.* connected with ἀκούω, it is, under κλύω, no doubt rightly, connected with the Skt. *ḥru*, from which latter word ἀκούω is properly separated under κοέω. In the early editions πρόσφατος was (under ποταίνιος) connected with φα, to speak, whilst *s.v.* it was referred to φα, φεν, to kill; and this inconsistency seems not to have disappeared from the last edition. In ἄμβροτος it is stated (under ἀμπλακεῖν) that the μ is inserted; under Β it is said that the β is inserted. In the latter place, too, it is strangely said that in ὄμβριμος the β is inserted, as in ἄμβροτος, "to give a fuller sound," though the root of ὄβριμος is under that word stated to be βρι, and ὄμβριμος is rightly said to be a false reading arising from error of the copyists. In the article on χορός, amongst several *rapprochements*, for which Curtius would certainly decline to be responsible, it is sought to connect that word with the Latin *cornu*, the latter being thus separated from κέρας, which, however, in the article which deals with it is rightly associated with *cornu* as well as with κάρα.

In such a revision of the work as I have recommended, it would of course be necessary not only to re-examine the words on which the Dictionary always differed from Curtius, *ex. gr.* ἥλιος and φώς (a man), but also to compare the latest (fourth) edition of the *Grundzüge* with the first, and to reconsider carefully the words in which the author has seen reason to change his mind; *ex. gr.* κάπρος, which he no longer regards as related to *aper* and *Eber*; μόχλος, which he once seemed to think might possibly be associated with ὄχλεός, but does not now join with it; ἀδευκής, the connexion of which with γλυκύς he formerly admitted, though indeed this view was retracted at the end of the first edition, on the ground that δεῦκος is a *vox nihili*.

II. Dr. Donaldson said of Dr. William Smith's Latin Dictionary that it was the best representative of the scholarship of our day in the department to which it

belongs. It is not my object at present to compare it with other recent Latin-English Dictionaries, nor even to consider its general merits, which, however, in passing I gladly recognise as being of a very high order. I wish to examine it on the etymological side only. And I must be pardoned if I say that, though on this side generally deserving praise, it has been, perhaps, praised beyond its merits. Though it has passed through eleven editions (in seven of which, I gather from the preface, corrections have been introduced), it is still largely capable of improvement, and a revision of its etymological portion is required not less, but more, than in the case of Liddell and Scott. There are occasional extravagances, arising from the undue influence of authorities more ingenious than judicious, which ought to be removed, a good many errors to be corrected, and a good many omissions to be supplied.

Let me mention first some of these last. Here is a set of undeniable cognates to Latin words, which yet are not given in the Dictionary.

To *albus*, Gr. ἀλφός; to *balbus*, Gr. βάρβαρος; to *brevis* (= *bregvis*), Gr. βραχύς; to *caveo*, Gr. κοέω, Germ. *schauen*; to *clunis*, Gr. κλώνις, Skt. *çroni*; to *et*, Gr. ἔτι; to *farcio* and *frequens*, Gr. φράσσω (= φρακ-γω); to *fendo*, Gr. θείνω (= θεν-γω); to *foro*, Eng. *bore*; to *fruo* (= *frugvor*, cf. *fructus*), Germ. *brauchen*; to *grando*, Gr. χάλαζα (= χαλαδ-γα); to *gravis*, Gr. βαρύς (β=gv); to *holus*, Gr. χλόη; to *jus* (sauce), Gr. ζύμη; to *labor*, Skt. *rabh*, Gr. ἀλφ-άνω, Germ. *arbeit*; to *obliquus*, Gr. λέχριος, λικριφίς; to *loquor*, Gr. λακείν, λάσκω; to *mereo*, Gr. μείρομαι (= μερ-γομαι), 'to get for one's share'; to *mingo*, Gr. ὀμιχέω; to *mola*, Gr. μύλη; to *paleo*, Gr. πετάννυμι; to *pruna*, Gr. πῦρ; to *rigo*, Gr. βρέχω; to *stella* (= *ster-ula*) Gr. ἁ-στήρ; to *strigilis*, Gr. στλεγγίς; to *suo*, Gr. σύω in κασσύω (= κατασυνω), καττύω, κάττυμα; to *texo*, Gr. ἔ-τεκον, τέκτων; to *turba*, Gr. τύρβη; to *vegeo*, Gr. ὑγιής; to *veho*, Gr. ὄχος; to *venus* (or *venum*), Gr. ὄνος; to *vetus*, Gr. ἔτος; to *vigil*,

Germ. *wachen*, Eng. *wake*; to *virus*, Skt. *vishas*, Gr. *ίός*; to *vitis*, Gr. *ἴνυς*, *ἰτέα*.

The etymologies given in the Dictionary seem to be, in a good many instances, either certainly wrong or extremely improbable. Thus, *adepts* is said to be from a root *dap*, with which is compared the English *fat*, though the latter under *pinguis* is referred to the root of *πίων*. *Aestas* and *aestus* are referred to *uro* (*uso*), but how *ae* comes from *u* is not explained; the words are really connected with Gr. *αἶθω*, and Skt. *idh*, *indh*. The comparison of *amarus* with Heb. *marah* is a specimen of an altogether objectionable proceeding in a Latin Lexicon; the possible affinities of Indo-European and Semitic, except in borrowed words, lie quite outside the range of such a work; and *amarus* seems in truth to come from the same root as the Greek *ἀμ-ός*. *Bilis* is wrongly connected with Gr. *χολή*; *fel* really corresponds to the latter, and *b* in Latin *never* represents original *gh*. *Carmen* cannot come from *kri*, as is plain from the old form *Casmenae* for *Camenae*; the original word was *casmen*. *Carus* (in the article on *gratus*) is connected with *χαίρω*, which is also a phonetic impossibility. *Coquo* is compared with Eng. *bake*, which, as I mentioned above, is really related not to *coquo* or to *πέσσω* but to *φώγω*. *Damno* is wrongly connected with Eng. *doom*. *Deus* is unhesitatingly, though erroneously, identified with *θεός*. *Exterior* is referred not to *περάω*, *πειράω*, to which it plainly belongs, but to Skt. *char*. *Faber* is said to be for *fac-ber* from *facio*, though the termination *ber*, to imply an agent, is unknown to Latin.* *Fas*, *fascis*, &c., are compared with the Germ. *fassen*, which contradicts Grimm's law. *Felo* (*fello*) is made the same with *βδάλλω*, though it is as certainly = Gr. *θηλάζομαι* as *foris* is = Gr. *θύρα*. *Filius* is said to come from the root *fu*, *fi* or *fe*, the same from which "the Greek *υἱός* perhaps comes;" but it cannot be doubted that, from whatever root

* Schleicher, however, seems to accept an account of *faber* not differing substantially from this; see *Compendium*, § 153, 2.

filius may be derived, *υῖός* comes from the root *su*, which appears in Skt. *sānus*, Goth. *sunus*, Eng. *son*. *Fors* is really related, not to *fallo*, as the Dictionary tells us, but to *fero*. *Follis* is wrongly connected with *pellis*; it is akin to Gr. *θυλλίς* (Hesych.) = *θύλακος*. *Fortis* (*fortis*) is not to be referred to the root *bhar* (*fero*), but to *dhar* (with determinative *k*). *Homo* is wrongly compared with Greek *ἄνθρωπος* and English *man*; *ἄνθρωπος*, in spite of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, did not take the digamma, and the initial *g* of the Gothic *guma* and old high German *gomo* shows that the original word began with *gh*; it was, beyond reasonable doubt, of the same group from which *χαμαί* and *humus* took their origin. *Inseco* is not a "form of *insequor*," but is from a root *sak*, in Greek *σέπ*, which appears in *ἔσπετε*, *ἐνίσπεν*, and in the German *sagen*. *Latus*, broad, cannot be akin to *πλατύς*, for it is known to have been originally *stlatus*. *Penis* is referred, after Festus, to *pendeo*, though the Skt. *pasas* and the Greek *πέ(σ)ος* show that it is really *pes-nis*. *Pinguis* is compared with *πίων*; it is really the Latin correlative of *παχύς*. *Porta* and *Portus* are erroneously connected with *πύλη*; they belong without doubt to the same group with *περάω*, *πορθμός*, *ἔμπορος*. *Pug* (whence *pugna*, *pugnus*) is strangely conjectured to be perhaps the same root as that of Gr. *μάχομαι*. *Quisquiliæ* is said to be probably from *quisque*, instead of being connected with Gr. *κοσκυλμάτια*. *Radius*, as well as *ράβδος*, is said to come from *ῥάσσω*, though the *σσ* in that verb plainly arises not from a dental, but from a guttural. *Rapio* is compared (*s.v.* *carpo*) not only rightly with *ῥηπάζω*, but wrongly with *κάρφω*. *Sacer*, *sancio*, are not from the same root as *ἄγιος*, in which the *spiritus asper* represents not *s* but *y*. *Sterto* is not from "a root *ter*, whence *dormio*;" *dormio* is not from "a root *ter*" (cf. *δαρθάνω*), nor has it anything to do with *sterro*. *Torqueo* seems without doubt related to *τρέπω*. *Trames* has no more to do with *meo* than *fomes*. *Velo* is unreasonably said to be perhaps

akin to *celo*. The four words *vir*, *vires*, *vireo*, *virgo*, are wrongly associated; the first three are certainly all distinct from each other, and the notion that *virgo* = *virago* seems to have no foundation.

Particular errors or oversights are of minor consequence, unless they involve violations of phonetic law. Some of those I have given, which *do* involve such violation, may have been inadvertently admitted. But in other places there are direct assertions respecting letter-changes, which show mistaken or vague ideas on word-formation and the principles of phonology. Thus *favilla* is represented as coming from *fax*, *facis*, by change of *c* to *v*, and the legitimacy of such change is asserted in the article on the letter C. But the cases there adduced really prove nothing; there is no interchange of *c* and *v* in *nivis*, *coniveo*, *vivo*, as compared with *nix*, *conixi*, *vixi*, for in each of the former words there was an original guttural; and if *focus* be connected with *foveo*, which the article on the former word is surely right in pronouncing to be uncertain, the *c* certainly does not take the place of the *v*. On letter D, words such as *sella* compared with *sedes*, *scala* compared with *scando*, are quoted to prove the interchange of *d* and *l*; but they prove no such thing; *sella* = *sed-la*, *scala* = *scad-la*, and these are really cases of Assimilation. It must be added that the term 'interchange' is here and elsewhere improperly used, for though in *δάκρυ*, *lacrima*, *δαήρ*, *levir*, &c., *d* is changed to *l*, the opposite change does not take place. On J, *major* from *magnus* is given as presenting an instance of the interchange of *g* and *j*; but this again is wrong; *major* = *mag-iōr*; the *g* disappears, and there is no 'interchange.' Again, an interchange of *m* and *b* is not proved by *hiems*, *hibernus*, as is stated in the article on M, but at most the change of *mr* to *br*, as in *μυρός*, *βροτός*; the transition of sound being, apparently, as Fick gives it, *heimrinus* (= *χευμρινός*), *heimbrinus*, *hibrinus*. Nor is the interchange of *m* and *v* proved, as is there asserted, by *uvividus*, *humidus*;

the root is, as Curtius shows, *ug* (compare Gr. ὑγρός), whence *ugveo*, *uveo*, *umor* from a lost *umus*, as *albor* from *albus*, and *umidus* from *umus*, as *vividus* from *vivus*. (These relations are wrongly stated in the article of the Dictionary on *udus*). To cite as another example of *m=v*, the group, Lat. *mare*, Skt. *vâri*. Engl. *water*, is monstrous; for *mare* (in spite of Bopp) is not akin to *vâri*, and *vâri* is related to Lat. *urina*, but has nothing to do with *water*, which is of course radically the same as ὕδωρ. On P, the interchange of *p* and *t* is sought to be proved from *hostis*, *hospes*, which is absurd, for what here takes place, even supposing that the words mean the same thing, is not the substitution of one letter for another, but the substitution of one termination (or mode of word-formation) for another. But the words almost certainly mean different things: *hostis* = Germ. *gast*; and, even if the first syllable of *hospes* have that sense, there is a distinct element in the second syllable, and the whole word more probably means primarily *host*. A similar remark applies to the statement that *murus* "belongs to the same root as *munio* and *moenia*, the *n* and *r* being interchangeable." They do, indeed, both come from a primary root *mu*. But it is no more necessary to suppose that the *n* becomes *r* than it is to regard the Greek ἐῶρον and the Latin *donum* as not merely cognate but identical. Again, to quote, as in the article on P, *opilio* ('for *ovilio*') as an example of the interchange of *p* and *v* is a grave error; for *opilio* (compare *upilio*) is really *ovipilio* (compare αἰπόλος), and the *v* does not take the place of the *p* at all. These assertions shew considerable laxity of view as to the relations of sounds. But what shall we say of the state of mind as to phonetic law and the Teutonic *Lautverschiebung*, from which proceeded the suggestion that *pejor* perhaps comes from a root *ped*, which is the same with the English *bad*!

I may add that, on questions of word-formation, into which considerations of phonology do not enter, serious

mistakes are made. Thus, in the article on *metior*, μέτ-πον (*sic*) is quoted as showing a form of the root with a final dental, the Greek word being really not μέτ-πον, but μέτ-πον, from root με, Indo-European *ma*. *Arbiter*, again, rightly—no doubt—derived from *adbilo*, ought to be divided, not, as in the Dictionary, *arbit-er*, but *arbi-ter*; the root which appears in the word is *ba* (compare ε-βην), the *t* in Lat. *beto* being a determinative addition (*Weiterbildung*) to that root.

As specimens of the extravagances to be found here and there may be mentioned the following: the notion that *cado* is akin to Engl. *fall*; the identification of *dico* (-are) with *ligo*; the reference of *famulus* to *facio*, quasi *fac-mulus*;* the derivation of *jus*, law, from *dicare*, to bind (?), the word being, as we are told, "a compression of *dicus*," which, losing its guttural, passes from *di'us* to *jus*; the connexion of *luo* with *laxus*; the suggestion that *orbus* has a prothetic *o*, and comes from a root akin to *rapio*; &c.

An interesting feature of Dr. Smith's Dictionary is the comparison with Latin words of their correlatives in the several Romance languages. Though such comparisons cannot be carried out in a complete or altogether satisfactory manner in a Latin Dictionary which does not include low-Latin, it is yet, I think, very desirable that they should be introduced as far as possible. There is, perhaps, no way in which the Etymological habit can be better formed in young minds than by having their attention fixed on these correspondences. But great caution must be exercised in stating them, for it is peculiarly easy in this field to be led astray by plausible-looking, but unreal, affinities. This part of Dr. Smith's work appears to have been done with very great accuracy as well as completeness. I have noticed a few omissions, as of

* I am surprised to find this account. See his "Essays," an interesting volume, edited by Professor Whitney, scholar as the late Professor Hadley. London, 1873, p. 160.

acheter on *accepto*, *cheveu* on *capillus*, *compter* on *computo*, *feu* on *focus*, *lieu* on *locus* (which, however, is mentioned on *medius*), *payer* on *paco*, *rien* on *res*, *ver* on *vermis*, *verre* on *vitrum*, *vert* on *viridis*, *brebis* on *vervex*, but I have observed only one certain mistake; that of deriving (in the article on *malus*) *bonheur*, *malheur*, from *bona hora*, *mala hora*. There can be no doubt that these words come, not from *hora*, but from *augurium*. See Diez *s.v.* *augurio*, or Max Müller's Lectures, II. p. 241, and compare Ital. *sciagurato* from *exauguratus*.

We arrive, on the whole, with respect to Dr. Smith's Dictionary at substantially the same conclusion as with respect to Liddell and Scott, that, whatever are its merits as it now stands, a general revision of its Etymological portion is required. In truth, though the Preface to the eleventh edition speaks of improvements in the "derivations," no less than in other features of the work, the changes must be very few; for, in comparing this edition on several hundred words with that of 1862 (which bears 'Ninth Thousand' on its title-page), I have not found in the Etymologies a single alteration.

III. The commentators on Greek and Latin authors do not often enter on discussions as to the etymologies of words. Such discussions are, in general, foreign to their legitimate business, which is that of explaining the connexion and purport of the text, illustrating rare or peculiar turns of expression, and clearing up difficulties arising from allusions not easily understood. Etymological questions will, however, naturally arise pretty often on the more ancient writings in both languages. On Homer, for example, they cannot be dispensed with, when we seek to fix the meanings of many of his words, which do not occur, or only seldom occur, in other authors, and which can be interpreted only by the methods so well exemplified in Buttman's *Lexilogus*, with the further aid of Comparative Philology. Mr. Paley, accordingly, in his edition of the *Iliad*, has given a good deal of space—more, indeed,

than was at all necessary—to remarks on Etymology; and, as I believe the influence of the book likely to be—unless counteracted—in the highest degree detrimental to rational notions on this subject, I feel bound to warn my younger readers that his method is unscientific, and his results, in many instances, untenable.

Of Mr. Paley's general attainments, and his services to Classical Literature, I wish to speak with all respect. His Aeschylus, in particular, deserves high praise, and has always been much used and esteemed in the Dublin School of Classics. But it is precisely the distinction Mr. Paley has attained, and the reputation he enjoys, that tend to make his influence pernicious, when exercised in a wrong direction. This consideration formed the motive of the just protest against his Etymological aberrations, contained in the Preface to Mr. Peile's work. Had the protest here referred to been preserved in the second edition of that work, my present undertaking would have been less necessary. But for the sake of Classical students generally, who are likely to be overpowered by the prestige of Mr. Paley's name, and especially for the sake of those of our Dublin School, for whose interests I am particularly concerned, I think that I shall execute a useful task in examining, as I proceed to do, with some degree of minuteness, a number of passages from the Notes to his 'Iliad,' from which I believe it will be easy to form a just estimate of the value of the work on the etymological side, with which alone I have here to deal.

I will take first his note on I. 268, which is as follows:—
 “*φῆρσιν*, the Centaurs. So Cheiron is called *φῆρ* by Pindar, Pyth. iii. 4, and ib. iv. 119. The word is commonly considered an Aeolic form of *θῆρ*, with which the Latin *fera* is compared. But the *φῆρες* proper were not ‘monsters;’ on the contrary, old Cheiron was *δικαιότατος*, a human being of higher civilization than others, learned too in music and the healing art. It is true they are

called *φῆρες λαχνηέντες*, inf. ii. 743, which is probably the later and post-Homeric notion. The *φῆρες* seem to have been a real pre-historic people, possibly not different from the *Φεραῖοι* or people of Pherae in Thessaly. That *φῆρ* or *Φῆρ* is the Latin *vīr* has been elsewhere remarked; see on ii. 711; viii. 332; xii. 128. Compare *φέριστος*, *φέρτατος*, *φέρτερος* from an old word *φερεύς*. The connexion of the *φῆρες* with the Lapithae, or 'stone men' (see on xii. 128), is easily explained on the theory that there was a conflict between the superior race of *φῆρες* and the indigenous savages who were supposed to have sprung from the earth.—*ὄρεσκόοισι*, from the crude form of *ὄρος*, combined with the root *κοF* = *cav*, and meaning 'the dwellers in mountain caves.' We have *κοF* in *κοῖλος* for *κοFελος*, in *Κοῖος*, the Titan, in "Juno Covella," an ancient term for the sky, and in our word *coffer*, if not in *κόφινος* and *coffin*."

Now this note, and the others referred to in it, abound in assertions, many of which are wrong, and almost all entirely unproved. There is really no reason to doubt that *φῆρες* = *θήρες*. Old Cheiron is described by Pindar as *σώφρων*, *νοῦν ἔχων ἀνδρῶν φίλον*, and a skilled physician. Will it be denied that Pindar conceived him as *μιξάνθρωπος*? (Compare *Pyth.* ii. 46.) Why then must Homer have regarded him as a "monster" in the moral sense, because he had the same notion as to his bodily form? Sophocles, in applying the word *θήρ*, as he frequently does in the *Trachiniae*, to Nessus, similarly refers only to his half-human shape. (The mode in which Mr. Paley gets rid of the difficulty arising from the Homeric epithet *λαχνηέντες* is amusing.) It would be more correct, as Ahrens remarks (*De Dial. Aeol.* § 50, 3), to call *φῆρες* a Thessalian form than an Aeolic one; it was, in fact, the name the Centaurs bore in the native home of the legends about them. The Latin *fera* is to be compared not with this Thessalian *φῆρ*, but with the common Greek *θήρ*, as *fores* with *θύρα*. The notion that *φῆρες* = *Φεραῖοι* is purely gratuitous. *Φῆρ* is not = *Φῆρ*, *φ* not representing *F* in

Greek (except in two or three words under a special phonetic influence), nor is it = Latin *vir*, φ not corresponding to Latin *v* (except under like extremely limited conditions). When we turn to the notes in other parts of Mr. Paley's book to which he here refers, we find that this imaginary word *Fῆρ* has extensive affinities in the Greek language, and even turns up in the Germanic family. It is (though it means a *man*) somehow or other the same with the real ῆρ in the phrase ἐπὶ ῆρα φέρων (where it means *gratification*), and is also found in composition in the epithet ἐπὶ ῆρος (plural ἐπὶ ῆρες), which Mr. Paley renders 'warlike,' though applied in the *Odyssey* to a blind αἰδοῖός. We also learn that it is the root of ῆριον, a sepulchral tumulus, which, it appears, means properly a "man-place" (on vii. 90). It is, perhaps, the Ἥρ ὁ Ἀρμενίου of Plato's *Republic*. Somewhat disguised it appears in Ἄρης, ἀπερῆ, and *war*, and even in the name *Orion*, for Ὠαρίων is, "as closely as possible, our *warrior* both in form and meaning." Nay, it undergoes a further transformation, after which Mr. Paley's eyes could alone recognize it, and takes the shape φῶς, for this, being "the same as ῆρως, is probably from the same root *Fῆρ*." Are we to discuss seriously all these random guesses, or treat them as amusing specimens of perverse ingenuity? If there were not rather important educational issues involved, we might adopt the latter course; but, as there happen to be, I will just set over against Mr. Paley's propositions what I think may reasonably be said about the words in question. There is, then, nothing whatever to indicate any connexion of φῶς with ῆρως or *vir*. Whether these two last words are themselves akin is very doubtful (even if the η = i can be justified), because ῆρως is not digammated. Ἐπὶ ῆρος, the form of which no more implies an initial digamma for the second element of the compound than ἐπὶ ὄρκος implies Ὀρῆκος, I refer to the root ἄρ (ἀραρίσκω), comparing θυμαρής. As to the affinities of ῆρ = χάρις, I cannot pronounce, for, though the derivation from ἄρ would perfectly suit with respect to

sense, ἦρ seems to take the digamma, which ἀρ does not. Ἀπετή appears certainly to come from this root, to which the cognate adjectives ἀρείων, ἀριστος, also belong. Ἄρης I cannot explain; I can no more agree about this name with Mr. Paley, who seems to forget that it is undigammated, than I can follow Max Müller in identifying it with *Mars*. Of ἡρίων, too, I am unable to give any account; I think the common one which refers it to ἔρα wrong, because ἡρίων appears (it is ἄπαξ εἰρημένον in Hom. Il. xxiii. 126) to be digammated, and ἔρα does not mean 'earth' in the sense of *soil*, of which a barrow would be formed, but as ἔραζε implies, the *ground*; and Mr. Paley's I cannot accept, because ἦρως has no digamma, and because it seems unnatural to call a tumulus—it is not a *grave*—"a man-place." That the oldest form of Ὀαρίων was Φαρίων, and that Φαρίων was = Ἄρης, was a guess of Buttmann's, refuted, as I have said, by the consideration that Ἄρης had not the digamma. That Ὀαρίων = *warrior* is a suggestion, the merit (?) of which, I believe, belongs to Dr. Donaldson. *War*, it is certain, has nothing to do with the group of words with which Mr. Paley connects it. The fundamental notion of the German *werra* appears to be *quarrel*, which is far enough from *vir* or from the notion of *excellence* in φέρτερος, φέριστος. When we consider the Sophoclean forms προφέρτερος and προφέρτατος from προφέρης, we cannot doubt that φέρτερος and φέρτατος are connected, not with Mr. Paley's hypothetical Γήρ, but with φέρ-ω, the notion conveyed by the root in these words being probably that of extending itself or advancing; compare the verb of similar sense in ποδηγεκής and διηγεκής.

In the note we are considering, Mr. Paley seems to say that the Lapithae were so called as being sprung from the earth, from stones; on ii. 743, as having used stones or celts. On xii. 128, he has the following, the logic of which I do not quite apprehend. "The legend of their fighting with the Centaurs by throwing stones (like that of Pyrrha and Deucalion's 'people,' λαός, got by tossing

about stones, Virg. Georg. i. 62) may perhaps most readily be explained by the identity of the root λαF in all these words—*λάας*, *λαός*, *Lapithae*, *lapis*. It is the same in *λαμβάνω*." Were the Lapithae specially noted for fighting with stones? (Homer, in the passage thus annotated, calls them *αἰχμηταί*, and some of his own heroes used to throw *χερμάδια*.) Can *λάFας* be represented in Latin by *lapis*? Has *λάFας* anything to do with *λαFός*? Can *λαFός* come from a root having the sense of *λαμβάνω*? Does λαF enter into *λαμβάνω*? To all these questions I should reply in the negative, as it will be found Curtius does, directly or by implication, to such of them as have to do with Etymology. But I cannot stop to discuss them here.

As to the root κοF, *κοῖλος* is no doubt = *κόFιλος*; *Κοῖος* and *Covella* may be connected with the same, as Lat. *caelum* is with *cav*. But Mr. Paley is wrong in his other conjecture. The French *coffre* and old-French *coffin* come indeed from Lat. *cophinus*, which is borrowed from the Greek *κόφινος*, but *κόφινος* has nothing to do with the root κοF (for φ = bh, not v).

Here, again, is Mr. Paley's note, or the greater part of it, on i. 449. "The word *ὄλαι*, which Buttmann not very probably considers identical with *mola*, contains the root ὄλ, which occurs in *ὄλῦρα*, v. 196, a kind of grain, and in many words implying *growth by nourishment, elementum*, e.g. *suboles*, *proles* (pro-oles), *adolescens*, *coalescere*. It may be the same in *oleum* and *olere*. It had another form, ἄλ, whence *alescere*, *alere*, *altus* (*ἄλτος*, *ἀναλδής*), *alimentum* (= *elementum*), *ἄλευρον* (for ἄλεFρον), *ἄλείν*, *ἄλετριβανος* (Ar. Pac. 259), *ἄλφитον*. Similarly *ζειά*, a kind of grain, from *ζεF* (*ζην*). Photius, *ὄλας· οὐχὶ ἄλας λεκτέον*. Read *ὄλάς· οὐχὶ ἄλας*, κ. τ. λ. Both were ancient forms; but he considered the former more correct. Perhaps we may hence account for the custom in later times of *salting* the meal (*mola salsa*). With this form probably *albus* and *ἄλφός* are connected (from the *whiteness* of flour). The

form οὐλαί is changed from ὀΦλαί or ὀλφαί, whence ὀλβιος meant 'rich in corn' (New Cratylus, § 116)."

It does seem that Buttmann was wrong in seeking on the basis of a few questionable analogies to identify ὀλαί with *mola*. But that ὀλαί comes from the root *al* or ὀλ, from which *alo*, *proles*, &c., are derived, seems very improbable, for the notion of the word is not that of grain growing in the field, but of bread-corn *prepared by bruising*. (Compare Herod. i. 160, οὐλαί κριθῶν.) It seems impossible to separate it from ἄλευρον, or from ἀλεῖν. But how can we, as Mr. Paley does, connect ἀλέω, ἀλετριβανος with the notion of *growing*? And, not to speak of *oleum* (ἔλαιον), which is a difficult word, can Mr. Paley really think that *olere* belongs to the *ol* in *proles*? Is it not manifestly related to ὄζειν = ὄδ-γειν (cf. *odor*) as *lacrima* to δάκρυ, or *levir* to δαήρ? For ὀλαί there is no authority beyond Mr. Paley's very doubtful emendation of Photius. And how can we derive ἀλφός, *albus*, from this imaginary ὀλαί = ὀλαί, because *flour is white*? Are not ἄλφι, ἄλφιτον, plainly from the root of ἀλφός, as *wheat* is from the notion of *white*, not *white* from that of *wheat*? Mr. Paley derives ζειά from ζεF (ζῆν). But ζεF is not the root of ζῆν, and ζειά, the Skt. *yavas*, has nothing to do with ζάω. The derivation, adopted from Donaldson, of ὀλβιος (quasi *rich in corn*) from οὐλαί (bruised barley) is simply incredible.

In the note on iv. 117, a number of erroneous or rash assertions are heaped together. On the difficult expression ἔρμ' ὀδυνάων, he quotes Mr. Newman's remark, "I venture to treat *herma* as equivalent to Latin *germen* and *gemma*" without observing that the *rapprochement* here proposed is phonetically impossible, the Greek spiritus asper not arising from original *g*. He then goes on, "It cannot be doubted that ἔρμα and σπέρμα are as truly the same words as *sew* and *sow*; *sero*, *serui*, and *sero*, *sevi*; and that the root, as also in ἐρεῖν and *sermo*, is Fep with the aspirated (*wh* or *hw*) digamma, σFep = εἶρ, σπερ,

ser or *swer*. The idea in all the derivations without exception is that of *stringing together in a row*. . . . Similarly εἶπερος and *seruus*, as well as the name *Hermes*, may refer to the driving captives, or ghosts to Hades, tied or strung in a row. The root σφερ exists quite unaltered in our word *swear*, which involves the notion of *binding* by an oath."

I am not here concerned with Mr. Paley's account of the word ἔρμα (if indeed there be not more words than one so spelled), though in ἔρμα πόλῃος, I confess I do not understand how the alleged root-notion of ἔρμα, viz. that of *placing in a row*, is appropriate, or how an individual hero can have applied to him a word meaning not one supporting stone, but a *row* of stones without any idea of supporting being contained in it. But I am compelled not only to 'doubt,' but entirely to disbelieve, that ἔρμα and σπέρμα are the same, and I ask Mr. Paley to give the least reason, except the *alleged* similarity of meaning, for assuming this connexion, and to point to other examples of such disappearance of σπ. I further deny that *sew* is the same word as *sow*. The former is akin to the Latin *suo*, and to a similar verb which the words καττύω (κατα-σύω), κάττυμα show to have existed in Greek; the root of the latter is seen in Lat. *sa-tus*. Again, I deny that *sero*, *serui*, is the same with *sero*, *serui*; the root of the former, as Mr. Paley correctly says, is *swer*, but the root of the latter is *sa*, and the verb = *sa-s-o*. It appears extremely improbable that ἐπεῖν has anything to do with *serere* or *sermo*; it connects itself naturally (by two different determinatives) with *ver-b-um* and *wor-d*. Ἐλπερος and *servus* may be related and both akin to εἶρω (to bind); Curtius thinks they are; but that *Hermes* was so called from *stringing souls together* in the descent to the world of the dead, is, I must take the liberty of saying, a ludicrous suggestion. What the affinities of *Hermes* (Ἑρμείας) really are, whether Kuhn and Max Müller are, or are not, right in connecting the name with Saramêyas, I do not

take on me to say. That the Teutonic word *swear* morally involves the notion of binding *oneself* is true enough, but even Mr. Paley will admit that the notion of *stringing in a row* cannot enter here, and, etymologically, it is certain that *swear* has nothing whatever to do with *εἶρω* or *sero*.

On ii. 484, Mr. Paley has on *ἔσπετε* the strange remark—"A form of *εἶπετε*. The *σ* results from the sibilant digamma in the root *σFer* or *σερ* (Lat. *sermo*, &c.). Thus *σΓέπετε* became *Γέσπετε*. . . ." Does he seriously believe that *ἔπος*, *εἶπον* are related to *σFer* and *sermo*? I had thought all were agreed that *ἔπος* belongs to the Indo-European root *vak* (cf. Lat. *vox*). By what phonetic process can we pass from *σFer* to *Γεπ*? The *ἔσπετε* in the passage annotated as above seems to come from neither of these, but from the root *σеп*, corresponding to the old Latin *in-sec-o*, &c., and to the O. H. G. *seg-jan*.

The following is Mr. Paley's note on v. 138:

"*χραύση*, 'shall have grazed,' or slightly wounded. Schol. *ξύση*, *ψαύση*. Hesych. *πλήξη*. From *χράω* for *χράφω*, whence *ἔχραε δαίμων*, in allusion to death's dart, Od. v. 396. Inf. xxi. 369. "*Ἡρη, τίπτει σὸς υἱὸς ἐμὸν ῥόον ἔχραε κήδειν*, 'made an assault upon;' xvi. 352, *ὥς δὲ λύκοι ἄρνεσσιν ἐπέχραον ἢ ἐρίφοισιν*. A large class of words belong to this root; *γράφω*, primarily 'to scratch a mark,' hence 'to write;' thus *ἐπέγραψε χροά φωτὸς* in iv. 139, means 'grazed.' Compare xvii. 599. From the same root *χρῶς*, i.e., *χροῖς* is derived, and also *χροιά*, meaning the outer surface which is acted upon by a point. So also *χρόζειν*, and perhaps *χραισμεῖν* (see in i. 566). Both *χαράσσω* and *ταράσσω*, another form of which is *θράσσω*, have a cognate sense 'to roughen or plough up' (compare *τραχύς*). Hence *οὐ χθόνα ταράσσοντες*, *terram solicitantes*, Pind. Ol. ii. 63. From the guttural form of the root come our words *harrow* and *harass*, both undoubtedly identical with *χαράσσω*. Even *rough*, *grave*, *gruff*, and the Latin *raucus*, *rauis*, contain the same root. In Pindar, Ol. ii. 29, we may best explain *ἔχραον* by the notion of *imparting* by

writing or inscribing on the mind. We have *χαίρω* for *γράφω*, 'to pass the hand over a surface,' and thus to stain or soil it. We have *γραῦς*, 'an old woman,' from *γραῖς*, from the lines or furrows in the face; and also *γραῦς* in the sense of 'foam on a goblet' (on which Aristophanes has a joke in *Plut.* 1206), obviously from the crisp and wrinkled outline of 'the head' in fermented liquor."

That *χραύω* (root *χραF*) means 'to graze' is certain; why Mr. Paley says that *χραύση* comes not from *χραύω* or *γράφω*, but 'from *χράω* for *γράφω*,' I am at a loss to understand. The 'allusion to death's dart' in *Od.* v. 396, is purely imaginary; the word *ἔχραε* in that passage has nothing to do with grazing, but means *set upon, attacked*. The sentence in *Il.* xxi. 369, is mistranslated by Mr. Paley; *ἔχραε* does not govern *ρόον*, but goes with the infinitive, and means 'set about' behaving in a certain way. To *χραύω* it is probable enough that *χαίρω*, *χροιά*, *χρός*, *χρώμα*, perhaps *χρίω* and *χρίπτω*, are related (though 'the being acted upon by a point' does not furnish the bond of connexion with *χροιά* or *χρός*). But it is surely unreasonable to connect with *χραύω* the word *χραισμέω*, as Mr. Paley does (on i. 566), giving to the latter the primary sense of 'touching a person's side in close succour.' It seems plainly to be *χρασιμέω*, connected with *χράσμαι* (whence *χρέος*, *χρεῖα*), which may, or may not, be distinct from the *χράω*, *aggređior*, above mentioned. Between *χραύω* and *γράφω* there is no etymological relation; the latter is probably referable to an Indo-European *skrabh*; compare *Lat. scrobs*. Nor are *χαράσσω* and *ταράσσω* radically the same, as Mr. Paley makes them to be; phonology absolutely forbids their union. I may remark in passing, that Mr. Paley's rendering, *sollicitantes*, admits what is obvious, that Pindar has a poetic image in his use of *ταράσσοντες*, and does not employ it in the strictly physical sense of "roughening up." *Harass* is a difficult word and has been much discussed; I do not profess to be able to explain it; but one thing is certain, that neither it nor

harrow has anything to do with *χαράσσω*; these words appear to be Germanic, and original *gh* would not in that family be represented by *h*. Mr. Paley, by joining *grave* with *rough*, *gruff*, &c., seems to shew that he is speaking of the adjective used to characterize certain tones; but will he deny that this *grave* is from Lat. *gravis*, which cannot be associated with *χαύω*? *Raucus* and *raucus*, hoarse, come (with *Zulaut*) from the root *ru*, whence *ru-mor*, and, with determinative *g*, *ru-g-iō*. It seems a decisive objection to the proposed interpretation of *ἔχραον* in Pindar Ol. vii. (ii. is an error of the press) that it would make the word imply a *slight* impression, whilst the sense of the passage requires that a *profound* one should be meant. It seems certain that we should compare with Pindar's word the *ἐξέχρη* of Sophocles in O. C. 87. Lastly, will Mr. Paley deliberately separate *γραιῦς*, an old woman, from *γραιᾶ*, *γεραιός*, *γέρων*? The root of these latter words (*gar*, Skt. *gar*) has in it the notion of 'rubbing away,' whence that of 'senio conficere;' and from this root came also that other *γραιῦς*, applied to the rough and wrinkled scum of boiled milk or the like.

I do not intend at present to carry the examination of Mr. Paley's notes on the *Iliad* beyond those on the Fifth Book. Accordingly, having now spoken of some of the longer notes, where he enters more fully into etymological questions, I will turn back and notice some of the shorter ones containing isolated observations on words, which appear to me to be erroneous or to furnish examples of vicious method.

The root of *τιθημι*, I will begin by observing, is not *θεF*, as Mr. Paley makes it on i. 140, but *θε*. *δαίω*, to divide, is not from the root *δαF* (as on i. 125); it is really *δαίω*, to burn, which is *δάF-yō*. The root of *σεύω* is not *σεF* (as on i. 173), but *σν*; of *χέω*, *θέω*, *ξέω*, not *χεF*, *θεF*, *ξεF* (as *passim*), but *χv*, *θv*, *ξv*, which, however, by a well-known phonetic process, sometimes become *χεF*, *θεF*, *ξεF*, and, dropping the digamma, *χε*, *θε*, *ξε*. If Mr. Paley had

seen this, he would have been saved the trouble of explaining, in the Preface to his Hesiod, p. xli., the "singular fact" that $\chi\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ for $\chi\epsilon\text{F}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ has the υ short. The root of $\zeta\acute{\omega}$ is not $\zeta\epsilon\text{F}$ (as on ii. 548), but $\zeta\epsilon\varsigma$; of $\pi\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ is not $\pi\alpha\text{F}$ (as on i. 464), but $\pi\alpha\tau$, a *Weiterbildung* of $\pi\alpha$. $\Sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\alpha$, keel (or cutwater), is not $\sigma\tau\epsilon\text{F}\rho\alpha$, connected with $\sigma\tau\iota\phi\acute{\rho}\omicron\varsigma$ and Eng. *stiff* (as on i. 482), but $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ takes the two forms $\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, and, by hyperthesis, $\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$, which latter appears in $\sigma\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\alpha$ and seems rightly associated with Lat. *sterilis*. Ἄφενος , whether or not it ought to be compared with Skt. *apnas*, Lat. *ops*, is, in any case, not (as on i. 170) "from the old word $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ or $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, *annus*, connected probably with $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ ($\text{F}\acute{\epsilon}\nu\varsigma$);" for, on that supposition, what are we to make of the $\acute{\alpha}\phi$? $\Upsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$ is not " $\phi\upsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$ or even $\phi\epsilon\text{F}\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ " (as on i. 505', ϕ not changing to the spiritus asper. Of $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\pi\epsilon\phi\upsilon\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (on i. 512) Mr. Paley says, that "it is a changed form, the oldest verb being $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\text{F}\epsilon\mu\iota = \phi\acute{\epsilon}\text{F}\omega$ or $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\omega$." But the form $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\text{F}\epsilon\mu\iota$ could not exist; the present of the verb in question, if affected with *Zulaut*, could only be $\phi\epsilon\text{F}\acute{\omega}\mu\iota$, $\phi\acute{\epsilon}\text{F}\omega$; cf. Skt. *bhavanāmi*: nor are the other assertions in the same note more correct, though I cannot dwell on them. On $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\tau\omicron$ in i. 532, he says—"Here the F is well marked, the root being $\text{F}\alpha\lambda = \text{sal}$ (*salio*)."
But it is surely the spiritus asper of $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, not the F, which corresponds to the Latin *s*. Ποιπνύω is not (as on i. 600) "from the roots $\pi\omicron\iota$ or $\pi\omicron\iota\phi$ (*puff*), and $\pi\nu\epsilon\text{F}$ ($\pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\omega$);" but contains a reduplication of $\pi\nu$. The Latin *cubo*, *cumbo*, are not to be referred to an imaginary $\kappa\epsilon\text{F}$, but to be compared with $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omega$, $\kappa\upsilon\phi\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, from the root $\kappa\upsilon\phi$. That $\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\rho\gamma\alpha$ was not originally pronounced $\text{F}\acute{\epsilon}\text{F}\omicron\rho\gamma\alpha$ (as on iii. 57), but $\text{F}\acute{\epsilon}\text{F}\epsilon\rho\gamma\alpha$, will surprise those who have read Schleicher's account of the *Vocalreihen* in the *Ursprache*, the Greek, and the Latin. Was $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omicron\rho\kappa\alpha$ originally pronounced $\delta\acute{\epsilon}\delta\epsilon\rho\kappa\alpha$? Nor is $\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ for $\acute{\epsilon}\text{F}\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ (as on i. 306). $\text{F}\acute{\iota}\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega$ (iii. 106) is entirely without authority, and the liberty Mr. Paley everywhere takes of interchanging ϕ and F is quite unwarranted. Ἐφιάτης is plainly from $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$; compare

the form ἐφίλορκος; and *φιαλοῦμεν in Aristophanes (for so Eustathius writes it) cannot prove anything more than that ἰάλλω was in Attic, as Arcadius says it was, ἰάλλω. 'Εὖς, ἡύς, good, is derived by Mr. Paley (on iii. 167) from the root ἄF, ἐF, in ἀὔτεϊν, "which occurs in the formula for the warrior's shout, ἡῦσεν δὲ διαπρῦσιον. Compare. . . . βοὴν ἀγαθός. . . . Hence ἡύς originally meant 'the shouter.'" The word has really nothing to do with shouting. Its original form was ἔσσυς, as the common *su* = *ev* of Sanskrit compounds shews; it is, perhaps, akin to ἐσθλός, and is certainly derived from the root ἐς, to be. Compare the relation of ideas in ἐτεός, Skt. *sat-ya-s*. Mr. Paley seems from his note on v. 628 to have felt some compunctious visitings on further consideration of the 'shouting' idea, for which Donaldson, it appears, is primarily responsible: still he does his best, there also, to bolster it up.

Of πῶν (on iii. 198) he makes the original root to be "ποF (or ποκ, the Koppa, with a sound like *poq* or *poç*), whence πόκος, pecus, ποιμήν, and ποία, 'food for sheep,' 'grass.'" Now, that F can = κ is impossible. Πόκος, *pecus*, ποιμήν, and ποία seem to be all from different roots. The first is from πέκω, Lat. *pecto*; *pecus* is the same with Skt. *ṛagus*, but the further etymology is uncertain; ποιμήν is from the root *ṛa*, to take care of (cf. Vedic Skt. *ṛājus*), and πῶν seems clearly to go with it; ποία, πῶα, appears to be connected with the root *ṛu*, to grow. The identity of πῶν with *pecus*, though maintained by Pott, must be denied, κ not disappearing between vowels.

Neither can it be admitted that, as Mr. Paley says on iv. 171, βέλ-τερος, βελτ-ίων, βέλτ-ιστος (for the roots of the first and of the other two do not seem to be quite the same), give us the words *better*, *best*, the positive being "perhaps for βελέτης, 'a darter.'" For neither in the Gothic *batiza*, nor in the corresponding O. H. German form, *peziro*, is there any more trace of an *l* than in the English word. Besides, Gothic *b* would indicate Greek φ. The attempt to connect βελτίων with βελέτης (which I am

sorry to find in Liddell and Scott also), is quite in the etymological style of the last century.

On v. 50, Mr. Paley asserts that there is some relation between $\delta\xiύς$ and $\xiύω$, a relation which there is no reason to accept. Strangely, whilst he affirms this connexion, which seems to imply that the o in $\delta\xiύς$ is prothetic, he states that $\delta\xiύς$ was digammated, which it appears not to have been, and he gives as evidence of its digamma the word $\phiοξός$, which has nothing to do with it. But further he joins with $\xiέFω$ not only $\xiόανον$, which he is right in doing, but $\xiίφος$ (in which he has the support of the Etymologicum Magnum, but could not have that of any scientific philologist), and also the English *shave* and *shaft*. *Shave* is possibly related to Lat. *scabo*, but any kinship between *scabo* and $\xiέω$, though affirmed by L. Meyer, must be regarded as highly questionable, the δ remaining unexplained. *Shaft* is certainly connected with $\sigmaκήπων$, $\sigmaκήπ-τρον$, (root *skap*), and has plainly nothing to do with $\xiέω$.

On v. 486 he compares $\deltaαρ$, a wife, with *Hure*, *whore*, regarding the initial o as representing the digamma (a phenomenon which is, no doubt, sometimes found), so that $\deltaαρ$ was really *hwar*. But the *w* appears to be peculiar to English, not appearing in Anglo-Saxon or any other Germanic language, and the *h* of *Hure* indicates initial *k* in the original. What $\deltaαρ$ really is, it is not easy to say. Some compare it with Skt. *svasar*. Perhaps the best account of it is that which Curtius offers, namely, that it is = $\delta\cdot\sigmaαρ$, from the root $\sigmaερ$, $\sigmaερ$, of which I have already spoken, so that it would be the exact equivalent of $\sigmaυνήορος$, *conjux*. That $\deltaαρίζειν$, $\deltaαριστύς$ are derived from this word Mr. Paley assumes, but it is by no means certain; Pindar's use of $\deltaαρος$ places great difficulties in the way of this connexion.

On v. 526, Mr. Paley tells us that the root of $\alpha\omega$ or $\alpha\etaμι$ is FaF, as in *vapor* and *favonius*, referring at the same time to a passage in the 'New Cratylus,' where we also find $\phiάος$ in the monstrous shape FaFος. Mr. Peile

has done justice to this FaF. *Vapor* seems certainly to be for *εναφ-ορ*, and to be connected with Gr. *καπύω*, *καπνός*. *Favonius* may be akin to *φαF*, *φαῦ-ος*, with the notion of 'clear' (candidi Favonii. *Hor.*), and to *faveo*, but cannot have anything to do with *ἄημι*.

When I saw in a note to Mr. Paley's translation of Pindar (p. 67) that he derived *Ἐννάλιος* "from *ἐν* and *ἄλλεσθαι*, comparing the *Salii*, priests or devotees of Mars," I said to myself, 'surely he has forgotten the existence of *Ἐννώ*.' But no—Mr. Paley's etymology is equal to any emergency, and, on Il. v. 592, he tells us that *Ἐννώ* is "*ΕναλFώ* (for *ἘνFαλ-ώ*) formed after the analogy of *Ἐννάλιος*!" This, however, could scarcely have been entirely satisfactory to him; and it is perhaps because the existence of the female divinity throws some doubt on his derivation of *Ἐννάλιος* that he takes revenge on her by pronouncing her "post-Homeric."

On v. 726, *χναF* or *χνοF*, the root of *χνόαι*, the tragic word for the naves or axle-boxes of wheels, is said to be probably our word *nave*. *Nave* is, in reality, the German *nabe*, and is closely akin to *navel*; it is quite unconnected with *χνόη*, but is not without relation to *ὀμφαλός*, though in a way which I cannot stop to explain.

At v. 828, Mr. Paley has a note on the curious word *ἐπιτάρροθος*, which he agrees with every one else in regarding as an altered form of *ἐπίρροθος*. He goes on as follows:—"As *ῥόδον* made *βρόδον*, and *ῥάκος* made *βράκος*, by prefixing the F, so *ῥόθος* was pronounced *Fρόθος* (probably our word *froth*, as *ῥόθιον* is used of sea-foam, e.g. Eur. Iph. T. 1387). As, however, the F is often equivalent to *ἐF* or *Fε*, *Fέρροθος* would be changed to *τάρροθος*, as *ἄFατηρὸς* (*ἄτη*) passed into *ἄτάρτηρος*. And it is not a little remarkable that the simple form *τάρροθος* is actually used by Lysias, p. 360."

Now on this there are three remarks to be made, with which my present criticisms must close. 1. There is no evidence that *ῥόθος*, more than any other Greek word

with initial ρ , had a prefixed digamma. The Lesbian-Aeolic forms $\beta\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\nu$, $\beta\racute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$, go to shew that $\rho\acute{o}\delta\omicron\nu$, $\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ had such digamma; but $\beta\rho\acute{o}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ is not found. Nor would $\rho\acute{o}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ give English *froth*; $\text{F}\rho\acute{\iota}\zeta\alpha$ corresponds to German *wurzel*, and Greek θ is represented by English *d*, so that *wrod* might be expected. 2. The change of a supposed $\text{F}\acute{\epsilon}\rho\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\varsigma$ to $\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\varsigma$ has not a parallel in the case of $\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\eta\rho\omicron\varsigma$. That word cannot have come from $\acute{\alpha}\text{F}\alpha\tau\eta\rho\omicron\varsigma$ —i.e. $\acute{\alpha}\tau\alpha\rho$ from $\acute{\alpha}\text{F}\alpha$ —by any conceivable process. What seems most reasonable to be said about it is, that from $\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\rho\omicron\varsigma$ came $\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\eta\rho\omicron\varsigma$ by a reduplication of the syllable $\tau\eta\rho$ (though this syllable was not all radical, but in part formative), and that the lengthening of the word was felt to justify the shortening of the initial α (cf. $\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\alpha\lambda\omicron\varsigma$). But in $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\varsigma$ there is no reduplication; the $\tau\alpha$ is simply a foreign element intruded into the word, which has never been satisfactorily explained. 3. If the existence of the simple $\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\varsigma$ could be proved, all difficulty would be removed, for there would be no necessity of connecting that word with $\rho\acute{o}\theta\omicron\varsigma$. Mr. Paley says it occurs in "Lysias, p. 360." This is a strange mistake; the reference* should be to verse 360 of the Cassandra of Lycophron; and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\varsigma$ was no doubt simply *inferred* by that hunter after obscure archaisms from the Homeric $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\rho\omicron\theta\omicron\varsigma$.

The notes I have reviewed—and many similar ones might be added, if I proceeded regularly through the book—appear to me decisive respecting Mr. Paley's merits as an etymologist. They seem to shew that he has no etymological *method*—probably so called—at all, but simply guesses more or less ingeniously, without any definite principles to determine whether or not the guess is likely to be right. I have not been able to satisfy myself whether he recognizes *any* phonetic laws, or, if he does, what they are. If he has a system of his own on

* I fear Mr. Paley must have taken it, without verification, from Liddell and Scott. In the 5th edition of that Dictionary (1861) the reference is "Lys. 360."

the subject, he would confer a favour on scholars by publishing it and submitting it to discussion; if he has no method but that of haphazard, my case is proved.

It will not do for Mr. Paley to overlook or neglect the works of the leading German etymologists, and throw himself altogether on his personal inspirations. No one is under any compulsion to deal with Etymology, but, if he does deal with it, he is bound to speak with due knowledge of what has been done by acknowledged masters in this branch of study. No one, I am persuaded, would condemn more strongly than he the pretention to pronounce on questions, for example, in the criticism of the Greek Dramatists, without having previously studied the best authorities on the subject. If any one were to make confident assertions, or hazard novel conjectures, without having made himself acquainted with what had been said on the same subjects by Porson or Hermann, Mr. Paley would not treat the rash speculator with much respect. And, if he quietly ignored such established canons as, for example, the rule of the pause, he would, I have no doubt, be set aside by Mr. Paley without the least hesitation, as having no claim to be heard. Now, Mr. Paley is himself in the same position on questions of etymology. He shews in a hundred different ways that he has not studied the works of Bopp, or Schleicher, or Curtius, and yet he makes positive assertions in a sense directly opposed to their conclusions; and he calmly overlooks the best-established laws of letter-change, such as that of the Teutonic *Lautverschiebung*, when it suits his purpose. This arbitrary way of handling such questions is fatal to scientific etymology. I protest against it in the interests of that study, and I earnestly warn students against Mr. Paley's assertions in this department of learning, as being entirely untrustworthy.

The case of his work—it will be observed—is quite different from that of the Dictionaries previously examined. The errors in Liddell and Scott arise mainly from the fact

that the new and good etymological matter has not yet thoroughly and uniformly displaced the old. Those in Dr. Smith's work are principally due to the improvement of its etymological portion not having kept pace with the advance of our knowledge and the increasing clearness of our views. Neither of the books in question disputes the bases of scientific etymology, or systematically ignores (though both sometimes neglect) phonetic laws. The authors would, I believe, on reflection, recognize the justness of most of my criticisms. But the errors of Mr. Paley arise—as it appears to me—from fundamentally wrong conceptions and an essentially vicious method; and whilst revision, without change of principles, would suffice to make the other books excellent in their kind, it is only after a radical excision or a complete renovation of its etymological parts that his work could safely be recommended to students.*

* As I have freely criticized the Homeric words" in *Hermathena*, No. 1. works of English scholars, I ought I take this opportunity of mentioning perhaps to add that I am compelled to that the view of the word *ἀλφειή* dissent from several of the etymologies advocated in that Essay was first in Mr. Davies' learned and ingenious proposed by K. F. Hermann. See Essay "on the meanings of certain Curtius, *Grundzüge*, No. 398.

JOHN KELS INGRAM.

THE PHILEBUS OF PLATO AND RECENT ENGLISH CRITICS.

THE Philebus of Plato has within a few years received a detailed examination at the hands of Badham, Poste, Grote, and Jowett. These critiques, however divergent in their several details, seem to me to agree in an incapacity to keep before them the Platonic point of view, while they exhibit a strong tendency, sometimes approaching perversity, to exaggerate into irreconcilable antagonisms the mere variations of language admissible in all writings save Acts of Parliament. Pope said that the censors of Homer triumph only over their own awkwardness. The same may be said, perhaps, of recent critics of the Philebus.

The value of every philosophic writing may be estimated by two different standards—its truth and its consistency. The first is the actual value of the conclusion at which it has arrived. The second is the logical exactness of the premisses which lead to that conclusion. It is obvious that the positive value of the conclusion may be totally independent of the premisses on which it depends. Truth may come out of falsehood, not because it is falsehood, but because it contains truth in combination with falsehood, and it is likewise obvious that as we may argue from premiss to conclusion, so we may argue back from conclusion to premiss. At all events, the author's own statement of his own conclusion must throw some light on what he wishes to prove. These considerations will justify us in the beginning with the conclusion of the Philebus.

The study of Metaphysics can scarcely be made amusing, and there seems no great reason why it should, but there seems good reason why it should not. Lawyers and Mathematicians address experts only, and do not care for the opinion of the general public. But the student of law or of mathematics has gained in consequence one sure and certain advantage—he has not to fear the deluge of words or the pyrotechnic metaphors which appear necessary to attract the general reader,

Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque
Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt;
Veraque constituunt, quæ belle tangere possunt
Aures et lepido quæ sunt fucata sonore.

Somewhat unhappily in this case the construction of the conclusion depends in part on a question of Greek, and it must be confessed that the first and most important sentence of the conclusion is fairly open to doubt as to construction. I annex the Greek with a literal translation, which I shall then endeavour to justify. At present I deal with the two first paragraphs only:—*Ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν. Π. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων. Σ. Δεύτερον μὲν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἰκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς ἐστίν. Π. Ἐοικε γοῦν. Σ. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεῖς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις. Π. Ἴσως. Σ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἀ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἡδονῆς ξυγγενή. Π. Τάχ' ἂν. Σ. Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὀρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμας, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν, ἐπομένας. Phil. 66. a—c.*

This passage I translate as follows, without regard to elegance, the words in italics being inserted to make the construction plain:—"You will tell on all hands that

Pleasure is not the first possession, nor even the second, but that the first *possession* in a manner has to do with Regulation and with that which is submitted to Regulation, and has *thereby* become suitable to something, and *has to do with* all things of such a kind as that we must from their very nature suppose them to have taken to themselves the eternal principle of being.

The second *possession* has to do with those things whose elements are brought into mutual correlation and *thereby* evoke a sense of the Beautiful, and *has to do with* that which is not an only object *per se* to us but is likewise an adequate object, and every thing which belongs to this order of things." Phil. 66 a b.

Nearly every word in this passage requires comment. *πρῶτον μὲν πη* surely required to have *κτῆμα* understood as its noun, as *δεύτερον* obviously has in the next clause. Besides the case all through the dialogue is Intelligence *versus* Pleasure, and, in order to settle the point, *Petenda* are classed in the order of ethical merit—a merit founded on metaphysical considerations. *πη* means to a certain extent—*sub modo*—in reference to the common Platonic doctrine that we see realities only in part: Rep. 205 a, 517 b—c. Tim. 28 c, Phaedo, 67 c—68 b.

Then again, *περί τι* is in the sense of object-matter—*id circa quod*—of knowledge or of influence, and therefore in the Platonic sense of apprehension of Reality, and so justifies *κτῆμα*. *Περὶ* occurs in this sense in the Philebus in the following passages, which will perhaps suffice to prove its use, 29 a, c, 32 c, 33 c, 35 e, 36 b, e, 57 c, 58 a, 59 a *quater*, b *ter*, c *bis*, d *bis*, 66 c, and perhaps elsewhere.

But the fight has raged most fiercely over *ῥῆσθαι*, as may be seen from the following: Dr. Badham will not have it at any price and conjectures *εὐρῆσθαι*; in this he was joined by Prof. W. H. Thompson of Cambridge, who, however, in his edition of the Phaedrus, p. 71, takes *ῥῆσθαι* in the passive sense *captam esse*, i.e. *τὴν αἰδίου φύσιν* is *hunted down*, a sense justified by Ag. 1209, and

other passages. Mr. Poste in his edition, *p.* 135, translates, "Whatever similar attributes the eternal essence must be deemed to combine," while, in his translation, he makes it "Whatever things are like to these and inhabit the eternal sphere." *p.* 88. Mr. Jowett: "Whatever similar attributes the eternal nature may be deemed to have attained," *Plato* 3, *p.* 219. And Mr. Grote paraphrases thus: "With every thing else analogous, which we can believe to be of eternal nature," *Plato* 2, *p.* 617. The true construction can only be settled by a consideration of some Platonic doctrine. To Mr. Poste and Mr. Jowett it must be conceded that Plato is fond of placing the object of the verb first; this would certainly favour making τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν the subject, but the following considerations will lead to the absolute rejection of that construction here.*

* Since writing the above I have procured Mr. Paley's translation of the *Philebus*. He has done good service by combating the critical objections of his predecessors. Ne spectaculo quidem proclii invidit. But his translation of the crucial passage, 66 a-c, seems to me doubly wrong: first, as it makes τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν the subject, and second, as it takes ὅποσα τοιαῦτα differently in two adjacent sentences built on the same model:—πρῶτον μὲν περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν. Δεύτερον μὲν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἰκανόν καὶ πᾶνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς ἐστίν. With regard to the order of the words, πᾶνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα occur in this order, *Phileb.* 54, b., 19, c., 42, d., and the full construction is πᾶνθ' ὅποσα ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ἃ κ. τ. λ., as in περὶ τὰ ξυμβολαῖα πᾶνθ' ὅποσα κῆται νόμιμα, *παραλαβοῦσα*, *Polit.* 305, b.; and see on the omission of the copula, Prof.

Campbell's note on *Polit.* 281, c. *p.* 92. As to the position of χρὴ with the infinitive, any one who cares to investigate the matter, will see that Plato places χρὴ both before and after the infinitive, apparently guided merely by sound. The passage therefore is really equivalent to ὅποσα τοιαῦτα τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆται φύσιν, and may therefore be rendered, *all such things as have taken on themselves the eternal Nature, i.e., are such, because they taken on themselves, the eternal Nature.* Mr. Paley's version is:—"that the first is surely that connected with measure and the moderate, with right time and place, and with all those qualities and conditions which we must suppose that, as being of the like kind, the eternal Nature has chosen for its own.... The second, then, is that which has symmetry, beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all the qualities which belong to this other class." And in his note, Mr. Paley adds, "with Stallbaum it seems that we must take τοιαῦτα for ὡς τοιαῦτα ὄντα." This,

In order to prove that τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν is the subject of ἡρῆσθαι, it is necessary to show that τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν is identical with τὸ ἐν and with τὸ ἀγαθόν. The term itself appears to have been used by Democritus to denote the infinity of atoms μικρὰς οὐσίας πλῆθος ἀπείρους Aristot. Gr. 202, p. 1514, 8, vol. 5, *Berlin ed.* From this it would be naturally applied to the constant element in things. Now the lectures of Plato περὶ τὰγαθοῦ were reported by Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and other pupils, and it is impossible to suppose that Aristotle could, under these circumstances, have misreported the views of his master. In that treatise and elsewhere in well-known passages Aristotle stated conformally with the Platonic dialogues that τὸ ἐν and ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς were the factors of all things what-so-ever. In the Metaphysics A. 6, he states that τὸ ἐν is to Ideas as Ideas are to Sensible things, and he also states that τὸ ἐν is related to τὸ ἀγαθόν as Form is to Matter. But as Form and Matter are metaphysical and not ethical distinctions, and as the purpose of the Philebus is to enquire what is the ethical object of man, Phil. 11 b, 19 c, it is plain that in that dialogue metaphysics are subordinated to ethics. If, then, Plato held that in ethical as well as in intellectual philosophy there was a permanent, as opposed to a transient object, and if that dialogue attempts to establish the difference between the two, it likewise follows that Plato would naturally describe the higher object as permanent

and the construction given above, comes to that of Trendelenburg, "quidquid ejusmodi æternam naturam suscepisse credendum est." πῆ appears to be treated with contempt by all the English translators. It surely cannot be "surely," as in Mr. Paley. Mr. Paley's misconception is the more remarkable, as in his note on 65, a. p. 113, he seems to have seen the truth in part. "Good or The Good, being an abstract principle, an ἰδέα that cannot be brought

under mortal ken, Socrates proposes a practical rule for knowing what is really good. Let the combination of things that compose it, he says, be regulated by truth, beauty, etc., which taken together form οἶον ἓν, a sort One for a rule, and the result will be a genuine ἀγαθόν." This is vitiated by regarding the Platonic ἰδέα, as abstract; concrete is opposed to abstract, ἰδέα to τῶν πραγμάτων. It is a cross division.

as opposed to the lower object as transient. This is the first step in the argument, and it shows the propriety of applying *τὴν αἰδίου φύσιν* to the higher ethical object. And this may be fully confirmed by the dialogues themselves.

But here an objection meets us at the outset: How far had Plato a consistent theory of Ideas—consistent in itself and waiving all difficulties which logic might educe. Mr. Grote, *Plato* 1, 215, n. f. 3, 474-5, holds that Aristotle himself bears testimony to Plato's transition from the doctrine of Ideas to that of Ideal Numbers, and in support of his view cites *Metaph.* m 1078, v. 9, 1080, and 12, A 987, b 20. The first passage is *πρῶτον αὐτὴν τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν δοξάν ἐπισκεπτόν μὴθὲν συνάπτουσιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς ὑπέλαβον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας φησάντες εἶναι.* p. 266, Tauchnitz. But surely in the first passage *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* means, as elsewhere, *from the beginning* of the theory, *primum* and not *primo*. Plato's successors, it is true, Speusippus in particular, manifested Pythagorean proclivities, but the only passage where Aristotle alleges a discrepancy between Plato's dialogues and his lectures deals with another point, the relation of the Idea to sensible things. Syrianus, too, in his *Commentary* 891, 6, on *M* 1078, b 9, points out that Aristotle alludes to the original speciality of the *εἶδη*, that they were *χωριστὰ*, and denies any difference between the Number and the Idea. The other two passages have no bearing on the point whatsoever. In a word, in regard to sensibles, *εἶδη* are *ἰδέαι* or Forms; in their moments they are Numbers.

In the *Philebus* Plato points out the four constituents of things. First, comes *τὸ πέρας*, the Principle of Determination and Relation, 25 a, b. Second, comes *τὸ ἄπειρον*, or that which is undetermined and out of relation, but is capable of receiving determination and relation. Third, comes the actual set of things produced by the Union of the two elements, and to any thinker who makes thought the sole or primary existence, it is obvious that Union or

Combination is as much a *sinē qua non* as the things in union or in combination. Plato, for example, would say that water was not oxygen and hydrogen only, but was oxygen and hydrogen in the combination imposed by τὸ πέρas. In modern science, Plato's analysis appears as the very first of Carus' *Notions Préliminaires, Anatomie Comparée*, Jourdan's *Translation*, vol. 3. p. 12: "Toute naissance, toute génération est, quant à son essence, la production d'une chose déterminée par une chose indéterminée mais déterminable," and p. 23 *ib.* he analyses every organism into 1. Unité (loi idéé) i.e. τὸ πέρas, and into 2 Pluralité (réalité) i.e. τὸ ἀπειρον in union with τὸ πέρas, for as Plato says τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἀπειρον πολλά ἐστι, Phil. 24 a. Over and above all these we have the fourth element the Cause. This cause—i.e. the efficient cause—he declares to be akin, γενούσσης to mind or intelligence. It is in fact the Νοῦς of Anaxagoras fr. 6, turned into the Efficient Cause of Aristotle, and thereby supplying the difficulty of which Socrates complains in the *Phaedo* 97—98.

The statement of the *Philebus* that all things are composed of τὸ πέρas and τὸ ἀπειρον is borne out fully by the *Parmenides* 158 d, where the special point under argument is what is the effect of the existence of τὸ ἐν on τὰ ἄλλα. The authenticity of the *Parmenides* has been denied by eminent modern Platonists, but this is a case of the fallacy of objections, and the question is, Is a masterpiece more likely to come from a known or an unknown genius, the latter too numbering amongst his accomplishments, that of consummate skill in forgery without any object to himself and nulla posteritatis cura, especially when the existence of the Academy under Plato's nephew Speusippus, and then Xenocrates γνησιώτατος τῶν μαθητῶν, would ensure a rigid scrutiny into the genuineness of the greatest monument of dialectic.

The *Parmenides* thus agrees with the *Philebus* in making τὸ πέρas and τὸ ἀπειρον the constituents of all

things. The Efficient Cause of the Philebus is identified with the Good in the Republic 6 and 7. Aristotle, *Metaph.* N 4, says that certain persons (i.e. Plato) identified the One and the Good, making the One ἡ οὐσία, and ἡ οὐσία is the word he applies in *Metaph.* A 987, b 20, to the formal factor of the Idea. Again Aristotle, *Metaph.* N 1091, b 13, states that the essential notion of τὸ ἐν is μέτρον, and as Plato expressly defines τὸ πέρας as every relation of μέτρον, Phil. 25 a b, we may conclude that τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν is the Good and the One so far as the notion is required in an ethical discussion without dwelling on either of its constituents—either its formal or material elements. Τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν would thus represent that which, to use Butler's language, is an object to the heart and a subject to the understanding. If then we recollect in the Pythagorean συστοιχία that τὸ πέρας is good and τὸ ἄπειρον evil, and that the lower elements are in Plato represented as receiving the higher, we may translate ἡρῆσθαι τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν to have incorporated the eternal principle of the One and the Good. Thus we have θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἐλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, Phil. 20 d. The kindred word δέχεσθαι in the sense of admitting a quality or predicate occurs Phil. 24 e, 25 a bis c, 27 e, 32 d, and the application of such verbs to the higher elements, as ἐπεῖναι ἐπισφραγίζεσθαι ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἐπινέμεσθαι and such like is frequent. That Plato in the Philebus identifies τὸ πέρας with τὸ ἐν is plain; καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν οὔτε ἐδυσκοαίνομεν ὥς οὐκ ἦν ἐν φύσει, Phil. 26 d. So likewise τὸ ἄπειρον is a kind of Multiety τρόπὸν τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλὰ ἐστι 24 a, and lastly φύσις, as applied to the permanent factor, is in accordance with his usage of that word to denote the manifestation of the Idea, rather than the Idea itself. I am most happy to observe that this view of φύσις has been also arrived at by Prof. Teichmüller, of Dorpat, in his essay Geschichte des Begriff der Parusie, and this result has no reference to the disputed point in the Philebus.

This being so, the logical filiation of the other terms in the passage is not far to seek. First comes μέτρον, then that which receives it and thereby possesses suitability τὸ καίριον in general. In the next category we have τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν the mutual correlation of parts, and as a consequence τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἰκανὸν—the being an end, and an adequate end, to other things. Plato himself gives the explanation of τὸ σύμμετρον, ὅποση παύει πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται, Phil. 25 e.

The three other categories of the conclusion need not detain us long. The third category in the Hierarchy of Good is the Mind, and Moral Intelligence, at once objective in the sense of really existing and of being its own object, and subjective in the sense of evolving its own microcosm—a microcosm essentially uniform with the macrocosm of which it is part, the similarity of the two being held by thinkers so remote in time and approaching the subject by such different paths as Plato and Shadworth Hodgson. Fourthly, we have Science and Scientific Art less objective than the Mind from which they emanate, but more so than the fifth category Pleasures not evoked by the process of repletion nor followed by pain.

I have given substantially the same view of the passage in an essay published in 1866, of which one devoted friend has assured he read one half; “in the Philebus the hierarchy of Good is delineated as follows:—*First*, all things which deal immediately with the Limit, and in this way participate in the absolute and superessential Good; that is to say, in the order of objectivity, the Idea relatively to its elements stands next to The Good, of which our notion is negative. *Second*, the Beautiful, the Symmetrical, the Complete, the Adequate; that is to say, The Idea considered as the result of combination is logically consequent to The Idea considered relatively to its elements. *Third*, the intuitive faculty and Prudence; that

is to say, the psychic principle, as saturated with self-cognition, is at once subject and object, and accordingly logically consequent to The Idea, which is wholly an object. *Fourth*, speculative and practical branches of knowledge, and professional skill, not consciously grounded on scientific principles; that is to say, these branches contain a purely subjective, as well as a noetic element, and are therefore logically consequent to both the psychic principle—the subject-object—and to The Idea. *Fifth and last*, pure pleasures; that is to say, the law of antecedence and consequence, so far as it does not obstruct noetic efficiency. If the preceding view be sound, the meaning of the passage is clear. The one Extreme is the most objective of objects—The Idea in immediate relation to the superessential, and as yet unknown, Absolute. The other Extreme is the most subjective of objects which can be called Good—sensuous pleasure which does not interfere with noetic efficiency. The Indifference of the two Extremes is the psychic principle, which, being self-cognitive, is both subject and object, and which as noetic power confronts the Idea, and as emotive susceptibility is in contact with pleasure. The second grade of the hierarchy is The Idea, regarded as the result of its elements, and in relation to the subject. And the fourth grade contains a noetic element which has an affinity to the noetic faculty, and an empirical element which savours of the Indefinite."

Before proceeding to the criticism of detailed passages, there is one remark to be made on the metaphysics of the dialogue. Plato profoundly regards Quantity as the result of Quality, and not Quality as the result of Quantity, *Phil.* 24 c. This is the true position of idealism. Thus we may see why the perfect Circle and the perfect Sphere belongs to the divine region, *Phil.* 62 a, for they are the active thought of mind which therefore cannot be stereotyped in a visible or tangible symbol. *Epist.* 7, 343 a. Even a progressive picture can only be represented by taking

certain fixed points along the line, i.e., by destroying its progressiveness. Had Plato's Ideas been regarded as what they are, the objective qualities and powers of a mental essence, and not as phantom nebulae floating in space, we should have been spared much absurdity. But first, Aristotle makes his τὸ ὑποκείμενον gross matter, and gross matter displays extension, and extension must have space. And when we have once got to this we have only to choose between the common Common Sense of Reid and the uncommon Common Sense of Hamilton and Mansel. But Aristotle has not merely materialised language, he has for ever materialised thought. Even professed metaphysicians for the most part seem to hold that sensible things are made out of some mysterious material, in the same way as loaves are made out of dough.

If we regard Quantity or Extension as the result of Quality or Intensity of force, we at once get rid of the jingling conundrums about Finite and Infinite which pass current for Philosophy, and lay down in confidence the following distinctions which rest on Psychological experience.

Visible extension is always coloured extension, and no visible extension is without colour, for black is *qua* sensation as much a colour as red. Black may be opposed in optics to all other colours, but this is considering it and the others in its antecedents and not in itself. All coloured extension is finite, and no accumulation of coloured patches can make it otherwise. Tangible or muscular extension is likewise finite, and no building up of blocks can make it otherwise. The only thing apparently infinite in either is that we can keep on adding as long as there is anything to add, and we get tired if the quantity is large and the process monotonous. Extension, whether visible or tangible, is no more infinite than it would be infinity for an individual to lay out the fortune of the Rothschilds, halfpenny after halfpenny, in halfpenny stamps. But that which is occupied by tangible

extension τὸ κενόν—inane—is certainly infinite, for there is nothing *dehors* to limit it—

“Angels might tire their wings and find no stop,”

for there is no stop to find. This, which is a common topic in Greek Philosophy, would scarcely require repeating were it not that Mr. Herbert Spencer gravely revives, in opposition to Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, Hamilton’s argument, that we cannot conceive Infinite Space. Of course we cannot paint it on a board, and therefore cannot picture it in our imagination, but reason tells us that what can have no limit is unlimited. Mr. Mill’s supposition that we might be transported to the end of space, and be apprised of what happened by some impression of a kind utterly unknown to us now, cannot be entertained for a moment. If the new impression be heterogenous to space, we have examples at present of heterogenous things occupying the same space at the same moment. Thus a room may be filled with smoke, heat, smell, colour, and sound, at one and the same instant. Even when we say no two things can be in the same space at the same time, we are talking of extended bodies only, and then the general principle comes in, no one part can be another part.

And so of the Universe. The Universe, since it is the whole, can have nothing outside it. It is therefore infinite. But it is also certainly absolute, for it exists, and being the whole can depend on nothing else. This was clear as light to Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno. In a word, the jingle of finite and infinite may be put an end to, if we recollect that there can be no contradiction, unless the quality contrasted be exactly similar. But finiteness is only in colour an accident of some particular colour depending on the intrusion of another piece of colour, and extension is limited to the touch by the accidental want of material; while infinity is of the essence of space, for we cannot think of space without construing it as infinite. On the other hand, since extended solidity, as a matter of

fact, is actually, though *per accidens*, presented to us as finite, Hamilton Unconditioned is not only bad Logic but a contradiction. Extension visible or tangible both is actually finite and is imagined as finite, πεπερασμένον, and therefore cannot be ἄπειρον. As to the infinitely little—the ever-decreasing *minus*—we may say with confidence, that there can be no division where there is nothing to divide; and Carnot describes quantites infiniment petites as seulement des quantites aux quelles les conditions de la question proposée permettent de demeurer variables jusque a'ce que le calcul soit entierment achevé. *Metaph. du Calcul*. 1839, pp. 21-22, and in his two definitive propositions he says that these "Ne sont point actuellement nulles, ni actuellement moindres que telles ou telles grandeurs déterminées." Thus, according to a professed mathematician, we see that mathematics do not want the infinitely little, and certainly sound metaphysics repudiate it completely. I have met many who maintained its existence, because of the good results which flowed from the hypothesis, but this, if true, would only be the common case of a fiction containing more truth than the negation of the fiction.

Nor do the molecules and atoms of modern science help the materialist in the difficulty. These provisional figments are either extended or they are not. If they are extended, they require explanation as much as the outer phenomena they are called in to explain. If they are not extended, we have extended things built of unextended things—the great Pyramid piled up out of mathematical points. But the idealist requires none of these flights of fancy: he merely asserts that an effect requires a cause; and this is in fact admitted by the materialist, for otherwise we would not have had the sensational fictions of atoms and molecules. A universe might be constructed of snipe-shot, but not of unextended atoms.

There is nothing therefore in modern science, whether mathematical or physical, to shake the metaphysical

analysis of the *Philebus*. Things are composed of a determining principle acting on what is determinable, and so partaking of causality; and, in support of Plato's view that these effects are not due to the working of chance, we may appeal to Laplace, "Il y a plus 200,000,000,000,000, a parier contre un qu'il ne sont pas l'effet du hasard." *Syst. du Monde*, Lib. v. 6.

The next section will be devoted to the discussion of passages in the *Philebus*.

II.

This section does not admit of systematic treatment, as it deals with the detached statements of recent critics. One general remark may, however, be made at the outset. They, one and all, appear to confound mere difference, *i.e.* different modes of viewing a subject with flat contradiction. France is not England, and neither is Europe, but a description of London does not annihilate any one of the three. Everything, says Butler, is what it is, and not another thing, and yet everybody appears to ignore the axiom at the slightest provocation. The lesson in common logic in the Protagoras that justice is not holiness, but is not therefore unholy, might still be mastered with advantage by critics of Plato.

To begin with the most recent, Prof. Jowett:—In his introduction to the dialogue, *Vol. III.*, he states that the problem of the one and the many has lost to "us" its chief interest and perplexity, *p.* 134, and in the same page that Hegel's antinomies have their origin in the Platonic one and many. But without discussing the point whether Hegel's philosophy is so very easy to "us," as is represented, it so happens that the one and the many furnished occasion for controversy between Mill and Mr. Herbert Spencer, *Logic*, 5th ed. n. 203. Nor can Prof. Jowett's account of the problem be regarded as having cleared it of perplexity:—"We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the continuous is also the divisible,

that in all objects of sense there is a one and a many which may be applied by analogy to purely intellectual conceptions. In acknowledging this we are compelled to admit that two contradictions are true," *ib.* We are compelled to admit no such thing. Take Plato's illustration: A vowel is the contrary or exact opposite of a mute, but it is certainly not its contradictory. To establish contradiction it would be necessary to state that a vowel has sound and no sound at the same time.

(2) With regard to finite and infinite, we are not much assisted by Prof. Jowett. Prof. Mac Ivor has already pointed out that the finite is not opposed to the infinite, one being to the other as part to that which out-comprehends it. *Relig. Progress*, Note A. xiv. It has not been, I think, pointed out that the infinite is not in itself negative; neither is the finite. It is by its own *αὐτάρκεια* that the infinite admits of no limits, and it is by its own positive power that the finite affects us. Nothing can be more absurd than Hamilton's illustration of the eagle: "The eagle cannot outsoar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he is supported. So the mind cannot transcend that sphere of limitation within or through which exclusively the possibility of thought is realised." *Disc.* p. 14. As Prof. Mac Ivor pointed out, the eagle flies, not because the air is limited, but because to him it is unlimited. If he got into a vacuum he could not fly at all, but the vacuum is not the cause of his flying in the plenum. Plato's *τὸ ἄπειρον* is a metaphysical entity, like Mr. Hodgson's Matter, not found out of combination. Every day we lose in precision of language and therefore of thought. The meaning of a metaphysical entity was well known as that which did and could not exist by itself, although real, *e. g.* Matter, Form. But in that language the infinite would be a physical entity and all reality. But the idea of the infinite was in our sense familiar to Plato in the order of (1) parts, *τὰ μέρη*; (2) their aggregate correlation, *τὸ ὅλον*, and (3) their

highest physical objective aspect, τὸ πᾶν, Theaet. 204-5, and the universe—our infinite—is one and many determining and determined, both separately and conjointly. How any process of pure thinking or of material investigation can add anything to this conception of the infinite, not being one of “us,” I find it impossible to conceive. But Plato not only had the notion but elaborated it as follows:—The one exists, *i.e.* the universe exists, and, therefore, its constituents—one and existence, *i.e.* Form and Matter. But as matter in itself is formless, though not void, we require its unification. Suppose we have I. and X, and X has in itself no numerical value, it must, if brought into relation to number, have a numerical index, *i.e.* I. Hence we require 3 distinct symbols to express the relation of the undetermined to the one, *i.e.* I., X, and index. Hence the Pythagorean formula that 3 is the symbol of the Definite, and 2 of the Indefinite, since I. and X by themselves are not in relation. Plato would have added to Mr. Shadworth Hodgson’s Space, Time, and Feeling, the fourth element, their relation.

(3) Professor Jowett, p. 136, says that “to us there is a strongly marked distinction between a first cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work.” But surely any one who believes that God made the world—whatever sense he attached to “made”—must believe that it is made for some purpose, which purpose must be outside the thing made; and the purpose or reason of making the world must finally rest in some intelligence. Suppose Robinson Crusoe contrived an ingenious piece of mechanism for his own amusement, the amusement is certainly outside the toy. As Plato therefore makes the Good the Matter of God, the demiurgic process must have been motivated by good, informed by intelligence, *i.e.*, in ancient language, the One. For intelligence is that which *a parte intellectus* apprehends that which is its object *a parte rei*, Unity.

(4) Prof. Jowett excepts to Plato's view of pleasure that it is of the nature of the indefinite, and adds that to the modern philosopher the indefinite is equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are of all things the most indefinite, and yet they are admitted by Plato into his list of goods. p. 137. This is to criticise Plato by using words in the modern sense. It would be not less absurd to argue that the phrase, "I've no idea!" disproves idealism. The indefinite is real, for it is an element in *rerum natura*, *i.e.*, a metaphysical reality existing in combination only. Surely the elements detected by the spectroscope would be equally real if discriminated only by that instrument. But as pleasure, health, mental qualities, admit of the predicates More or Less, from zero to acme and from acme to zero, the quantified or determinable material must be *per se* undetermined, *i.e.*, be Plato's *τὸ ἀπείρον*.

(5) Prof. Jowett considers that the distinction between the Heraclitean transience and the Parmenidean permanence is to "us" unmeaning, and belonging to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. If so, the passing away must have been very recent, as not to speak of Berkeley, it has been maintained by Dean Mansel, and admitted to all intents and purposes by Mr. J. S. Mill. Dean Mansel upholds an intuition of the ego, and Mr. Mill's admission that our notice of the ego postulates the veracity of memory, is urged with powerful effect by Dr. Ward in the Dublin Review. May not the truth be that the mind discovers its own permanent reality amid the changes of the past, and if the ego the microcosm be permanent, why not the ego maximus the macrocosm?

Prof. Jowett's other objections will be considered under other heads.

Mr. Grote is no mere Zoilus. His history, even in narrative, is the most impressive work of the present century, and is a brilliant exception to the hero-worship of the recent school. Writers on classics and antiquity in

former days were on the side of free institutions, but within a few years we have had historians like Merivale Mommsen and Ewald grovelling before despotism. No admirer of Greek development can read without emotion the last sentence in Mr. Grote's Plato, wherein he expresses his satisfaction that Plato and Xenophon both "died, as they were born, citizens of free Athens and of unconquered Hellas." Had Mr. Grote's Aristotle been completed, we should have had the most valuable contribution to the history of Philosophy in any language. Here he is at home, and his sympathy with Aristotle, perhaps in accordance with Coleridge's dictum, disqualifies him from appreciating Plato. Waiving, however, occasional perversity, every Platonist must feel under obligation to Mr. Grote for setting out the opposite case in the strongest form. And out of his objections the Platonic result is often obtained in the purest form.

There is one distinction in the Philebus which has met with the condemnation of Grote, Baine, Jowett, Poste and Paley—the division of pleasures into true and false. I have carefully considered the objections, but see no reason to alter what I have written in 1870. I extract the passage with a few verbal alterations; the sense is as before:—

"Reserving the question of propriety of language, Plato's explanation of the offensive terms is clear, and, I believe, justifiable; and it is somewhat odd that he carefully provides against the very objection, which is urged against him. As follows: an empirical judgment, *δόξα*, is true or false according as it is verified or falsified by further experience. Thus I see what I believe to be a man under a tree: I approach nearer and find it to be a wooden figure. My judgment, *δόξα*, is accordingly false. *Phil.* 38, c.d. Falsity, accordingly, exists only in the reference to future experience. But the subjective impression, whether ultimately verified or falsified by further experience, is never in itself false, *οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἂν τε ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς δοξάσῃ, τὸ γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτε*

ἀπόλλυσιν, 37 a. b. In the same way, the pleasure, as actually experienced, cannot be false, but may attract that predicate, when examined by the light of further experience, οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἂν τε ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ἥδηται, τό γε ὄντως ἡδεσθαι δῆλον ὥς οὐδέποτε ἀπολεῖ, 37, b., cf. 37, e.; 38, a. In other words, Pleasure, as a subject, admits of the predicate, true or false, according as it is followed by good or evil effects, 39, e. Pleasure and Pain may be also termed true or false in relation to the Law of Contrast, and the effects of the latter on the vividness of our feelings.

As to the appropriateness of the terms: Plato's Ethics are rational and not sentimental; it is, therefore, not inappropriate to apply such terms to Pleasure and Pain, and thus force us to see that the Reason or Intellect is the ultimate judge of human feeling and conduct. If Plato had used the terms *repented* and *unrepented*, no modern would have excepted, but his terminology in that case would be sentimental and not rational. I do not press his argument, that Pleasure and Pain are ποιῶτιν, that is, as subjects admit of predicates of quality. To discuss this fully belongs to the Metaphysics of Logic. But it fully answers Mr. Poste's objection that 'Pleasure can never be an imaginary predicate, but always an immediate sensation.' *Philebus*, p. 179." *Essays on the Platonic Ethics*, p. 109—10.

Mr. Poste adds "We can speak of τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν or τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, but no one, unless led to use such expressions in defence of a thesis, would speak of τὸ φαινόμενον ἡδύ. If so, in spite of the arguments of Socrates in this dialogue, Pleasures are not susceptible of distinction as true and false, real and imaginary." *Phil.* p. 179.

In reply, I ask why, usage apart, cannot we speak of τὸ φαινόμενον ἡδύ? If τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν be that which on the moment of impression presents characteristics from which we call the object ἀγαθόν, and afterwards that

predicate is at variance with experience, why can we not, *mutatis mutandis*, apply the same process to τὸ ἥδὺ? What rule in Logic prevents the predicate of one proposition becoming in turn the subject of another? Unless heterogenous predicates be applicable to pleasures, ethic is impossible. You cannot argue with an opium eater by denying that he feels pleasure. But Ancient philosophy, even more than Ancient poetry, is pre-eminently objective, and ἀληθής and ἀλήθεια are like *verus* used objectively, as in οὐ καταλαμβάνει ἡ ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ δν, *Rep.* 508 d. ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. *Gorg.* 472 B.

(2) Mr. Grote, *vol.* 2, p. 593, Prof. Jowett and others, object to Plato's antithesis of pleasure and intelligence. In order to contrast the two conditions, Plato isolates pleasure from intelligence and intelligence from pleasure. With intelligence alone we would lead a dreary life, but still it would be a life. With pleasure alone, *i.e.*, repletion of vacuity, our life is that of a star-jelly. Laying the next world quite out of count, most men would prefer execution to a respite on account of idiotcy. As a matter of fact we may concede to Mr. Grote and Prof. Jowett that we cannot completely isolate the two phenomena, for the most sensual pleasure requires a thread of connecting consciousness. But though we cannot apply the method of difference, we can apply that of Concomitant Variations. Thus in the Republic, Plato contrasts the most extreme case of successful hypocrisy with one of unsuccessful merit. To test any argument, an extreme case is the proof-charge. It is the method of all biography and of all apologue and fable—of all instructive fiction. All effective writing must have something of the caricature.

Mr. Grote, *vol.* 3, p. 475, n., accepts Zeller's objection that Plato's *Summum Bonum* is a mixture of ethical and metaphysical apprehension. True, and admitted by Plato himself: Good was the Matter and One the Form of the highest ens. *Aristot. Metaph.* N. 1091, b. 13. But that it, the *summum bonum*, is, in our language, complex is Plato's

glory—that it satisfies the reason as ultimate and un-commenced Unity, while it supplies the susceptibility with emotional and inexhaustible pabulum. And here a word—Platonic critics are fond of talking of abstractions. Jowett, vol. 2, p. 141. This is to use the language and thought of Aristotle, and not of Plato. With us saturated with Aristoteleanism, the abstract notion possesses the least quantum of reality; it is the minutest chipping from the solid block. With Aristotle we are at the base of a cone, narrowing as it stretches; with Plato, we are at the point, and each section grows in breadth and reality the further it is from us. Till this difference be not merely speculatively but practically grasped, the reading Plato is utter waste of time. And which is the truer aspect? Looking from the base to a vanishing point, or from a point to an infinitely widening base? The latter most unquestionably, even if we appeal to the physical science of the present day. Nature and her laws are the ever widening *τὸ ἄπειρον* reduced to *τὸ μέτριον*. In a word, the problem for Plato was the converse of that for Kant. With Kant, commencing with the subject, the question is—How is synthesis possible? With Plato, commencing with the object, the question is—How is analysis possible? How is it that the one diverges into many? And he profoundly answers, through the body. Rep. 476, a. It is in consequence of the bodily organism that we localise and thereby pluralise the volume of force *τὸ ἄπειρον*, which the non-ego floods upon us. Phil. 52, c. Plato, in the Euthydemus, the Republic and the Philebus, reprobates the folly of opposing one sensible or concrete fraction to another. Experience tells us they are both compatible—black coexists side by side with white. All inner observation—all introspection—tells us that, though we are in space, we are not of space, whether we hold with Kant that we project that Form, or with Plato and Berkeley that it is a spurious generalisation from our bodily states. And if this be true of us, why not a fortiori of the ego maximus and the *ἰδεαί*?

Nothing can illustrate more strongly Mr. Grote's desire to reduce the various dialogues to contradiction than his setting the metrical good of the *Philebus* in contradiction to the passionate *ἔρως* of the *Phaedrus* and the Banquet. How are they incompatible? Does not the complex though not the compound* soul of man—reason glowing with passion—passion illumined by reason—distinct with multitude of eyes, take in both aspects of objective reality?

Mr. Grote and Prof. Bain object to Plato's account of intellectual pleasures as pure as opposed to the bodily appetites, the first phase of which is pain. But pure is *καθαρά*, i.e. free from pain, and in this sense Plato has every right to use the term. To these objections I have replied before as follows:—"Intellectual pleasure, according to Plato, is not preceded by any Want; the particular instance, Mathematics, is questioned by Mr. Grote, and the general principle by Mr. Bain, at least as far as scientific studies are concerned."

Mr. Grote, criticising Aristotle, who agrees with Plato, observes that 'if he had examined the lives of Mathematicians, especially that of Kepler, he would hardly have imagined that Mathematical investigations have no pains attached to them,' Vol. II. p. 607, *Note x*. Mr. Grote immediately gives as Aristotle's probable meaning, the very explanation, which Plato gives explicitly on the point: 'He probably means,' says Mr. Grote, 'that they are not preceded by painful appetites such as hunger and thirst.' *ib.* But, Plato in asserting that intellectual pleasure is not preceded by pain, declares that he is speaking of these pleasures in their natural development, stripped of all intellectual associations, *Phil.* 52, b. ;* and he expressly

* ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν, 52, B. The formula of appetite is a desire of the means of relief for the sake of relief, because of the presence of the special evil, *Lys.* 218,

E.; that is, without the pain of hunger there can be no pleasure in food; but there is no precedent want which impels a child to learn, as a precedent want impels it to food.

recognises some of the annoyances incidental to the study.
ib. a. b.

Professor Bain, besides adopting Mr. Grote's objection, brings a new one of his own. 'The highest charms of knowledge are a reaction from the pains of ignorance.' *Macmillan*, Vol. XII., p. 468. But Plato would reply as before. He is talking of natural development, and not of intellectual associations. We may feel humiliated by coming in contact with a better informed man; but the pain of humiliation is not a pain of ignorance. Where such a pain is evoked, it arises either from envy or from shame. Envy may be caused by any superiority at all in size, strength, beauty, dress, rank, wealth; and when we do feel ashamed of ignorance, it is because either our pretensions have been exposed, or because we feel that we have wasted the opportunities of acquiring the knowledge, which reminds us of our deficiency. On the contrary, accidental associations apart, the better any intellectual object is known the better it is liked. A man of taste may hate the *Aeneid*, because he was forced to learn it as a task, or because he has been compelled to teach it. But, compulsion apart, are not Music and Poetry better liked just in proportion as they are better known? If so, it is an Experiment by way of Variation in favour of Plato's views. Complete knowledge must exclude all antecedent want. If I know a favourite piece of poetry by heart, I cannot surely *want* to know it, and yet I can receive the highest pleasure from either reading or hearing it. It is surely far fetched to say, that the pleasure a mature man derives from something he learns when a child is a "reaction from the pains of ignorance." The same facts justify Aristotle in assigning the pleasures of knowledge to more perfect beings.

The distinction, then, between Mixed and Unmixed Pleasures is founded on fact, and as the former merely cancel a want, while the latter are a direct source of

positive pleasure, Psychology is on the side of Plato's Ethics.

I have been accused by Mr. Sidgwick, of Cambridge, of defending Plato by reading into him modern thought. The Protagoras fully bore me out in the point I took. But is the method wrong? If Plato's view, say, of corporeal solidity, is really chemical, viz., that the elements combine in certain numerical proportions only, does not Plato's chemistry with its four elements occupy in metaphysics the same position as the modern with its seventy elements? Besides, as Mr. Sidgwick acknowledges, Mr. Grote tries to condemn Plato "by the standard of the latest empiricism," *Acad.* p. 441, that is, to criticise Hannibal as if the Romans had rifled cannon, as they certainly would have had, if the peace-at-any-price party in Carthage had had such material for sale. The reply is obvious. The General who could handle troops well with sword and pike, would handle them still better with bayonets, cannon and railroads. But Plato does not require anything more than that he should be understood—a possibility at present extremely remote.

III.

Mr. Paley has fully answered most of Dr. Badham's critical objections, and I cheerfully recognise the maxim, "prior tempore potior jure." I notice mainly some omissions:—

14, c. Dr. Badham, p. 8, objects to μέλη τε καὶ ἄμα μέρη. In addition to *Legg.* 794 d, 795 e, the two words are found in *Tim.* 76 e. The words are not equivalent, μέλος is the physical division, e.g. leg and foot; μέρος is the logical division by διχοτομία. This is proved by *Polit.* 287 c, κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἶον ἱερεῖον διαιρώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν. Xenocrates, ap. *Simplic.* 427 a 17, mentions μέρη καὶ ἰδεαί as the ultima of Platonic division. The divisions of the Academy are ridiculed by

Epicrates, Ath. 2, 59, c; the Sicilian dictator appears to have been a most decided positivist.

15, *a.* *περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλή σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίνεται.* Sic. MSS. The sense is good; The Monads, when earnestly considered, give rise to controversy, as soon as we pluralise them in things sensible, *e.g.* little difficulty is felt about Ideal Beauty until we think of the *quomodo* of its distribution in this world.

15, *B.* *πρῶτον μὲν.* These are three questions here, as Stalbaum and Paley see:

1. Do the identical Monads exist?
2. If so, does identity continue *ἐν μεθέξει*?
3. If so, how?

17, *a.* *θᾶπτον καὶ βραδύτερον.* MSS. are right. Men generalise too hastily, and then finding their generalisations unsound, refuse to recognise any unity at all, *i.e.*, become *μισολόγοι*, Phaed. 89 c.

29, *e.* *οὐδεν τῶν αὐτῶν* may mean 'The two cases are quite unlike' *ὁ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*

35, *d.* *ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ* *admits*, Badh., it surely is *gains this point* *evincit*, metaphor from pursuit.

38, *d.* *προσεῖποι* 'would say in addition when a substitution is required,' Badham, p. 48. But every addition either confirms or corrects the previous statement, *e.g.* *ἀλλὰ mais = magis, but*, cf. Chaucer C.T. Prol. 839, 'but forward,' *i.e.*, in addition to agreement; critics not seeing this read *by*.

39, *b.* Mr. Grote says "it is odd that Pl. puts the painter *after* the scribe." Not at all. The scribe is the empirical faculty, *δοξαστική*, whereas the painter is *εἰκαστική*, fancy, conception. The scribe writes *λόγοι*, the painter paints *εἰκόνες*, perception preceding conception.

40, *a.* *αὐτόν.* Badham reads *αὐτόν*, which he says is indispensable; but *αὐτὸς* may stand for *αὐτός*, when it refers to the subject.

53, *e.* *τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρῳ* is a formula for relation, as in

the well-known δ τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. The ancients used the concrete case for the abstract expression, and were thus saved from what M. Taine calls abstractions pedantiques. To the Idealist relation—the third thing—is as real as the other two; hence the arguments in the Republic, 523 e, 524 a, about size, and in the Phaed. 96-97 b as to addition and division. Cf. Phaed. 102 b-d; Theaet. 154 c, 155 c; Hipp. Maj. 289 B-c; Rep. 479 a; Phaed. 74 b.

54, B. I cannot see any absurdity in Socrates, as in the Vulgate distribution, calling a thing *before* it is described *τοιόνδε τι*, and *afterwards* *τοῦτ' αὐτό*. We say, What I mean is *this*...., and then, at the end, *That's* what I mean.

55. I do not see the necessity of supposing with Mr. Poste that two dialogues were soldered together by the words *πολλή—ἀλογώτατα*, 55 a—c. The argument is:—If pleasure be *γένεσις*, it is not *οὐσία*, and is not therefore *τέλος*, and therefore not *ἀγαθόν*. Again, if it is *γένεσις*, the end is *ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι* in the process and not in the consequence *ἀλυπίαν*, Q, A, E, for it is pain we wish to get rid of. Again, if pleasure is *γένεσις*, the only good and therefore the only beauty is in the Soul; whereas the Cyrenaic Pleasure, and therefore good, was (apparently) wholly corporeal, *i.e.* the good is not good. Q, A, E.

56 d-e. As to the difference between unequal and equal numbers, *e.g.* a dozen of oysters and 12 x; Mill, Grote and Paley are on Plato's side against Jowett. In the symbol 12 x the identical x is twelve times repeated, but no one can prove that the 12 oysters are exactly of the same size, &c.

64 b. *ἄρξων καλῶς*. Mr. Paley, p. 111, doubts if the future participle here would be correct Greek, but the future is used of a conclusion or consequence supposed to ensue, in the way the imperfect is used of the premiss or condition supposed to precede, cf. *e.g.* *καί τι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς πείσοντά τινα ὠφελεθῆναι* that a man should have the benefit of a weak argument in case he *shall*

succeed in making it plausible, *Thuc.* 5, 90; οἶδ' ὅτιοῦν
 ἂν ἀργυρίου ποιήσαντες τὸν δώσοντα οὐχ ἔχουσιν αὐτοῖς,
 who would pay for their dirty work, *Dem. de fals.* 366, 91;
 εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, of
 the man who would teach under the opposite hypothesis,
Aristotel. Eth. N. 2, 1, 7; and

sub illis

Montibus, inquit, *erunt*; et *erant* sub montibus illis.

Ov. Met. 2, 102-3.

T. MAGUIRE.

VIRG. AEN. I. 246.

ANTENOR POTUIT MEDIIS ELAPSUS ACHIVIS
 ILLYRICOS PENETRARE SINUS ATQUE INTIMA TUTUS
 REGNA LIBURNORUM ET FONTEM SUPERARE TIMAVI
 UNDE PER ORA NOVEM VASTO CUM MURMURE MONTIS
 IT MARE PRORUPTUM ET PELAGO PREMIT ARVA SONANTI

I BELIEVE I am not only the first but the only one of Virgil's commentators who has explored the Timavus and can speak of it from personal observation. In September, 1865, being on a foot tour with my daughter, from Leghorn, through the Tirol, to Dresden, we turned aside at Ober-Drauburg, the frontier town of Carinthia, and crossing the Julian Alps southward, by the Predil, descended through Görtz and along the Isonzo to the embouchure of the Timavo (or Timao) into the bay of Monfalcone—the extreme north-westerly nook of the Adriatic—at San Giovanni di Tuba, between Monfalcone and Castle Duino. We remained three days, going over the whole locality in every direction, and with the most lively interest comparing the accounts given by ancient authors, and especially these celebrated verses of Virgil, with the testimony of our own senses, the viva-voce relations of persons on the spot, the notices of Cluverius (*Ital. Antiq.* 1. 20), of Schlözer, who visited the place in 1777 (*Briefwechsel, Part 2, p. 340*), and of Valvasor, *Ehre des herzogthums Krain, Laibach*, 1689, *B. 2, ch. 66*, and *B. 4, ch. 44*, as well as with the more recent memoirs of Abate Berini di Ronchi di Monfalcone, *Indagine sullo stato del Timavo e delle sue adjacenze al principio dell' era cristiana, Udine* 1826; of Catinelli, *sulla identità dell' antico*

*coll' odierno Timavo, Archeografo Triestino, Trieste, 1829, vol. 2, p. 379; of Dr. Adolf Schmidl: über den unterirdischen lauf der Reca, aus dem hefte des jahrgangs, 1851, der sitzungsberichte der Math—Naturwis—lasse der Kaiserl. Akademie der Wissenschaften besonders abgedruckt; and of Dr. P. Kandler, of Trieste, Discorso sul Timavo, Trieste, 1864; these two last the cause of our extending our personal researches as far as the disappearance of the Reca underground at San Canziano, eighteen Italian miles above its re-appearance and discharge into the sea near the church of San Giovanni di Tuba. Only when we saw the Reca after a course of sixteen Italian miles from its source at the foot of Monte Albio, chafing in its rocky, much-impeded channel, at the bottom of the four-hundred-foot-deep chasm, on the brink of which we stood, and disappearing under the dark arch of the natural tunnel ("voragine," Dr. Kandler) under the mountain; only when we heard from Dr. Kandler, and read in his *Discorso*, that the sand and silt and broken pieces of mill-wheels of the Reca valley are discharged through the ora Timavi at San Giovanni di Tuba: "a San Giovanni uscissero e sabbia e melme che sono unicamente della valle del Timavo soprano" (so Dr. Kandler denominates the Reca *above* San Canziano, to distinguish it from the Reca *below* San Canziano, denominated by him Timavo sottano) "e pezzi di legno di ruote di molini che in quella vallata si trovano," Kandler, *Discorso*, p. 24; only when we read the accounts in Dr. Kandler's periodical, *L'Istria*, of the floods of the Reca both above San Canziano and below San Giovanni di Tuba, did we at last understand the mystery of the fons Timavi,*

"unde per ora novem vasto cum murmure montis
it mare proruptum et pelago premit arva sonanti,"

viz., that the so-called fons Timavi is not a fons or spring or source at all, but only the re-appearance, in several streams gushing forth from under the mountain at very

short distances from each other, of the river—Posidonius's river Timavus—which had become subterranean at San Canziano, eighteen miles higher up in the mountains (Strabo, 5, 1, 8, Ποσειδώνιος δέ φησι ποταμὸν τὸν Τίμανον ἐκ τῶν ὀρῶν φερόμενον καταπίπτειν εἰς βέρεθρον, εἰς ὑπὸ γῆς ἐνεχθέντα περὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ τριάκοντα σταδίου ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ τὴν ἐκβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι), and that it is the occasional sudden bursting forth of this river with unusual violence and in unusual quantity through the ora at San Giovanni di Tuba—in other words, a flood of the Reca below San Giovanni di Tuba—which our author describes in our text.

A personal visit to the locality having thus cleared up our own difficulties, I am enabled to present the reader with such a picture as will probably clear up his also. At the foot of Monte Albio (Schneeberg), the last of the Julian Alps eastward, rises a river, which at San Canziano, sixteen miles from its source, becomes subterranean, and having flowed from San Canziano eighteen miles underground, emerges from under the mountain at San Giovanni di Tuba in numerous so-called springs or "sorgenti" coalescing almost immediately again into a single deep and broad stream, which, after a slow, smooth and noiseless course of scarcely more than an Italian mile through the flat and marshy litoral, discharges itself into the Adriatic by a single mouth. The Timavus of our author is this river from its re-appearance above-ground at San Giovanni di Tuba to the sea; the ora novem of our author are the apertures which give passage to the re-appearing river; the fons Timavi of our author is the aggregate of these apertures (these apertures taken collectively and regarded, as they are still regarded on the spot, viz., as the source or spring of the river below them), and the phenomenon described in our text is a flood or freshet (usual after heavy rains or a sudden melting of the snow upon the Albio) of the unseen, unsuspected river behind them, suddenly bursting through them with great violence

and deluging, as with a wide-spread boisterous sea, the narrow and almost flat stripe of land between them and the Adriatic. Antenor, says our author, penetrated to the very extremity of the Adriatic gulf, beyond the fountain of the Timavus, i.e., beyond those nine mouths or apertures through which the river bursting, floods the country (ARVA, the fields, the lands, the cultivated grounds) as with a wide and noisy sea. So understood, the passage is free from all difficulty, the description agrees accurately in every respect with the circumstances both of the Timavus of Posidonius and Strabo, and of the Timavo (or Timao) of the present day, and the reader is as little under the necessity either of magnifying a river only about one thousand yards long, not merely into a sea ("MARE") but into a wide and noisy expanse of sea ("PELAGO SONANTI").

"An omnia ista" (Virgil's and other similar accounts of the Timavus) "inania, cum hic tam magnus vastusque fluvius nullibi sit terrarum; veteres omnes illius meminerunt, nostri vix inveniunt," La Cerda. "Quibus autem in terris fluvius ille quaerendus sit, magna fuit inter viros doctos controversia," Heyne,

or of adopting the preposterous construction put on the passage by I. H. Voss, and repeated by Thiel and Kappes, viz., that PRORUPTUM is a supine depending on IT and having MARE for its object, as he is under the necessity of leaving the present Timavo, both springs and river, and going in vain search of a river—the Tagliamento, or the Brenta or the Po (!)—("Alii dicunt esse fluvium Patavinum, et appellari lingua vernacula Brentam." Cynthius Cenet. quoting Luc. 7, 192, and Mart. Ep. 13, 89. "Maluere itaque alii referre ad Meduacum s. Brentam, nonnulli adeo ad Padum" Heyne, *Excurs. ad loc.*) to which the expressions "MARE PRORUPTUM," "PELAGO SONANTI" and "VASTO CUM MURMURE MONTIS" may with some shadow of propriety apply.

At verse 261 of the third book of his Pharsalia, a more manly and dignified, however less elegant, courtly, in-

sinuating and successful a poet than Virgil, writes thus of the Tigris :

“At Tigrim subito tellus absorbet hiatu,
occultosque tegit cursus, rursusque renatum
fonte novo flumen pelagi non abnegat undis.”

Change one single word, viz., Tigrim into Timavum, and these verses become a faithful re-enumeration of the just-described particularities of the Reca-Timavo, if I may so denominate our river, in its course from its source at the foot of Monte Albio to the sea. There is, first, its sudden disappearance in the chasm at San Canziano (“subito tellus absorbet hiatu”); then its underground course of eighteen Italian miles from San Canziano to San Giovanni di Tuba (“occultosque tegit cursus”); next, its re-appearance (“rursusque renatum”) at San Giovanni di Tuba, by a new spring (“fonte novo,” Virgil’s nine-mouthed fountain of Timavus); and, lastly, its discharge into the sea about a mile below San Giovanni di Tuba and the new spring (“pelagi non abnegat undis”) in a single deep and broad stream (flumen).

All this seems sufficiently plain and simple, and the reader has little difficulty in picturing to himself the Timavus, or, as I prefer to call it, the Reca-Timavo, issuing, at the height of about 1200 feet above the sea-level, from under the last of the Julian Alps immediately to the north of Fiume, running thence in a north-westerly direction for sixteen Italian miles, parallel to and not far from the line of the ancient Roman road from Aquileia to Pola, suddenly engulfed in the ground at the village of San Canziano, running from thence eighteen miles underground, and re-appearing at San Giovanni di Tuba, only to throw itself into the bay of Monfalcone, the extreme north-westerly nook of the Adriatic, ἔσχατος μυχὸς τοῦ Ἀδρίου, about a mile further on. Some one of my readers, perhaps, more curious than the rest, either about Virgil and Antenor, or about ancient chorography, or about

picturesque scenery—not impossibly about all three together—and more deeply impressed than his fellows by the Horatian maxim :

“Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem
quam quae sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus,”

suddenly stops short when he has read so far, flings my half-perused essay, along with a couple of shirts, a Bradshaw and a Murray, into his valise, and sets out, by rail and first packet, direct for the spot. He will judge for himself—small blame to him—and not take it on the word of any one. Arrived towards the end of the week at Monfalcone, he sleeps there and spends the following day walking to San Giovanni di Tuba, either along the high Monfalcone and Trieste post-road, or, as I and my daughter preferred, along the parallel railway line close under the most westerly spurs of the Karst, diverging a little, on his way, to visit the tarn of Pietra Rossa on his left, and on his right the still-frequented ancient Roman hot baths of Monte Sant Antonio. San Giovanni reached towards evening, there is no sleeping place, and he goes on, as we went on, to the little roadside inn at Duino, sups and sleeps, and next morning after breakfast returns to San Giovanni, halting every now and then, both as he goes and as he returns, to listen for the *vastum murmur montis*, always present to his mind, but never, even so much as once, saluting his ear. Disappointed and perplexed he stands still at last in the middle of the road, the slightly elevated church of San Giovanni only about a hundred yards before him, with the road trending-on past it towards Monfalcone. “Here, if any where,” he says to himself, “should the fons Timavi be.” Not a drop of water, however, is to be seen, except just below the road, on his left, two millponds, or, rather, one large millpond divided into two by a bush-covered peninsula only a few yards wide. “Even if the Timavus were here and the mountain echoing it as much as ever it did either

in Virgil's time or Antenor's, one could not hear it for the rout those weirs are making; one would think it was the Timavus itself was tumbling over them. The mills are not at work. I'll see is there any one at them can give me any information." Ere long he has found the intendant, who receives him with a courteousness and a readiness to give information for nothing, not easy to be imagined by an Englishman who has never been in Italy. "Come with me and I will shew it to you," he says, "only the waters are now low, and will give you little notion what it is sometimes." In a few minutes they are standing beside and below the mill weir. "There it is," says the intendant. "Where?" says the traveller. "There, coming down over the weir." "I see nothing," says the traveller, "but the overflow of the mill-pond tumbling down the weir and running off." "That is the river you were asking about, the Timavo." "And where are the ora?" Unfortunately, the intendant is not a Latin scholar, knows nothing about ora. "Where does all this large quantity of water come from?" "Out of the mountain, through a culvert under the post-road you came by. We believe it to be the Reca that sinks into the ground at San Canziano. But you have not seen the half of it. Let us walk down a little further." "How wide do you think it is?" asks the traveller, as they walk down along the left bank." "I would guess about twenty-five or thirty yards," replies his guide, "but it will soon be twice as wide or more, for look there at the accession it is just going to get, and we are not more than a hundred yards below the weir yet." "What river is that?" asks the traveller. "The Timavo." "Another Timavo?" "Yes. That is the Timavo from the other weir." "The breadth of the two united cannot be much less than seventy yards?" "Not much less," replies the intendant, "and they are to be joined by the Locavitz bye-and-bye." "Would you have time to come that far with me?" "Certainly. It is not more than quarter of a mile

further, and I am never tired of looking at the deep, broad, majestic stream, up which so many trabaccoli are constantly bringing the grist to our mills, and down which they are no less constantly bringing the flour back to Trieste. You see the tops of the masts there under the church behind you. And here is the Locavitz joining-in, and, yonder, scarcely a mile before us, the double line of uprights marking the channel for the trabaccoli, where the river spreading out on both sides is hardly distinguishable from the sea. Indeed, it would be no harm if the poles came up to where we are standing, for after heavy rains, especially in the spring when the snow begins to melt in the mountains, both banks of the river are overflowed up to the very weirs, the Locavitz, and the two arms coming down from the weirs, thrown into one; that wide-spreading and pretty high hill on the other side of the river, where you see the fortification, and where yesterday you visited the ancient Roman hot baths, is turned into an island, and all this lowland here into a perfect sea. Sometimes we think we shall be all lost, when the sea itself, driven by a Sirocco, comes inland at the same time and forces the flooded river back upon us. Have you seen enough? or shall we go further?" "Thank you very much," replies the traveller, "I have only too much imposed on your kindness. Let us turn." So they go back along the bank, past the weir and pond, and out on the road just where the traveller had been standing. "Many is the accident which has happened here before this new road was made," says the intendant. "In times of floods you could hardly tell which was the road and which the pond, and you were swallowed up before you knew where you were. Look down over the kerb and see how the water is rushing out of the culvert below, yet there is no flood now, the pond is only at its usual level." The traveller looks down and sees through the smooth, transparent surface the violently agitated water below. "How many of these culverts have you?" "Three; one

for this pond, two for the other." "Answering, of course, to as many openings in the side of the mountain?" "Not exactly. I understand that before the culverts were built or the road made, there were in this place five 'sorgenti.'" "You mean five openings in the mountain's side discharging water?" "Yes. Three culverts were found sufficient to transmit the water of the five sorgenti safely across, under the road, into the ponds." "Five of the ora Timavi satisfactorily accounted for," thinks the traveller to himself: "And you sleep quietly in your bed a-nights in the mill, with all this quantity of water impending over you?" "Yes, now we do. I do not say we did before the Trieste waterworks had relieved the underground river of so large a proportion of its water. The only danger now is a flood from above stopped below and thrown back upon us by a high tide and the Sirocco working together. The culverts are nine feet below the sea level." "Then you sometimes have a visit from the sea itself?" "No. The sea only throws back the river upon us, never comes itself. We are a good deal protected by the rising ground next the water, and the accumulated sand on the very shore, as well as by the far-from-inconsiderable hill of Sant Antonio nearer us, where you saw the fortification to-day, and the ancient Roman hot baths yesterday," "and except for which," subjoins the traveller, "the whole of the flat and marshy ground, I think you call it the Lisert, along the foot of the mountains, between this and Monfalcone, would long ages ago have become an estuary of the Adriatic." "I am not so sure," answers the intendant. "Those great floods, the result of melting snows or heavy rains in the mountains, are exceptional, occur only at long intervals; whereas the deposition of the sand and other debris of the mountains is perpetual; and I, for my part, am so little of opinion that there is any danger of the Lisert being turned into a bay, and Monte Sant Antonio into an island, by irruptions of the sea, that I rather think it is the Lisert

which is filling up, becoming every day more and more inland, and Monte Sant Antonio every day less and less an island in the sea." So saying and wishing the traveller a pleasant journey, the intendant doffs his hat and turns into the mill, and the traveller proceeds along the post-road to Monfalcone, comparing, as he goes, the aspect of the locality now when the water is at the lowest, with the description given by Dr. Kandler in his periodical, *L'Istria*, Anno 6, No. 46, published in Trieste, Nov. 15, 1851, of the same locality during a flood :

"Le piene straordinarie d' acque che si monstrarono in questi primi giorni del Novembre, ci persuasero a visitare di persona le regioni del Timavo inferiore, per trarne argomento o di conferma per quanto avemmo a ritenere del corso e delle comunicazioni summontane di quell' acque, o di rettificazione o di richiamo per quanto avessimo erroneamente guidicato di quei singolari fenomeni.....Abbiamo visitato nel dì 9 Novembre l'estuario di Monfalcone o le paludi fra S. Giovanni di Duino e quell' antico Municipio, che non esitiamo a dire tale. Quel seno coperto tutto dalle acque ci presentò agli occhi corporei precisamente quell' antica condizione marina che cogli occhi della mente credemmo di riconoscere attraverso i cangiamenti seguiti. Il monte di S. Antonio o dei bagni e quell' altro ivi prossimo, detto della Punta, che è più prossimo all' emissario del Timavo di S. Giovanni, si mostrarono perfettamente in isole a breve distanza l'una dall' altra ; quella dei bagni a breve distanza dalla terra ferma ; per cui ha conferma la credenza ad un ponte di congiungimento, che Marino Sanuto vide nel 1483, e che noi facciamo rimontare fino all' epoca Romana. Fra il Monte della Punta e l'Isola *Amarina* rimaneva aperto l' ingresso cui dinanzi stava la lanterna o faro detto poi *Belforte*, di cui oggi poche riune, e la *fossa Timavi*. L' estuario fra le isole ed i monti posti di contro presentava l'aspetto di amplissimo e bellissimo porto, difeso dalle isole contro i marosi ; ma non tutto era porto praticabile da legni maggiori, come altra volta avemmo ad indicare. Le sorgenti di S. Giovanni di Tuba, quelle che mettono in movimento il molino, e quelle altre più a levante, erano talmente rigonfie,

che le colonne d' acqua sorgiva si vedevano sbalzare oltre il livello della massa del fiume, il quale era alto quanto la traversata pel molino permetteva alzarsi ; alle sorgenti più orientali, il livello della massa d' acqua era assai-più alto dell' ordinario ed occupava il letto della strada abbandonata ivi prossima ; indizio che l' acqua sgorgante era maggiore in copia di quello che il solito letto permettesse di scorrere tosto per equilibrarsi col mare ; ondosio era il correre del fiume, non per vento che lo spingesse, o per ineguaglianze del letto (che anzi concede solitamente placidissimo lo scorrere del fiume), ma per la foga dell' acqua sgorgante dalle aperture sottacquee del masso compressa dall' acqua di più alto livello, contenuta nell' interno dei monti."

That it is such a flood of the river Timavus, not the river Timavus itself in its ordinary state, which our author places before us in the text, appears, I think, from the following considerations : First, that the word ARVA, in conjunction with PREMIT, cannot signify the country through which something—in the case before us a river—runs, as arva signifies where it is joined with inter and fluit, 2, 781 :

"ubi Lydius arva
inter opima virum leni fluit agmine Tybris,"

can only signify the country which something—in the case before us a flooded and overflowing river—presses with its physical weight (as Faunus lying on the grass in the heat of the day is said premere arva, Ovid. Fast. 4, 761 :

"Nec Dryadas, nec nos videamus labra Dianae,
nec Faunum, medio cum premit arva die").

Compare Avien. Orb. Terr. 336 :

"Hic qua secretis incidit flexibus agros,
Aethiopum lingua Siris ruit ; utque Syenen
caerulus accedens diti loca flumine adulat,
nomine se claro Nilum trahit, inque jacentem
Aegyptum fusus fluctu premit arva marito,
fecundatque solum ;"

also Rutil. Itiner. 1, 639 (of the Port of Pisa in Tuscany):

"Vidimus excitis pontum flavescere arenis,
atque eructato vortice rura tegi,
qualiter oceanus mediis infunditur agris
destituenda vago quum premit arva salo,
sive alio refluxus nostro colliditur orbe,
sive corusca suis sidera pascit aquis;"

in both which passages premit arva can only be presses (oppresses) the lands with its physical weight, and in the latter of which, arva is explained by rura and agris, proof demonstrative that arva, in the same connexion in our text, is neither the country through which the river flows, nor the tract usually occupied by the river—the bed of the river—sometimes of considerable width at the foot of mountains, or at a river's embouchure into the sea, but is the cultivated ground overflowed by the river in a state of flood, the valles, campi and agri of Pliny, Ep. 8, 17: "Tiberis alveum excessit et demissioribus ripis alte superfunditur. Quamquam fossa, quam providentissimus imperator fecit, exhaustus, premit valles, innatat campis, quaque planum solum, pro solo cernitur. Inde, quae solet flumina accipere et permista devehere, velut obviis retro cogit, atque ita alienis aquis operit agros, quos ipse non tangit," the patuli campi of Silius, 6, 141:

"Bagrada non ullo Libycis in finibus amne
victus limosas extendere latius undas,
et stagnante vado patulos involvere campos;"

and of Avienus, Orb. Terr. 423:

"Tum caeruleum Padus evomit antro
flumen, et extento patulos premit aequore campos;"

the agri of Ovid, Met. 1, 422:

"Sic ubi deseruit madidos septemfluus agros
Nilus, et antiquo sua flumina reddidit alveo;"

the agri and campi of Lucan, 6, 272:

"Sic pleno Padus ore tumens super aggere tutas
excurrit ripas, et totos concutit agros."

Succubuit si qua tellus, cumulumque furentem
 undarum non passa ruit, tum flumine toto
 transit, et ignotos aperit sibi gurgite campos ;”

and the omnia of our author himself, Georg. 1, 115 :

“Praesertim incertis si mensibus amnis abundans
 exit et obducto late tenet omnia limo.”

Secondly, that the very word *arva* has been used by our author himself when speaking of the irruption of a flood over a country, Aen. 2, 496 :

“Non sic aggeribus ruptis cum spumeus amnis
 exiit, oppositasque evicit gurgite moles,
 fertur in arva furens cumulo, camposque per omnes
 cum stabulis armenta trahit,”

where not only have we the very *arva* of our text, but *exiit* corresponds to the *unde it*, *oppositas evicit moles* to the *proruptum*, *gurgite* to the *mare*, and *fertur furens cumulo* to the *pelago premit sonanti* as nearly as the difference of circumstances permits, i.e., as nearly as the difference between an ordinary river which overflows its banks and floods the country, and a river which bursts already-flooded out of the ground and overflows the country, permits. Thirdly, that the district of the *Timavus* is actually, as testified by Dr. Kandler (above), subject to such floods bursting-out through the *ora* at San Giovanni ; and, above all, that the expressions *mare proruptum*, *pelago sonanti* and *vasto cum murmure montis* applied to the already-flooded *Timavus* bursting-out from under the mountain, are as fit and proper,

Compare Claud. in Rufin. 2, 209 :

.....“Prorumpat in arva
 libertas effrena maris, vel limite justo
 devius errantes Phaethon confundat habenas,”

as applied to the *Timavus* in its ordinary state, whether at the *ora*, or elsewhere in its course, they are unfit and bombastic. How modest in comparison the younger Pliny's account (Ep. 8, 8) of the font of the *Clitumnus* !

"Fons adhuc et jam amplissimum flumen atque etiam navium patiens;" how excusable in comparison Seneca's application of the term mare (not even heightened by pelagus) whether to the arm of the great Nile in its ordinary state, or to the great, inundating Nile itself! Nat. Quaest. 4, 2: "Sic quoque quum se ripis continet Nilus, per septena ostia in mare emittitur; quodcunque elegeris ex his mare est." Ibid.: "Initio diducitur, deinde continuatis aquis in faciem lati ac turbidi maris stagnat."

Nor let any one suspect that this flood of Dr. Kandler's may be the imagination, or, at least, the exaggeration, of a partisan, whereon to found or wherewith to buttress a theory of the Virgilian meaning. On the contrary, Dr. Kandler, so far from being the partisan of a scholastic theory, does not even profess to be a scholar at all, and while writing his interesting, eloquent, enthusiastic and truly Italian *Discorso sul Timavo* (observe, not for a learned society, but "per nozze Guastalla-Levi") turns his back on geographers and poets, not excepting even Virgil himself, and indites directly from "the great book of nature:" "Ma io preferisco leggere dapprima il gran libro che dio ha plasmato, il quale svela le veracità o le aberrazioni degli uomini che ne voller discorrere," *Discorso*, p. 7; and again, in the Dedication, p. 2: "In altri tempi aveva raccolto notizie, e, come tutti gli scrittori s'ingegnano, non comuni; le ho per Voi rivedute: vengo dal campo e fui testimone di ciò che narro, io stesso. Del Timavo vi tesso ghirlanda fresca fresca, di tutta mia composizione, e l'offro a Voi, sposi fortunati." Had the amiable garlandist adhered strictly to his programme and interwoven in his garland no flowers at all from poet's or geographer's parterre, he had neither mistaken Virgil's fons Timavi, viz., the fons at San Giovanni—the only fons Timavi of which Virgil seems to have had any knowledge—for the real fons Timavi at the foot of the Albio, *Discorso*, p. 7: "Il quale (Virgilio) dà un solo fonte al Timavo, in prossimità della Liburnia più interna, che è

appunto sopra Fiume città, e dà a lui nove emissari al mare Adriatico, nel suo seno più interno, togliendo così ogni possibilità di scambio tra fonte ed emissario, ben altro che identici, anzi richiedenti distanza tra l'uno e l'altro," nor have jumbled up together Asinius Pollio and Antenor, Ibid: "Virgilio celebrando Antenore, che securo traversò le parti più settentrionali di Liburnia, lo felicità di avere¹ superato *saxa Timavi*, il che è facilissimo presso all' emissario, ed accena alle *arva Timavi*, che possono cercarsi intorno la chiesa di S. Giovanni e per molte miglia in distanza." But the reader is long since sufficiently convinced that the picture in our text is not of a river, whether the Timavus (the modern Timavo) or any other, in its ordinary state "medio alveo delabentis in mare," but of the Timavus (the modern Timavo), reputed both then and now, to have its source less than an Italian mile from the sea, bursting-forth suddenly and unaccountably in full flood from that reputed source, and "lapides adesos stirpesque raptas et pecus et domos volventis unà, non sine montium clamore vicinaeque silvae, cum fera diluvies quietos irritat amnes," and begs I may proceed.

IT MARE PRORUPTUM.—What is the subject of it? What is it that *goes*? "The sea," answer many, "the real, literal sea (mare), which ascends the river up to its very source. Serv. ed. Lion: "Sane multi *it mare proruptum et pelago premit arva sonanti*, hoc intelligi volunt: quod tanta est in illis locis accessa, quae dicitur maris, ut per ora Timavi, i.e., usque ad initium fontis, mare ascendat. unde ait; it mare, &c., i.e., aqua maris premit arva, h.e. littori vicina cooperiat. Constat autem et in illo loco, accessa maris usque ad montem pervenire, et per omne littus Venetiarum mare certis horis et accedere per infinitum et recedere." Phaer.:

"Where issues nine the sea makes in, for noise the mountain
[rings."

Wood, *Essay on Homer*, p. 51: "This is not a description

of the river running with violence into the sea, but of the sea bursting into the channel and even the sources of the river and overflowing the land ;" answer, to which it will be time enough to attend when it has first been explained how "fontem *unde* it" comes to mean "fountain *towards* which goes." "The sea" answer others, "the real, literal sea (mare), which penetrates by hidden, underground channels into the ora and bursts-out through them:" Iovitae Raptii *Balnearum ad Timavi ostia descriptio*, ap. Graevii Thesaur. Antiquit. Italiae. Tom. 6: "Nunc autem iam planum est eum (Virgilium) proprie et ad rem accomodate locutum esse. Ut enim mare est quod aestu excrescens per subterraneas concavitates in ipsa montis intima et quasi viscera ingreditur, recte dicitur *mare* et *pelagus*, eo tropo quo ex toto partem intelligimus, ut sit mare proruptum prius occulte ingressi et prorupti maris pars, quae mox non sine magno murmure prorumpens atque exundans circumpositas terras late opprimit atque operit aut vastat sonantibus aquis illis e pelago ingressis et egressis atque una cum maris aestu vel exundantibus vel subsidentibus."

"Where with the limestone's reboant roar,
through nine loud mouths the sea-waves pour,
and all the fields are deluged o'er."

Conington.

answer, which it will be time enough to consider when there is any reliable evidence of the real, literal sea (mare) bursting forth, or having ever burst forth, through the ora. The real, literal sea therefore, i.e., the Adriatic, neither ascending to the fountain nor descending from the fountain, it becomes certain that it is not with the real, literal sea we have here to do at all, but only with a figurative sea, and the new question, never, I believe, discussed by any commentator, arises: whether, is this figurative sea subject or predicate? in other words: whether is the structure *unde (veluti) proruptum mare* it, or *unde (Timavus) it (veluti) proruptum mare*? and I, for

my part, find no difficulty in answering: predicate; predicate, because Timavus is more effectually lauded, every word of the laudation being made to gravitate directly towards Timavus itself, than every word of the laudation being made to gravitate towards a mere characteristic, the representative of Timavus for the nonce; predicate, because so long as (*veluti*) *mare* is regarded as the subject of IT, the action of the first clause of the verse begins, is carried on, and ends within the limits of a monosyllable of no more than two letters, whereas (*veluti*) *mare* being regarded as predicate, the action of the first clause is carried on until it is lost and disappears in the greater action of the second; predicate, because *mare* and *pelagus* being but different names for one and the same thing viewed under different lights, the expression *mare premit pelago* is, if allowable at all, as awkward and disagreeable as it is tautologous; predicate, because instances of a sea's being said to go, in the sense of really going, and not merely as in Mela 3, 3, "Qua littora attingit (mare) ripis contentum insularum non longe distantibus, et ubique paene tantundem, it angustum et par freto; curvansque se subinde, longo supercilio inflexum est," in the sense of seeming to go or trending, are as rare—an hour's search has furnished me with no more than one, viz., Claud. Stilich. 1, 172:

"Illyricum peteres, campi montesque latebant;
vexillum navale dares, sub puppibus ibat
Ionium."—

as instances of a river's being said to go, in the sense of really going, are of common occurrence, an hour's search having afforded me no fewer than eleven, viz., Aen. 8, 726:

"Euphrates ibat jam mollior undis
extremique hominum Morini Rhenusque bicornis;"

Hor. Od. 1, 2, 13:

"Vidimus flavum Tiberim, retortis
littore Etrusco violenter undis,

ire delectum monumenta regis
templaque Vestae;”

Ovid. Heroid. 1, 33 :

“Hac ibat Simois, hic est Sigeia tellus;”

Ovid. Rem. Am. 257 :

“Ut solet, aequoreas ibit Tiberinus in undas;”

Ovid. Met. 1, 111 :

“Flumina iam lactis, iam flumina nectaris ibant;”

Ovid. Met. 2, 455 :

.....“nexus gelidum, de quo cum murmure labens
ibat, et attritas versabat rivus arenas;”

Ovid. Fast. 4, 364 :

“Amnis it insana, nomine Gallus, aqua;”

Ovid. Amor. 3, 6, 19 :

“Tu potius, ripis effuse capacibus amnis,
—Sic aeternus eas—labere fine tuo;”

Ovid. Amor. 3, 6, 25 :

“Inachus in Melie Bithynide pallidus isse
dicitur;”

Ovid. Amor. 3, 6, 98 :

“Quis grata dixit voce, perennis eas?”

Mela, 1, 9 : “Deinde iterum iterumque divisus (Nilus) it per omnem Aegyptum vagus atque dispersus;” and, finally, predicate because while I search in vain for an example of a sea (mare) said to press the lands with a pelagus, I meet, at every turning, examples of a river *πελαγιζων*, i.e., pressing the lands with a pelagus. Herodot. 2, 92, (of the Nile): *Ἐπεὰν πλήρης γένηται ὁ ποταμὸς καὶ τὰ πεδία πελαγίζῃ, φύεται ἐν τῷ ὕδατι κρίνεα πολλὰ τὰ Αἰγύπτιοι καλεῦσι λωτόν.* Herodot. 1, 184, (of the Euphrates): *Πρότερον δὲ ἑώθεε ὁ ποταμὸς ἀνὰ τὸ πεδίων πᾶν πελαγίζειν.* Strabo, 3, 3 : *Ὁ δὲ Τάγος καὶ τὸ πλάτος ἔχει τοῦ στόματος εἴκοσι πού σταδίων καὶ τὸ βάθος μέγα, ὥστε*

μυριαγωγαῖς ἀναπλεῖσθαι. δύο δ' ἀναχύσεις ἐν τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις ποιεῖται πεδίοις, ὅταν αἱ πληγαὶ γίνωνται, ὥστε πελαγίζειν μὲν ἐπὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους καὶ ποιεῖν πλωτὸν τὸ πεδίον, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐπάνω ἀναχύσει καὶ νησίον ἀπολαμβάνειν ὅσον τριάκοντα σταδίων τὸ μήκος, πλάτος δὲ μικρὸν ἀπολειπὸν τοῦ μήκους, εὐαλδὲς καὶ εὐάμπελον. Dio Cass. 53, 20: 'Ο γὰρ Τίβερις πελαγίσας πᾶσαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις Ρώμην κατέλαβεν, ὥστε πλεῖσθαι. Id. 45, 17: "Ο τε Ἡρίδανος ἐπὶ πόλιν τῆς πέριξ γῆς πελαγίσας, ἐξαίφνης ἀνεχώρησε. Theophyl. Simoc. Quaest. Phys.: "Ισασι τοίνυν διαίτης τέχνην οἱ κόρακες. ὀρώσι δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ἰστρου τὰ ρεῖθρα, καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν Νεῖλον τὴν Αἴγυπτον πελαγίζοντα, ἀλλ' ὅμως πίνειν ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἔνεστιν. ἀλλ' οἷα Τάνταλοι κολαζόμενοι δριμυτάτην δίκην ταύτην εἰσπράττουσιν. Himer. Ecl. 13, 31: 'Ο γὰρ δὴ Μέλης οὗτος... ἀνίσχει μὲν ἐν προαστείῳ τῆς Σμύρνης, τίκτουσι δ' αὐτὸν μυρίαὶ πηγαὶ καὶ πλησίον ἀλλήλων βλαστάνουσιν· ἀφ' ὧν πλημμύρων ὁ ποταμὸς πελαγίζει τε εὐθὺς ἐκ πηγῶν καὶ πλωτὸς καὶ ὀλκάσι καὶ κόπῃ γίνεται. passages almost sufficient of themselves to make it certain not only that it is an inundation of the country by the Timavus, as it were with a pelagus or wide-spreading sea, which Virgil describes in our text, but that the whole clause "pelago premit arva sonanti" is neither more nor less than Virgil's ornate paraphrase of the Greek word *πελαγίζει*.

For all these reasons MARE is predicate, not subject, and the structure is not unde (veluti) mare it, but unde (Timavus) it (veluti) mare. It will, of course, be objected that at first sight, and before consideration, MARE puts itself forward as the subject of IT quite as prominently as (10, 207) Aulestes; or (Georg. 3, 517) arator, puts itself forward as subject of the same verb, and I do not deny that it does; but if it does, and yet is not, as I think I have shown it is not, really subject but only predicate, and the reader is obliged in consequence to cast-about for another subject, such trouble to the reader arises wholly and solely from an inaccuracy in the construction similar

to, however less in degree than, that which is so observable in a passage quoted a little above, viz., Aen. 2, 496:

“Non sic aggeribus ruptis quum spumeus amnis
exiit, oppositasque evicit gurgite moles,
fertur in arva furens cumulo, camposque per omnes
cum stabulis armenta trahit.”

where *fertur* and *trahit* stand absolutely without a subject, and cannot be supplied with one, except either by depriving *exiit* and *evicit* of theirs in some such manner as the following: Non sic spumeus amnis, quum aggeribus ruptis exiit, oppositasque evicit gurgite moles, fertur in arva furens cumulo, camposque per omnes cum stabulis armenta trahit; or by imagining an anacoluthon at *moles*, thus: non sic aggeribus ruptis quum spumeus amnis exiit, oppositasque evicit gurgite moles—fertur (spumeus amnis) in arva furens cumulo, camposque per omnes cum stabulis armenta trahit. In both places the reader—the experienced reader even more than the inexperienced—feels the hitch, the jolt in the saddle, and if he says nothing about it, it is only because he recollects that the poem consists of some seven thousand verses, and was impatiently expected by the absolute master of the ancient Roman world. Curious and almost incredible that in both passages it is the principal verb, occupying the most prominent position, and expressing the main action, which stands thus subjectless, or, to use a milder phrase, for which *subiectum quaeritur*. Let not, however, the reader, in either case, dwell too much on a petty *désagrément*, or make a mountain out of a mole-hill. Let him rather draw, for the case in hand, what advantage he can from the just-cited case, and observing that *fertur*, in the latter, perfectly represents *IT* in the former both in meaning and position in the verse, that *amnis* in the latter is neither more nor less than the generic expression for the special *Timavi* of the former, and occupies the very same position in the verse, that the *aggeribus ruptis* and oppo-

sitas evicit moles of the latter exactly make up the proruptum of the former, and that there is the same arva in both, let him conclude at once and without hesitation that as the subject of fertur in the latter case is only to be found in amnis, so the subject of IT in the former case is only to be found in Timavi, and console himself for his henceforward somewhat lower estimate both of Virgil's fertility of imagination and accuracy of expression, with his henceforward much more correct notion of Virgil's landscape of the Timavus.

IT MARE PRORUPTUM ET PELAGO PREMIT ARVA SONANTI.—The second clause of the verse is our author's usual variation, or re-enunciation in different terms, of the first clause: (Timavus) *goes as if it were a burst-forth sea and presses the fields with, as it were, a sounding pelagus.*

Let us suppose for a moment that Antenor, instead of sailing up to the head of the Adriatic and founding the city of Patavium beyond where the Timavus, issuing out of the ground through nine ora, overflows its banks and turns the country into a pelagus, had sailed up to the head of the Mediterranean and founded the city of Berytus beyond where the Nile *πελαγίζει* (Herodotus, quoted above), our author, in his account of the circumstance, might have used the very words "pelago premit arva sonanti." Let us further suppose that the Nile, instead of flowing through Nubia and upper Egypt sub dio, had performed that part of its course secretly under ground and emerged only at the cataracts in several streams coalescing immediately into a river, which, in its course to the sea, overflowed its banks and inundated the country ("effuso stagnantem flumine Nilum"); our author, in his account of the circumstance, might have used not merely the words pelago premit arva sonanti, but, had his measure permitted him, all the other words of our text, except the geographical denominations alone; thus: Cyrenaicos penetrare sinus atque intima tutus Regna Marmaridarum et fontem superare Nili, Unde per ora

novem magno cum murmure montis, It mare proruptum
et pelago premit arva sonanti. Hic tamen ille urbem
[Beryti] sedesque locavit Teucrorum.

Having now, let us hope, some definite notion of the river Timavus—its fons or source at the foot of Monte Albio, its disappearance under ground at San Canziano, its reappearance at San Giovanni in several streams more or less numerous under different circumstances and mistaken for a fons, its almost immediate re-coalescence into a single stream, its discharge into the sea about a mile further-on by a single mouth, and its occasional flooding of the country below San Giovanni, we are in a condition to enquire what has this river—either itself, or its fons, or its flood—to do with Antenor's flight from Troy to Italy. Cleonymus, bound for Venetia (Liv. 2, 10), sails right up the middle of the Adriatic, keeping clear of the two dangerous coasts, the Scylla on the one side and the Charybdis on the other, until, arrived opposite the Brenta, he makes for, and sails up, that river. "Circumvectus inde Brundisii promontorium, medioque sinu Hadriatico ventis latus, quum laeva importuosa Italiae litora, dextra Illyrii Liburnique et Istri, gentes ferae, et magna ex parte latrociniis maritimis infames, terrerent, penitus ad litora Venetorum, pervenit; ibi expositis paucis, qui loca explorarent, quum audisset tenue praetentum litus esse, quod transgressis stagna a tergo sint, irrigua aestibus maritimis; agros haud procul proximos campestres cerni; ulteriora colles; inde esse ostium fluminis praealti, quo circumagi naves in stationem tutam vidisse (Meduacus amnis erat); eo invectam classem subire flumine adverso jussit. Gravissimas navium non pertulit alveus fluminis. in leviora navigia transgressa multitudo armatorum ad frequentes agros, tribus maritimis Patavinorum vicis colentibus eam oram, pervenit." Antenor, on the contrary, sailing up the same Adriatic for the same Venetia, instead of ascending the Brenta westward, turns his back upon it and penetrates eastward into the heart of Liburnia and

passes the fons Timavi; potuit Illyricos penetrare sinus atque intima tutus regna Liburnorum et fontem superare Timavi. How he ever got out alive from among those fierce tribes, or how, having got out alive from among them, he ever made his way by that route to where he built Padua on the Brenta, passes my comprehension, and if it did not pass Jupiter's also it could only have been because that personage was, ex-officio, as well as ex natura rerum, familiar with and up-to all sorts of impossibilities. "I cannot help thinking Venus might have been more cautious about what she said." "How do we know Venus said so at all?" "Virgil says she did, and so do all the commentators." "All the commentators, if you please, but certainly not Virgil." "Are you serious?" "Never was more serious in my life. But what's the matter? What makes you put-on so long a face?" "I'm thinking of the Civil Service, and the lot of poor fellows I sent off yesterday." "Oh! never mind them; they're all right. You told them what answers they were expected to give, and you may be sure they'll give them. Had you told them the real state of the case, what Venus really does say, you would only have brought disgrace both upon them and yourself." "It's an idle curiosity, perhaps, still I must own I would like to know the truth. Tell me, in confidence, I'll not breathe one word of it to any one." "Well, I'll tell you. Venus does not say Antenor penetrated the Illyrian gulf and the interior of the Liburnian realms in safety, and passed the nine-mouthed spring of the Timavus:

"Hoc ergo nunc ad augmentum pertinet quod tutus est etiam inter saevos populos." Serv. Ed. Lion. "Nach Virgil's angabe drang Antenor.....durch die Liburnier ueber den Timavus in das innere des landes welches den namen von seinen begleitern erhielt." Mannert, Geogr. von Italia, s. 53. "Illyricos penetrare sinus atque intima tutus regna Liburnorum," Heyne (who observes in a note: "poetam male a Servio accusatum dices, quod Antenorem Illyricum et Libur-

niam tenuisse dixerit, nec minus male post Corradum a Burmanno defensum ex usu voc. *penetrasse*, quod h. l. sit *transiisse*"); and Wagner, 1832 and 1861: "Tief zur Illyrischen bucht und dem innersten reich der Liburner Eingehen ohne gefahr, und umlenken den quell des Timavus." J. H. Voss: "Drang in alle buchten (penetrare sinus atque intima regna Liburnorum) und kam so auch in die durch die weite mündung des Timavus gebildete bucht" (!) Kappes: "Penetrare is not so much to penetrare into, as to make his way through or past (!), Illyricum." Conington:

but Venus says, Antenor penetrated the Illyrian gulf, and passed in safety the Liburnian realms farthest up on that gulf and the nine-mouthed spring of the Timavus." "You are most undoubtedly right. It can be nothing else. Antenor did not go-in among the fierce Liburni at all, only passed both them and the Timavus by, and then made across for the Brenta. He could do that 'tutus.' If he had gone-in either among the Liburnians or the Istrians, he never would have been heard-of more, nor one of his company. Penetrare Illyricos sinus, superare intima regna Liburnorum et fontem Timavi. Quite Virgil's manner. Penetrare Illyricos sinus, the general enunciation; Superare intima regna Liburnorum et fontem Timavi, the specification; the former of the two clauses informing us that he went up the Illyrian gulf, the latter how far he went up it, viz., past both Liburnia and Istria. What a dolt I was not to see it sooner! Say, rather, what dolts we all were." Nothing could be plainer. Penetrated the Illyrian gulf beyond both Liburnia and Istria, and sailing up the Brenta, founded his city in Venetia. And that terrible Timavus ("and all the dangers of Timavus' fount") with the whole Adriatic rushing out through it ("Where with the limestone's reboant roar, Through nine loud mouths the sea-waves pour")—no wonder the mountain rumbled—is nothing but a raw-head and bloody-bones to frighten children. Take off the raddled cloth and you have the bare broomstick,

the Timavus—remarkable for its manifold spring, and the overflowing of its banks—standing for Istria, just as you so often have the Nile—remarkable for its manifold mouth and the overflowing of its banks—standing for Egypt: ex. gr. Georg. 3, 28:

“Atque hic undantem bello magnumque fluentem
Nilum ac navali surgentes aere columnas
Addam, urbes Asiae domitas pulsumque Niphaten.”

Aen. 6, 801:

“Et septemgemini turbant trepida ostia Nili;”

and the sole difference between the line Cleonymus took, up the Gulf, and the line taken by Antenor, is, that Cleonymus, setting out from Magna Graecia, kept nearer the western side and turned sooner into the Brenta than Antenor, who, having come round the Peloponnesus from Troy, kept naturally nearer to the eastern side, and went round by the top of the gulf, beyond both Liburnia and Istria, before he turned into the same river.

ILLYRICOS SINUS.—“Antenor segelte längs der küste hin, drang in alle buchten, und kam so auch in die durch die weite mündung des Timavus gebildete bucht.” Kappes: “Illyricos sinus may be either the Adriatic, as washing the shore of Illyricum, or the indentations in the Illyrian coast.” Conington: Most undoubtedly erroneous. Antenor had no business in the indentations of the Illyrian coast. On the contrary, those indentations were, of all things, to be avoided on account of the ferocity of the inhabitants: Liv. 10, 2. “Circumvectus inde (Cleomenes) Brundisii promontorium, medioque sinu Hadriatico ventis latus, quum laeva inportuosa Italiae litora, dextra Illyrii Liburnique et Istri, gentes ferae, et magna ex parte latrociniis maritimis infames, terrerent, penitus ad litora Venetorum pervenit.” Illyricos sinus is the Illyrian or Adriatic gulf, up which Antenor penetrated to the mouth of the Brenta. The plural is used as answering the verse

better than the singular. Compare 3, 689: "Megarosque sinus." The gulf or bay of Megara. Manilius, 5, 52:

"Actiacosque sinus inter suspensus utrimque
orbis, et in ponto caeli Fortuna nabit;"

the gulf or bay of Actium, i.e., the Ambracian gulf or bay.
Ovid Met. 15, 50:

"Lacedaemoniumque Tarentum
praeterit, et Sybarin, Salentinumque Neaetum,
Thurinosque sinus, Temesenque et Iapygis arva;"

the gulf or bay of Thurii. Ovid. Trist. 1, 10, 35:

"Thyniacosque sinus, et ab his per Apollinis urbem
acta, sub Anchiali moenia tendat iter;"

the gulf or bay of Thynias. Prop. 4, 1, 114:

"Tu diruta fletum
supprime et Euboicos respice, Troia, sinus;"

the gulf or channel of Egripo. So common is the use of this word in the plural to signify a single object, that we have quite as many examples of a plural *sinus* signifying a single bosom as we have just seen there are of a plural *sinus* signifying a single gulf or bay. It may be sufficient to quote Ovid. Art. Amat. 3. 33:

"Phasida, iam matrem, fallax dimisit Iason;
Venit in Aesonios altera nupta sinus;"

and Claud. Gigant. ad extrem:

"Implorat Paeana suum conterrita Delos,
auxiliumque rogat: Si te gratissima fudit
in nostros Latona sinus, succurre precanti."

Nor let objection be made to the Adriatic gulf's being called Illyrian gulf; Aquileia, at the very head of it, and within view of the Timavus, is not only said by Ausonius, Ordo Nobil. Urb. 6. 3, to be an Italian colony *objecta ad Illyricos montes*:

"Nona inter claras, Aquileia, cieberis urbes,
Itala ad Illyricos obiecta colonia montes;"

but is stated by Strabo, 5. 1. 8, to be an emporium opened to the Illyrian tribes on the Ister: Ἀνεῖται δ' ἐμπόριον τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἰστρον τῶν Ἰλλυρίων ἔθνεσι.

ILLYRICOS PENETRARE SINUS.—The expression *penetrare sinum*, in the sense of going up a gulf or bay, has been used by Priscian, *Perieges.* 607 :

“Persicus inde sinus penetratur, et Icaron offert.”

INTIMA REGNA LIBURNORUM.—Not the interior or heart of the Liburnian realms (the interior of Liburnia), for in that case it should be *intima regnorum Liburnorum*, Priscian. *Perieges.* 650 :

“Inter quas Tanais Maeotidis intima pulsat,”

the inmost, most internal parts of the Maeotis. Nemesian. *Cyneg.* 71 :

“utque intima frater

Persidos, et veteres Babylonos ceperit arces,”

the inmost, most internal parts of Persia. Stat. *Theb.* 1, 426 :

“Intima vultus,” the inmost, most internal parts, of the face, viz. the sockets of the eyes,

but the Liburnian realms which are in the inmost part, or heart, of something else, viz. of the Adriatic gulf; in other words: are far up the Adriatic. Compare Valer. Flacc. 4, 512. (of the Harpies.)

“Iamque et ad Ionias metas atque intima tendunt
saxa, vocat magni Strophadas nunc incola ponti;”

not the innermost part, or heart, of the saxa (Strophades) but the saxa (Strophades) innermost, i.e. far up in the Ionian sea. Valer. Flacc. 5, 281 :

“At Iuno et summi virgo Iovis intima secum
consilia et varias sociabant pectore curas;”

not the interior or heart of their counsels, but the counsels which were innermost in their hearts. Ovid. *Met.* 11, 416, of Halcyone :

“Cui protinus intima frigus
ossa receperunt;”

not the innermost part, or marrow, of her bones, but her bones, the innermost part of herself. Ovid. Heroid. 16, 133 (Paris, of himself):

“Praecordiaque intima sensi
attonitus curis intumuisse novis;”

not the innermost part of the praecordia, but the praecordia, innermost part of himself. Sil. 4, 691:

“Nympharumque intima moestus
implevit chorus attonitis ululatibus antra;”

not the innermost part of the caves, but the innermost caves (of the river). And our author himself, Georg. 4, 65:

“Ipsae
intima more suo sese in cunabula condent;”

not the innermost part of their cradles, but their cradles in the innermost part of the hive. And Georg. 4, 481:

“Quin ipsae stupuere domus, atque intima Leti
Tartara;”

not, with Wagner and Forbiger, and in pointblank contradiction to Aen. 6, 273:

“Vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus orci
.....letumque labosque,”

not the innermost part of Tartarus, where letum dwells, but Tartarus, innermost part of letum, far-in in the realms of letum, whither it was, of course, the most difficult for song to penetrate. Compare Liv. 1, 1, of this very expedition of Antenor: “Casibus deinde variis, Antenorem cum multitudine Henetum, qui, seditione ex Paphlagonia pulsi, et sedes et ducem, rege Pylaemene ad Troiam amisso, quaerebant, venisse in intimum maris Hadriatici sinum;” not the innermost part of the sinus of the Adriatic sea, but the innermost sinus of the Adriatic sea, the sinus which was farthest up the Adriatic, i.e. the extreme northerly sinus, comprehending towards south-east the present bay of Trieste (Meerbusen von

Triest) and towards north-west the present bay of Monfalcone (Meerbusen von Monfalcone), into which latter, and not, as stated by Heyne, Wagner, Conington, and so many others who have neither visited the place nor used good charts, into the bay of Trieste, the present river Timavus as we have already seen, discharges itself.

ILLYRICOS PENETRARE SINUS—INTIMA REGNA LIBURNORUM SUPERARE.—Antenor is *not* said to pass-by the Illyrian gulf, as Myscelus, Ovid. Met. 15. 50, just quoted, is said to pass-by the bay of Thurii, because not past, but into, the Illyrian gulf was Antenor's direct way to the Brenta and site of his future city, whereas past and not into the Thurian gulf was the direct way for Myscelus to the Aesar and site of his future city, and Antenor *is* said to pass-by Liburnia and the fons Timavi, as Myscelus is said to pass by the bay of Thurii, because past and not into Liburnia and the fons Timavi was Antenor's way to the Brenta and site of his future city, as past and not into the bay of Thurii was the way for Myscelus to the Aesar and site of his future city.

Fontem TIMAVI.—“Pro Timavo, ait fontem Timavi” Serv. (ed. Lion), followed by Gossrau (who, having quoted Servius, adds: “multus ea in re est Avienus, apud quem, *tergum maris, salis, sali, lacus; vada, freta gurgitis, arva soli, iugera terrae, aequoris unda, alia multa.*”) Also by Forbiger, ed. 4. (“fontem Timavi, h. e. Timavum.”) The gloss is most assuredly false, if it were only because UNDE then becomes, of necessity, *ex quo Timavo*, quod absurdum. On the contrary, it is with the greatest propriety Antenor, who is making a coasting voyage, is said to pass the fons Timavi, not the Timavus (river Timavus), the fons not the river being the remarkable object, partly on account of the unusual proximity of the fons to the sea, a proximity little less than that of the fons Arethusa worshipped by Aeneas himself as he sails past on his voyage from the same Troy to the same Italy, partly on account of the unusual number of ora of which it consisted, a number

variously reported by different visitors : Claud. 3 Consul. Honor. 120 : "Phrygii numerantur stagna Timavi," where the enumerator is no less a personage than the emperor Honorius, partly on account of the quantity of water discharged by those ora, so considerable at times as to overflow both banks of the deep and wide river, and *πελαγίζειν* all round, and partly because, of the two always sacred objects, fons and river, the fons as source and father of the river, and residence of the river-god, and as consisting of purer water than the river, was the most sacred ; so sacred indeed that a fons without its chapel or temple or lucus or oracular cave, or all four together,

Aen. 7, 81 :

"At rex sollicitus monstis, oracula Fauni,
fatidici genitoris adit, lucosque sub alta
consulit Albunea, memorum quae maxima sacro
fonte sonat, saevamque exhalat opaca mephitim."

Ovid. Fast. 3, 295 :

"Lucus Aventino suberat niger ilicis umbra,
quo posses viso dicere, numen inest.
In medio gramen, muscoque adoperta virenti
manabat saxo vena perennis aquae.
Inde fere soli Faunus Picusque bibebant.
Huc venit et Fonti rex Numa mactat ovem."

Plin. Ep. 8, 8 (of the Fons Clitumni) : "Adiacet templum priscum et religiosum. Stat Clitumnus ipse amictus ornatusque praetexta. Praesens numen atque etiam fatidicum indicant sortes. Sparsa sunt circa sacella complura, totidemque dei ; sua cuique veneratio, suum nomen, quibusdam vero etiam fontes. Nam praeter illum quasi parentem caeterorum, sunt minores capite discreti, sed flumini miscentur, quod ponte transmittitur. Is terminus sacri profanique. In superiore parte navigare tantum, infra etiam natare concessum ;"

was as rare in ancient Greece or Italy as is at present in Bohemia a well or bridge without its Saint Nepomuck. Compare Ovid. Fast. 4, 469 :

"Praeterit (Ceres) et Cyanen et fontem lenis Anapi,
et te, vorticibus non adeunde, Gela."

Claud. Gigantom., 69 :

“Hic Rhodopen Hebri cum fonte revellit
et socias truncavit aquas.”

Stat. Theb. 4, 830 (thirsty soldier addressing the Fons Langiæ) :

....“Tuque o cunctis insuete domari
solibus, aeternae largitor corniger undae,
laetas eas ; quacunq̃ue domo gelida ora resolvīs,
immortale tumens ; neque enim tibi cana repostas
bruma nives, raptasq̃ue alio de fonte refundit
arcus aquas, gravidive indulgent nubila Cori
sed tuus, et nulli ruis expugnabilis astro ;”

and Horace's Fons Bandusiae rivo dare nomen idoneus.
Fontem unde.—Varro, L. L. 4, 26 : “Fons unde funditur
e terra, aqua viva.” Cicer. de Orat. 1, 46 (figuratively) :
“Fontes unde hauriretis.”

ORA NOVEM.—The number of ora assigned by Virgil to the fons Timavi is not to be too closely pressed. If it is higher by two than the highest number assigned to it by any writer who could not have copied from him, we must not forget that not only were the actual ora always varying in number, and therefore variously reported by visitors, but that no probable number had so good a claim on the poet—the poet par excellence and not the geographer—as the poetical and mystic three times three, the Muse's own number, the number of the enfolded spheres, the number of the holidays kept in honour of the dead, the number of the acres covered by the body of Tityus, the number of the stars in Ariadne's crown, the number of the days Ulysses was floating on the wreck of his vessel from Charybdis to the island of Calypso, the number of the days the same hero floated on the mast from Crete to Thesprotia, the number of the years the ox was old out of whose hide was made the bag full of winds given by Aeolus to the same hero, the number of the days the same hero sailed from Aeolia with the bag before he came in sight of home, the number of the goats the same hero

carried off from Cyclops' land for each of his twelve ships, the number of the judges of the sports at the court of Alcinous, the number of the years the Aloidae were old when they were already that same number of cubits in breadth and that same number of *δρῦναι* in height, the number of the days, and the number of the nights Latona was in labor, the number of the cubits the golden necklace was long with which Dione and Rhea and Themis and Amphitrite and all the other goddesses except Juno bribed Lucina to expedite Latona's labor, the number of the days Deucalion's ark was tossed about on the waters of the flood before it rested on the top of mount Parnassus, the number of the days Apollo discharged his arrows on the Grecian army, the number of the days for which Apollo and Neptune turned the Trojan rivers against the wall which had protected the Grecian fleet during the siege of Troy, the number of the dogs accompanying the shepherds on the shield of Achilles, the number of the parlour dogs of Achilles himself, the number of the benches occupied by Nestor and the Pylians sacrificing to Neptune, and the number of the oxen sacrificed by the occupants of each bench, the number of the Trojans slain by Patroclus each of the three times he rushed on them just before he was himself slain, the number of the days the gods disputed whether or not Mercury should steal Hector's body from Achilles and restore it to Priam, the number of his sons Priam orders to prepare the cart which is to carry the ransom of Hector's body, the number of the cubits the *ζυγόδεσμον* of the said cart is long, the number of the days Clytie mourned and fasted before she was turned into a heliotrope, the number of the pulcherrima fratrum corpora with which his fida Tuscan coniux presented Arcadian Gilippus, the number of the months—but ohe! iam satis, superque.

If the aspect of the place has changed, the land having so much encroached on the sea that the quondam island of the baths is now part and parcel of the continent—

if the *Timavum* of Strabo, with its temple of Diomede, port, and sacred grove, has disappeared—if the mountain no longer resounds with the tumultuous out-bursting through numerous ora, of a flood resembling a sea—if the numerous ora themselves, opening, the principal of them, at the bottom of a mill-pond, require to be sought-for—still the Roman baths are there, the mountain is there, the numerous ora are there, and are as differently counted as ever by different visitors; the flood outbursting through them like a sea is there, the river is there and called by the same name, nay, even the *religio loci* is there, maintained by the church of Santo Giovanni il battezzatore, built on an elevation within the shortest safe distance of the venerable and venerated font. Where have two thousand rolling years not left as rough or rougher wheel-tracks?

JAMES HENRY.

Dalkey Lodge, Dalkey, Ireland,
April 16, 1874.

ON THE NATURE OF THE BOUNDING SURFACES OF BODIES.

PHYSICISTS are not agreed as to the exact meaning to be assigned to the term "boundary" as applied to a body, solid, liquid or gaseous. Are we to understand this term as denoting a mathematical surface, implying therefore that the transition from one body to another, which in common language is said to be in contact with it, is abrupt ; or are we to understand by the word "boundary" a *region* whose thickness is very small, but not absolutely evanescent, and throughout which the particles of matter differ from, and are in some sort intermediate between, those of either of the bodies which are said to be in contact.

Thus, when a piece of glass is immersed in water, if a line be drawn intersecting both bodies, are we to suppose that, in passing along this line, we shall find a molecule of glass succeeding immediately to a molecule of water ; or shall we find on this line a number of molecules which are neither glass nor water, but something intermediate between these substances.

I offer the following argument in support of the former of these hypotheses.

When a ray of polarized light undergoes refraction in passing from one transparent medium to another, it is known that the plane of polarization is in general changed, the amount of change which it undergoes augmenting with the deviation of the refracted ray. I shall now establish the following proposition with regard to the deviation of this plane :—

When the difference between the refractive indices of the two media is gradually diminished, the limit of the ratio of the deviation of the plane to the deviation of the ray is zero.

I shall in the first place shew that this proposition is a consequence of the law of Fresnel, and shall then establish it independently of that law, by direct experiment.

1. According to the law of Fresnel, if α , β be the azimuths of the planes of polarization of the incident and refracted rays respectively, and u the deviation of the refracted ray,

$$\tan \beta = \sec u \tan \alpha.$$

Hence it is easily seen that

$$\frac{\sin(\beta - \alpha)}{\cos \alpha \cos \beta} = \frac{2 \sin^2 \frac{1}{2} u}{\cos u} \tan \alpha.$$

Now if the difference between the refractive indices of the media be constantly diminished, so that u and $\beta - \alpha$ become very small, we shall have ultimately

$$\beta - \alpha = \frac{u^2 \sin 2\alpha}{4}.$$

Hence
$$\frac{\beta - \alpha}{u} = \frac{u \sin 2\alpha}{4},$$

a ratio whose limit is plainly zero.

2. I proceed now to establish the same conclusion by direct experiment.

For this purpose a polariscope is employed, in which the polarizer and the analyzer respectively are attached to two arms which are capable of moving as radii of a vertical circle. To the arm containing the polarizer (which may be termed the polarizing arm) is attached a cylindrical vessel, having its sides parallel to the arm,* and its lower extremity closed with plate glass. By this means a ray, parallel to the axis of the polarizer (which is a Nicol's prism), and polarized in any required plane, may be made to traverse the cylindrical vessel.

* This adjustment is adopted only as a matter of convenience.

If the vessel be now partly filled with a transparent liquid, the transmitted ray will be refracted at its free surface, which is necessarily horizontal, the angle of internal incidence being obviously the same as the angle between the polarizing arm and the vertical. Hence, it is evident that, by varying the position of the arm, we may obtain a ray refracted at any required angle.

The emergent light is received upon an analyzing prism (constructed in the manner described before the Royal Irish Academy, Proc. Vol. VII. p. 348) by means of which the position of the plane of polarization may be determined subject to an error of observation of less than 1'. By this method, as is easily seen, the truth of the law of Fresnel may be subjected to a severe test. For the present, however, I confine myself to the experimental proof of the proposition enunciated above, namely, that when the refractive indices of the two media approach in value, so that the deviation of the ray at the common surface of the media becomes small, the ratio of the deviation of the plane of polarization to the deviation of the ray tends to zero.

For this purpose the cylindrical vessel is partly filled with linseed oil. A ray of light polarized in azimuth 45° , and parallel to the sides of the cylinder, enters the lower part of the vessel, and having traversed the plane, is refracted at its free surface. The analyzing arm having been so adjusted that the refracted ray passes through it, the analyzer is turned round its axis until the tints become equal. A portion of the oil having been now removed, different fluids are successively introduced under it by means of a pipette, so that the oil forms a stratum on the surface of the fluid so introduced. With each fluid the polarizing arm, to which the cylindrical vessel is attached, is moved so that the refracted ray emerges at the same angle. The deviation of the ray which takes place at the common surface of the two fluids is evidently given by the angle through which it was necessary to move the polari-

zing arm. The deviation at the upper surface of the oil is of course the same as in the first experiment.

Hence if ϵ_1 be the change in the plane of polarization in the first experiment, and ϵ that in any of the others, v being the change in the plane produced at the common surface of the fluids, we shall have

$$v = \epsilon - \epsilon_1,$$

neglecting the small error resulting from the fact that, in the second experiment, the azimuth of the incident light differs slightly from 45° . It is evident, therefore, that the value of v will be given by the angle through which it has been necessary to turn the analyzing prism round its axis between the first and second experiment.

Suppose now the lower fluid to be distilled water. Then I have found by experiment

Deviation of ray at common surface.	$4^\circ 45'$
Change in plane of polarization at same. .	$0^\circ 3'$
Ratio of these angles	$\cdot 0105$

When the lower fluid possesses a refractive index considerably higher than water, as for example a strong solution of one of the metallic salts, I have found the change in the plane of polarization to be quite imperceptible. It may then be assumed that the limiting ratio of the deviation of the plane of polarization to the deviation of the ray is zero, and hence it follows necessarily that, if the deviation of the ray be *continuous*, there will be *no* deviation of the plane.

Now if two media pass into each other by a continuous change (however rapid it may be), the deviation of the ray is necessarily also continuous. It would seem, therefore, that the deviation of the plane ought to be *nil*. This we know not to be the case. The hypothesis, therefore, of a *continuous* change in passing from one body to another appears to be inadmissible, unless the words "continuous change" are to be understood in a sense different from that which ordinarily attaches to them.

Strictly speaking, of course, the experimental proof of the limit to which the ratio of the deviation of the plane to the deviation of the ray continually tends, is applicable only to the liquids actually examined. But when the evidence so obtained is combined with that given by the theoretic law of Fresnel, I suppose that little doubt can be entertained of the universality of the conclusion.

JOHN H. JELLETT.

A SKETCH IN THE THEORY OF SCREWS.

§ 1. **I**ntroduction. It is proposed in the present essay to solve the following problems in the mechanics of a rigid body which has *three degrees of freedom*.

a. To determine a geometrical representation for all the small movements which a body so circumstanced is able to make.

b. To ascertain the geometrical relations of the forces when the body is in equilibrium.

c. To give a construction by which the instantaneous movement produced by a given impulse can be found.

d. To determine the nature of the small oscillations in the vicinity of a position of stable equilibrium.

Before entering directly upon these problems, some preliminary investigations are necessary.

§ 2. **T**wist. If a rigid body be moved in any manner from a position *A* to a position *B*, then it is well known that the transference from *A* to *B* could have been effected by rotating the body about a certain line, and at the same time translating it parallel to the line. This compound movement which resembles that of a nut upon a *screw* may be called a *twist*, and the *pitch* of the *screw* is the distance the nut advances when turned through the angular unit of circular measure. In the present theory the *screw* is simply defined to be *a straight line with which a linear magnitude termed the pitch is associated*.

It is natural to compare a twist with a vector, as the latter bears the same relation to a point which the former does to a rigid system; each just expresses what is necessary to transfer the corresponding object from one given posi-

tion to another. The vector, however, only involves the ideas of direction and magnitude, while the twist involves direction, situation, pitch and magnitude.

A twist is *measured* by the angle of twist.

§ 3. **Wrench.** Imagine a force P directed along a screw, and a couple in a plane perpendicular to the screw, of which the moment is equal to the product of P and the pitch of the screw: then this force and couple *taken together* constitute a *wrench*. The wrench is *measured* by the force P .

A wrench is as appropriate to a rigid body as a force is to a particle. Each just expresses in its most simple form the resultant of any system of forces applied to the corresponding object.

§ 4. **Composition of twists and wrenches.** It is merely a different method of expressing well-known theorems to assert—

First. That *any* small movement of a rigid body is a twist.

Second. That *any* set of forces applied to a rigid body constitute a wrench.

Two or more twists (or wrenches) can be compounded into one twist (or wrench); and it is very important to notice that twists and wrenches are to be compounded by the same laws. This principle includes two properties which have often been remarked, viz.: that angular velocities are compounded like forces, and translations like couples.

For the present* it will be sufficient to state the following law with reference to composition. If n wrenches equilibrate (or twists neutralise), then a closed polygon of n sides can be drawn, each of the sides of which is proportional to one of the wrenches (or twists) and parallel to the corresponding screw.

§ 5. **Reciprocal Screws.** Take two screws α and β of

* For a more complete development of the subject, see "Theory of Screws," Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, vol. xxv. p. 157.

itches α' and β' . Let a wrench $\ddot{H}\alpha$ act about α , and let a body be forced against the wrench by a small twist $H\beta$ about β ; it is required to find an expression for the quantity of work done. Let d be the shortest distance between α and β , and let θ be the angle between them, then the required expression is

$$\ddot{H}\alpha.H\beta\{(\alpha' + \beta')\cos\theta - d\sin\theta\}.$$

The quantity inside the bracket is termed the *virtual coefficient* of α and β .

The proof is as follows:—The force $\ddot{H}\alpha$ is to be decomposed into $\ddot{H}\alpha\cos\theta$, $\ddot{H}\alpha\sin\theta$, the former may be transferred to β with the introduction of a neutralised couple; the component $\ddot{H}\alpha\sin\theta$ produces a negative couple about β of moment $\ddot{H}\alpha.d\sin\theta$. The couple, of moment $\alpha'.\ddot{H}\alpha$, is resolved into $\alpha'.\ddot{H}\alpha\sin\theta$, which is neutralised, and $\alpha'.\ddot{H}\alpha\cos\theta$ which may be directly transferred to β ; thus the total effect of $\ddot{H}\alpha$ upon β consists of the force $\ddot{H}\alpha\cos\theta$ along β and the couple whose moment is

$$\ddot{H}\alpha(\alpha'\cos\theta - d\sin\theta)$$

in a plane perpendicular to β : the above result is hence easily seen.

It is of fundamental importance to observe that by interchanging α and β the virtual coefficient is not altered.

When the virtual coefficient vanishes, the screws α and β are said to be reciprocal, for a wrench about either is then unable to disturb the equilibrium of a body only free to twist about the other.

The theory of screws has many points of connexion with recent geometrical speculations on the linear complex, by the late Dr. Plücker and Dr. Felix Klein. Thus the latter has shown* that if α' and β' be each the “haupt-parameter” of a linear complex, and if

$$(\alpha' + \beta')\cos\theta - d\sin\theta = 0$$

where d and θ relate to the principal axes of the com-

* Mathematische Annalen, Band II., p. 368.

plexes, that then the two complexes possess a special relation and are said to be in "involution."

§ 6. **On the screw complex of the third order and first degree.** It may be observed that a free rigid body can receive six independent displacements. Its position is, therefore, to be specified by six coordinates. If, however, the body be so constrained that its six coordinates must always satisfy three equations of condition, there are then only three really independent coordinates, and any position possible for a body so circumstanced may be attained by twists along three fixed screws, provided that twists about these screws are permitted by the constraints. We may mention two different cases of a body so circumstanced which are of course selected from a countless variety. 1st, a body which has three of its points limited to fixed surfaces, or, 2nd, a body which is capable of rotating about a fixed point. All the investigations which follow, relate, however, to the general problem.

Let A be an initial position of the rigid body which, for brevity, we denote by M . Let M be moved from A to a closely adjacent position X , and let x be the screw by twisting about which this movement has been effected; similarly let y and z be the two screws, twists about which would have brought the body from A to the adjacent positions Y and Z . We thus have the three screws x, y, z , which completely specify the circumstances of the body so far as its capacity for movement is considered.

Since M can be twisted about each and all of x, y, z , it must be capable of twisting about a doubly infinite number of other screws. For twist the body about x, y, z , through small angles H_0x, H_0y, H_0z respectively, and let V be the final position attained. This position could have been reached by twisting about v , so as to come from A to V by a single movement. As the ratios of H_0x to H_0y and H_0z are arbitrary, and as a change in either of these changes v , the number of v screws is doubly infinite.

All the screws of which v is a type form what may be

called a *screw-complex of the third order and first degree*, or, more briefly, so far as the present essay is concerned, a *screw-complex* S . We may, therefore, define a screw-complex to be the locus of screws, about each one of which a body which has three degrees of freedom may be twisted.

§ 7. **The reciprocal screw complex.** A wrench $\dot{H}\eta$ which acts about a screw η will not be able to disturb the equilibrium of M , provided η be reciprocal to x, y, z . If, therefore, η be reciprocal to three screws of the complex S it will be reciprocal to every screw of S . Since η has only three conditions to satisfy in order that it may be reciprocal to S , and since 5 quantities determine a screw, it follows that η may be any one of a doubly infinite number of screws which we may term the *reciprocal screw-complex* S' . Remembering the property of reciprocal screws we have the following fundamental theorem :

A body only free to twist about all the screws of S will not be disturbed by a wrench about any screw of S' ; and, conversely, a body only free to twist about the screws of S' cannot be disturbed by a wrench about any screw of S .

The reaction of the constraints by which the freedom is prescribed must constitute a wrench about a screw which belongs to S' .

The condition of equilibrium is that the external forces shall constitute a wrench about S' .

§ 8. **On the distribution in space of the screws which belong to a screw complex :** To present a clear picture of all the movements which the body is competent to execute, it will be necessary to examine the mutual connexion of the doubly infinite number of screws which form the screw-complex. It will be most convenient in the first place to classify the screws in the complex according to their pitches ; the first theorem to be proved is that all the screws of given pitch $+k$ lie upon a hyperboloid of which they form one system of generators, while the other system

of generators with the pitch $-k$ belong to the reciprocal screw-complex S' .

This is proved as follows : Draw three screws, p, q, r , of pitch $+k$ belonging to S . Draw three screws l, m, n , each of which intersects the three screws p, q, r , and attribute to each of l, m, n , a pitch $-k$. Since two intersecting screws of equal and opposite pitches are reciprocal (see the condition of reciprocity § 5), it follows that p, q, r , must all be reciprocal to l, m, n . Hence, since the former belong to S , the latter must belong to S' . Let now O be any other screw of pitch $+k$ intersecting l, m, n , it follows that O is reciprocal to S' , and must therefore belong to S : the theorem is therefore proved.

We have thus shown that S and S' may be considered to consist of a family of hyperboloids, and we shall next shew that these hyperboloids are concentric, and that their axes lie along the same directions.

§ 9. **The pitch hyperboloid.** Draw that particular hyperboloid which contains all the screws of zero pitch. This surface being of special importance may be termed the *pitch hyperboloid*, for a reason which will presently appear (§ 10). Draw the principal axis of x , this will intersect the surface in two points through each of which the two generators are to be drawn ; one generator of each pair belongs to S , and the other to S' . Let the generators belonging to S be m and n , and let a be the semi-axis of x . It is easily seen that m and n are parallel to the asymptotes of the section of the hyperboloid made by the plane of y and z , and that consequently lines bisecting internally and externally the angle between two lines in a plane parallel to m and n are parallel to the axes of x and z .

Two equal rotations about m and n will compound into a twist about a screw β on the axis of y of pitch β' , or into a twist about a screw γ of pitch γ' on the axis of z , according to the signs of two rotations, and we have

$$a = \sqrt{(-\beta' \gamma')}.$$

Similar values are found for b , &c., the remaining principal axes, and the equation of the pitch hyperboloid is, therefore,

$$\alpha' x^2 + \beta' y^2 + \gamma' z^2 + \alpha' \beta' \gamma' = 0 \dots \dots \dots (I).$$

A body capable of twisting about m and n must be capable of twisting about β and γ , so that the three axes of the hyperboloid with pitches α' , β' , γ' , must belong to the system S .

The three axes of the hyperboloid with pitches $-\alpha'$, $-\beta'$, $-\gamma'$, belong to the reciprocal screw-complex S' .

We shall next shew how the hyperboloids which are the loci of screws of equal pitch are connected with the pitch hyperboloid.

If the pitches of all the screws of a complex be augmented or diminished by the *same quantity*, the screws still form a complex. This is apparent when we remember that the condition two screws should be reciprocal (§ 5), depends only upon the sum of their pitches. Let the pitches of all the screws of the complex S be diminished by $+k$, then the hyperboloid

$$(\alpha' - k) x^2 + (\beta' - k) y^2 + (\gamma' - k) z^2 + (\alpha' - k) (\beta' - k) (\gamma' - k) = 0 \dots \dots \dots (II)$$

must be the locus of screws of zero-pitch in the altered system, and, therefore, of pitch $+k$ in the original system.

Regarding k as a variable parameter, the equation just written represents the family of hyperboloids which constitute the screw-complex S , and the reciprocal screw-complex S' . Thus all the generators of one system on each hyperboloid, with pitch $+k$, constitute screws about which the body, with three degrees of freedom, can be twisted; while all the generators of the other system, with pitch $-k$, constitute screws, wrenches about which would be neutralized by the reaction of the constraints.

§ 10. **On the screws which pass through a given point, and belong to a screw complex.** We shall now shew that three screws belonging to S , and also three screws belong-

ing to S' , can be drawn through any point x', y', z' . Substitute x', y', z' , in II., and we find a cubic for k . This shews that three hyperboloids of the system can be drawn through each point of space. The three tangent planes at the point each contain two generators, one belonging to S and the other to S' .

Two intersecting screws can only be reciprocal if they be at right angles, or if the sum of their pitches be zero (§ 5). It is hence easy to see that, if a sphere be described around any point as centre, the three screws belonging to S , which pass through the point, intersect the sphere in the vertices of a spherical triangle which is the polar of the triangle similarly formed by the lines belonging to S' .

We shall now shew that *one* screw belonging to S can be found parallel to any given direction. All the generators of II. are parallel to the cone

$$(\alpha' - k)x^2 + (\beta' - k)y^2 + (\gamma' - k)z^2 = 0,$$

and k can be determined so that this cone shall have one generator parallel to the given direction; II. can then be drawn, and two generators will be found on II. parallel to the given direction; one of these belongs to S , while the other belongs to S' .

It remains to be proved that each screw of S has a pitch which is proportional to the inverse square of the parallel diameter of the pitch hyperboloid.

Let ρ be the intercept on a generator of the cone

$$(\alpha' - k)x^2 + (\beta' - k)y^2 + (\gamma' - k)z^2 = 0;$$

by the pitch hyperboloid,

$$\alpha' x^2 + \beta' y^2 + \gamma' z^2 + \alpha' \beta' \gamma' = 0;$$

then

$$k = -\frac{\alpha' \beta' \gamma'}{\rho^2}.$$

This is connected with some purely geometrical theorems of Plücker, who has shown* that

$$k, x^2 + k, y^2 + k, z^2 + k, k, k, = 0,$$

* Neue Geometrie des Raumes, p. 130.

is the locus of lines common to three linear complexes of the first degree. The axes of the three complexes are directed along the coordinate axes, and the parameters of the complexes are k_1, k_2, k_3 ; the same author has also proved that the parameter of any complex belonging to the ("dreigliedrigen Gruppe") is proportional to the inverse square of the parallel diameter of the hyperboloid.

§ 11. **Interpretation of conjugate diameters of the pitch hyperboloid.** We proceed to prove that a pair of conjugate diameters of the pitch hyperboloid are parallel to a pair of reciprocal screws, both belonging to the screw-complex S .

Let θ and ϕ be two reciprocal screws belonging to S , of pitches θ' and ϕ' , and let wrenches $\ddot{H}\theta$ and $\ddot{H}\phi$ about θ and ϕ compound into a wrench $\ddot{H}\psi$ about ψ of pitch ψ' . We shall denote by $2(\theta, \psi)'$ the virtual coefficient of θ and ψ . The work done against $\ddot{H}\psi$ by a twist must equal the work done against $\ddot{H}\theta$ and $\ddot{H}\phi$ by the same twist. We shall write the equation expressing this identity for each of two twists, $H_\theta\theta, H_\phi\phi$, about the two screws, θ, ϕ , respectively. Since θ and ϕ are reciprocal, the work done against $\ddot{H}\theta$ by $H_\phi\phi$ is zero, hence we must have (§ 5)

$$\ddot{H}\phi.\phi' = \ddot{H}\psi.(\psi, \phi)',$$

$$\text{and, similarly,} \quad \ddot{H}\theta.\theta' = \ddot{H}\psi.(\psi, \theta)'.$$

A twist $H_\psi\psi$ must do as much work against $\ddot{H}\psi$ as the sum of the works done against $\ddot{H}\theta$ and $\ddot{H}\phi$, whence

$$\ddot{H}\psi.\psi' = \ddot{H}\theta.(\theta, \psi)' + \ddot{H}\phi.(\phi, \psi)';$$

eliminating the virtual coefficients, we have, finally,

$$(\ddot{H}\psi)^2.\psi' = (\ddot{H}\theta)^2.\theta' + (\ddot{H}\phi)^2.\phi'.$$

It is easy to see that ψ must be parallel to the plane to which θ and ϕ are parallel, and that $\ddot{H}\theta, \ddot{H}\phi, \ddot{H}\psi$, are each proportional to the sine of the angle between the other two. Remembering also that θ', ϕ', ψ' , are proportional to the inverse squares of the parallel diameters of the pitch hyperboloid, it is easily seen that θ and ϕ must be parallel to a pair of conjugate diameters.

We thus see that three conjugate diameters of the pitch hyperboloid are parallel to three screws belonging to S , such that each is reciprocal to the other two.

§ 12. **On the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy.** Suppose a body be twisting about any screw θ belonging to the system S , with a twist velocity $\dot{H}\theta$. It is required to deduce an expression for the kinetic energy. We shall answer this question by proving the following theorem:—A certain ellipsoid, called the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy can be constructed such that the length of any semi-diameter of the ellipsoid represents the number of units of twist velocity with which the body should twist about the parallel screw (§ 10), in order that the kinetic energy shall be one unit.

If λ, μ, ν , be the direction cosines of a line parallel to θ , then the twist velocity $\dot{H}\theta$ may be resolved into the three twist velocities $\lambda\dot{H}\theta, \mu\dot{H}\theta, \nu\dot{H}\theta$, about the three principal screws of the system α, β, γ (§ 4). The actual velocity of any particle of the body will be a linear function of the quantities just written. The total kinetic energy will, therefore, be the product of $(\dot{H}\theta)^2$ and an homogenous quadratic function of λ, μ, ν . If this be equated to unity and r be substituted for $\dot{H}\theta$, we obtain the equation of an ellipsoid, r being the radius vector whose direction cosines are λ, μ, ν .

It may be remarked that where the constraints are such that the body simply rotates about a point, the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy assumes the familiar form of the momental ellipsoid.

§ 13. **Impulsive and instantaneous screws.** By an impulsive wrench is to be understood a very great wrench which acts for a very short time, and the question which we now approach may be stated as follows:

An impulsive wrench acts about a given screw on a quiescent rigid body which has three degrees of freedom; it is required to determine the instantaneous screw about which the body will commence to twist.

§ 14. **Conjugate screws of kinetic energy.** Let a body be either perfectly free or constrained in any way. Let $\bar{\alpha}, \bar{\beta}$ be a pair of impulsive screws, and α, β be the corresponding pair of instantaneous screws. If $\bar{\alpha}$ be reciprocal to β then $\bar{\beta}$ will be reciprocal to α ; when this relation holds good α and β are said to be conjugate screws of kinetic energy.

Let the impulsive wrench $\bar{H}\bar{\alpha}$ act first, and the body commences to twist about α with a kinetic energy $E\alpha.(\dot{H}\alpha)^2$. The wrench $\bar{H}\bar{\beta}$ now begins to act for a short time t , but since α is reciprocal to $\bar{\beta}$ the kinetic energy acquired by the second impulse must be unaffected by the twist velocity $\dot{H}\alpha$, and hence the total kinetic energy is

$$E\alpha.(\dot{H}\alpha)^2 + E\beta(\dot{H}\beta)^2.$$

The final kinetic energy must, however, be the same if the body had first received the impulse $\bar{H}\bar{\beta}$, and then the impulse $\bar{H}\bar{\alpha}$. Hence the latter must produce the same quantity of energy in the time t whether the body have the twist velocity $\dot{H}\beta$ or not, consequently $\bar{\alpha}$ must be reciprocal to β .

It may be shewn by similar reasoning to that of § 11 that when α and β are conjugate screws of kinetic energy they are parallel to a pair of conjugate diameters of the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy.

§ 15. **The principal screws of inertia.** When a rigid body has three degrees of freedom there are three screws belonging to the screw complex which represents the freedom such that if an impulsive wrench be communicated about one of these screws when the body is quiescent, it will instantly commence to twist about the same screw.

These screws may be called the principal screws of inertia; they reduce to the ordinary principal axes when the general conception of three degrees of freedom reduces to the case of rotation around a fixed point.

Draw the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy. This depends of course upon the actual distribution of the

material of the body, and is to be determined by calculating the twist velocity about one screw which would give the body one unit of kinetic energy. The same process is to be repeated for five other screws. Draw from the centre of the pitch hyperboloid six radii vectores parallel to these screws and equal to the corresponding twist velocities; thus six points on the ellipsoid and its centre are known, and it is, therefore, determined.

Draw the three common conjugate diameters of the pitch hyperboloid and the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy. The three screws of S which are parallel to these diameters are the principal screws of inertia. This is proved as follows :

Let ϕ , χ , ψ , be the three screws thus determined. If an impulsive wrench act about ϕ , the instantaneous screw about which the body commences to twist must be reciprocal to χ and ψ , since ϕ , χ , ψ , are parallel to conjugate diameters of the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy. But the only screw which belongs to S , and is reciprocal to χ and ψ , must be ϕ , because they are parallel to conjugate diameters of the pitch hyperboloid. Hence an impulsive wrench about ϕ must make the body commence to twist about ϕ . Similar reasoning applies to χ and ψ .

§ 16. **Construction for the instantaneous screw when the impulsive screw is given.** All the screws in the screw-complex S which are reciprocal to any screw $\bar{\eta}$ (wherever situated) are parallel to a plane. This appears as follows : To introduce an additional constraint upon the body is equivalent to saying that all the screws about which the body can be twisted must be reciprocal to some screw $\bar{\eta}$, in addition to all the screws of S' . In this case, the body has only two degrees of freedom, and, therefore, all the screws about which it can be twisted are parallel to a plane (§ 4).

This plane, drawn through the centre of the pitch hyperboloid, may be called the reciprocal plane, with respect to $\bar{\eta}$.

Let an impulsive wrench act about $\bar{\eta}$, then the body commences to twist about an instantaneous screw η , which may be found as follows: Draw the reciprocal plane to $\bar{\eta}$; find the diameter of the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy which is conjugate to the reciprocal plane; then the screw belonging to S , which is parallel to this conjugate diameter, is the required instantaneous screw.

For let η, ξ, ζ be three conjugate screws of kinetic energy, and $\bar{\eta}, \bar{\xi}, \bar{\zeta}$ be three corresponding impulsive screws. Since $\bar{\xi}, \bar{\zeta}$ are reciprocal to $\bar{\eta}$, they must be parallel to the reciprocal plane, and since η, ξ, ζ are parallel to conjugate diameters of the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy, the construction is manifest.

In the case of a body rotating around a fixed point, the construction reduces to Poinso't's well-known result.

§ 17. **On the ellipsoid of equal potential energy.** Let us suppose the rigid body to be in a position of stable equilibrium under the influence of a conservative system of forces. If the body receive a small twist about the *displacement screw*, it is no longer in a position of equilibrium, and the forces which act upon it constitute a wrench about a certain screw which we may call the *restoration screw*. Since the forces form a conservative system, the energy consumed in forcing the body from its initial position to any other position is quite independent of the route by which the displacement may have been effected. The potential energy due to any position can, therefore, be adequately expressed by a function of the coordinates of that position. It is easy to see that this function must be a homogenous expression containing λ, μ, ν , in the second degree.

Proceeding as before we arrive at the conception of the ellipsoid of equal potential energy, which possesses the property that a twist about any screw of S , through a small angle proportional to the parallel semi-diameter of the ellipsoid, will do one unit of work against the external forces.

The three common conjugate diameters of the pitch hyperboloid and the ellipsoid of equal potential energy are parallel to the three screws of S , which possess the property that if the body be displaced by a twist about one of these screws, the forces of restoration constitute a wrench about the same screw.

The restoration screw corresponding to a given displacement screw can be found by the construction of § 16, if we replace the ellipsoid of equal kinetic energy by the ellipsoid of equal potential energy.

§ 18. **Small oscillations.** If released after the displacement, the body will commence to make small oscillations, the character of which we can completely determine. Draw the two ellipsoids of energy, find the three screws, u, v, w , belonging to S , which are parallel to their common conjugate diameters. If, then, the body be displaced originally by a twist about one of these screws, it will continue for ever to perform small twist oscillations about the same screw. In general, whatever be the initial displacement it may be decomposed into twists about u, v, w , and the small oscillations are compounded of three simple harmonic oscillations about the same screws. (u, v, w , are called *harmonic screws* at the suggestion of the Rev. Prof. Townsend, F.T.C.D.).

This is proved by the consideration that if \bar{u} be the impulsive screw corresponding to u as an instantaneous screw, then, owing to the particular construction by which u is formed, precisely the same screw \bar{u} corresponds as a restoration screw to u as a displacement screw.

R. S. BALL.

ON A GEOMETRICAL METHOD OF DEDUCING
THE CENTRAL AND DIAMETRAL PROPER-
TIES OF CONICS FROM THOSE BELONGING
TO THE FOCUS AND DIRECTRIX.

IN the following investigation a conic is defined as the locus of a point whose distance from a given point is in a fixed ratio to its distance from a given right line.

The fixed point is, of course, the focus, and the fixed right line the directrix of the conic.

From the above definition the fundamental properties of the centre and diameters of conics can be easily deduced by means of the well-known geometrical problem. *To find the locus of the vertex of a triangle whose base and the ratio of whose sides are given.*

As the following investigation is founded altogether on the solution of this problem, it may be well to give that solution here.

Let AB be the given base, and APB any triangle satisfying the given conditions. Draw the bisectors of the internal and external angles at P , and they will be at right angles to each other and meet AB in points X, X' , such that the ratios $AX : XB$ and $AX' : BX'$ will be equal to the given ratio of the sides. Hence the points X and X' are found by dividing the base internally and externally in the ratio of the sides, and a circle described on XX' as diameter is the locus required.

It is easy by means of the above to construct the points in which any perpendicular to the directrix meets the conic. For, let Q (fig. 1) be the point in which the perpendicular meets the directrix, join FQ , and describe the circle which is the locus of the vertex of the triangle

whose base is FQ , and the ratio of whose sides is that of the distances from a point on the conic to the focus and directrix. The points PP' in which this circle meets QP are manifestly points on the conic, and it is also plain that they are the only points common to the conic and the line QP .

If DF (fig. 2), the perpendicular from F to the directrix, be divided internally in A and externally in A' in the given ratio, and if AA' be bisected in C , it is plain that parallels to the directrix through A and A' will divide any line FQ from the focus to the directrix internally in X and externally in X' in the given ratio; and, also, that a parallel to the directrix through C will bisect XX' , and PP' since it is perpendicular to PP' , and passes through the centre of the circle of which PP' is a chord. Hence, the locus of the middle points of chords of the conic which are perpendicular to the directrix is a parallel to the directrix through the point C .

It is obvious that the points in which a given parallel to the directrix meets the conic lie on a circle, having F for its centre; and, hence, that every such parallel can meet the conic in only two points, and that the locus of the middle points of chords parallel to the directrix is the line FD .

From hence it appears that the conic is perfectly symmetrical with respect to the line AF , and also perfectly symmetrical with respect to a perpendicular to AA' , through C .

From this last consideration it appears that there must be a second point F' having properties similar to those of F , and situated on the line AA' at a distance CF' from C equal to CF . The point C is called the centre of the conic.

To determine the points in which any given right line meets the conic.

Let PQ (fig. 3) be the given line, Q the point in which it meets the directrix, and P a point on the conic.

Draw FL parallel to PQ and PR perpendicular to the directrix, and join FP . The ratio of PR to PF is given.

Let $\frac{PF}{PR} = e$, then we have

$$FP = e PR = e \frac{PR}{PQ} \cdot PQ = e \frac{FD}{FL} \cdot PQ,$$

therefore,
$$\frac{FP}{PQ} = \frac{eFD}{FL}.$$

P is therefore the vertex of a triangle whose base is FQ and the ratio of whose sides is given. Hence, divide QF internally in X and externally in X' , so that

$$QX : XF :: QX' : FX' :: FL : eFD,$$

and on XX' as diameter describe a circle, the points in which it meets QP are the points in which QP meets the conic.

If the point Q (fig. 4) be supposed to vary, QP remaining parallel to a fixed right line FL , it is manifest that the loci of X and X' will be fixed right lines, parallel to the directrix, and passing through the points H and H' , which divide the line FL , so that,

$$LH : HF :: LH' : FH' :: FL : eFD.$$

It is also plain that the locus of S , the middle point of XX' , is another line parallel to the directrix, and passing through O the middle point of HH' .

Again, the locus of the middle points of chords of the conic parallel to FL is a right line passing through the point O .

For, let QP be any right line parallel to LF , determine the points P and P' in which it meets the conic; let M be the middle point of PP' , then the line OM makes with OS an angle, which is given. Join SM , and since S is the centre of a circle of which PP' is a chord, SM is perpendicular to PP' , or to LF , therefore the angle OSY is equal to the angle OFK , which is given. Again,

$$\frac{SM}{SO} = \frac{SM}{SY} \cdot \frac{SY}{SO} = \frac{SQ}{SF} \cdot \frac{SY}{SO} = \frac{OL}{OF} \cdot \frac{SY}{SO} = \frac{OL}{OF} \cdot \frac{KD}{OL} = \frac{KD}{OF};$$

but KD and OF are each given, therefore so is the ratio of SM to SO , and since the angle MSO is given, so is the species of the triangle MSO ; OM is, therefore, a given line, and is the same for all chords parallel to LF .

It follows from the construction which has been given for determining the points in which any given right line meets the conic that in general every right line meets it in two points.

Again, any chord of the conic drawn through the centre is bisected at the centre.

This follows from the fact that the line joining the foci and a perpendicular to it through the centre, each divide the conic symmetrically.

Let FF' (fig. 5) be the line joining the foci and CM a perpendicular to it through its middle point. Let P be any point on the conic, let fall PL perpendicular to FF' , and produce it till $LQ = PL$, Q will be another point on the conic. Let fall QM' perpendicular to CM and produce it till $P'M' = M'Q$, P' will be another point on the conic. If, now, C be joined to P and P' it is plain that CP and CP' will form one right line, and that $CP = CP'$.

We have already seen that the locus of the middle points of chords parallel to a fixed right line is a right line; and as it appears from what has just been stated that every chord drawn through the centre is bisected there, it follows that the locus of middle points of chords parallel to a fixed right line passes in all cases through the centre.



If a conic section be defined as the section of a right cone made by a plane, it is very easy to deduce the fundamental property of focus and directrix as follows:

If a sphere be cut by a plane, and tangents be drawn to the sphere at every point of the section so as to meet the perpendicular from the centre of the sphere on the plane, it is obvious they will form a right cone. If any point be taken on this cone, the tangents to the sphere from this point are in a constant ratio to the perpendicular from the point on the plane of contact of the

sphere and cone, no matter where the point be taken. Again, if there be two fixed planes, and if from any point in one perpendiculars be let fall on the other, and on their line of intersection, these perpendiculars have to each other a constant ratio, no matter where the point be taken. Let us now suppose a section of a right cone to be made by a plane which touches a sphere inscribed in the cone at the point F . Let d be the line of intersection of the plane of the section with the plane of contact of the sphere and cone. Take any point P on the section, its distance from F will be in a constant ratio to its distance from d . For from P let fall a perpendicular on the plane of contact, then this perpendicular has a constant ratio both to the perpendicular from P on d and also to PF , since PF is a tangent to the sphere, therefore the distances from P to F and from P to d have a constant ratio to each other.

This last proof is probably not new, though the author of this paper does not remember to have seen it before.

FRANCIS A. TARLETON.



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



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